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PREFACE
“The Lord said to Moses... you shall not defraud or rob your neighbor. ”
"Where large sums of money are involved, it is advisable to trust nobody."

—Leviticus 19:1,13
—Agatha Christie

Fraud is estimated to cost the North American economy more than $400 billion annually,
according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. This figure may even be conservative
when it is considered that insurance fraud alone costs U.S. industry $120 billion annually, as
reported by Conning & Company, a prominent research and investment firm.
Despite these loud numbers, fraud is primarily a silent problem. Fraud experts estimate that more
than 75 percent of frauds are undetected, and many that are detected are not reported. Firms do
not disclose their losses resulting from fraud for many reasons, including that they are embarrassed
that they have been defrauded, or they want to keep the bad news from clients and customers.

Perhaps because fraud is so underreported, many companies think it will never happen to them.
Unfortunately, a firm unwilling to consider that its personnel, agents or vendors could act
dishonestly is a fraudster’s dream. What better environment to exploit than one in which the guard
is down?
The purpose of this Handbook is to provide CPAs with practical information and resources to help
them identify and respond to fraud in the workplace, with an emphasis on prevention rather than
investigation. Although it is impossible to eliminate the risk of fraud completely, effective
prevention policies can reduce opportunities for fraud to occur. At the same time, sophisticated
detection methods can help uncover fraud in the early stages, minimize losses, and enable those
affected by fraud, particularly CPAs or financial managers responsible for fraud prevention, to
react to fraud in a way that could solve or mitigate the problem rather than contributing to it.

Handbook Overview
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention. Since prevention cannot be realized
without understanding how fraud is perpetrated and concealed, the material in this Handbook has
been written to explain to CPAs the nature and extent of fraud and to familiarize them with
general fraud prevention techniques. In addition to the core topics of fraud prevention and
methods of combating specific kinds of fraud, two chapters are devoted to computer security and
the unique kinds of crimes and criminals related to computer crimes.
The contents of the Handbook are summarized below, in brief synopses of each chapter, to
provide readers an overview of the material.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Chapter Contents

Managing the Risk of Fraud
Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” describes the concept of fraud risk: understanding it and
guarding against the threat posed by it. The specific factors that affect fraud risk are addressed,
including the key internal controls—basic, supervisory and audit—that help prevent fraud. Since
detecting and preventing fraud in books of account is key to any prevention strategy, there is a
section devoted exclusively to this topic, with fraud and AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards
(SAS) No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU sec. 316) discussed in relation to fraud auditing. A comprehensive and practical risk
management checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Promoting an Ethical Environment
Because an ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy, chapter 2,
“Promoting an Ethical Environment,” describes the various steps that can be taken to promote an
ethical environment within an organization, and thereby reduce the risk of fraud. A sample code of
ethics and business conduct, which can be reproduced and/or adapted for use in any organization,
is included, along with an ethical environment checklist.

Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance
Risk management is a key component of fraud awareness and is essential for providing protection
against potentially catastrophic risks, including fraud-related losses. Chapter 3, “Risk Financing and
Fidelity Insurance,” examines the concept of risk financing. The chapter gives a description of the
kinds of fidelity insurance policies that are available—including some of the more typical policy
clauses and the insured’s responsibilities—and the factors that enter into the fidelity insurance
purchase decision. A practical checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Computer Security and System Recovery
Adequate computer security is an indispensable fraud prevention tool. Chapter 4, “Computer
Security and System Recovery,” provides a comprehensive overview of computer security,
including physical security, logical security, and system recovery. A checklist is also included with
this chapter.

Internal Fraud
Chapter 5, “Internal Fraud,” addresses the various ways fraud is committed against an organization
by a perpetrator from within that organization, meaning, by officers, managers, or employees—the
most common form of fraud. Frauds are classified according to the various accounting cycles to
which they relate: sales and collection, acquisition and payment, payroll and personnel, inventory
and warehousing, and capital acquisition and repayment. Since cash is the focal point of most
entities, a separate section is devoted to cash misappropriation.

vi

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Preface

External Fraud for Personal Gain
Fraud can also be committed against organizations by suppliers, professional con artists and other
outside perpetrators. Chapter 6, “External Fraud for Personal Gain,” is a discussion of the various
ways frauds are committed against small businesses and individuals, the government, and financial
institutions, such as banks and insurance companies. Case studies are included to clarify the
various kinds of fraud perpetrated by outsiders.

Commercial Crime
In addition to being victimized by fraud, organizations can also be the perpetrators of fraud.
Chapter 7, “Commercial Crime,” provides an overview of the various forms of commercial crime
and methods of preventing them. The crimes considered include false advertising, industrial
espionage and trade secret theft, insider trading, securities fraud, organizational bribe giving.
Interesting and informative case studies are included to exemplify the different kinds of
commercial crime.

Computer Crime and Computer Criminals
Although it has resulted in very few genuinely “new” frauds, the computer has dramatically
changed the environment in which fraud is committed. Chapter 8, “Computer Crime and
Computer Criminals,” is a description of the nature of computer-related crime and computer
criminals and the control considerations that affect the risk of fraud in a computer environment,
and provides selected computer crime case studies.

Addressing a Known or Suspected Fraud
Despite the best prevention strategies, an actual crisis may strike. Chapter 9, “Dealing With a
Known or Suspected Fraud,” focuses on crisis management and, more particularly, forensic
accounting. A comprehensive checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud
Financial statement fraud is of prime importance to CPAs because of their direct involvement in
creating or reviewing financial statements, whether as an employee of a company or as a
company's independent auditor. Chapter 10 focuses on the nature of financial statement fraud, the
motivations for these frauds, the qualitative and quantitative predictors of these frauds, and special
areas to consider. A comprehensive checklist is included at the end of the chapter.

Appendices
A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector
This comprehensive section outlines a breakdown of fraud in the different sectors, complete with
checklists and fraud vulnerability grids for each of the following sectors:
•
•
•
•

Construction
Financial services
Government
High technology

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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• Manufacturing

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Media and communications
Nonprofit
Professional services
Real estate
Recreation
Natural resources
Retail
Small business
Transportation

• Wholesale

B—Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
A complete text version of SAS 82 is provided as Appendix B for reference.

Bibliography
This alphabetical listing of the most current and relevant sources of information, including a
separate section for Web sites and books, pertaining to fraud, commercial crime, and other closely
related topics for further reading.

Glossary
The comprehensive glossary is an effective quick-reference tool which provides an alphabetically
arranged listing of definitions and explanations for all fraud-related terms and kinds of fraud.
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CHAPTER 1:
Managing the Risk of Fraud
1.1 The Nature and Extent of Fraud

1.1.1 Definitions
The key word used in most dictionaries to define fraud is deception. In the broadest sense of
the word fraud, this definition may be sufficient. However, in the context of this Handbook,
a slightly more restrictive definition is appropriate: fraud is criminal deception intended to
financially benefit the deceiver. Both of the qualifiers in this definition are necessary—that is,
the deception must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
Criminal Deception
The qualifier criminal is necessary to exclude certain deceptions that may financially benefit
the deceiver—for example, the mild overstatement of one’s skills on a job application;
however, this kind of transgression will not be examined in this Handbook. While such an
overstatement could be labeled fraudulent in the broadest sense of the word, it can hardly be
described as criminal.
Note that, for purposes of this definition, the word criminal is not used in a strict legal sense.
Rather, it refers to a seriously “wrong” action taken with malicious intent. Thus, even if
perpetrators of fraud are able to avoid successful criminal prosecution—for example,
because a particular jurisdiction has lax laws or enforcement, or because of some legal
technicality—their actions are still considered “criminal” for purposes of this Handbook.

Financial Benefit
The qualifier financial benefit is necessary in order to exclude certain types of criminal
deception that we do not commonly think of as fraud and therefore, are not dealt with in
this Handbook—for example, a wealthy bigamist failing to disclose a previous marriage.
The financial benefit accruing to the fraudster from an action need not be direct for that
action to be considered fraudulent. Indirect financial benefits are also possible, for example,
environmental criminals (fraudsters) who dump toxic waste into rivers to avoid higher
disposal costs and falsify records to conceal their actions.

1.1.2 Magnitude of the Threat
Because the essence of fraud is deception, determining its prevalence is problematic. Many
frauds go undetected—probably more than 75 percent—and many frauds that are detected
are not reported. It is virtually impossible to compile reliable statistics under these
circumstances.
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Simply based on the largest reported frauds—for example, the U.S. savings and loan
scandal, BCCI, Boesky and Milken—it is safe to say that fraud in the United States runs in
the billions of dollars. If one assumes that fraud represents about 3 percent of gross national
product (GNP)—conservative by some estimates—then the total cost in the United States
would be about $300 billion.

Macro statistics are not particularly meaningful, however, even if you could obtain accurate
statistics. The fact is that the threat of fraud depends largely on the circumstances, that is,
the environment in which it takes place. Let’s begin with a view of personal integrity, as
illustrated by Figure 1-1.

Figure 1-1. One View of Personal Integrity

One View of Personal Integrity

Views of commitment to personal integrity vary, and the percentage figures shown are not
definitive. Some views suggest a more even split between the three categories, while others
state that the honest and dishonest categories may be as low as ten percent each. However,
all of these views point to one important conclusion: exclusive reliance on the honesty of
individuals is the surest way to be victimized. Over half the population—and probably
more than two thirds—is quite capable of committing dishonest acts in the right (or should
we say wrong?) environment.

The importance of creating an environment that discourages fraud brings us back to the
question “What is the magnitude of the threat?” Answer: the threat offraud is as big as it is
allowed to be.
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1.1.3 Sources of the Threat
The magnitude of the fraud threat is only one dimension contributing to the extent of the
problem. The breadth of the fraud threat—that is, the various sources of fraud—must also
be considered. A truly comprehensive prevention strategy must address the full spectrum of
fraud sources.

You can classify the sources of the fraud threat as either internal or external collusion. A
brief description of each classification follows.
Internal Sources
Internal opportunities to commit fraud differ from company to company. Some typical
examples, which illustrate the broad nature of these internal opportunities, include the
following.

• Officers of a company create false financial reports to improve their own performance
measurement.
• Managers inflate their expense accounts or turn a blind eye to supplier fraud in
exchange for kickbacks.
• Other employees commit fraud such as embezzlement, cash skimming, or accounts
receivable lapping.
• Corporate directors defraud a company’s shareholders through stock market
manipulation or insider trading.
External Sources
Typical examples of external opportunities to commit fraud include the following.

• Suppliers falsify or duplicate invoices.
• Competitors victimize a company through industrial espionage or price fixing.

• Con artists defraud a company with schemes involving products, services, or investment
opportunities that never materialize.
• Customers commit fraud through false credits posted to their accounts or through rebate
coupon frauds.

See figure 1-2 for a depiction of the various internal and external sources of fraud.

1.1.4

The Causes of White Collar Crime

The theory of differential association is undoubtedly the best known among all explanations
offered to account for crime. Although it applies to all forms of crime—not just white collar
crime—it is nevertheless useful for the purposes of this Handbook.
This theory first appeared in 1939 in the third edition of Edwin H. Sutherland’s Principles of
Criminology. Later, Sutherland would make his best-known contribution to criminology by
coining the phrase white-collar crime and writing a monograph on the subject.

Based on nine concepts or points, the theory of differential association begins by asserting
that criminal behavior is learned. Expanding on that assertion, Sutherland specifies as a
second point that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other people in a process
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of communication. If individuals acquiring criminal habits or propensities were exposed to
situations, circumstances, and interactions totally of a criminal nature, it would be relatively
easy to comprehend how this process of communication operates. In view of the enormous
variation in standards and personalities to which any individual in our society is exposed, it
becomes exceedingly difficult to discern the elements that induce criminal behavior without
some additional principles.

Sutherland’s third point is that criminal behavior is acquired through participation within
intimate personal groups. This suggests that the roots of crime are in the socializing
experiences of the individual. Unfortunately, the process of socialization is far from
adequately understood. Sutherland’s fourth point indicates that the criminal learning

Figure 1-2. How a Company Can Be Victimized

How a Company Can Be Victimized
Supplier

(false invoicing)

Competitors
Con Men

(profit fixing)

(false sale of ad products)

Customers
Officers

(false credits)

(false financial reporting)

Managers

Externally

internally

(kickbacks, expense accounts)

Other Employees (cover up asset theft)
Directors

(manipulate share prices)

process includes not only techniques of committing crime but also the shaping of motives,
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Crime techniques often can involve a high degree of
skill: picking pockets (and not getting caught at it) demands considerable adroitness.
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Fifth, Sutherland stipulates that legal codes define the specific direction of motives and
drives as favorable or unfavorable.

Sixth, Sutherland establishes the principle of differential association. According to this
postulate, a person becomes criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. Sutherland states in
his seventh point that differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and
intensity. But he does not suggest which of these elements is apt to be more important than
the others.
Sutherland’s eighth point is that learning criminal and delinquent behavior involves all the
mechanisms that are involved in any other learning. As his next to last proposition
Sutherland stresses that learning differs from pure imitation.

The last point is a worthwhile reminder that while criminal behavior is an expression of
general needs and values, it is not explained by these general needs and values because
noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. This means that the
generalizations sometimes employed to account for crime—that people steal because they
crave “esteem” or are “greedy” or kill because they are “unhappy”—have little scientific
merit.

In other words, much of the same needs and values motivate criminals and noncriminals
alike. People become or do not become criminals on the basis of their unique responses to
common drives for prestige, happiness, success, power, wealth, and other human
aspirations. One person with a pressing need for money may take an extra weekend job
pumping gas, or try to borrow from a friend. Another person, feeling the same need, may
hold up a fast food outlet.

1.1.5 Understanding the Risk
Of the two available ways to combat fraud—prevention and detection—a prevention
strategy is obviously the preferred approach. Such a strategy can be either general or
specific in its objective. General prevention techniques for risk management involve two
main elements: understanding the risk and guarding against the threat.

Fraud Versus Theft
Resolved: fraud is not the same as theft.
In a debate, most people would choose to defend the above statement. They might win by
arguing that—

• Theft is like robbing a bank; fraud is like cooking the books to cover up petty cash theft.
• People committing theft do so at night, wearing masks; people committing fraud do so
during the day, wearing suits.
• Theft is direct; fraud is indirect.
• Theft is what lower-class criminals commit; fraud is what upper-class criminals commit.
Few people, if any, however, will point out what is perhaps the most important difference
between fraud and theft: the risk of fraud is much greater.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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With an increasingly high media profile given to crime, particularly in large cities, most
people are acutely aware of the need to protect themselves against crime’s overt forms. In a
bad neighborhood, for example, you would not leave the keys in your car or the doors
unlocked. In fact you probably would not want to be there at all. In this case the risk of
theft, a more overt and direct form of criminal act than fraud, is easy to assess and deal
with.
Now consider a different scenario: if you were to leave your wallet briefly on your desk at
work, you would also be exposing yourself to a risk. However, assuming that access to your
workplace is restricted to other employees, in all likelihood, you would consider this risk to
be a very small one. Presumably the people you work with aren’t criminals and would
never pick up your wallet in a direct act of theft. The risk of being detected, as perceived
by a perpetrator, would be relatively high. You would certainly know that your wallet had
been stolen and a thorough investigation would ensue, possibly implicating a coworker.

Herein lies the first of two pillars on which the greater threat of fraud is built. One pillar is
based on the premise that most people believe that those who are relatively close to
them—their friends and coworkers—are basically honest. Potential victims may rationalize
about those around them: “They would never steal. As long as we lock the doors at night to
keep out the ‘real crooks,’ we’ll be safe.”

The other pillar is based on the perception that fraud is in some sense an indirect form of
theft. Although a criminal act, people who perpetrate fraud will in many cases rationalize
their behavior, believing that because it’s indirect, it’s victimless. Alternatively, the
perpetrator may rationalize that the victim deserves it, or where the amount involved in the
fraud is low in relation to the total assets available, that the victim can afford it and—or
won’t—even miss it. And so the second pillar is formed from the rationalizations of most
fraudsters—the denial that the fraud is morally wrong: “No one will be hurt by this. The
company won’t even miss it. Besides, they deserve it for the lousy way they treat me.”

These two pillars—low perception of the threat of fraud by potential victims, and a high
degree of rationalization by potential perpetrators—combine to make fraud a much more
insidious threat than ordinary theft. A further illustration of this greater risk: according to a
report in a 1999 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, check fraud in 1994 was estimated to have an
impact on financial institutions, private business, and the public that ranged from $815
million up to $10 billion. Further, according to bank executives, check fraud is the major
crime problem facing the financial community. The enormity of the fraud problem is
illustrated by another FBI report that indicated that about $60 billion in mortgage loans
processed annually involved some degree of fraud and that in 1996, 35 percent of the $3.3
billion of reported losses in the financial institution fraud criminal referrals the FBI received
involved some type of loan fraud or false statement.

Generic Versus Individual Risk Factors
A large number of factors can impact the risk of fraud. This Handbook contains an
approach—a system of categorization—that facilitates the understanding of fraud risk and
the development of an appropriate strategy to manage it.
The literature is filled with many different systems of categorizing fraud risk. The system
developed for this Handbook splits the risk factors into two groups: generic and individual.
Generic risk factors remain relatively constant in their impact on any subject individual or
group of individuals. They are largely within the control of the organization or entity that is
protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators. Because these risk
factors apply in the same way to any employee, they can be set and manipulated by an
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organization without considering individual differences among employees. Employee
turnover has virtually no effect on these risk factors.
Individual risk factors change from person to person and can even change for the same
individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the organization or entity
that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise because it applies to
each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk factors change
and must be managed. Even worse, whenever an individual’s personality, state of mind,
circumstance, or motivation changes—which, after all, is a constant process—the associated
risk factors may also change.
See sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of generic and individual risk
factors.

1.1.6 Guarding Against the Threat
On understanding the risk of fraud, you must develop an appropriate strategy and
implement policies to guard against the threat. The main elements of this process are:
• Choosing acceptable risk levels

• Developing and implementing internal controls
• Promoting an ethical environment
• Arranging appropriate risk financing (insurance)
• Ensuring adequate computer security

Choosing Acceptable Risk Levels
The risk of fraud can never be completely eliminated. Even if this were possible, it would
probably not be desirable because of prohibitive costs and extremely tight controls that
would stifle creativity and make employee morale suffer. The first step in a fraudprevention strategy is to determine the acceptable level of risk.
Choosing acceptable risk levels intertwines with assessing the various risk factors. For
example, one of the generic risk factors is the opportunity risk available to potential
perpetrators. Assessing this opportunity risk enables you to make other decisions—such as:
“Do we need to lower this risk, and if so, by how much?”
Developing and Implementing Internal Controls
Internal controls—consisting of basic controls, supervisory controls, and audit—represent
the cornerstone of any fraud prevention strategy.

To ensure complete and accurate reporting an internal control system must be designed
and implemented regardless of the risk of fraud. However, a system should never disregard
the risk of fraud; such disregard would amount to a virtual invitation to potential
perpetrators.
See section 1.3 for a detailed discussion of internal controls.
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Promoting an Ethical Environment

Promoting an ethical environment is another key element in a prevention strategy. In
particular implementing a formal code of ethics and business conduct helps set the tone for
all employees within an organization. See chapter 2 for further discussion.
Arranging Appropriate Insurance

Recognizing that there will always be some risk of fraud, organizations must finance this
risk either externally and explicitly (fidelity insurance) or internally and implicitly (self
insurance). See chapter 3 for further discussion.

Ensuring Adequate Computer Security
Computers and information technology play an increasingly important role in business and
society in general. The pervasive nature of these technologies demands that adequate
computer security be an integral part of any prevention strategy. Although computer
security may be considered a subset of internal control, it is still an important aspect. See
chapter 4 for details.

1.2

Fraud Risk Factors
Several factors contribute to the risk of fraud. Organizations use various systems for
categorizing these factors; however, under most systems, the elements that combine to
determine fraud risk are largely the same.

For example, one classification system is known as the GONE theory, an acronym for
Greed, Opportunity, Need, and Exposure. Under this system, the Greed and Need factors relate
largely to the individual (that is, the potential perpetrator), while the Opportunity and
Exposure factors relate largely to the organization (that is, the potential victim). The four
elements of the GONE theory interact to determine the level of fraud risk, and no one
factor is universally more important than another. Each of the factors is unfavorable, to
some extent, in virtually all situations. However, an organization that allows a sufficiently
unfavorable or an out-of-balance combination of all four factors may face serious troubles.
As one fraud investigator observed, “You can consider your money GONE.”
In this Handbook we use a slightly different system that groups the risk factors into generic
or individual, as previously defined. However, as described below, many of the same
elements of the GONE theory apply under this system as well.

1.2.1 Generic Risk Factors
Generic risk factors—those largely under the control of the organization or entity that is
protecting itself—include:
• The opportunity given to potential perpetrators.
• The likelihood of discovering a fraud that was committed.
• The nature and extent of the punishment a perpetrator will receive once the fraud is
uncovered and the perpetrator is caught.
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Note that the first factor corresponds to the “O” or Opportunity in the GONE theory,
while the second and third factors correspond to the “E” or Exposure risk element. The
Exposure risk under the GONE theory is a product of two generic factors: the likelihood of
getting caught and the subsequent consequences. The product of both must be low for
there to be any risk to the organization. For example, if the likelihood of getting caught is 0
percent, then the exposure risk is 100 percent. Similarly, if the consequences of getting
caught are insignificant, then the exposure risk is high.

A brief description of each generic risk factor follows.

Opportunity to Commit Fraud
The opportunity to commit fraud refers primarily to allowing a potential perpetrator access
to the assets of the organization or object of the fraud. No organization can completely
eliminate opportunity; experts consider such attempts uneconomical and
counterproductive. As long as organizations have assets of value and these assets flow, are
traded or come under the control of others—such as employees, customers and suppliers—
the opportunity to commit fraud will always exist.
For organizations the challenge in fraud prevention is ensuring that the opportunity risk
level is minimal under the circumstances, that is:
1. Assign, either explicitly or implicitly, to each employee an appropriate maximum
opportunity level. For example, limit a junior clerk’s opportunity level to certain smaller
fixed assets not bolted down in the office. Allow a more senior clerk’s maximum
opportunity level to include an additional $500 petty cash fund, or the day’s cash
receipts. Allow a senior executive an additional $5,000 check-signing limit.
2. Prohibit catastrophic opportunity levels. The definition of a catastrophic level depends
on the circumstances—in particular, the size of the organization. For example, a small
business with $50,000 in cash should probably not allow anyone but its owner(s) access
to the full amount.

Likelihood of Discovery
If an opportunity to commit fraud exists, making the chances of discovery high reduces the
risk. In fact, even the perception that the chances of discovery are high can act as a deterrent.
Of course, if a fraud does occur, discovery may result in recovery of some of the lost assets.

The likelihood of discovery stems primarily from the system of internal controls. While
these controls can never be so tight as to preclude any fraud from taking place, ideally they
should be sufficient to prevent most material frauds from going undetected for any length
of time.
Another factor that could increase the chance of discovery is encouraging employees to
take an active role in reporting suspected fraud activities. Publicizing the impact of fraud on
employer profitability and fraud’s negative effect on employee profit-sharing benefits has
worked to stimulate employee efforts to curtail fraud.

See section 1.3 for a closer look at internal controls.

Nature and Extent of Punishment
Discovery of a fraud is, in itself, insufficient to act as a deterrent against future fraud.
Organizations must put in place some adverse consequences for potential perpetrators,
who, most important, must perceive these adverse consequences.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

11

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Although research has not provided proof, conventional wisdom holds that the nature and
extent of punishment has a deterrent impact. The occurrence of theft in countries governed
by Islamic law is extremely low compared to Western countries. Presumably this is due, at
least in part, to the severity of the punishment (amputation of one or both of the hands).
Can anyone doubt that the occurrence of theft in North America would diminish if
perpetrators knew they would face the same punishment? Of course, the reality is that the
punishment must “fit the crime” and be consistent with a society’s justice system.

Organizations or entities wishing to protect themselves from fraud should have clear
policies regarding the nature and extent of the consequences of getting caught; for
example—
• Anyone who commits a fraud will be dismissed.
• All frauds will be reported to the authorities and charges will be laid.

1.2.2 Individual Risk Factors
Individual risk factors—those that vary from employee to employee, largely outside the
control of the organization or entity that is protecting itself—fall into two categories:

1. Moral character

2. Motivation
Moral character corresponds to the “G” or Greed factor in the GONE theory, while
motivation is equivalent to the “N” or Need factor. Each of these categories is described
below.

Moral Character (Greed Factor)
Greed represents broad concepts, such as ethics and moral character, or the lack thereof.
Moreover greed and ethics essentially relate to the internal or personality attributes of an
individual, as do character, integrity, honesty, and the like. You cannot know whether an
individual possesses these attributes without the ability to read that individual’s mind. Even
if this were possible, personal interpretation would still come into play.
Social values also have an impact on moral character. Many sociologists lamented a trend
in Western societies during the 1980s, namely the pursuit of wealth as an overriding
objective. The Me Generation and the Decade Of Greed were phrases coined in connection
with this trend, which was perhaps best epitomized by the memorable speech of Michael
Douglas’ Gordon Gecco character in the 1987 movie, Wall Street: “Greed is right. Greed is
good. . .”
In fact, Gordon Gecco’s philosophy may hold some element of truth. A certain amount of
greed, tough-mindedness, and competitive instinct could greatly enhance the chances of
success for an organization or an individual in a free enterprise society. Regardless of one’s
own value judgment, there is no doubt that these attributes do exist in society. This poses a
problem, however, because, while greed may not necessarily preclude the existence of
ethics and good moral character, if left unchecked or promoted to a great extent, it can
have an adverse impact vis-a-vis the risk of fraud.
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This leads to the essential question at issue here: What can or should an organization do to
minimize the risk of fraud posed by greed and other negative human attributes? Consider
the following.

• Corporate Mission Statement: Set the goals of an organization in a corporate mission
statement, and communicate it to all managers and other employees. The primary goal
of most businesses is to maximize profits, presumably over the long-term in order to
survive. Other objectives might include maintaining either a high market share,
leadership in an industry, or both. However, businesses must pursue these goals in a
manner consistent with good corporate citizenship and standing in the community. This
emphasis on corporate responsibility sets the tone for management and employees, and
encourages personal responsibility. Conversely, business should discourage
irresponsible actions—and by extension, fraud.
• Written Codes ofBusiness Conduct: “Good moral character” means different things to
different people; an organization must define this term and relate it to particular types of
behavior. For example, does your organization consider it moral and ethical for its
employees to accept gifts from customers and, if so, is there a specified value or limit? A
written code of ethics and business conduct can help translate the relative concepts of
greed, ethics, and morality into more specific behaviors that are either acceptable or
unacceptable.
• Management Style and Role Models: Management must set the right example for employees
by acting responsibly and living up to the spirit of the corporate mission statement and
code of business conduct. Moreover, it must clearly and visibly appear to do so in its
dealings and communications with employees. Policy statements mean nothing when
undermined by management’s actions. In fact, such a situation may be worse than
having no policy at all because management’s failure to adhere to its own guidelines
would foster a kind of cynicism and “rules are made to be broken” philosophy that
might potentially encourage fraud and commercial crime.
• Hiring Practices: Regardless of corporate mission statements, codes of business conduct,
and good role models, moral character ultimately depends on the individual employee.
To the extent possible set hiring practices that weed out prospects with low moral
character. See chapter 3 for further discussion.

Motivation (Need Factor)
Why do people commit fraud? There is obviously no single, specific answer. People
commit frauds for a variety of reasons.

Probably the most common group of fraud motivations relates to economic need. For
example, the perpetrator may be experiencing an actual or perceived cash emergency: a
mortgage to pay, drugs to purchase to satisfy an addiction, or gambling losses to win back.
Alternatively, there may be no emergency but simply an unchecked desire for the good life:
expensive restaurants, clothes, furs, jewelry, vacations, cars, homes, and summer cottages.

Less frequently, there might be other reasons, such as, disenchantment, revenge, or simply
the fact that everyone else seems to do it. Even more rarely, the motives could be eccentric:
a sense of challenge or thrill. Finally, the cause may be some form of psychological illness:
compulsion, anxiety, paranoia, or outright psychosis.
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What can be done about all of these complex motives, seemingly locked up in the
Pandora’s box of an employee’s mind? Admittedly, the options are limited but they
include—

• A Favorable Environment: Creating the right environment can reduce the motivation
among employees to commit fraud. In an unfavorable environment, morale suffers and
feelings of disenchantment—even hate and the desire for revenge—may take hold. Try
to promote the right environment by treating employees fairly, keeping communication
lines open, and providing mechanisms for discussing and resolving grievances.
• Performance Appraisal and Reward Systems: Measure each employee’s work fairly by
implementing a performance appraisal and reward system.
• Employee Assistance Programs: Many enlightened employers provide free counseling and
other assistance to employees facing personal problems, for example, alcohol and drug
abuse. From the point of view of fraud prevention, this approach is preferable to keeping
these problems “bottled up.” This approach helps prevent resentment that could
ultimately lead to the commission of fraud.
• Employee Testing and Screening: As part of their hiring practices and sometimes on a
regular basis thereafter, some employers use testing and screening procedures to identify
and weed out high risk individuals, or form the basis for remedial action, or both.
Procedures include psychological testing, drug testing, and even honesty testing in the
form of lie detector tests where not prohibited by law. Highly controversial, these tests,
in some instances, could cause more harm than good, for example, to employee morale,
the organization’s reputation among prospective employees, and so on. Nevertheless, in
especially sensitive occupations or circumstances, employers might find this testing
appropriate and even necessary.
• Common Sense and a Watchful Eye: While motives are not observable, the product of
certain motives often is. An employee with a drug or gambling problem may not be able
to keep it a secret. And beware the $25,000-a-year bookkeeper who comes to work
driving a Mercedes or who, wary of getting caught, never takes a vacation.
Profiles of Fraud Perpetrators
While external pressures do play a major role in whether or not an individual commits
fraud, internal characteristics can affect a potential fraud perpetrator as well. Gwynn Nettler
in his book, Lying, Cheating and Stealing, makes the following observations:

• People who have experienced failure are more likely to cheat.
• People who are disliked and who dislike themselves tend to be more deceitful.
• People who are impulsive, distractible, and unable to postpone gratification are more
likely to engage in deceitful crimes.
• People who have a conscience (fear, apprehension, and punishment) are more resistant
to the temptation to deceive.
• Intelligent people tend to be more honest than ignorant people.
• The easier it is to cheat and steal, the more people will do so.
• Individuals have different needs and therefore different levels at which they will be
moved to lie, cheat, or steal.
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• Lying, cheating, and stealing increase when people are under great pressure to achieve
important objectives.
• The struggle to survive generates deceit.
The highly publicized cases in recent years of computer hackers committing high-tech
crimes have resulted in a public perception that individuals who are highly knowledgeable
about computers are more likely to commit fraud; however, there is no evidence to support
this premise.

1.2.3 High Fraud-Low Fraud Environments
Employee fraud, theft, and embezzlement are more likely to occur in some organizations
than others. The most vulnerable organizations are usually hampered by weak management
and inadequate accounting and security controls. Solutions often proposed include:

• Tight accounting and audit controls
• Thorough screening of applicants for employment
• Close supervision and monitoring of employee performance and behavior
• Explicit rules against theft, fraud, embezzlement, sabotage, and information piracy
Other considerations also affect the likelihood of employee crime. See table 1.1 for a
comparison of the environment and culture of organizations with high fraud potential and
organizations with low fraud potential.

Table 1.1

Environmental and cultural comparison of those organizations with
HIGH FRAUD POTENTIAL AND THOSE WITH LOW FRAUD POTENTIAL.

Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

1. Management style

a. Autocratic

a. Participative

2. Management orientation

a. Low trust

a. High trust

b. Power-driven

b. Achievement-driven

3. Distribution ofauthority

a. Centralized, reserved by top
management

a. Decentralized, dispersed to
all levels, delegated

4. Planning

a. Centralized

a. Decentralized

b. Short range

b. Long range

5. Performance

a. Measured quantitatively and
on a short term basis

a. Measured both
quantitatively and
qualitatively
and on a long term basis

6. Business focus

a. Profit-focused

a. Customer-focused

7. Management strategy

a. Management by crisis

a. Management by objectives

8. Reporting

a. Reporting by routine

a. Reporting by exception
(continued)

15

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

9. Policies and rules

a. Rigid and inflexible, strongly
policed

a. Reasonable, fairly
enforced

10. Primary management
concern

a. Capital assets

a. Human, then capital and

11. Reward system

a. Punitive

a. Generous

b. Penurious

b. Reinforcing

c. Politically administered

c. Fairly administered

a. Critical

a. Positive

b. Negative

b. Stroking

13. Interaction mode

a. Issues and personal differences
are skirted or repressed

a. Issues and personal
differences are confronted
and addressed openly

14. Payoffs for good
behavior

a. Mainly monetary

a. Recognition, promotion,
added responsibility,
choice assignments, plus
money

15. Business ethics

a. Ambivalent, rides the tide

a. Clearly defined and
regularly followed

16. Internal relationships

a. Highly competitive, hostile

a. Friendly, competitive,
supportive

17. Values and beliefs

a. Economic, political, self
centered

a. Social, spiritual, groupcentered

18. Success formula

a. Works harder

a. Works smarter

19. Human resources

a. Burnout

a. Not enough promotional
opportunities for all the

12. Feedback on
performance

technological assets

talent
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b. High turnover

b. Low turnover

c. Grievances

c. Job satisfaction

20. Company loyalty

a. Low

a. High

21. Majorfinancial concern

a. Cash flow shortage

a. Opportunities for new
investment

22. Growth pattern

a. Sporadic

a. Consistent

23. Relationship with
competitors

a. Hostile

a. Professional

the Risk of Fraud

Chapter One:

Table 1.1 (continued)
Variable

High Fraud Potential

Low Fraud Potential

a. Leader, proactive

24. Innovativeness

a. Copy cat, reactive

25. CEO characteristics

a. Professional, decisive, fasta. Swinger, braggart, self
paced, respected by peers,
interested, driver, insensitive to
secure risk-taker,
people, feared, insecure,
thoughtful, generous with
gambler, impulsive, tight-fisted,
personal time and money,
numbers- and things-oriented,
people- products- and
profit-seeker, vain, bombastic,
market-oriented, builder
highly emotional, partial,
helper, self-confident,
pretend to be more than they
composed, calm,
are
deliberate, even
disposition, fair, know
who they are, what they
are and where they are
going

26. Management structure, systems
and controls

a. Bureaucratic

a. Collegial

b. Regimented

b. Systematic

c. Inflexible

c. Open to change

d. Imposed controls

d. Self-controlled

e. Many-tiered structure, vertical

e. Flat structure, horizontal

f.

2 7. Internal communication
28. Peer relationships

Everything documented, a rule f.
for everything

Documentation is
adequate but not
burdensome, some
discretion is afforded

a. Formal, written, stiff, pompous, a. Informal, oral, clear,
friendly, open, candid
ambiguous
a. Hostile, aggressive, rivalrous

a. Cooperative, friendly,
trusting

1.3 Internal Controls and “Fraudproofing”
Developing an understanding of the various factors that contribute to the risk of fraud is
only the first step in a fraud prevention strategy. Following this, it is necessary to
implement policies that will help to reduce the threat.

Some of the measures that can guard against the threat of fraud were explained previously
in this chapter. Consider what is perhaps the main, and certainly the most common,
prevention tool: a good system of internal controls.
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1.3.1 Defining Internal Control Objectives
In recent years, fraudproofing has appeared in the literature and some seminars. This term is
somewhat misleading, however, because no internal control system can completely
eliminate the risk of fraud. What fraud proofing should do, in theory, is reduce the risk of
fraud to an acceptable level. If you have suffered from a fraud attack, consider interviewing
the fraudster after the case is closed. Many fraudsters have a bit of braggadocio in them
and, as a result, are only too willing to let you in on the very holes in your control system
that they exploited.
The risk of fraud is not the only factor in defining internal control objectives; for example,
management information and reporting requirements are important considerations as well.
However, the acceptable levels of risk and opportunity, as defined in section 1.1.6 should
also be considered. This means effectively combining the three levels of internal control—
basic, supervisory, and audit (see sections 1.3.2-1.3.4)—to limit the risk of fraud to
acceptable levels.

1.3.2

Basic Controls

A variety of basic controls exist in a typical system of internal controls. The most relevant
basic controls are grouped into three categories: physical access, job descriptions, and
accounting reconciliations and analyses.

Physical Access
Most people acknowledge the need to control physical access to valuable assets including
intangible assets such as information. Measures to control physical access include the
obvious practice of locking doors, desks, and file cabinets so that unauthorized personnel,
either within or outside the organization, cannot gain access. Other measures include
employee IDs and passwords, computerized security systems (for example, access cards
that record time of entry and exit), and electronic surveillance systems, which should
include every new innovation, such as biometrics—including, for example, iris scans and
voice recognition-that the business can afford.
As a general rule, organizations should restrict physical access to those who require it to
perform their job function. Of course, controlling physical access in this way will not
completely reduce the risk of fraud. However, it will help to reduce the risk in the following
ways:

• Many frauds require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset
being misappropriated, or the related asset records, in order to conceal the fraud.
Reducing physical access reduces opportunity.
• Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Access controls that do not prevent fraud often assist in the fraud investigation process
(for example, determining what actually happened and narrowing down suspects).
Carefully screening who had access to cash receipts would have saved one U.S. County
Clerk much grief. According to a newspaper report, a temporary employee was stationed at
the front desk to handle passport applications, including collecting the necessary fees. The
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temp properly recorded and submitted for processing those applications paid for by check
or money order. She pocketed any cash received and destroyed all evidence of the cash
applications so that there was no record of the transaction. Not paying attention to
controlling physical access led to several thousands of dollars in losses.

Job Descriptions
Formal, specific job descriptions are a very effective fraud prevention tool. These
descriptions should spell out exactly what is expected of each employee. Generally,
employees should not perform duties outside their job description. Those who do,
represent a significant red flag.
Create job descriptions that reflect the important principle of division of duties. For
example, employees with physical control over an asset should not also keep the records
relating to that asset (this will only make it easier for them to cover up the fraud). Segregate
all other especially sensitive duties—for example purchasing and check signing.

The need for job descriptions goes beyond the widely recognized concept of segregating
duties, although it is certainly one of the important consequences of job descriptions. Some
cases may result in an entirely appropriate duplication of duties, for example, double
signing checks. Specify in the job description that all employees whs/take annual vacations
(another well known fraud prevention tool, because an employer can more likely discover
perpetrators running an ongoing fraud scheme when they’re removed from the scene).
Thus, it is apparent that employers must approach the process of formulating job
descriptions for their employees in an integrated fashion. From an internal-control and
fraud-prevention perspective, different tasks performed by different individuals may be
interrelated; therefore, an appropriate job description for one employee will often depend
on the job descriptions of others, and vice versa.
Employers often ignore or underestimate the need for formal job descriptions, writing them
off as “more useless paper.” At other times, employers create job descriptions but then
ignore them. This attitude invites trouble. As one leading fraud investigator put it: “When
people begin to do things outside their job description, you have reason to be concerned. If
it goes unrewarded, they begin to develop a justification to steal. It’s very important that
job descriptions are clear, agreed upon, and adhered to.”

Accounting Reconciliations and Analyses
After access controls and job descriptions, accounting reconciliations and analyses are the
third most important group of basic controls. An essential ingredient of a successful fraud is
successful concealment. Regular, appropriately performed accounting reconciliations and
analyses often make such concealment difficult or impossible.

Perform accounting reconciliations regularly (for example, monthly basis) including:

• Bank reconciliations, for all accounts
• Accounts receivable reconciliations (both month to month and general ledger to
subledger)
• Accounts payable reconciliations (again, both month to month and general ledger to
subledger)

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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The exact nature of the accounting analyses performed depends on the nature of the
organization’s operations. Analyses relevant for most organizations include:

• Variance analysis of general ledger accounts (budget to actual, current year versus prior
year, and so on)
• Vertical analysis of profit and loss accounts (that is, calculation of expenses as a
percentage of sales, and comparison of these percentages with historical standards, or
budgets, or both)
• Detailed sales and major expense analyses (for example, by product line or territory)
Of course, organizations often undertake accounting reconciliations and analyses with
other purposes in mind—for example, to make management decisions or to ensure the
accuracy of the accounting records, or both. Nevertheless, this process also can highlight
discrepancies that point to fraud.

1.3.3 Supervision
Supervision represents the second level of internal control. From a fraud prevention
perspective, strong supervision is vital—especially in small businesses that may have
difficulty achieving segregation of duties.

Note that active supervision most definitely differs from supervisory or management
override, in which a manager or supervisor actually takes charge of or alters the work of a
subordinate. In fact, override itself is a red flag—that is, it suggests that the manager or
supervisor may be engaged in fraud or the concealment of one. Allow basic controls to
operate as they were intended, rather than to be circumvented by those at higher levels.

As a fraud prevention mechanism, good supervision consists of:
• Fraud awareness
• Approval, review, double-checking and redoing

FraudAwareness
Fraud prevention specialists constantly emphasize the need for “fraud awareness,” to the
point that the term has almost become a cliche. However, such awareness is perhaps the
key prerequisite in building any effective fraud prevention strategy, and is especially
important at the supervisory level.

Specifically, supervisors must be alert to the possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or
exceptional situation occurs, such as complaints from suppliers or customers, discrepancies
that don’t make sense, or accounting reconciliations that don’t balance. If a manager’s
mind is closed to the possibility of fraud during an unusual or exceptional situation, the risk
of the fraud continuing unabated greatly increases.
Several businesses have had positive results in raising employees’ awareness by publishing
regular internal newsletters. In addition to reporting actual fraudulent activities, the
newsletters relate the impact of the fraud on both the employees and the bottom line.

Approval, Review, Double-checking and Redoing
In addition to awareness, fraud prevention demands that supervisors actually supervise.
This means going beyond the typical approval function, such as initialing invoices or
20
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performing other duties of supervisors and managers. A more thorough review, double
checking employees’ work, and redoing some tasks, may be necessary and should be
approached diligently. For example, assign supervisors the responsibility of double
checking important procedures such as the monthly bank reconciliation—that is,
comparing the numbers on the bank reconciliations to those on the bank statements and in
the general ledger, making certain those numbers total correctly, test-checking outstanding
items at the very least, and so on. To simply initial bank reconciliations in a habitual or
reflex-like manner without really reviewing and actually redoing them invites fraud.

For example, the owner of a busy downtown restaurant used the following system of
internal control for sales. Employees entered all prenumbered customer bills into the cash
register, and at least once each day the hostess/bookkeeper batched the customer bills,
listed them on a deposit sheet, and made the related bank deposit. The owner then
matched the totals on the deposit sheet with the amounts shown in the stamped deposit
book, and believed this to be adequate supervision.
The owner’s supervision of the bookkeeper, however, was inadequate especially because
she was responsible for handling the cash (the bank deposit) and related records (customer
bills, cash register tapes, deposit sheets). In fact, over a three-month period, the bookkeeper

(Text continued on page 21)
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skimmed a portion of each day’s cash receipts by omitting some of the cash sales bills and
pocketing the corresponding amounts. The owner might have uncovered the fraud by using
any one of the following methods:

• Segregating duties: The owner rejected this method because he trusted the bookkeeper
and did not want to incur the cost of an additional employee.
• Accountingfor all prenumbered bills: The owner opted not to use prenumbered bills
because it was too time-consuming. The bookkeeper intentionally did not list the bills in
numbered order on the deposit sheet and prenumbered books were issued out of
sequence to waiters and waitresses.
• Matching daily cash register tapes to the daily cash deposit: The owner rejected this simplest
and most appropriate method; not wanting to check his employee’s work in this way
because the tapes were a messy “dog’s breakfast” kept in a shoe box by the bookkeeper,
entirely by design, of course, to cover up the fraud.
The owner eventually uncovered the fraud when the bookkeeper became too greedy and
withheld a bit too much from what the owner knew was an especially good cash sales day,
which raised his suspicions and lead to an investigation.

This example illustrates the necessity of supervision: often it is the primary defense against
ongoing frauds such as the skimming of cash or the lapping of accounts receivable. The
maximum opportunity level for the bookkeeper in the previous example should have been
the outright theft of the day’s cash receipts—typically less than half of a day’s total receipts
of about $10,000. However, inadequate supervision allowed a smaller amount of cash—
about $700 a day—to be stolen over a period of three months, which amounted to a total
loss of over $60,000.

1.3.4 Audit
From a fraud-prevention perspective, audit represents the third level of an organization’s
internal control system.

Internal Audit
Internal auditors work for the organization and perform the kinds of work defined by senior
management. In this sense, internal auditors are an extension of senior management—they
have the same concerns and deal with the same issues described throughout this chapter.
Therefore, their work might include fraud detection, or developing fraud prevention
mechanisms, or both.
The training programs and available literature for internal auditors—as provided by the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)—pay specific attention to the issue of fraud prevention
and detection. Historically the perspective of internal auditors differs from that of the
external auditors, which is described below.

External Audit
External auditors are independent of the organization. They report on financial statements
and perform other independent reviews. The restricted role of the external auditor has
evolved over time. During the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, auditors actively looked
for fraud—to be a kind of “bloodhound.” Court rulings redefined their role to that of a
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“watchdog.” Today, auditors are expected to bark if they see something suspicious, but they
are not expected to sniff around for things that might be suspicious.

This watchdog metaphor has persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. In
particular, the concept of materiality has played an important part in the accounting
profession’s view of fraud, which is, specifically, that an auditor’s procedures cannot be
expected to detect immaterial frauds. No audit can be expected to give absolute assurances
in this area, and even limited assurances would require procedures so extensive that the
audit would be uneconomical. If a fraud is material enough to affect the financial statements
of an organization—and an auditor’s opinion on those financial statements—then the
auditor’s procedures may uncover it. However, there is certainly no guarantee of detection.
For example, even when the auditor’s procedures are sound, the perpetrator(s) may go to
extensive lengths to deceive the auditor and hide the defalcation.
In recent years, the public’s expectations has reopened to some extent the bloodhound
watchdog debate primarily because of the perception that auditors should bear
responsibility for detecting significant frauds even when immaterial to the total worth of an
organization.

1.4 Detecting and Preventing Fraud in Books of Account
1.4.1 The Auditor’s Duty to Detect Fraud
Shortly after human beings became rational animals, their thinking skills were enhanced by
the ability to rationalize. Unfortunately, this led to lying and cheating. Today, lying and
cheating are commonly labeled fraud. Accordingly, humans have a long history of both
committing frauds and being victims of fraud.

Accountants and auditors have had to contend with dishonest practices in accounting
records since commerce was first recorded and bookkeeping became a double-entry
process of recording. Since that time, we have needed accountants to make such double
entries and auditors to assure the accuracy of their entries.
In addition to the auditor’s duty to determine whether entries are made accurately,
historically auditors have had a corollary responsibility to determine whether any entries
were false (that is, fraudulent). But not everyone agreed that the latter was the peculiar
province of the auditor. Some found management primarily responsible for detecting fraud
in the accounting records. At its discretion, management could delegate that duty to
auditors.

Most outside auditors do not accept responsibility for detecting fraud in the usual course of
independent audits. But despite their protestations, many courts have suggested that
independent auditors be given such a duty. These precedents were established in cases in
which outside auditors were the targets of regulatory agencies. In these suits, courts have
ruled that outside auditors have a duty to detect fraud in the accounting records, but only to
the point where clients actively have attempted to deceive the outside auditors by
concealing fraudulent transactions or entries. Federal courts seem to hold auditors to a
higher duty of professional care than do State courts. But even State courts tend to impose a
duty to detect fraud under some circumstances. In fact, a large number of professional
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malpractice suits brought against outside auditors in State courts involve allegations of
undetected embezzlement.
Other distinguishing characteristics of the businesses most frequently involved in
malpractice suits include:

•
•
•
•
•

Nonpublic, small, family owned enterprises
One-person, unbonded bookkeeping staff with loose internal controls
Poor prospects of business survival and a chronic cash flow shortage
Inactive or incompetent management and a high rate of turnover of outside audit firms
Engaging an auditor to review or compile rather than to audit.

1.4.2 Fraud and Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Fraud detection is not the primary objective of a financial statement audit. Yet the auditors’
responsibility for detecting fraud is increasingly controversial. This is due, in part, to the
expectation gap.
The expectation gap is the difference between what the public expects auditors do and what
auditors in fact, do. In other words, the public remains ignorant of the extent of the auditors’
responsibilities. This contrasts with the limitations of what auditors can reasonably expect to
achieve. The average person’s exposure to what an accountant or auditor does is usually
limited to the tax season or tax audits. Accordingly, the general public, regardless of the
efforts by the AICPA and other professional groups, still lacks a true perception of the role
of the auditor.
Auditors should be fully aware of their responsibilities under the AICPA’s Statement on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82, Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit. This
SAS was issued in February of 1997 and superceded SAS 53, entitled The Auditors
Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities.

According to SAS No. 53, “Since the auditors opinion on the financial statements is based
on the concept of reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and his report does not
constitute a guarantee.” While auditors agree with this statement, the public, due in large
part to the expectation gap, may not agree.
As stated in SAS No. 82, the auditor should consider the risk that the financial statements
are materially misstated due either to unintentional error or fraud. Accordingly, the auditor
must specifically consider factors that bear on the likelihood of fraud. The level of risk
assessed may affect engagement staffing, extent of supervision, overall strategy, and the
degree of professional skepticism applied.

Auditors' Responsibility
SAS No. 82, in amending SAS No. 53, states, in part: “When considering the auditor’s
responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from
material misstatement, there is no important distinction between errors and fraud.” In other
words, the auditor is responsible for planning the audit to detect material misstatements due
to fraud. SAS No. 82 does not increase the auditor’s responsibility for the detection of
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material misstatement due to fraud, but rather makes clear the responsibility that previously
existed. According to SAS No. 82, an auditor should do the following:

• Assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and
consider that assessment in designing audit procedures.
• Inquire of management about its understanding of the risk of fraud and its knowledge of
frauds perpetrated on or within the organization.
• Plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable assurance of detecting material
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud.

• Consider whether misstatements detected during the audit are the result of fraud and, if
so, evaluate the implications and communicate the matter to appropriate client
personnel.
• Document the facts that evidence the auditor’s assessment of the risk of fraud and the
auditor’s response to the risks identified.
Types of Fraud
The misstatements most relevant to an audit of financial statements originate from two
types of fraud:

1. Fraudulent financial reporting. The client intentionally misstates the financial statements
through phony accounting records or documents, misrepresentation or omission of
significant information, or misapplication of accounting principles. Fraudulent
management usually directs or performs these activities.
2. Misappropriation ofassets: Client personnel steal entity assets and conceal the theft
through misstatement of financial records. Fraudulent employees usually perform these
activities.

The auditor has no responsibility for detection of misstatements, whether caused by error or
fraud, that are not material to the financial statements. For example, misappropriation of
assets often is not material to the financial statements. However, the client might incorrectly
expect that the auditor should detect all cases of fraud, whether or not the financial
statements are materially misstated.

1.4.3 Fraud Auditing versus Financial Statement Auditing
Financial statement auditing is a methodology for evaluating the level of accuracy,
timeliness and completeness of the recordings of business transactions. However, auditors
do not review all transactions. Auditors use sampling and confirmation techniques to test
accuracy, timeliness and completeness. The purpose of testing is to determine whether
transaction data are free of material error and to confirm that financial statements
accordingly are free of material misstatement.

Fraud auditing, while borrowing many techniques from financial statement auditing, is
more a mindset than a methodology. It relies on creativity (right-brain thinking) as much as
it does on reasoning (left-brain thinking). It requires that the fraud auditor think, but not act,
like a thief by considering the following:

• Where are the weakest links in the chain of controls?
• How can the controls be attacked without drawing attention?
• How can thieves destroy the evidence of their attack?
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• What powers can the thieves enlarge?
• What plausible explanation can thieves give if someone suspects their activities?

• How can fraudsters, if apprehended, explain their conduct?
The more fraud auditors can learn to think like thieves, the more effective their efforts will
be in detecting fraud.
Financial statement and fraud auditing also differ in the degree of concern for evidence of
material error or misstatement. While the materiality rule in financial statement auditing
has its place in a cost-benefit context, materiality is not a guiding principle in fraud auditing.
The amount of a visible fraud may be small, but frauds in books of account can be like
icebergs—the biggest part is below the surface. Discovering even small discrepancies can
reveal large defalcations. That’s one reason why auditors often say they discover fraud by
accident, not by audit plan or design. In truth, the “discovery” of fraud is generally no
accident. It comes from diligent effort and a basic assumption by auditors that if fraud
exists, they will find it.
Are all frauds in the accounting records discovered on the basis of undetected
discrepancies? No. Many frauds surface on the basis of allegations or complaints by
coworkers, coconspirators, customers, competitors, suppliers, or prospective suppliers.

1.4.4 Fraud Auditors versus Financial Statement Auditors
Skills of fraud auditors include:

• Reconstructing financial transactions through third-party sources
• Gathering and preserving accounting evidence for trial
• Testifying as expert witnesses
• Calculating net worth and living expenses

• Inspecting documents for authenticity, alteration, forgery and counterfeiting
• Documenting a fraud case for criminal, civil, and insurance claim purposes
• Designing fraud scenarios, that is, imagining what a criminal might think and do in
situations where internal controls are loose or not enforced and the criminal has certain
powers and authority over assets and accounting records
What distinguishes fraud auditors from financial statement auditors? In most respects, they
are the same. Financial statement auditors are in their element when books and records are
complete and reasonably accurate. Fraud auditors must make order out of what looks like
chaos in books and records. Most of the supporting documents the fraud auditor must
access for confirmation lie in the hands of third parties who might be reluctant to assist in
the audit effort.
Fraud auditors tend to be right-brain thinkers, that is, more creative than rational in their
thought processes. In that context, they may understand the inner workings of the criminal
mind somewhat better because many criminals are not noted for orderly, rational or
systematic thinking. Criminals are often of the “hit and run” variety—neither planning their
crimes thoroughly nor anticipating the consequences of getting caught. They want the “big
score” now. Most embezzlers, however, tend to be left brain thinkers, that is, known for
their reasoning abilities, who will steal small sums over an extended period of time.
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1.4.5 The Risk of Fraud
Some organizations suffer more fraud than others. What increases the risk or exposure to
loss from fraud in any organization? The answer depends on a number of factors. The
incidence of fraud in the accounting records is distributed unevenly. Some industries, some
companies, some occupations, and some individuals are higher risks than others.
High-risk industries are noted for intense rivalry, low profits, and unethical business practices.
Some members of these industries are controlled by underworld figures and may enjoy
sweetheart arrangements with corrupt labor unions. Disputes are often settled by bribes, or,
when necessary, by force.
High-risk companies are noted for poor management, loose controls, loose cash, and loose
business morality.
High-risk occupations provide easy access to cash and accounting records, and are often
characterized by low pay, long hours and job-related stress.
High-risk individuals are financially overburdened people with low self-esteems, addictive
personalities (gambling, substance abuse, high living), are poor managers of their financial
resources, have worked their way into positions of trust, and rationalize their thefts as
“borrowing” or getting even for imagined exploitation. Such people often work long hours
at their own discretion, and take no vacations for fear their defalcations might be
discovered while they are away. A growing number of these thieves also keep elaborate
records of their thefts. The records usually contain dates, amounts, and details of the
conditions in their lives at the time the cash or property was taken. It is believed that such
scrupulous bookkeeping is a defensive ploy. If they get caught, they think they can make a
credible defense of their intention to return the money or property. This defense may cast
doubt on one element of proof needed to convict: the intent to permanently deprive the
owners of their property.

People commit crimes for a number of reasons. The main motives are economic,
egocentric, ideological, and psychotic. The economic motive (need or greed) is the most
common one found for the crimes of fraud, theft, and embezzlement.
In large corporations, with promotional policies and compensation plans geared to short
term bottom-line results and little else, a form of competitive greed can set in at the profit
center management level. Even well managed companies have become victims of their own
compensation designs. Therefore, falsifications of unit profits, revenues and expenses have
become a greater problem in the U.S. corporate landscape.

1.5 Risk Management Checklist
Table 1.2, Risk Management Checklist, is designed to assist CPAs in assessing and
managing the risk of fraud in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all
NO answers require investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be
documented. Use the Ref column to cross-reference any additional documentation to the
appropriate work papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute
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for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.

Table 1.2 Risk Management Checklist
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Does the organization have an adequate level
of fraud awareness and are appropriate
policies in place to minimize fraud risk,
specifically:
a.

Generic risk factors
•

Has the organization assigned each employee a
maximum “opportunity level” to commit fraud,
that is, has management asked itself the question,
“What is the maximum amount this employee
could defraud the organization, and does this
represent an acceptable risk?”

•

Has the organization set a catastrophic
opportunity level; that is, has management asked
itself the question, “Have we ensured that no
single employee—or group of employees in
collusion—can commit a fraud that would place
the organization in imminent risk of survival?”

•

Does the organization have a policy of
immediately dismissing any employee who has
committed fraud?

•

Does the organization have a policy of reporting
all frauds to the authorities and pressing charges?

•

b.

____

For all frauds experienced by the organization in
the past, has management evaluated the reasons
that led to the fraud and taken corrective action?

Individual risk factors
•

Does the organization have a corporate mission
statement, which includes as an objective good
citizenship, that is, the maintenance of good
standing in the community?

•

Does the organization have a written code of
ethics and business conduct (see checklist in
chapter 2 for details)?

____

Does the organization conduct ethical and
security training for new employees and periodic
updates for existing employees?

____

•

(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist
•

c.

Does the organization’s culture avoid
characteristics that promote unethical behavior,
for example, high or even hostile competitiveness
within the organization that might push
employees to the point of burnout; pointless rigid
or petty policies, or both; over-centralization of
authority?

•

Do the organization’s hiring policies, to the extent
possible, seek out individuals of high moral
character and weed out those of low moral
character (see checklist in chapter 3)?

•

Does the organization use for especially sensitive
positions screening or testing procedures, or both;
for example, psychological tests, drug tests, or lie
detector tests, or a combination of all three, where
permitted by law?

•

Does the organization provide or encourage
counseling, or both, for employees with personal
problems, for example, alcohol and drug abuse?

•

Does the organization have fair policies in the
area of employee relations and compensation, for
example, salaries, fringe benefits, performance
appraisal, promotions, severance pay, and do
these policies compare favorably with those of
competitors and promote an environment that
minimizes disenchantment and other similar
motives to commit fraud?

•

Does the organization have fair mechanisms in
place for dealing with employee grievances?

No

NA

Ref

—

—

—

Does the organization, as a feedback mechanism
concerning employee relations’ policies, conduct
exit interviews with departing employees?

Overall risk factors
•
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Does management set the right example; that is,
does it follow the organization’s mission
statement, code of ethics and business conduct,
and other policies of the organization, and is it
clearly seen to be doing so by employees?

•

•

Yes

Does the organization exhibit an awareness of
fraud and its possible manifestations, for example,
signs of employee problems such as drug
addictions, the low paid employee who suddenly
appears with the trappings of wealth, and so on?

□

___
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

2. Does the organization have an adequate
system of internal controls, specifically:

a.

Internal control

•

b.

Has the organization explicitly considered the
need for fraud prevention in the design and
maintenance of the system of internal controls?

Control over physical- and logical-access
•

Does the organization have a policy of locking
doors, desks, and cabinets after hours and when
unattended, especially in areas with valuable
assets including files and records, for example,
personnel and payroll, customer and vendor lists,
corporate strategies, marketing plans, research?

•

Does the organization use IDs and passwords, for
example, for computer files?

•

Does the organization state and enforce a policy
that restricts access to those requiring it for job
performance, including a strict policy against
employees allowing access to unauthorized
personnel, for example, by loaning keys or
sharing passwords?

•

Has the organization installed, for especially
sensitive areas, computerized security or
electronic surveillance systems, or both?

•

Does the workplace appear to an impartial
observer to have adequate access controls?

c. Job descriptions
•

Does the organization have written, specific job
descriptions?

•

Are job descriptions adhered to?

•

Does the organization have an organization chart
that reflects and is consistent with the job
descriptions of its employees?

•

Are incompatible duties segregated, for example,
handling of valuable assets—especially cash—and
related records?

—

(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

d.

e.
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•

Does the organization properly segregate the
purchasing functions, that is, ensuring that one
individual cannot requisition goods or services,
approve and make the related payment, and
access accounts payable records?

•

Are especially sensitive duties duplicated, for
example, the double-signing of checks over a
specified amount?

•

Do job descriptions specify that employees must
take annual vacations?

•

Is the overall process of formulating job
descriptions integrated with adequate
consideration to the importance of fraud
prevention?

Regular accounting reconciliations and analyses
•

Are all bank accounts reconciled?

•

Are all accounts receivable reconciled, for
example, month to month, general ledger to
subledger?

•

Are all accounts payable reconciled, for example,
month to month, general ledger to subledger?

•

Has the organization performed a variance
analysis of general ledger accounts, for example,
budget to actual, current year versus prior year?

•

Has the organization performed a vertical analysis
of profit and loss accounts, that is, as a percentage
of sales against historical or budget standards, or
both?

•

Has the organization performed an analysis of
detailed sales and major expenses, for example,
by product line or geographic territory?

Supervision

•

Do supervisors and managers have adequate
fraud awareness, that is, are they alert to the
possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or
exceptional situation occurs, such as supplier or
customer complaints about their accounts?

•

Do supervisors and managers diligently review
their subordinates’ work, for example, accounting
reconciliations, and redo the work when
appropriate?

Yes

No

NA

Ref
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist

f.

•

Does close supervision adequately compensate
against the increased risk of fraud in smaller
businesses or where an inability to divide duties
exists.

•

Is supervisory or management override, that is, a
manager or supervisor taking charge of, altering,
or otherwise interfering in the work of a
subordinate prohibited, and are others in the
hierarchy alert to this situation as a fraud red flag?

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Audit

•

Is there an internal audit function?

•

Does the internal audit function perform regular
checks to ensure that fraud prevention
mechanisms are in place and operating as
intended?

•

Are external audits performed on a regular basis,
for example, quarterly for larger businesses?

•

Do external auditors receive full cooperation
from management with respect to their work in
general and fraud matters in particular, for
example, through the audit committee?

3. Has the organization specifically addressed
the following fraud prevention issues:
a.

Ethical Environment

b.

Risk Financing

c.

Computer Security
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CHAPTER 2:
Promoting an Ethical Environment

2.1 Ethics: A Framework
An ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy. This chapter
will acquaint you with the field of applied ethics, provide essential tools for promoting an
ethical environment within an organization, and conclude with a diagnostic tool that you
can use when evaluating an organization’s current ethical status.

2.1.1 Overview
Ethics—derived from the Greek ethos, meaning character or custom—is a very broad term
referring to principles or standards of human conduct. Ethics has been, and continues to be,
one of the key concerns of all religions, schools of philosophy, sciences, liberal arts,
professions, and political movements. Moses, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Kanto, and many
others devoted a great deal of their recorded teachings to the subject of ethics. It is
impossible to engage in any human endeavor, including business, without entering the field
of ethics.

Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the science devoted to the study of the “walk,” rather than the talk, of
ethics. According to Lisa H. Newton, in her text Doing Good and Avoiding Evil: Principles and
Reasoning ofApplied Ethics, “Applied ethics, then, is the field that holds ethical theory
accountable to practice and professional and business practice accountable to theory.” It’s
where the rubber meets the road.
Personal Versus Organizational Ethics
Whose principles and standards should we adopt? There remains much confusion about
this fundamental question. Some believe that ethics are a matter of personal choice.
Therefore, any attempt to establish a code of ethics, or conduct, would result in a narrow
flight of parochial fancy that would be so patently offensive to so many, it would render
itself immediately irrelevant. Others believe that a kind of universal genetic code of ethics
or conduct exists. This theory suggests that we are all born with an inherent sense of right
and wrong. So, any artificial code of ethics is unnecessary and would be flawed in any way
in which it conflicted with the natural code. Both groups believe it would be wrong for any
organization to impose ethical standards on its members, employees, or other stakeholders.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
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It is an organization’s right and duty to clearly communicate its values and expectations
regarding the conduct of its affairs to all its stakeholders. Employees or members may freely
choose to join, or not to join, any given organization. But, once individuals choose to join
an organization, they assume a duty to respect the organization’s values and abide by its
code of conduct.
Ethics and the Law

When confronted about unethical behavior, many people will point out that their actions
were not illegal. This would be roughly analogous to saying that because a person follows
the rules of law, he or she would be an excellent judge. According to the Professional Ethics
for Certified Public Accountants (a publication of the California Certified Public Accountants
Foundation for Education and Research) “Laws and rules establish minimum standards of
consensus impropriety, they do not define the criteria of ethical behavior.”

2.1.2 Ethics at Work
In the Professions
Most, if not all, recognized professions have developed written codes of ethics, professional
conduct, or both. They also have implemented means to assure that members of the
profession abide by these codes. Violators are usually disciplined or expelled, sometimes in
public proceedings, to demonstrate the profession’s commitment to its code and willingness
to effectively police itself.

Some would argue that the professions became interested in ethics for entirely selfish
reasons. They see the rise of successful plaintiffs’ litigation in the 1970s as a key motivator
in the promulgation of professional codes of ethics and conduct They also point out that,
during the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government demonstrated an interest in playing an
increased role, including the actual promulgation of codes of conduct, in the regulation of
professions. The AICPA has written and rewritten its code of professional conduct many
times during the past 100 years or so. In fact, according to Professional Ethics for Certified
Public Accountants, a complete restatement of the code was made in 1973.
Whatever the motivation, professional codes of conduct have been effective. The reason is
simple: if you do not abide by the ethics code of your profession, you lose the right to
practice and earn a living. Coupling this reason with the profession’s corporate interest in
maintaining its standing and authority, thus minimizing its exposure to litigation and
intrusion by the government, demonstrates the steps taken toward promoting an ethical
environment.

But, how do we apply this model to businesses, including professional firms?

Business Ethics
Should business be concerned with ethics? The answer was not always a unanimous yes.
Who hasn’t heard the appropriated maxim: All is fair in love and business. You may recall
Shakespeare’s merchant and Dickens’ Fagan as examples of at least the perception of
business motives in western society. In this country, tales of the robber barons of the
nineteenth century suggest that business ethics were not at the top of the enterprise success
factor list. That was then, but what about now? As recently as the 1970s, mainstream
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economist Milton Friedman said that the only obligation of a business is to make a profit.
This became dogma in American business schools in the 1970s and 1980s.

So, why should business be concerned with ethics today? One could argue that after
November 1991—the effective date of the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations—
business became concerned with ethics in order to guard against huge fines and penalties.
But there are other, pragmatic reasons for business to be concerned with ethics:

Enlightened self-interest. According to the Professional Ethics for Certified Public Accountants, a
business needs to avoid scandals, keep government off its back, protect itself from internal
corruption, avoid fines and penalties, and keep its executives out of jail. Also, there is the
value of a good corporate image, the internal cost of investigations and legal fees, the value
of good employee morale, and the impact of wrongdoing on the share value of public
companies to consider. In fact, ethics may have a great deal more to do with making a
profit than Mr. Friedman imagined.

2.1.3 Promoting an Ethical Environment
The Tone at the Top
You’ve heard it before and it must be said again. The tone of upper management is most
important in the field of ethics. Ethics will not suffer senior management’s clever
rationalization or thinly veiled hypocrisy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, ethics always
comes down to a simple choice of right over wrong. Even the most learned defense of
improper conduct in the executive suite would fail the ethics test. If the bosses aren’t ready
to walk the talk, the process simply will not work.
Senior management must be made aware of this essential element. Some will raise
objections about the cost of an ethics program or its potential negative impact on revenue.
Even today, the best way to communicate the value of an effective ethics program is to
quantify the cost of not having an ethics program. Statistics and examples abound.
According to an Association of Certified Fraud Examiners report, it was estimated that in
1996 U.S. organizations lost over $400 billion to occupational fraud and abuse. But, to
bring the point home, you need look no further than your favorite daily business journal.
Virtually every issue contains stories of businesses and other organizations that have been
victimized through fraud and paid dearly for it. Those businesses that allegedly “benefited”
from the fraud end up losing the most.

The Current Situation
All ethics, like all politics, are local. Resist the temptation to run out and “buy” someone
else’s ethics program for your organization. An ethical environment flows from an ethics
program that is tailored to the organization. If you try to develop a rule in advance for
every situation, you will fail. If you try to fix things that are not broken, you will fail.
Finally, if in the process of installing your new, super-deluxe, off-the-shelf ethics program,
you communicate your distrust of employees and other stakeholders to them, they, in turn,
will justify that distrust.
For all of these reasons, begin by analyzing your individual organization. Involve everyone
in the process. Get their input. Develop a brief statement (mission statement) of the
organization’s core values and mission.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Perform a diagnostic to identify weak and strong areas of ethical conduct within the
organization. You should consider using the Ethical Environmental Checklist at the end of
this chapter, or you could use this checklist as a template to develop a diagnostic tool of
your own. Once you compile the results of your diagnostic exercise, analyze the results,
make any necessary decisions, and begin designing the program.

Designing the Ethics Program
The most important requirement when promoting an ethical environment is having a
written code of ethics and business conduct. A written code helps to set the right ethical
tone within an organization. Figure 2-1 is an example of a written mission statement.
Figure 2-1. A Written Mission Statement

Mission Statement

The Organization’s mission is to provide the highest quality goods and services to its
customers; to strive at all times for market leadership and in so doing, to benefit the
Organization’s shareholders and its employees.
The Organization is committed to a policy of fair dealing and integrity in the conduct of all
aspects of its business. This commitment is based on a fundamental belief in law, honesty
and fairness. The Organization expects its employees to share its commitment to high legal,
ethical and moral standards.
This Code of Business Conduct is mandatory, and the Organization expects full
compliance by all of its employees and by its subsidiaries under all circumstances. The
Organization will monitor compliance, and any violation of the Code may result in
disciplinary action that could include termination of employment.
Employees uncertain about the application of the Code should consult with their superior.
Similarly any employee who becomes aware of, or suspects, a contravention of the Code,
must promptly advise his or her superior, or report the matter directly to Human
Resources, Internal Audit or the Law Department.

Figure 2-2 is an example of an organizational code of conduct, which includes definitions
of what is considered unacceptable, and the consequences of any breaches thereof. Note
that figure 2-2 is only an example. The specific content and areas addressed in your
mission statement and code should flow from your own analysis of your organization.
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Figure 2-2. An Organizational Code of Conduct

Organizational Code of Conduct
The Organization and its employees must, at all times, comply with all applicable laws and
regulations. The Organization will not condone the activities of employees who achieve
results through violation of the law or unethical business dealings. This includes any
payments for illegal acts, indirect contributions, rebates and bribery. The Organization does
not permit any activity that fails to stand the closest possible public scrutiny.

All business conduct should be well above the minimum standards required by law.
Accordingly, employees must ensure that their actions cannot be interpreted as being, in
any way, in contravention of the laws and regulations governing the Organization’s
worldwide operations.
Employees uncertain about the application or interpretation of any legal requirements
should refer the matter to their superior, who, if necessary, should seek the advice of the
Law Department.

General Employee Conduct

The Organization expects its employees to conduct themselves in a businesslike manner.
Drinking, gambling, fighting, swearing and similar unprofessional activities are strictly
prohibited while on the job.
Employees must not engage in sexual harassment, or conduct themselves in a way that
could be construed as such, for example, by using inappropriate language, keeping or
posting inappropriate materials in their work area, or accessing inappropriate materials on
their computer.

Conflicts ofInterest

The Organization expects that employees will perform their duties conscientiously,
honestly and in accordance with the best interests of the Organization. Employees must not
use their position or the knowledge gained as a result of their position for private or
personal advantage. Regardless of the circumstances, if employees sense that a course of
action they have pursued, are presently pursuing or are contemplating pursuing may
involve them in a conflict of interest with their employer, they should immediately
communicate all the facts to their superior.

Outside Activities, Employment and Directorships

All employees share a serious responsibility for an Organization’s good public relations,
especially at the community level. Their readiness to help with religious, charitable,
educational and civic activities brings credit to the Organization and is encouraged.
Employees must, however, avoid acquiring any business interest or participating in any
other activity outside the Organization that would, or would appear to—
(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

• Create an excessive demand upon their time and attention, thus depriving the
Organization of their best efforts on the job.
• Create a conflict of interest—an obligation, interest or distraction—that may interfere
with the independent exercise of judgment in the Organization’s best interest.

Relationships with Clients and Suppliers
Employees should avoid investing in or acquiring a financial interest for their own accounts
in any business organization that has a contractual relationship with the Organization, or
that provides goods or services, or both to the Organization, if such investment or interest
could influence or create the impression of influencing their decisions in the performance
of their duties on behalf of the Organization.

Gifts, Entertainment and Favors

Employees must not accept entertainment, gifts, or personal favors that could, in any way,
influence, or appear to influence, business decisions in favor of any person or organization
with whom or with which the Organization has, or is likely to have, business dealings.
Similarly, employees must not accept any other preferential treatment under these
circumstances because their position with the Organization might be inclined to, or be
perceived to, place them under obligation.
Kickbacks and Secret Commissions

Regarding the Organization’s business activities, employees may not receive payment or
compensation of any kind, except as authorized under the Organization’s remuneration
policies. In particular, the Organization strictly prohibits the acceptance of kickbacks and
secret commissions from suppliers or others. Any breach of this rule will result in
immediate termination and prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.

Organization Funds and Other Assets
Employees who have access to Organization funds in any form must follow the prescribed
procedures for recording, handling and protecting money as detailed in the Organization’s
instructional manuals or other explanatory materials, or both. The Organization imposes
strict standards to prevent fraud and dishonesty. If employees become aware of any
evidence of fraud and dishonesty, they should immediately advise their superior or the Law
Department so that the Organization can promptly investigate further.
When an employee’s position requires spending Organization funds or incurring any
reimbursable personal expenses, that individual must use good judgment on the
Organization’s behalf to ensure that good value is received for every expenditure.
Organization funds and all other assets of the Organization are for Organization purposes
only and not for personal benefit. This includes the personal use of organizational assets
such as computers.
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

Organization Records and Communications
Accurate and reliable records of many kinds are necessary to meet the Organization’s legal
and financial obligations and to manage the affairs of the Organization. The Organization’s
books and records must reflect in an accurate and timely manner all business transactions.
The employees responsible for accounting and record-keeping must fully disclose and
record all assets, liabilities, or both, and must exercise diligence in enforcing these
requirements.

Employees must not make or engage in any false record or communication of any kind,
whether internal or external, including but not limited to—

• False expense, attendance, production, financial or similar reports and statements
• False advertising, deceptive marketing practices, or other misleading representations
Dealing With Outside People and Organizations

Employees must take care to separate their personal roles from their Organization positions
when communicating on matters not involving Organization business. Employees must not
use organization identification, stationery, supplies and equipment for personal or political
matters.
When communicating publicly on matters that involve Organization business, employees
must not presume to speak for the Organization on any topic, unless they are certain that
the views they express are those of the Organization, and it is the Organization’s desire that
such views be publicly disseminated.
When dealing with anyone outside the Organization, including public officials, employees
must take care not to compromise the integrity or damage the reputation of either the
Organization, or any outside individual, business, or government body.

Prompt Communications
In all matters relevant to customers, suppliers, government authorities, the public and
others in the Organization, all employees must make every effort to achieve complete,
accurate and timely communications—responding promptly and courteously to all proper
requests for information and to all complaints.

Privacy and Confidentiality

When handling financial and personal information about customers or others with whom
the Organization has dealings, observe the following principles:
1. Collect, use, and retain only the personal information necessary for the Organization’s
business. Whenever possible, obtain any relevant information directly from the person
concerned. Use only reputable and reliable sources to supplement this information.

(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)

2. Retain information only for as long as necessary or as required by law. Protect the
physical security of this information.
3. Limit internal access to personal information to those with a legitimate business reason
for seeking that information. Only use personal information for the purposes for which it
was originally obtained. Obtain the consent of the person concerned before externally
disclosing any personal information, unless legal process or contractual obligation
provides otherwise.

When designing your program, implementation strategy and training, remember the
following bit of wisdom:
Give a person a fish and he or she will be able to eat today. Teach a person to fish and he
or she will be able to eat for a lifetime.
If you try to create a rule for every ethical dilemma, your people will focus on how to fit
their decisions to the rules. On this premise, if there is no rule, there is no problem. If you
train your people to make ethical decisions for themselves, however, they will focus on
doing just that.

Training and Communication
After writing your organization’s code of ethics and business conduct, ask everyone to read
it and have them confirm in writing that they have done so and understood the content.
Keep a record of this acknowledgment.
You should consider seminar training for all employees and agents. The training doesn’t
have to be long and complicated. Use the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) method to develop
your ethics curriculum. Instead of giving them rules, give them tools. These tools can be as
simple as a list of broad principles to follow and questions to ask when making decisions.
In Policies and Persons: A Case Book in Business Ethics, John B. Mathews and coauthors suggest
the following tools.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Avoid harming others.
Prevent harm to others.
Respect the rights of others.
Do not lie or cheat.
Keep promises and contracts.

6. Obey the law.
7. Help those in need.
8. Be fair.
So, when a considered action may raise serious ethical questions, try applying the
generalized criteria. For example, you can use the guidelines above and ask yourself the
following specific questions.
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1. Does the considered action violate any of the following?:
—A criminal law
—A civil law

—A company policy

—A professional code
—An industry code
2.
3.
4.
5.

—My personal values
Is the action fair, just, and equitable to all parties?
Does the action serve the common good and the public’s interest?
Does it provide the greatest good for the greatest number?
Does it do the least harm to the greatest number?

6. Does it cost more than its social benefits?
7. Would you like it if it were done to you (known as “The Golden Rule”)?

8. Would an ethical role model (for example, your parent, priest, or minister) approve of
this act?
Enforcement
As discussed in chapter 1, an effective prevention strategy demands there be some adverse
consequences when an employee is caught committing fraud (for example, dismissal of the
employee and the pressing of charges). Similarly, there also must be some adverse
consequences—commensurate with the severity of the breach—when an employee
contravenes an organization’s stated policies, and in particular its code of ethics and
business conduct For severe breaches, or for repeat offenders, dismissal may be an
appropriate consequence and the organization’s policies should so state.

To ensure that all employees are aware of their responsibilities, organizations should
require that the staff sign an annual declaration stating they are aware of the company’s
code of ethics and business conduct policies, and confirming they have complied in the past
and will continue to do so.
Employee Hiring and Employee Relations
Ultimately, the employees, not the organization’s policies, create a good ethical climate.
Employee hiring practices and employee relations are therefore important fraud prevention
variables. The Ethical Environment Checklist (at the end of this chapter) provides a fairly
comprehensive list of the factors to consider.
Generally, organizations face a balancing act. On the one hand, they must minimize the
risk of fraud and be cost-effective in employee remuneration. On the other hand, they must
promote an open environment in which employee morale and creativity flourish, while
employees feel rewarded for their efforts. Tipping the scale too far to one side or the other
can lead to problems, or reduce the competitiveness of an organization, or both.
Organizations can achieve success at a point somewhere in between and only through the
good judgment of management.
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2.1.4 Ethics and Information Technology
The ever-accelerating information revolution—particularly during the latter half of the
twentieth century—has raised special ethical issues. In particular, makers, distributors,
owners, managers, and users of information resources have ethical responsibilities for the
products and services that they create, own, sell, manage, and use. The ethical issues raised
by information technology include the following:
• Privacy
• Piracy
• Safety and health

• Data security
• Data integrity
• Competence
• Honesty
• Loyalty
• Fairness
Privacy
A myriad of both private-and public-sector organizations collect data for a wide variety of
purposes. The U.S. government alone has gathered and stored four billion records on
individuals. The development of database management software for personal computers
has extended these capabilities to anyone with a few hundred dollars. Although databases
have grown explosively, controls over access and disclosure of confidential data have not
kept pace. Unauthorized access to databases and disclosure of confidential information
contained therein are commonplace.
There are legal constraints on the improper collection and dissemination of personal data in
the United States and Canada, embodied in their respective Constitutions, Supreme Court
decisions, tort law, and in federal and state privacy and consumer rights enactment.
However, these laws and rulings are not sufficiently clear to reach consensus. For example,
on the question of access to personal history databases versus an individual’s right of
privacy, an ethicist might ask the following.

● Who is collecting the data?

● For what use are the data being collected?
● How, to whom, and for what purpose will the data be disseminated?
How well protected is that data against unauthorized access and disclosure?
●
● How accurate, complete, and timely are the data?
● What degrees of confidentiality should be accorded to such disparate data as medical,
psychiatric, credit, employment, school and criminal records?

If medical records were considered the most confidential of the lot, the ethical standard for
the care accorded such data would be higher; that is, medical records should be gathered,
stored, and disseminated with great care and caution.
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Piracy
Software piracy signifies that the creative work of another has been used or duplicated
without permission or payment of royalty, or both. The definition assumes that the
software’s creator has complied adequately with the legal requirements of the federal
copyright law. Therefore, the software pirate commits an act of infringement and may be
civilly sued for damages, criminally prosecuted, or both.
Software piracy is probably the most common breach of ethics in the field of information
technology. For each software program sold, developers claim that another two to five
copies are bootlegged. The lost royalties of developers are staggering. Some thieves
rationalize that software prices are too high and that the developers are large and will not
miss the lost royalties. In reality, the software industry has become increasingly competitive
and losses to piracy can have a serious impact on a company’s viability. Moreover, even the
largest and most profitable developers have a right to seek a fair price and return for their
development efforts, the costs incurred and the risks taken.

Safety and Health
The widespread use of computers in today’s information-driven economy has contributed
to and in some instances created, unique safety issues that can be divided into the following
two distinct categories:
1. Accidents resulting from the use of computer-controlled systems
2. Occupational health and safety problems for users caused by long-term or improper use
of computers, or both
Computer-controlled systems safety issues—The accelerated pace of technological change in this
century has resulted in an exponential increase in new industries with many innovative
products and processes. Dangerous substances and sensitive information are being handled
on an unparalleled scale. New systems are being built—using computers to control them—
that have the capacity to cause extensive destruction of life and the environment. A single
accident could be catastrophic. Computers now control most safety-critical devices and they
often replace traditional hardware safety interlocks and protection systems. Even when
hardware protection devices are retained, software is often used to control them. Because of
the explosive increase in the use of, and reliance on computers, methods to ensure the
safety of computer-controlled systems have not always kept pace with the development of
these very systems. Ethicists recognize there is a serious danger of overreliance on the
accuracy of computer outputs and databases. The nonoccurrence of particular types of
accidents in the past is no guarantee that they will not take place in the future. Software and
hardware developers and information technology professionals alike must recognize their
moral and ethical responsibilities. We can’t wait to learn from experience, but must attempt
to anticipate and prevent accidents before they occur.

Computer-related safety and health issues—Today’s computer operators, particularly heavy
users, may develop problems caused by the repetitive motions used daily in operating their
machines. The most common problem is repetitive stress injury (RSI), in which workers
experience moderate to severe pain in the muscles and joints of the hands, wrists, arms,
shoulders, neck and back. RSI can be caused by carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), irritation of
the nerves leading to the fingers due to the prolonged use of a keyboard while the body is
in an unnatural or strained position. RSI can be completely incapacitating, sometimes
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requiring surgery if not treated early. According to Patrick G. McKeown in his text, Living
With Computers, these injuries are epidemic in computer-related jobs; RSI constitutes more
than 60 percent of work injuries and costs employers $20 billion annually. Other healthrelated problems involve radiation emissions from the monitor and eyestrain from watching
the screen for long periods of time without proper lighting or screen glare protection, as
well as noise-induced problems caused by the pervasive low-level noise in today’s computer
environment.

Because of the enormous costs resulting from worker’s health and safety issues, many
organizations are opting for ergonomically designed work environments. Ergonomics, or
human factor engineering, is the science of designing equipment for the workplace to keep
employees safe and healthy while they work, which usually results in fewer physical
complaints, higher employee morale and increased productivity. An ergonomically
designed work area considers the following factors:

• The height and position of the monitor
• The height and angle of the keyboard
• A fully adjustable chair that provides lower back and adjustable arm support and height
adjustment capabilities
• A keyboard that allows users to work with their hands in a natural position
• A mouse designed for either a left- or right-handed user with wrist support
• An anti-glare monitor screen

• Noise reduction measures

• Proper indirect and task lighting
• Adequate ventilation

In addition, employers should emphasize the proper use of equipment, encourage regular
breaks, and provide stress reduction training for employees to further minimize the risk
factors related to RSI and related injuries. In an ethical environment management is
sensitive to the well-being of regular employees and applies the same principles to part-time
workers and support staff.

Data Security
The protection of personal information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and
duplication obligates a database owner to—

• Formulate and enforce standards for the proper use of the data.
• Communicate to, educate, and train users about their responsibility for protecting such
information.
• Plan for likely contingencies.
• Establish adequate security controls.
• Monitor control exceptions.
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Data Integrity
An incorrectly entered arrest report, credit report, insurance rejection, debt default, or lab
test can cause great emotional and financial damage. Yet the error rates of databases with
such sensitive information are often higher than the standards of quality set by the original
designers of these systems. Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevance are what give
information its value. In particular, creators of personal history databases have a special
obligation to compile and process such data accurately and to protect it from the prying
eyes of snoops, browsers, and hackers.

Today people can collect, process and disseminate information at a high speed. If
information is irrelevant to the needs of users or is flawed in logic, assumptions or
conclusions, relying on such specious data can cause catastrophic damage. Therefore,
quality begins with clear objectives, exacting designs, flawless development and proper
training of users. People and organizations involved in software development and database
design are obliged to make products that are fit for their intended uses and have no
fundamental defects.
Competence
The field of information technology is notable for its fast growth and complexity, and the
sweeping social, economic, and political changes it has wrought. At times, change seems
overwhelming. Skills and products become obsolete overnight. Companies must invest
large sums of money in research and product development.

In the race to get new products out of the labs and into the market, people often
compromise quality, safety and security. New products might contain design flaws, software
errors, bugs and glitches, and other impediments to proper functioning. These impediments
can be costly to uninformed and unsophisticated users. Makers and providers of
information technology products—both hardware and software—must take great care and
caution in their work to avoid damage or interruption of service to their users. Providers of
information technology should seek the most competent people available for sensitive
design and product development projects. They should also create an ethical climate in
their firms and foster responsible behavior among all employees.
Honesty
Makers, sellers, dealers, distributors, and installers of information technology products—
like all other business people—must be honest in their dealings with one another. All
parties should use truthful representations, nondeceptive advertising, and accurate labeling,
as well as fulfill contract requirements.

Loyalty
The information technology industry is large, complex, fast changing, and highly
competitive. Some information products—such as chips and PCs—have become
commodities. The relationship between buyers and sellers is changing from one in which
mutual trust, confidence, and faith give way to arms-length transactions. Sellers attract
buyers on the basis of price alone. The service-after-sale element is forgotten.
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These same industry dynamics have also changed the relationship between employers and
employees. Loyalty is supposed to be a two-way street. In today’s competitive environment,
some high-tech, high-talent employees are loyal only to their paychecks thereby blurring
obligations between employers and employees, sellers and buyers, and manufacturers and
suppliers.

Fairness
Normally people conduct business on the basis of mutual faith and trust. You cannot,
however, provide for all contingencies in a formal contract. The writing and execution of a
detailed contract would take too long, thus frustrating the objectives of both parties.

Assuming business ethics are a matter of mutual rights and obligations of the transacting
parties implies that fairness is the rule by which we measure whether a transaction is right
or wrong. In theory, both parties have equal bargaining power in a commercial transaction.
Therefore, ethics should leave the parties to their own negotiations. Often in the
information industry, both parties are not of equal size, competence, skill, knowledge or
experience. In these circumstances, fairness may mean that the more powerful of the two
has an added measure of obligation. The English common law treated buyers and sellers as
equally competent to transact business. Yet in the modern era the notion of caveat emptor (let
the buyer beware) has been diluted. Sellers with superior knowledge, skills, and resources
must be most forthcoming. Fairness may no longer be a 50-50 proposition. Fairness
depends on the relationship between the parties, their relative power positions, and the
context of the business transaction.

2.2 Ethical Environment Checklist
CPAs can use table 2.1, Ethical Environment Checklist to help promote an ethical
environment in their organizations and in those of their clients. No answers may require
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Refcolumn
to cross-reference the checklist to appropriate work papers.

Some sections in this comprehensive checklist may not be applicable or appropriate in
certain instances. For example, most organizations will not conduct the entire employee
screening procedures described in section 4 of the checklist. This checklist is intended for
general guidance and information only. Use of this checklist does not guarantee the
prevention of fraud. If fraud prevention is an especially vital concern or if fraud is suspected,
consider seeking the advice of a knowledgeable fraud practitioner.
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Table 2.1 Ethical Environment Checklist
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Organizational Approach to Ethics

a. Does the organization have a Mission Statement that
emphasizes respect for the law, ethics, and ethical conduct?

b. Does the organization have a written and enforced Code of
Ethics?

c. If the organization or its employees are subject to outside
ethical standards and rules (e.g., industry or professional),
does the organization’s code refer to and emphasize their
importance?
d. Does the organization have—

• Internal auditors?
• Electronic data processing (EDP) auditors?
• At least one Data-Security Officer or Administrator?

• A Corporate-Security or Loss-Prevention Unit?

• An investigative staff?
e. Does the organization, as a matter of written policy, refer
incidents of employee crimes on the job to police or
prosecutorial authorities?
f. If the organization has experienced fraud in the past five
years, has management established the causes and taken
remedial action for any of the following:

• A substantial inventory shortage corporate-wide
• A substantial inventory shortage in a major operating
division
• A major embezzlement involving a loss of more than
$10,000
• A successful penetration of the main office computers by
outsiders
• An accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, or
benefit claim fraud of any amount

• A commercial bribery of purchasing or other personnel

2. Situational Approach to Ethics
a. Are ethical considerations a critical element in corporate
policies, tactics, and decision-making?

b. Is there a specific framework—especially for important and
difficult corporate decisions or actions—for addressing the
ethical element, such as a series of questions like those set out
in item 2c (below)?
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist
c. Does the organization, when contemplating actions or
decisions that may raise ethical concerns, consider the
following:
• Does the action violate any law or code to which the
organization is subject?

• Is the action fair, just and equitable to all the parties
involved?
• Does the action serve the common good and the public’s
interest (for example, does it: (i) provide the greatest good
for the greatest number, (ii) do the least harm to the
greatest number, and (iii) yield social benefits that exceed
the cost)?

• Would an ethical purist or role model (for example, the
stereotypical good parent, priest or minister) approve of
the act?

3. Policy Approach to Ethics
a. Does management set the right tone for employees and
demonstrate the organization’s commitment to ethical
conduct (for example, by regularly referring to the
organization’s code of ethics in policy meetings and
communications) ?

b. Do the organization’s policies in all activities,
communications, and transactions reflect a commitment to
the following:
• Honesty and integrity

• Competence and due care
• Commitment to excellence
• Fair and prompt dealings
• Respect for privacy and confidentiality
c. Does the organization have written policies that restrict or
prohibit the following:
• Engaging in outside employment (moonlighting)

• Engaging in conflicts of interest
• Accepting gratuities, expensive gifts or lavish
entertainments from vendors, contractors and suppliers

• Compromising or bribing customers
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Engaging in false advertising and deceptive marketing
practices

• Disclosing company trade secrets to unauthorized persons
• Fixing prices with competitors

• Gambling on the job

• Abusing drugs or alcohol, or both
• Fighting on the job
• Stealing company property, including personal use of
company property (for example, computer time)
• Destroying company property

• Falsifying time or attendance reports
• Falsifying production reports
• Falsifying personal data on a job application
• Falsifying or forging accounting records

• Destroying accounting records
• Falsifying expense accounts
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to confidential
records (for example, payroll and personnel records,
customer and vendor lists, research results, product and
marketing plans)
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to company
buildings or critical work areas

• Loaning company building access identification cards,
badges or door keys to unauthorized persons
• Disclosing computer log-on codes or passwords to
unauthorized persons

• Allowing unauthorized persons use of computer terminals
4. Ethics and Human Resources
a. To the extent necessary, when considering an applicant and
depending on the importance and sensitivity of the position,
does the organization perform reference checks, background
inquiries or investigations, or any combination thereof, to
confirm the applicant’s—

• Identity
• Educational achievements
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

• Credit standing
• Satisfactory past employment history
• Absence of criminal convictions (including name or
fingerprint checks, or both)
• Reputation

• Character

b. Especially for very sensitive positions (for example, those
affecting public safety, the custodianship of large amounts of
cash or securities, the secrecy of important information), and
to the extent allowed by law, does the organization
administer any of the following to employees and
prospective employees:
• Polygraphs

• Paper and pencil honesty tests
• Voice stress analyses

• Handwriting analyses

• Intelligence tests
• Psychological diagnostic tests

• Drug tests
c. Does the organization conduct or provide (or both) any of
the following:

• Security orientation training for new hires
• Ongoing security awareness training programs for all
employees
• Written rules of employee conduct to all employees

• Annual, signed employee declarations acknowledging
awareness of the company’s code of conduct, and past and
future adherence to it
• Hearings for employees charged with punishable offenses
• Employee representation at such hearings

d. Does the organization use or provide any of the following:
• Job descriptions
• Organization charts
• Performance standards

• Performance appraisals
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No

NA

Ref

Chapter Two: Promoting an Ethical Environment
Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Coaching and counseling of employees whose work is
unsatisfactory
• Counseling of employees with drug abuse problems
• Technical training programs
• Human resource development programs

• Tuition reimbursement
• Time off for study

• Time off for family emergencies
• Employee involvement programs

• Job enlargement, enrichment or rotation programs
• Exit interviews for departing employees
e. Does the organization compare favorably or at least equally
with other firms in its industry, or areas of operations, or
both, with respect to any of the following:
• Salaries

• Fringe benefits
• Blue-collar turnover
• White-collar turnover

• Absenteeism
• Employee firings
• Promotions from within the company
• Ability to recruit new employees

• Skills of its employees
• Educational level of employees
• Employee attitudes toward their work
• Employee loyalty
5. Ethics and Information Technology

a. Does the organization’s code of conduct specifically address
the importance of using information technology (especially
computers) in an ethical manner?

b. Are the following specific ethical concerns relating to
information technology adequately addressed in the
organization’s code of conduct and in its policies:
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist
• Privacy of information (for example, information related
to employees, customers or clients)
• Prohibition of software piracy
• Safety and health (for example, ergonomically sound
computer workstations)

• Quality standards for information technologies and the
information they process (for example, accuracy, integrity,
security)
© Relationship of technology and human resources (for
example, communication with employees concerning
technological change, adequate training)
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CHAPTER 3:
Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance

3.1

The Concept of Risk Financing
The risk of loss due to fraud and other forms of dishonesty can never be completely
eliminated. Organizations can finance the potential loss either by purchasing fidelity
insurance coverage or by self-insuring the risk, that is, absorbing out of one’s own pocket
any losses incurred. Experts recommend giving serious consideration to purchasing
insurance in situations with significant risk or potential loss. In reality, however, many
organizations choose the self-insurance default because they either fail to assess the risk and
its financial impact or they are simply unfamiliar with fidelity insurance.

Most individuals and businesses would never—or at least should never—consider self
insurance as a viable option in the case of potentially catastrophic risk. Examples of
insuring against potentially catastrophic risks include life and disability insurance for
breadwinners supporting families, fire insurance for homeowners, and liability insurance for
doctors and automobile owners. In some cases, a statute or contractual agreement may
mandate insurance; for example, a mortgage agreement may require fire insurance. The
risk of catastrophic loss due to fraud merits serious consideration for the purchase of fidelity
coverage.
This chapter reviews the kinds of available “dishonesty” insurance including the issues
typically addressed in a policy, policy exemptions and the duties of the insured. The
remainder of the chapter provides some insights into preparing an employee dishonesty
claim.

3.2 Dishonesty Insurance

3.2.1 Overview
Insurance coverage for dishonest acts is known by many names, including fidelity
insurance, commercial crime coverage, blanket bonds and 3D policies (Dishonesty,
Destruction and Disappearance). The desired coverage can be written in standard bond or
policy language, as a rider to other insurance policies, or in a manuscript format, that is,
written for a specific company or organization.
For certain industries there are standard policy-bond forms. For example, there are
standard forms for financial institutions such as banks, brokerages and insurance
companies. For other industries, including manufacturing, health care, retailing,
transportation or service providers, dishonesty coverage is more generic. Regardless of
name, the policies generally follow a similar format. This Handbook uses the term
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commercial crime policy to refer to dishonesty coverage except in discussions of other, specific
kinds of coverage.

3.2.2 The Policy Provisions
When considering the purchase of dishonesty coverage, you should understand what is and
what is not covered under the policy. Generally, you can acquire an understanding from
the four major policy provisions:

1. Insuring agreements that describe what the policy covers

2. Definitions that provide specificity of terms of coverage and effectively limit the scope for
interpretation of coverage

3. Exclusions that enumerate what the policy does not cover
4. Duties of the insured that specify what the insured must do to receive indemnity under a
policy

3. 2.3 Coverage in Insuring Agreements
The first sections of a policy, usually called insuring agreements, specify what types of losses
are covered. Typically, the insuring agreements (and riders when necessary) cover—
• Employee dishonesty

• Loss Inside the Premises
• Loss Outside the Premises
• Money Order Fraud and Counterfeit Paper
• Depositor Forgery
Employee Dishonesty
The generally used employee dishonesty Blanket Coverage Form Insuring Agreement (CR
00 01) is shown in figure 3-1. You should note that coverage applies only to loss of “covered
property.”

Covered property is defined very narrowly in the insuring agreement and, in addition, the
terms used in that agreement are also subject to further specific definitions. Therefore, when
considering filing a claim, one of the first questions that you should answer is whether
covered property was lost. Also, you should make sure to tailor your coverage to your
organization’s specific industry and needs, and to include the kinds of risks your
organization may encounter.
Insuring Agreements and riders are also available to cover losses caused by non-employees.
These include the following:

Loss Inside the Premises
Organizations can insure against loss inside the premises, which is defined in most
agreements and riders as “Losses of money and securities by the actual destruction,
disappearance or wrongful abstraction .. . within the premises ... or banking premises ....
Including loss resulting from safe burglary or robbery with the premises . . . .”
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Loss Outside the Premises
Organizations can insure against loss outside the premises, which is defined in most
agreements and riders as a “Loss of money and securities and other property . . . while
being conveyed by messenger ... or armored car company.”

Figure 3-1. Blanket Coverage Form Insuring Agreement (CR 00 01)

BLANKET COVERAGE FORM
INSURING AGREEMENT
We will pay for loss of and loss from damage to, Covered Property resulting directly from
the Covered Cause of Loss.
1. Covered Property: "Money," "securities," and "property other than money and securities"

2. Covered Cause of Loss: "employee dishonesty"
3. Coverage Extension
Employees Temporarily Outside Coverage Territory: We will pay for loss caused by any
"employee" while temporarily outside the territory specified in the Territory General
Condition for a period of not more than 90 days.

Money Order Fraud and Counterfeit Paper
Organizations can insure against money order fraud and counterfeit paper, which is defined
in most agreements and riders as “Loss due to the acceptance in good faith, in exchange for
merchandise, money ... in the normal course of business of counterfeit currency, money
orders, etc., through the Insured bank account. . . .”

Depositor Forgery
Organizations can insure against depositor forgery, which is defined in most agreements
and riders as “Loss as a result of the Insured having someone process forged checks, money
orders, etc., through the Insured bank account. . . .”
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3.2.4 Riders
Remember you can add riders to the standard policy coverage to provide for the unique
areas of risk not otherwise included. Some riders that you should consider include coverage
for loss from:
• Unauthorized electronic transfers
• Pension plan frauds
• Credit card forgeries
• Computer frauds

• Unauthorized use of telephone services

3.3 Important Clauses in Dishonesty Policies

3.3.1 Policy Definitions
Other policy provisions include definitions of the terms used in the insuring agreements.
Usually, the definitions are used to limit the scope for interpreting the terms of coverage.
For example, the employee dishonesty insuring agreement describes a covered loss as one
resulting from employee dishonesty. This term and the term employee, on which it relies, are
further defined to provide specific qualifications of coverage as to cause. Figure 3-2 contains
a typical policy definition of employee dishonesty.

For coverage to apply, the first requirement is that an employee must commit the covered act.
If the perpetrator were not an employee, coverage would not apply. This requirement
makes it important to determine the identity of the perpetrator(s).
While the policy language specifically defines the term employee, you can request
endorsements to alter the definition and to expand coverage of certain other parties (for
example, volunteer workers and designated agents) as employees.

Because a policy provides a specific definition of dishonesty, it is important for you to
ascertain—
1. That the employee committed the act with the manifest intent to cause the insured to
incur a loss, and
2. That the employee or some intended third party received a benefit. Few other
provisions in a policy have resulted in as much litigation as this one, particularly
concerning the meaning of manifest intent.

Unfortunately, there is no consensus among jurisdictions on the interpretation of manifest
intent, rather, there is a broad spectrum of interpretations. Some courts have found this term
to apply only to those situations where the employee has the intent to gain a benefit for
someone at the expense of the insured. Other courts have found a broader meaning
affording coverage for situations in which the employee acted with such disregard for the
insured that the loss was a substantial certainty. In one case involving the definition of the
term a court ruled, “Such a person is deemed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.”
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Figure 3-2. Typical Policy Definition of Employee Dishonesty

EMPLOYEE DISHONESTY DEFINITION
"Employee Dishonesty" in paragraph 3.3.1 means only dishonest acts committed by an "employee,"
whether identified or not, acting alone or in collusion with other persons, except you or a partner, with
the manifest intent to:

(1) Cause you to sustain loss; and also
(2) Obtain financial benefit (other than employee benefits earned in the normal course of employment,
including: salaries, commissions, fees, bonuses, promotions, awards, profits sharing or pensions) for:
a. The "employee," or
b. Any person or organization intended by the "employee" to receive that benefit.

"Employee" means
a. Any natural person:
(1) While in your service (and for 30 days after termination of service); and
(2) Whom you compensate directly by salary, wages or commissions; and
(3) Whom you have the right to direct and control while performing services for you; or
b. Any natural person employed by an employment contractor while that person is subject to your
direction and control and performing services for you excluding, however, any such person while
having care and custody of property.

Consequently, an insured should not necessarily give up on a claim just because the insurer
believes the dishonest individual did not possess the requisite manifest intent. Before
challenging a claim denial, legal counsel should be retained to conduct research to discover
how the applicable jurisdiction interprets this language. Then if favorable case law is found,
you can approach the insurer seeking a reversal of the claim denial.

3.3.2 Policy Exclusions
The policy describes the covered losses and the specific exclusions for losses that it will not
cover. Because insurers tailor each policy with its own list of exclusions, you should read
and understand the terms before purchasing the coverage.
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Although we won’t explore the legal implications of policy provisions, you should consider
the practical problems arising from the exclusions both when purchasing the coverage and
when preparing a proof of loss. Even though the specific exclusions can vary, here are some
examples of typical exclusions found in many standard policies:

Indirect Losses
Commercial crime policies specifically exclude indirect and consequential losses. It is
generally accepted that this exclusion’s original intent was to limit the coverage to direct
losses, thus, excluding consequential losses, such as lost profits, lost business opportunities,
or lost interest on stolen funds. While this exclusion’s intent may seem to be clear, judicial
interpretations remain inconsistent. Clearly, you should discuss this issue with legal counsel,
who can interpret the relevant case law in the applicable jurisdiction(s).

An indirect loss may involve the costs incurred in establishing the insured’s claim. Again,
this provision excludes from coverage the costs of investigating and quantifying a claim. In
today’s market, you can purchase coverage for the costs of establishing a claim. Some
carriers write policies that cover all, or a stated amount, of an investigation’s costs, while
others write policies under which the costs are shared between the insured and the carrier.
Of course, you should evaluate the cost of purchasing this coverage in light of the potential
cost of any investigation. The indirect loss policy provision is excerpted in figure 3-3.

Inventory Loss
The inventory loss exclusion addresses losses of inventory when the insured may catch
dishonest employees with “the goods,” or the employees may confess their dishonesty, but
the insured cannot prove the extent of the dishonest acts and the resulting losses. See figure
3-4 for an example of a standard inventory loss exclusion.
Under this exclusion, an insurer will not accept a shortage of inventory on a comparison of
book to physical quantities as proof of dishonesty nor as verification of the quantum of loss
sustained. Similarly, the insurer will not consider a reduction in profits as proof of
dishonesty or loss because there can be other plausible explanations for either an inventory
shortage or a reduction in profits.
Thieves normally keep few, if any, records, and their veracity, at best, is questionable.
Often, dishonest employees purposely understate, in their confessions, the extent of the
losses in the hopes of avoiding not only prosecution but also any subsequent requirement to
make restitution. Conversely, dishonest employees may overestimate losses in an effort to
appease their employers by supporting a claim for a large insurance recovery. Simply
stated, most dishonest employees do not know how much they have actually stolen.

For example, an employee of an auto parts dealer is caught with a trunk full of stolen
automobile parts. When confronted, the employee confesses to stealing parts for four years
but doesn’t have the slightest idea of how much he actually took. In this situation, an
insured instinctively presents a proof of loss based on an inventory computation.
Essentially, this methodology attempts to blame all shortages, including those in the normal
inventory process, on the dishonest employee. Therefore, if the insured compares the
physical inventory available with the inventory records and discovers a shortage of
$400,000 in automobile parts, the insured may attempt to claim this amount.
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Figure 3-3. Indirect Loss Policy Provision

INDIRECT LOSS EXCLUSION
Indirect Loss: Loss that is an indirect result of any act or
"occurrence" covered by this insurance including but not limited
to, loss resulting from:
a. Your inability to realize income that you would have realized
had there been no loss of, or loss from damage to, Covered
Property...

b. Payment of costs, fees or other expenses you incur in
establishing either the existence or the amount of loss under
this insurance.

The same issues arise for claims based on lost profit calculations. If an insured projected a
profit of $500,000 but achieved a profit of only $200,000, the insured may attribute the
$300,000 difference to the dishonest employee.

Although an insured can use an inventory or profit computation to help support a claimed
loss amount, this method, generally, will not provide sufficient proof for a claim. Unless the
insured can demonstrate, in an irrefutable way, that the only explanation for the shortage
could be through the act of an employee, any claim presented will likely fail.
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Figure 3-4. Standard Inventory Loss Exclusion

INVENTORY SHORTAGES EXCLUSION
Loss, or that part of any loss, the proof of which as to its
existence or amount is dependent upon (1) an inventory
computation; or (2) a profit or loss computation.

Source: Employee Dishonesty Coverage Form (CR 00 01)

Therefore an insured should meticulously outline the method the employee used to
perpetrate the theft to demonstrate that the employee had the necessary access to perform
the dishonest act, and should also present all documents that connect the employee to the
claimed loss. For example, if part of the dishonesty involved the alteration of shipping
receipts, the insured should provide all the altered receipts to the insurer. Although these
documents may not directly support the loss amount, they will connect the employee to the
dishonesty and support the method by which the dishonesty occurred.

Is this documentation enough to assure a full recovery? Maybe not; however, every link
between the employee and the claimed loss strengthens the insured’s claim.
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Figure 3-5. Loan Loss Exclusion

LOAN LOSS EXCLUSION
This bond does not cover... (e) loss resulting directly or
indirectly from the complete or partial nonpayment of, or
default upon, any Loan or transaction involving the Insured as
lender or borrower, or extension of credit, including the
purchase, discounting or other acquisition of false or genuine
accounts, invoices, notes, agreements or Evidence of Debt,
whether such Loan, transaction, or extension was procured in
good faith or through trick, artifice, fraud or false pretense,
except when covered under Insuring Agreement A [Employee
Dishonesty], (d) or (E)...

Loan Loss
This chapter has focused on the standard provisions of a Commercial Crime Policy.
Although not part of a Commercial Crime Policy, the loan loss exclusion is worthy of
special mention. See figure 3-5 for an example of a loan loss exclusion taken from a
Financial Institution Bond.
This language establishes that the bond does not cover all risks; specifically, it avoids
coverage for credit decisions. The bond’s language seems clear, particularly because the
wording even stipulates that loans obtained through “trick, artifice, [or] fraud” are excluded.

You can obtain coverage for loan losses generated by a dishonest employee who had the
manifest intent both to cause a loss and to obtain a financial benefit. In addition, the insurer
may specify in the bond that it will cover those loan losses when an employee was in
collusion with one or more parties to the transaction and the employee received, as a result
of the dishonesty, a financial benefit with a value of at least $2,500.
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Figure 3-6. Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss

3.4 Insured’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Loss

3.4.1 Duties of the Insured
Dishonesty policies typically impose several duties that the insured must fulfill in order to
protect its ability to recover under the terms of the policy once a loss is discovered. In all
cases, the insured should take action to prevent further loss and take the appropriate steps
to mitigate the damage and recover from any loss sustained. These duties include:
• Giving timely notice of potential loss
• Filing a proof-of-loss form

• Cooperating with any insurance investigation

See figure 3-6 for an example of the specific language used in a Commercial Crime Policy
to spell out the insured’s duties.
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Most dishonesty policies typically contain two additional obligations for the insured. The
obligations are (1) agreeing not to prejudice the rights of the insurance carrier and (2)
accepting the procedures for filing a law suit in the event of a claim denial. See section 3.4.2
for more information on these duties.

3.4.2 Handling the Discovery of Employee Dishonesty
It’s a call that all executives dread—internal audit reveals that the controller has been
diverting corporate funds for his or her personal use. The discovery spawns a myriad of
questions and problems, all of which require quick solutions.

Dealing with an allegation of wrongdoing against an employee is never easy. Invariably it
provokes feelings of shock and betrayal within the firm, and often causes a decline in
internal morale and external goodwill. It may also hurt the bottom line, depending on the
extent of the loss and, most critically, whether the loss is covered by fidelity insurance.

You must deal with dishonest acts, whether you report to the police and pursue aggressively
or handle discreetly within the organization. In either case, the actions you take will have a
critical bearing on whether or not you can recover under your fidelity insurance. Therefore,
it is important to know how to respond when allegations of wrongdoing arise. Most victims
(and even most claims adjusters), however, rarely deal with these types of situations, and, as
a result, these claims are often learning experiences for all concerned.
Victims of dishonesty should never forget that it is their property that has been lost. There
can be no relaxed attitude when responding to this kind of incident. You must conduct
yourself as if no insurance existed, including making efforts to minimize or prevent further
loss and initiating proceedings for maximum recovery.
On the issue of recovery, it is important to note the right offirst recovery provisions in fidelity
coverage. Typically, where a loss does not exceed the policy limit and recoveries are made,
the right offirst recovery is to the underwriter and then to the insured, to satisfy any policy
deductible. However, if the loss exceeds the policy coverage amount, the right of first
recovery is to the insured for the amount of the loss in excess of the bond coverage only,
and then the aforementioned rule applies.

3.4.3 A Course of Action
The first decision to make on the discovery of any form of dishonesty is whether or not to
conduct an investigation. Some victims choose not to proceed even when they have fidelity
coverage. They consider the potential cost of an investigation, including the time lost
internally, combined with external investigators’ costs and legal fees, among other costs, to
be prohibitive.
There are many reasons to proceed with an investigation. The loss may be covered under
the fidelity insurance and therefore would be recoverable. In addition, there may be more
to the dishonest scheme than was initially manifest. Failing to investigate and take
appropriate action when the crime is first discovered may prejudice the insurer’s rights and
result in coverage denial when the true extent of the loss surfaces. Similarly, there may be
more people involved than originally believed, which could make any initial corrective
actions ineffective.
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A victim that fails to report a loss or reports a loss late risks the possibility of a subsequent
coverage denial. The typical policy includes the standard requirement for reporting a loss
as soon as possible (see section 3.4.4). In addition, the insurer also immediately cancels
coverage for any employee discovered by the insured (or the insured’s partners, officers, or
directors) to have committed any dishonest act. Therefore, it is extremely risky to continue
the employment of an individual who has defrauded or stolen from the company. If
management determines that the best course is to continue the employment of the
dishonest employee, management should consult with the insurer and request a waiver of
the provision canceling coverage for that employee.
Assuming the organization decides to proceed with an investigation, management should
assign a representative of the firm the responsibility of coordinating the organization’s
efforts to investigate, document, and prepare a proof of loss. In view of the timing
obligations under the policy, this individual should immediately be available to devote
considerable time to the claim. This claim coordinator should have a financial background
and the authority to cross departmental boundaries because the loss investigation will
undoubtedly involve numerous departments. The claim coordinator also must thoroughly
understand the policy before an in-depth investigation can begin. The claim coordinator,
along with legal counsel, should bear responsibility for all communications with the
dishonest employee, the insurer, and its representatives, including the insurance agent.

3.4.4 Notice of Loss
As discussed previously, immediate action after discovery is critical because discovery
triggers the policy’s notice and proof-of loss timing requirements. The policy requires the
insured to notify the insurer as soon as possible after a potential covered-loss situation is
discovered. Notice can be provided by telephone; however, best practice is to send a
written follow-up notification. Although the coverage states “as soon as possible,” sooner is
always better than later, as the date of notification is determined by the circumstances of the
case and can become a question for a jury. One jury found seventeen days to be an
unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer, but in another case, a fifteen-month delay was
not deemed unreasonable.
Some victims opt to allow the dishonest individual to continue his or her wrongdoing in an
attempt to gather evidence. This is not advisable because, as previously discussed, an
insurer will cancel coverage for any dishonest employee immediately upon discovery, and,
therefore, the policy will not cover subsequent losses.
When providing notice, it is not necessary to develop all the facts or even the extent of the
loss. After a more comprehensive investigation, the insured can then provide the details of
the claim in the form of a written, and sworn to, proof of loss. The policy typically requires
that the insured file the proof of loss within 120 days from the time it discovers the covered
act—not from the time the insured gave notice. If it is not possible to comply with the 120day deadline, ask for an extension—in advance—from the insurer, requesting a response in
writing. Most insurers will accommodate this request, thereby providing an extension under
a reservation of rights.
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3.4.5 Supporting Documents
Although insurers value statements made by the dishonest employee, they also require
documentation supporting the claim of dishonesty and the resulting loss amount. Make it a
priority to obtain and secure the relevant documents. Verify what may seem obvious or
conclusive in appearance using the most complete documentation possible. Use discussions
with other employees to determine the existence and importance of the documentation.
Early in the investigation, identify those employees who may be able to assist in the loss
calculation. While there are a myriad of factors that affect the timing and appropriateness of
interviewing these employees, remember that over time memories not only fade but
become selective. Conduct these interviews individually, and take detailed notes.
Whenever possible, the claim coordinator should attend all interviews.
3.5

The Insurer
3.5.1 The Insurer’s Investigation
After receiving the proof of loss, the insurer may send in an independent investigator to
analyze the claim. Start preparing for this investigation by designating one contact person—
usually the claim coordinator. This designated contact should act as liaison for all requests
from and discussions with the insurer’s representative.

3.5.2 Subrogation Rights and Duties
If the insurer pays any portion of the claim, the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s
recovery rights. This is covered under Section B 17 of the crime general conditions policy
form.

Although subrogation is thought of as arising in the context of a resolved claim, subrogation
also imposes a further duty on the insured long before resolution. The insured must, in no
way, jeopardize the subrogation rights of the insurer.
However, if the insured has the opportunity to maximize its recovery as a result of
accepting a settlement offer from the dishonest employee or the employee’s attorney, the
insured could appear to be acting contrary to the language of the subrogation provision. In
this case, the insured should bring the settlement offer to the attention of the insurer and
demonstrate its benefits. Generally speaking, insurers will agree to reasonable settlement
offers. As always, get all such “side agreements” with the insurer in writing.

3.5.3 Response to a Claim Denial
The game is not necessarily over when an insurer denies a claim. Request a detailed,
written explanation for the denial. Ask independent advisers to carefully review the claim
and the rationale for the coverage denial to determine whether the denial is warranted. If
you can make a good argument for coverage and it becomes necessary to file a lawsuit
against the insurer to invoke coverage, the provision form stipulates certain procedures for
the insured to follow (see figure 3-7.)

15

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Figure 3-7. Legal Action Against Insurer Provision

LEGAL ACTION AGAINST INSURER
PROVISION

You may not bring any legal action against us involving loss:

a. Unless you have complied with all of the terms of this
insurance;
b. Until 90 days after you have filed proof of loss with us; and

c. Unless brought within 2 years from the date you discover the
loss.
Source: Crime General Provisions (CR 10 00)

As stated in the clause in figure 3-7, the insured must give the insurer at least 90 days from
the day the proof of loss was filed, so that the insurer may investigate and make a decision
about the claim, before the insured may file a lawsuit against the insurer. However, the
insured also is limited in the amount of time permitted to bring such an action: within two
years after discovery of the crime.

3.5.4 Summary
Fortunately, most organizations experience few employee dishonesty losses of any
consequence. The strict policy requirements and sensitive nature of the investigation
required to document claims and the entire process of asserting a fidelity coverage claim
can be quite intimidating. If dealt with in a well thought-out and logical manner, however,
you can effectively handle employee dishonesty claims. The process reviewed in this
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Handbook should give risk- and insurance-professionals some guidance for planning a
response.
3.6 Risk Financing Checklist
See table 3.1 for a checklist designed to assist CPAs to address risk financing and fidelity
insurance issues in their organizations and in those of their clients. If necessary, investigate
and follow up No answers and then document the results. Use the Refcolumn is to cross
reference the checklist to any additional documentation.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If risk financing is a
concern, seek the advice of a risk management specialist.
Table 3.1 Risk Financing Checklist
Risk Financing Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Purchase of Fidelity Insurance Coverage
a. Has management reviewed operations to determine the nature
and extent of potential losses from fraud and commercial
crime?

b. Has management considered the extent to which the
organization can self-finance this risk (that is, could it survive a
catastrophic loss without insurance)?
c. Has management taken all reasonable steps to remedy any
previously identified vulnerable areas of the business or any
weaknesses in internal controls?
d. Has management established contact with a reputable
insurance broker capable of placing the required fidelity
coverage?
e. Has management assigned an appropriate person the task of
liaising with the broker to determine alternative kinds, levels,
and costs of coverage, and to report back to management on
these alternatives with appropriate recommendations?

f. Are procedures in place to provide for the timely and
appropriate response to circumstances where dishonesty is
identified, suspected or alleged?
g. Prior to finalizing the recommended fidelity coverage, has
management and, if necessary, legal counsel, carefully
reviewed the wording of the policy to ensure the following:

• Definitions, exclusions, and other clauses are acceptable
and consistent with the nature of the business
• When possible, duplication with other insurance (for
example, fire and theft policies) has been avoided
(continued)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Risk Financing Checklist

h. Prior to signing, has management verified all answers to the
questions on the application for coverage (for example, where
an internal control is indicated, does it exist and is it operating
effectively)?

i. Prior to signing, has management reviewed the wording of the
policy to determine what changes, if any, are required and
which of these changes should be made in the conduct of the
business, including the following:

• Hiring-screening of new employees
• Use of contract employees, who may not be covered
• Bookkeeping and reporting practices

• Internal controls
2. Maintenance of Fidelity Insurance Coverage
a. Is a mechanism in place to ensure that the organization meets
the important terms in the policy in order to keep the policy in
good standing, including the following:

© Paying premiums when due
• Reporting any loss incidents to the underwriter, even those
below the deductible when no loss claim is filed

© Maintaining adequate internal controls and good security
practices (for example, locking safes)
• Reporting changes in the accounting system

• Reporting changes in the nature and scope of operations
that may affect risk
b. Does the organization review its fidelity coverage on at least
an annual basis to ensure that the coverage remains adequate
and continues to meet acceptable cost-benefit criteria?

c. Does the organization assess its risk and its financing through
fidelity insurance on at least an annual basis?
3. Discovery of Dishonesty and Fidelity Insurance Claims

a. Immediately upon suspicion or discovery of a loss incident,
has the organization implemented the following steps:

• Protection of assets from further loss
• Preservation relevant documentation and other evidence

© Notification of the underwriter by hand delivery or
registered (certified) mail (“return receipt requested”)
• Involvement of legal counsel and a claim coordinator
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Risk Financing Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Never ignore this issue; you must act as if there is no
insurance

b. Internally, or in cooperation with the underwriter (or both),
are adequate resources in place to undertake a thorough and
timely investigation?
c. After establishing reasonable suspicion of a criminal act, has
management called in the police?

d. Has management ensured that no actions are taken to
prejudice the insurance claim, or the underwriter’s ability to
make recoveries, or both (for example, obtain underwriter’s
permission before reaching settlement with third parties or
suspected perpetrators)?
e. Has management considered initiating legal proceedings to
ensure maximum recovery?
f. Are adequate personnel and procedures in place to perform
the following:
0 Document the insurance claim (that is, the Proof of Loss)

• Follow up with the underwriter as required until the claim
is settled
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CHAPTER 4:
Computer Security and System Recovery
4.1 The Role of Computers in Modern Corporations
It is impossible to overstate the importance of computers in the modem corporation.
Computers track all assets, manage accounting, handle word processing, operate phone and
voicemail systems, and control communications. Computers have evolved from large
mainframes to networks of PCs—each of which has capabilities greater than those
mainframes from the sixties and seventies—to provide a wide range of services to the
modern corporation.

If those computers fail or are compromised, whether by accident or by deliberate action,
the company is in trouble. Preventing an incident is infinitely preferable to dealing with
one. If an incident occurs, however, the corporation must have a way of recovering
operations quickly and efficiently. Therefore, the establishment of appropriate computer
security and system recovery is a vital function of any organization.

Make no mistake—computer security is a complex subject that is growing and becoming
more complex every day. Businesses spend many billions of dollars each year on hardware
and software to control access to computers, to secure the data they contain, and to detect
intrusions. They invest hundreds of millions more in systems that permit efficient recovery
should a problem occur. There are firms, some with thousands of employees, specializing in
computer security. Clearly, this is a highly specialized field. One chapter in a Handbook
cannot make you an expert in computer security, and it is not intended to do so.
This chapter orients you to the field of computer security so that you, as a CPA, can be
certain not only to handle computer security and systems recovery appropriately, but also
to consider the major risk factors.
4.2 Management’s Security Issues
In the modern, global business environment, the computer has evolved from being a
number cruncher used by the accounting department and tended by a priesthood of
mathematical geniuses in a glass-fronted fire-protected computer room, to infiltrate virtually
every facet of the corporation. The computer has replaced typewriters with word
processors, adding machines with spreadsheets, and voluminous physical files with
database programs. In many companies, all significant information concerning assets,
transactions and operations are held on one or more computers. Today’s organization likely
makes use of hundreds of computers connected in local area networks (LANs) and wide
area networks (WANs). An organization may have dozens of these networks, each using
servers ranging from PCs to mainframes.
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4.2.1 Components of Security
Data Communications
Businesses do not exist in a vacuum. Increasingly companies are dedicating more resources
to data communications. Many companies—perhaps most, by now—have moved onto the
Internet, both as a way of distributing information (usually on the World Wide Web) and of
transmitting information between people or units: this includes electronic mail (email) and
the use of File Transfer Protocol (FTP) to move files across the Internet. The space on
business cards that formerly held a Telex address now has an email address.

Some companies are developing and fielding what are sometimes called extranets, which
link their suppliers and distributors through Internet connections. Other businesses, seeking
more security than is provided on the global public Internet, have turned to private
network providers who operate worldwide data communications networks that use the
same tools and protocols as the Internet, but are limited in use to subscribers.
Security and System Structure
Before computers, businesses achieved information security by installing locks on file
cabinets and file-room doors, and by restricting access to various files and documents.
During the initial period of centralization, organizations used mainframe computers with
attached terminals; effective access control existed on the central system. Today, the
situation is different. How is it possible to secure computer networks and data
communications structures that are not only complex, but also may exist on a global scale?
As businesses increasingly rely on computers and networks, they have an increased need to
secure their information-processing infrastructure against accidental or deliberate damage
and to provide an efficient, effective and secure system for backup of data and programs on
a regular basis. Organizations need security systems to restore information following an
incident or outage. Systems are virtually impossible to manage and keep secure if they are
not properly organized and structured. As a key aspect of security and recovery, and as a
measure of preventative maintenance, businesses should implement a structure for
organizing and storing information (for example, data files, spreadsheets, word processing
documents, and so on). In developing an effective information storage structure, you should
consider issues, such as file nomenclature and file access privileges.

External Versus Internal Security
As people recognize information to have enormous value, sometimes a value greater than
anything else in the organization, their need to safeguard this information has increased.
However, the risks inherent in the processing, storage and transmission of that data have
also increased, particularly as the Internet has flourished. There have been many
documented cases of industrial and economic espionage designed by organizations
attempting to jump-start their business activities by stealing proprietary information.
Companies have also been victimized because management believed the major risk they
faced was from outside the organization. They spent substantial resources on firewalls and
very little on other forms of security. Unfortunately, every study indicates that where crime
against business is concerned, 80 percent or more of that crime is perpetuated within the
company and hence, from inside the firewall.
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As systems grow more complex, with increasingly greater speed in connecting to the
Internet, it is important when assessing security that you consider a wide range of threats
and a wide range of ways in which to thwart those threats. Although an outsider can hack
into your network to gain access to a specific file, an insider might be able to pick up a
carelessly stored backup tape and walk out with a copy of every file in your system, all
recorded on a tape so small that it can be secreted in a shirt pocket.
Therefore no one should question the need for computer security and the ability to recover
from problems both natural and human-generated. However, it is useful to focus on some
of management’s key concerns.

4.2.2 Management’s Key Concerns
Managers in business and government have recognized the growing importance of
computer processing to their organizations and, over the last few years, have expressed
their concerns in a wide variety of publications. These concerns generally fall into one of
the following three categories.

1. Theft of confidential information
2. Information integrity
3. System availability
Each of these concerns is addressed below.
Theft of Confidential Information
Recognizing that companies increasingly store more information in computer systems,
management must have assurance that this information is well protected and that only
appropriately authorized employees have access.

For example, theft of proposed pay scales prior to labor negotiations could be detrimental
to the process and result in increased production costs. Theft of marketing or pricing plans
might result in a loss of competitive advantage. Similarly, theft of personal or financial
customer information could result not only in embarrassment, but also in a direct loss of
business and possible litigation. The threat of the loss of valuable intellectual property has
become so great that the government has enacted the Electronic Espionage Act, making the
theft of intellectual property a federal crime, punishable with up to ten years imprisonment.
Information Integrity
Because of the large volume of information processed by computers, it is not usually
feasible to confirm the validity or accuracy of processing results. Therefore, management
seeks assurance on the integrity of computer-generated information: that the information is
reasonably protected against unauthorized tampering by employees, computer viruses,
hackers, or other forms of sabotage.

For example, tampering that results in inaccurate reporting of sales figures could, in turn,
cause inappropriate production, excessive inventory levels, and lost product sales.
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Unauthorized altering of the accounts-payable records could result in incorrect mailing
labels or inaccurate shipping amounts, and therefore, direct financial loss.

System Availability
Recognizing their organization’s dependence on the data processing service, management
needs to be reassured, not only that everything has been done to reduce the likelihood of
disruption, but also that there are plans in place for resuming data processing in the
unlikely event of a major catastrophe. The total or partial loss of data processing services
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for most organizations to perform routine business
operations.

4.2.3 Effective Computer Security Systems
An effective computer security program can help to manage and, to an extent, alleviate the
above concerns. The design of an effective computer security program must take into
account the nature of the risk, and the nature and cost of the controls required to reduce
exposure. Note that there is no such thing as 100 percent protection. The growth of
networking and particularly of the Internet has materially increased the risk of computer
crimes and incidents. The following areas are among those that management must address.

Accidental Versus Deliberate Events
The events that result in breaches in confidentiality, integrity or availability may be
accidental or deliberate in nature, and may be the result of actions either internal or
external to an organization.

On a day-to-day basis, management could trace most incidents to internal accidents, such as
an employee entering incorrect data or inadvertently deleting an essential file. Accidents
also include failures arising out of undiscovered program errors, or bugs.

Some systems are composed of software packages procured from manufacturers. Others are
completely custom written. Others—perhaps most these days—are a combination of
procured software and custom code. In any case, the systems that support an organization
may consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of lines of code. It is virtually impossible
to test every possible condition that might occur in these immensely complex systems.
Program bugs exist in every major system. With the marketplace demanding speedier
program development cycles, manufacturers have converted at least a part of their
traditional testing procedures into beta testing, in which the manufacturers release an
advance version of the software to customers to assess its capabilities.
It is important to understand the difference between beta testing and the more traditional
system testing. In system testing, the software is stressed with deliberate input errors,
processing problems and anything else the testing team can do to cause the software to fail.
In beta testing, the users are not deliberately stressing the system in an attempt to make it
break down. Nonetheless, commercial-software beta testing is valuable, and results in
reports to the manufacturer of hundreds, or even thousands, of potential program bugs.
Regardless of how thoroughly a program is tested, it can still fail, and fail disastrously, as
the result of an accidental bug.
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Prevention, Detection and Recovery Controls
Prevention is the best and most effective way to minimize the impact of an unwanted event
that could affect information confidentiality, integrity or availability. In the case of
deliberate acts, preventive controls will reduce opportunity and thereby remove temptation.
Another important factor in preventive control is the notion of deterrence, which forms a
belief in the mind of would-be perpetrators that they are likely to be caught if they attempt
a computer-related crime.

Preventive controls, however, cannot provide a 100 percent guarantee that a problem will
not occur. As a result, organizations typically use complementary detective controls to
highlight any actual or attempted security violation. For example, existing software features
may prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to data. In these situations, the
software is programmed to produce reports that document all attempts by unauthorized
users—a feature known as detective control.
In addition to preventive and detective controls, organizations must prepare in advance for
recovery from unexpected events. For example, the backup-copy feature used to retrieve a
deleted data file constitutes a recovery control.

A well-designed security program includes elements of all three types of control:
1. Preventive
2. Detective
3. Recovery

The mix of controls used depends on the nature of the information stored on the computer,
combined with the reliance placed on the computer, and management’s willingness to
accept the associated risks. In the rapidly changing global environment in which we work,
with Internet connectivity growing at an unprecedented rate, and new equipment and
software becoming obsolete in months, it is no simple matter to keep security features up to
date with potential threats.
4.3 Physical Security

Physical security is the generic term used to describe the protection of the computing facility.
The controls exercised under the heading physical security are typically preventive and
detective in nature.
Many may think that physical security has become unimportant in the age of the personal
computer, when virtually every employee has a powerful workstation with a fast processor
and access to company networks, which are often equipped with huge local storage disk
drives. But the reality is that mid- to large-size organizations still use midrange computers
(such as the IBM AS400, Digital Vax and Alpha systems, HP 9000s, and similar systems
from other manufacturers) and mainframes (such as the IBM System 390 and large scale
DEC, SUN, HP, and Unisys machines). Even managers at companies that base their
computing on a LAN often realize that they best protect their servers by placing them in a
dedicated and protected operating facility.
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Physical security primarily addresses the accessibility concern, and attempts to minimize
the potential for system loss as a result of equipment damage. To achieve physical security,
consider each of the following areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Computer Room Construction
Fire Detection and Suppression
Water Protection
Electrical Power Reliability
Environmental Control
Physical Access Controls
Physical Security for PCs

Details on each of the components of physical security follow.

4. 3.1 Computer Room Construction
The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) standards provide the most concise
specifications for recommended mainframe, midrange and server computer room
construction. In summary, to provide an appropriate level of protection, computer room
perimeter walls should be constructed to a minimum of a one-hour fire resistance rating.
These walls should extend from concrete ceiling to concrete floor (slab to slab). Obviously,
slab-to-slab walls also serve to protect the facility against unauthorized entry from over a
false ceiling or under a raised floor.

This construction minimizes the possibility of fires originating in general office areas
migrating to the computer room before they can be extinguished. The use of glass partitions
to segregate the computer room from the general office environment usually does not
provide sufficient protection against a migrating fire.

Computer rooms have come full circle. During the sixties and seventies, the only
computers in most organizations were large mainframes kept in presumably secure
computer rooms. As companies changed from central computers to client-server
environments, file servers, which had become the departmental version of a mainframe, did
not need special environments. They were placed anywhere—on the floor, under a table, or
sometimes in a closet. This led to a lot of problems. Often they were accidentally turned off
or damaged. They did not always have power protection, and on more than one occasion,
companies suffered when someone accidentally pulled the server’s plug from the wall. With
servers in a closet or under someone’s desk, backup was sometimes forgotten, and even
when carried out, the backup tapes were often stored adjacent to the server.

4. 3.2 Fire Detection and Suppression
Fire detection and suppression systems are essential in the computer room to protect the
investment in computer equipment and the information stored thereon. These systems are
designed to detect and suppress fire before it advances to a serious state. Security experts
recommend automated detection and suppression systems because these systems reduce the
dependence on manual fire- fighting techniques that may prove either unsatisfactory or late
in arrival.
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The most common fire suppression systems axe water sprinklers and various fire
suppressing gasses. A gas, Halon 1301, formerly the most popular fire suppression gas, is no
longer manufactured because it turned out to be a significant environmental hazard.

Water sprinkler systems may be “wet” or “dry.” Wet systems contain water in the pipes at
all times. Dry pipe systems, also called pre-action systems, do not contain water until an
alarm situation occurs (usually involving a products-of-combustion detection unit), at which
point a valve automatically opens to charge the system. A high-temperature event must also
occur to open a sprinkler head.
Fire detection systems can also provide a direct linkage to other significant support
functions, such as opening fire exits, shutting off equipment and fans, and providing
immediate notification to an alarm company or the fire department via a communications
link.

4.3 .3 Water Protection
Water and electrical systems do not mix, but both are generally found in computer rooms
protected by sprinkler systems. Water can also enter computer rooms through leaks that
may originate on another floor of the building. Therefore, it is vitally important to ensure
that precautions are taken to detect and remove water leakage before it contacts the
electrical supply. Water protection usually involves the provision of:
• Underfloor water detectors, normally in the vicinity of air-conditioning units. Water
detection systems are usually monitored in the same manner as fire alarms.
• Floor drains to remove any water buildup. Unless specified during construction, floor
drains typically are not provided in modem office towers.
• Waterproof equipment covers. Where sprinkler systems or other above-floor water
sources are present, you should have available equipment covers or rolls of plastic that
can be pulled over the equipment in the event of a problem.

4.3 .4 Electrical Power Reliability
Unless suitable precautions are taken, a disruption to the electrical power supply will result
in the loss of computer service. The provision of backup power sources can be expensive,
and it may not be cost justified if the computer center is located in an area where the
electric power supply is reliable. If the electric power supply is unreliable, or the nature of
processing critical, consider using uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and backup
generators.

Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
UPS provides battery backup in the event of power failures or brownouts. The regular
power supply is monitored at all times, and battery power automatically provided when
required. These systems have become increasingly affordable.

Backup Generators
Backup generators are recommended because UPS can only provide battery backup power
for a limited time. In computer centers that provide critical processing services or in areas
where electric power is unreliable, diesel generators that can produce electric power for an
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indefinite period, provided fuel is available, often support UPS systems. Finally, regardless
of the local power supply outage record, it is likely that power conditioners will be used in
larger computer installations, and surge suppressors will be provided for desktop PCs.
Power conditioners and surge protectors monitor the electric power supply and remove
voltage sags and surges.

4. 3.5 Environmental Control
Environmental control is an issue that primarily has been a concern for larger mainframe
computer environments. Even the users of the smaller machines, whose manufacturers
claim can operate in a general office environment, cannot totally ignore the following
environmental issues:
1. Temperature
2. Humidity control

3. Environmental contamination
Temperature Control
Computers cannot operate in extreme temperatures. It is true that the range of operating
temperatures has increased over the years. However, even when the specifications indicate
that the machine will operate in a wide temperature range (for example, 59-90 degrees
Fahrenheit or 15-32 degrees Celsius), it is not advisable to operate these machines near
either the lower or upper limits. Air conditioning is usually installed to reduce the
likelihood of system outage or damage as a result of overheating.

Humidity Control
The computer manufacturers normally indicate a range of humidity that is acceptable for
their machines, for example a 20-80 percent humidity tolerance. Normally the air
conditioning unit provides humidity control.

Environmental Contamination
Dust can cause major problems in a computer environment. If dust gets into a disk pack, it
may cause a head crash, making information on that disk inaccessible. In addition,
accumulations of paper dust from printers are a potential fire hazard. To minimize the
potential for dust contamination, you should regularly vacuum the areas where dust
normally accumulates.

4. 3.6 Physical Access Controls
The importance of physical access controls over all assets and related records is obvious.
Such controls help to reduce the risk of fraud and commercial crime because—

• Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Perpetrators of many frauds must come into physical contact with either the asset being
misappropriated or the related asset records in order to cover up the fraud. Reducing
physical access reduces opportunity.
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® Access controls that fail to prevent fraud and commercial crime still often assist in the
investigation process, for example, the determination of what actually happened and the
narrowing of the list of possible suspects.

Physical security over computer installations and equipment is particularly important.
Sometimes white-collar criminals and irate employees can resort to blue-collar crimes, such
as arson and the willful destruction of property. When this happens, these blue-collar
crimes may be classified as commercial or economic in nature.
The only employees who should require access to computer equipment are those
responsible for its operation. Any third party engineers performing maintenance should be
accompanied by operations staff at all times. Providing more access increases the potential
for vandalism, mischief and human error; any of these threats could result in processing
disruptions.
Limiting access to the computer room involves securing the doors and keeping them closed
at all times. There are a variety of devices available for achieving this, the most common
include—
© Key locks: These are the cheapest to install but are usually the least secure because
duplicate keys can be made and distributed without control.
® Cipher locks: These are push button combination devices and are generally more secure,
provided the combination is changed on a regular basis.
® Card access devices: These are probably the most secure mechanisms because cards cannot
be readily duplicated and card distribution can be controlled.

4. 3.7 Physical Security for PCs
Much of the preceding discussion relates to computer systems of any size. Some especially
important measures necessary to physically secure PCs follow:
® Restrict physical access. Lock doors during off hours or when an office is vacant, or
both.
• Use the security features provided on many PCs, such as passwords, which prevent
access by unauthorized individuals.
® Ensure that all employees watch for unauthorized personnel in areas where
microcomputers are located.

4.4 Logical Security

Logical security is the term used to describe the protection of information stored on a
computer system. The controls involved are usually a blend of preventive and detective
controls. Organizations use logical security to address confidentiality and integrity
concerns, and to reduce the potential for inappropriate information disclosure, modification
or deletion.

Achieving an appropriate level of logical security involves giving thought to how the user
gains access to information. In addition to the security controls for the data itself, you
should consider the controls over the software that provide access to the data and to the
system. In so doing, keep in mind the following:
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•
•
•
•
•

Communications security
Data security
Software integrity

Computer operations security
Logical security for microcomputers

A description of each follows.

4.4.1 Communications Security
Communications security focuses on controlling the various methods of access to the
computer system. Of course, communications security primarily serves to ensure that valid
transmissions between computer systems are complete and accurate. As an added benefit,
communications security also presents an obstacle to criminal activity.

Passwords and Administration
A valid user identification (ID) and password is the first line of access control on most
computer systems. The validation of the ID and password by a computer program
represents the preventive part of the control while the rejection and recording of an invalid
ID or password represents the detection control. To be effective, the detective aspect of
password control requires an investigation of all reported access failures.
For effective password controls, procedures should be installed to ensure that—
1. Users choose passwords that are not simplistic in nature; for example, because simplistic
passwords can be readily guessed and the system compromised, never use initials, a
spouse’s name, or other similar personal passwords.
2. Management distributes new user IDs and passwords to users in a controlled manner.

3. Users change passwords regularly, approximately every 30-90 days, depending on the
nature of the information accessed.
4. Management revokes IDs and passwords of users who have left the organization.
Similarly, when users move from job to job within an organization, management
modifies their access rights so they can only access the data required for their current
job.

Network Security Features
The programmed network security features that are available vary from system to system.
Some of the common features include—

• A maximum number of log-on attempts. If the user has not successfully logged on in the
specified number of attempts, the session is terminated and the incident is recorded on a
log for investigation. On some systems, the user’s account is locked to prohibit further
attempts until the operators or the security-officer function takes action. This feature is
designed to prevent unauthorized users from repeatedly attempting to gain access.
• Automatic log-off of inactive terminals. If an employee leaves a terminal logged-on,
anyone who gains access to that terminal has the access rights of the previous user,
thereby breaching password security. Therefore, many systems automatically log off
users when the terminal has been inactive for a defined period of time.
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• Restrictions of users to specific terminals, specific times of the day, or both.

• Echo checking of transmitted information to ensure the information is complete and
accurate. This is achieved by a retransmission of the message to the source terminal for
validation.
• Firewalls to provide the security necessary to control unauthorized access to the system
from the Internet. Ranging from relatively simple hardware or software to complex and
hard-to-maintain packages, firewalls have become a requirement for systems attached to
the Internet. Careful installation is essential to prevent making unintended access points
available to an invader.

Remote-Access Security
Hackers have received considerable publicity in recent years, after successfully gaining
access to numerous computer systems. In response to the problems created by hackers,
several companies have developed and marketed security devices to limit remote access to
authorized employees.

One common device available to help control dial-up computer access is the callback
device. When an employee dials in, the callback device intercepts the call, the employee
enters a special code, and the device then calls back the phone number associated with the
code entered. The communications link is then established and the user ID and password
are entered in the normal way.
For both dial-up access and Internet access, there are a number of devices that provide
security by effectively providing authorized users with a new password for every log-on.
Some systems accomplish this by providing the user with a small key-chain-sized device
called a token, which has a window that displays a new code every minute. The user must
enter this code along with a memorized password to gain access.

Another version looks much like a calculator. When a user requests access, the system
provides a random number (called a challenge) that the user then enters into the special
calculator with a password. The calculator then displays another number (the response),
which is entered into the system to gain access.

Another class of access control, based on biometrics, involves measurement of a physical
characteristic. Currently manufacturers offer devices that can check identity based on
fingerprints, hand geometry, iris or retinal pattern, or facial geometry. Systems based on
voiceprint or signature dynamics are also under development.

4.4.2 Data Security
Unauthorized access to information can result in its disclosure, modification or deletion. To
achieve efficient data security, you should implement a system capable of evaluating the
sensitivity of the data to provide a level of protection commensurate with the nature and
perceived value of the information. Data security addresses the issue of protecting
information stored on computer files, magnetic media, and hard copy reports.
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On-line Data Files
On-line data files are those files stored on disk that users of a computer system can directly
access. Two effective techniques are available to secure on-line data files:

1. Software restrictions. A program, or series of programs, that references established security
tables to determine whether the user is allowed the requested access (for example, read
or write) to the requested data file. If the request is valid, the user will be permitted
access; if not, access is denied and the access violation is reported on a log file for
subsequent investigation. The security software process is illustrated by figure 4-1.

Figure 4-1. The Security Software Process

On some computer systems, the software restriction facility is an integral part of the
operating system, while on others a separate security software product that interfaces with
the operating system is used.

2. Data encryption. This technique scrambles information using a predefined algorithm or
key, so that the information is not meaningful to anyone who gains access to the disk
file. There are a number of mathematical systems (algorithms) in use as the basis of
encryption systems. These systems use keys of various length and complexity. Generally
longer keys provide more security than shorter keys. On the Internet all browsers
provide some level of security through encryption. Some have short-key capabilities
14
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(generally employing 40-bit keys) that provide a basic level of security, while other
versions (often export-restricted) use much stronger 128-bit keys. Some data encryption
packages (for example, PGP) can provide for even longer keys (often 1,024 bits in
length), which provide incredibly robust security against unauthorized interception.
Companies using the Internet to transmit confidential data should seriously consider
using encryption to protect that information from unauthorized interception.

Off-line Data Files
Off-line data files are information stored in libraries on magnetic tape, exchangeable disks,
and diskettes. Information stored on these media is as readily susceptible to inappropriate
disclosure, amendment, and deletion as on-line data files unless it is properly controlled.
The preventive controls usually applied include—

• Keeping the media library in a physically secure room where the door is locked
whenever authorized staff are not present
• Adhering to media library procedures, which require that the files be issued from the
library only for approved purposes, for example, production use and transport to off-site
storage
The detective controls normally include an investigation of all materials borrowed, but not
returned in a reasonable time, and the performance of periodic inventory checks. However,
many smaller organizations consider the use of comprehensive library procedures
impractical because of limited staff availability. In these situations and in microcomputer
environments, you should regularly back up computer information (on hard disks and
diskettes) and store it in a secure location away from the computers.

Reports and Documents
It is easy to become preoccupied with protecting information on computer systems while
neglecting information printed on input forms and computer reports. Generally, people rely
on internal controls exercised by user departments to ensure that data approved for input is
not modified before it is entered into the computer. Frequently, however, people pay less
attention to securing input documents before and after input. Yet these input documents
contain all of the confidential information ultimately stored on disk.

You should also pay attention to printed output, including—
• Printing control Appropriately destroy any partially printed reports that result from
printer problems.
• Distribution control Ensure that the appropriate staff distribute computer-printed reports,
particularly reports containing sensitive or confidential information, only to authorized
recipients.
• Storage security. Staff should secure computer reports in the user department for after
office hours protection.
• Destruction control. Staff should appropriately destroy all reports when no longer required
(this applies to all offices, not just computer areas). Even when information is outdated,
improper disclosure may still prove embarrassing.
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4.4.3 Software Integrity
The integrity of information depends on the integrity of the programs that produce and use
that information. Information’s integrity also depends on the integrity of the
communications software, transaction processors, file access software, security software, and
operating system—known collectively as the system software, which control the operation
of, and may be used by, application programs. Software integrity refers to the protection of
all system software stored on magnetic media and the migration of programs to production.
On-line Software Libraries

Computer programs are stored on disk files in libraries or software directories. The most
effective means of restricting user access to these libraries is through security software
restrictions as described earlier in the section, On-line Data Files, although library control
software may also assist in restricting user access.
The programming staff require access to copies of the programs to perform their job
functions. They do not, however, require access to the production versions. Providing
programmers with direct access to production versions compromises software control and
increases the possibility that unauthorized changes may be made. In general, only qualified
production librarians should require access to the production programs, and those individuals
should copy only new versions of programs into production, as required.
Off-line Software
Off-line software refers to the backup copies of program libraries or directories stored on
magnetic tape, exchangeable disks, and diskettes. The controls required to secure these
versions of the software are identical to those described earlier in this chapter in the section,
“Off-line Data Files.”

Migration of Programs to Production

If a programmer can gain access to a program and make changes between the program
tests being performed by the user and the program being put into production, the version
used in production may not be the same version that was originally tested and approved.
Changes may be introduced that could impact information integrity and expose the
organization to financial loss. Organizations can address this problem in a variety of ways
including—
• Restricting access to the test version of the program to the users who are running the test
and the individual(s) who are performing the librarian function responsible for the
transfer to production.
• Recording and monitoring the time when the last change was made, provided the
system or library control software retains that information. The date of the last change
should not be later than the date the tests were run and the software approved for use.
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4.4.4 Computer Operations Security
Improper operator intervention also can affect the proper operation of computer programs
and, therefore, the integrity of information. In particular, computer operators can create
problems by—

• Running the incorrect version of a program against the correct data files. This may
introduce errors through the use of untested program code or the possibility of fraud
through the use of unauthorized code.
• Running the correct version of the program against incorrect versions of data files.
Obviously the results produced by this action would be incorrect and could have serious
implications.
To effectively control operator activity, you should consider taking certain measures
including—

• Restricting an operator’s ability to change the Job Control Language. Job Control
Language directs the processing of a program and identifies the program to be run and
the data files to be used.
• Using internal tape, disk-label checking, or both, to ensure use of the correct file.
• Providing detailed operating instructions to reduce accidental error.
• Monitoring operator intervention by reviewing the computer activity-console logs and
investigating unusual activity.
• Reconciling data file totals from run to run, to ensure use of the correct version of the
file.

4.4.5 Logical Security for Microcomputers
Some of the important points to note with respect to logical security for PCs include:
• Be wary of leaving sensitive information on hard disks. Consider using removable disk
cartridge devices.
• Use cryptic passwords, and don’t leave passwords on or near computer workstations.
• Back up hard disks regularly to microcomputer diskettes or tape.
• Remember when erasing a hard disk that the normal erase procedures of some
operating systems leave the file on the disk (that is, it may only remove the file from the
directory). Even reformatting a PC hard drive does not make the data unrecoverable. To
prevent any possible recovery of sensitive files, use the disk-wiping functions provided
by commercial hard-drive utilities programs.
4.5

System Recovery
If properly applied, the preventive and detective controls provided by physical and logical
security will minimize the possibility of problems occurring. However, problems do
occur—either accidental or deliberate. System recovery procedures are intended to assist in
implementing an orderly and controlled return to normal operations, in the event of a
problem.
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You should consider using recovery controls to address any computer related availability
concerns. These controls are necessary in order to address short-term problems as well as
more catastrophic long-term events.

4.5.1 Recovery from Operational Failures
Operational failures are those problems that occur during the performance of day-to-day
processing. Examples include:
•
•
•
•
•

Incorrect file usage
Disk files deletion
Disk files destruction
Job processing failure
Computer equipment failure

Overcoming problems of this nature requires an appropriate combination of backup and
written recovery procedures.

Data File and Software Backup
To protect against accidental or deliberate destruction, for example, by hackers, it is
essential that you and your staff regularly make copies of all data files and software
libraries-directories. How often is regularly? This will vary from installation to installation.
In determining an appropriate backup cycle, you should consider the following factors:
• The frequency at which file managers update the file, library or directory. This will help
managers determine when to make backup files. For example, for system software
libraries that are rarely changed it may be more effective to make backup copies only
after making changes.
• The number of transactions processed each time the file is updated. This total helps
managers determine the amount of effort required to reprocess all transactions entered
since the last available backup was taken.
• The amount of processing time available for backup.
In the past, a backup cycle was often determined on an application-by-application basis.
Today organizations typically take a weekly copy of all files and libraries, and supplement
this with daily incremental backups. Incremental backups take copies of only those files and
libraries that have been updated during the day.

In many firms, employees frequently work off-line from their server, either away from their
office or saving files directly to their local drives. To ensure that all necessary data is
properly backed-up at appropriate times, you should establish guidelines that stress the
importance of the employees moving their work to the server as soon and as often as
possible. This not only provides back-up protection in the advent of a personal computer
failure, but also maintains a complete data record on the server for back-up purposes.
To assist in recovery from day-to-day operational failures, keep a backup copy of the data
files and software—on-site. In addition, send a copy off-site for use in the event of more
catastrophic problems, such as when all on-site material is either unavailable or destroyed.
(See section 4.5.2.).
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Recovery Procedures
In addition to providing backup copies of the files and libraries, provide the required
detailed written instructions for the operators so that they may efficiently and effectively
recover any necessary files. These procedures are described in most computer operational
manuals, and should address issues such as:

• Application failure recovery measures. These measures are normally documented for each
application and for each job step within the application. These measures describe how
operators can restore processing at an earlier point, and reprocess transactions. In some
cases when restoring and reprocessing is not possible, the manual should provide
direction for obtaining programming or technical support to resolve the problem.

• Use of utilities to recover from backup copies. The involvement of operators in recovery
varies from organization to organization. In some installations the operators copy the
files and libraries to a predefined recovery area on disk, and it is a user or support
group’s responsibility to copy them from the recovery area to the production area.
Other organizations will recover directly to the production areas.
• Vendor support for equipment failures or head crashes. Users should document all equipment
failures, including details of the request for vendor assistance and the vendor’s response.

4.5.2 Disaster Recovery Plans
Disaster recovery plans are intended to assist with recovery from a catastrophic event They
are not intended to deal with day-to-day operational failures. The term disaster is used in the
broadest sense—it need not be an act of God. As previously noted, white-collar criminals
can also arrange disasters to cover up their crimes.

Definition
A disaster recovery plan is a documented description of the action to take, resources to use,
and the procedures to follow before, during, and after a disruption of data processing
capability.

Given the business communities current reliance on computers, many executives would
probably find the loss of the computer center for a lengthy period of time inconceivable.
However, the same executive’s organization has probably taken no action on developing a
contingency plan. A survey completed several years ago suggested that less than 50 percent
of the Fortune 1000 companies had disaster recovery plans, and for the companies that had,
only half of the plans were feasible.

Elements of Effective Disaster Recovery Plans
Before disaster occurs, you should take action to ensure that off-site backup is capable of
supporting recovery operations. Keep off-site backup copies of data files and software some
distance from the principal site so that access to these vital records will not be inaccessible
and, therefore, denied in the event of a disaster affecting the local geographic area.
Consider what happened when a train derailed in Mississauga, Ontario (a Toronto suburb)
a number of years ago. In this case, the authorities closed access to a sizable city area for
five days because of a dangerous chemical spill. Any organization housing both its data
center and off-site storage in that geographical area would have had difficulty implementing
its disaster recovery plan.
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In addition to keeping off-site backup copies of data files and software, consider keeping
off-site the supplies of other materials required for processing. Examples include: check
stock files, special invoice forms and forms for laser printers, operations documentation,
and a copy of the recovery plan.

Perhaps documenting detailed recovery procedures and implementing regular tests of the
recovery plan are the most important actions to take before the advent of a disaster.
Disaster recovery operations require the channeling of information to management to assist
in decision making during the chaos of a disaster. Without clearly identifying reporting
channels and decision points in advance, employees may later take inappropriate action.
Similarly, prepare detailed procedures for system recovery because operations staff may not
perform standard procedures as expected when affected by the stress created by a disaster.
Remember that in a disaster personnel who might be expected to participate in the
recovery—either on the operations team or the management team—may be victims of the
disaster, so the plan must make allowances by designating one or more alternates for each
recovery position. Regular testing ensures that the plan is workable, and helps to keep the
plan current.
During the disaster, the staff with recovery responsibilities should follow documented
procedures to—

1. Notify all necessary parties that a problem has occurred.
2. Assess the extent of the damage and the expected period of system outage for
communications to the recovery team.
3. Report to a predetermined emergency control center.

After invoking the disaster recovery plan, the recovery staff should follow the documented
procedures for—
1. Recovering the critical systems at the identified alternative processing location.

2. Operating at the alternative site.
3. Refurbishing or replacing the damaged site.
4. Returning to normal operations once the damaged site has been refurbished.
Most organizations plan to recover only the critical systems at the alternative-processing
site. These are the application systems needed to ensure continued business operations. If
sufficient resources exist at the alternative site to run other systems, do not recover them
until the critical systems are running.
See figure 4-2 for a schematic of an approach to developing a disaster recovery plan.

4. 5.3 Insurance
For most businesses that rely heavily on computer processing, an effective disaster recovery
plan is likely the only effective means of ensuring continued business survival following a
major computer system disruption. However, it is possible to mitigate some of the financial
loss through insurance coverage. Some examples of the kinds of insurance coverage
available include:
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The Disaster Recovery
Planning Process
General Definition of Requirements
Identification of Critical Systems

Detailed Definition of Requirements
Resources Required to Run Critical Systems

Identification of
Processing Alternatives

Selection of
Best Alternative

Contingency Plan
Preparation

Plan Implementation, Testing and
Maintenance

Figure 4-2. The Disaster Recovery Planning Process

• Data processing equipment coverage: These policies assist in defraying the cost of
replacement computer hardware and air conditioning equipment. Some policies also
cover the cost of removing the debris from covered equipment.
• Data, computer programs, and media coverage: These policies cover only data and programs
in computer format, not hard copy. Organizations can take out insurance to cover the
estimated potential loss if data and programs are destroyed.
• Extra expense coverage: These policies cover the extra expenses involved in continuing
data processing operations if the equipment, air conditioning, or building housing the
equipment is damaged.
• Business interruption: These policies cover the business losses incurred following a disaster
in the computer department, subject to limits on the amount to be paid per day and a
total amount payable.
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• Fidelity coverage: These policies may cover costs associated with the unlawful acts of a
dishonest employee. There are various new forms of crime coverage that may extend
cover to certain acts by outsiders as well.

4.5.4 System Recovery for Microcomputers
Equipment failure for microcomputers generally is not a major concern for organizations,
particularly compared with similar situations associated with larger computer systems;
however, considering the dependency of many businesses on PCs and local area networks,
it should be given more attention. If a PC fails, normally another machine is available or
can be obtained with relative ease. Local area network (LAN) file servers and the
communications gear associated with connecting LANs to private and public networks,
including the Internet, may be highly specialized and take one or more days to replace and
reconfigure. The biggest concerns are the potential loss of communications (which would,
for example, cause a loss of electronic mail functions) and the loss of data stored on hard
disk or diskettes.

Good PC and LAN security should be a priority in order to avoid situations requiring
recovery. However, as noted earlier, disasters occur. Therefore, a regular policy of backing
up hard disks is advisable. Consider using Norton Utilities (a system diagnostic-detection
recovery software) or a similar program because under certain conditions this specialized
software enables the recovery of files that have been accidentally erased.

4.6 Management’s Responsibilities in a Security Program
Management is responsible for providing protection for the organization’s assets, including
protection against dishonest employees and outside criminal acts. The information asset,
administered in most organizations by the information systems or computer department, is
as vital and vulnerable as any other asset. Although many organizations have invested
heavily in the development of computerized systems to support their business operations,
they have not invested sufficient effort to establish a security program that would properly
protect that investment. Computer security is often neglected because of pressures to deal
with day-to-day operating needs first, yet security can be fundamental to business survival.
You can implement effective security by identifying—
• The information in your organization that requires protection.
• The level of protection currently provided for that information.
• The risks and exposures that currently make that information vulnerable.

Using this approach, you can achieve a level of security that is appropriate to your
organization’s requirements. The objective is to provide sufficient security without going
overboard and making security more complex than necessary. After taking the steps
outlined in this chapter, your organization can implement a security program to address the
exposures. This program should incorporate the development of policies, standards,
guidelines, and procedures; the assignment of security responsibilities; and the monitoring
of progress.
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4.6.1 Policy, Standards, Guidelines and Procedures
It is generally unwise to assume that employees will act in a security-conscious manner
particularly if the organization’s expectations in this regard have never been
communicated. Companies can communicate policies through the development and
implementation of policy statements on computer security and should emphasize security
and fraud awareness.

Effective policies must be short and succinct. If policies are too detailed and lengthy, they
probably will not have the desired effect (especially with junior-level employees). For
brevity, simply cross-reference the more-detailed standards, rather than attempting to
include this material in the policy statement itself. The policy, standards, guidelines and
procedures provide a framework for effective security in any organization.
Many organizations, in consultation with legal counsel, have determined that it is important
to have employees sign a security and confidentiality agreement that defines the person’s
responsibility for safeguarding information in all forms. Indeed, many organizations have
also developed agreements to be completed by contractors, vendors and temporary
workers who require access to confidential and proprietary information.

4.6.2 The Security Function
Having recognized the importance of computer and information security to the
organization, management must assign responsibility for this function. The person
identified to take on the security function will usually be responsible for—
• Assisting in the development of policies, standards, guidelines, and procedures.
• Developing a formal security program to improve the level of security in accordance
with management’s expectations.
• Raising security and fraud awareness.
• Reporting on progress to senior management.
• Liaising with specialists in the event of crisis (for example, police, forensic accountants,
computer forensics experts, and specialists in computer viruses).
Depending on the size of the organization, this may be either a full or part-time
responsibility. Initially setting up the program probably will require a full-time position.
One important function of the person or team charged with the computer security function
is to regularly check the Internet for new information about the latest trends in fraud
prevention and fraud techniques.

4.6.3 Policing
Once the security program is underway and the policy, standards, guidelines and
procedures are in place, an organization must ensure compliance with expectations on an
ongoing basis. This is a policing function.
Most organizations have an internal audit department that performs the policing function
for controls that operate in other areas of the business. As such, internal audit may be an
ideal candidate to become involved in testing compliance with corporate security
expectations. Alternatively, external auditors or consultants can fill this role.
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4.6.4 Evidence Recovery
If a security incident occurs, computer and security personnel may find they have different
objectives. In an actual case in which a company’s electronic mail servers suddenly
reformatted their hard disk drives, the computer operations department saw as its objective
repairing the damage and restoring email services within the company as quickly as
possible. In contrast, the security people regarded the data center as a crime scene, and
wanted to collect evidence to determine if the incident had been a technical accident or the
deliberate act of a perpetrator. The two groups had to work together to ensure that
technical personnel, who were assigned the task of restoring service (including outside
consultants who were quickly brought in), would understand the importance of identifying
any evidence of wrongdoing and call in the security people to gather and secure the
evidence so that it would be admissible in court.
In cases where the crime scene is, in fact, the surface of a hard drive, the collection of
evidence becomes critical. As with any other evidence, it is necessary to ensure that the
process of collecting and safeguarding the evidence also preserves that evidence from any
changes. Courts will not turn a blind eye when recovery technicians have made changes
and later claim that the hard drive bears evidence of a crime. Under these circumstances,
how is it possible to prove that the purported evidence of a crime wasn’t planted to
incriminate an innocent person? In complex or important cases, this task is often assigned
to experts in the field of computer evidence recovery—a discipline known as Computer
Forensics.
4.7

Computer Security Checklist
Table 4.1, Computer Security Checklist is designed to assist CPAs in dealing with
computer security in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all No
answers require investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented.
Use the Ref column to cross-reference the checklist to any additional work papers.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist
does not guarantee the adequacy of computer security, and it is not intended as a substitute
for audit or similar procedures. If computer security is an especially vital concern or if
computer fraud is suspected, seek the advice of a knowledgeable computer professional.

24

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Chapter Four: Computer Security and System Recovery

Table 4.1 Computer Security Checklist
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Physical Security
a. Computer Room: Most medium and larger organizations will
have dedicated computer rooms for their mainframe
computers or file servers. The following are basic questions to
answer when looking at such a facility.

• Are adequate fire detection and suppression systems in place
(for example, does the computer room construction have a
minimum one-hour fire resistance rating, in addition to
smoke detectors, fire alarms, and sprinklers)?
• Where sprinkler systems are in use, are adequate systems in
place to protect against water damage (for example,
underfloor water detectors, floor drains, waterproof
equipment covers)?

• Where power supplies are unreliable or the nature of
processing is critical, are suitable precautions in place (for
example, battery-equipped Uninterruptible Power Supplies
(UPS) or backup generators, and surge protectors for PCs)?

• Are appropriate environmental controls in place with respect
to temperature, humidity and dust particles?
• Is access to especially sensitive computer installations
appropriately restricted (for example, through key locks,
combination or cipher locks, or card access systems, along
with access-control policies and procedures)?
• Is overall physical computer security on the premises
adequate?
b. PCs and Workstations

• Are PCs and workstations in areas where theft is a threat
secured by cables, locks or other antitheft devices?
• Are PCs and workstations secured with screen-saver
programs that require passwords to unlock?

2. Communications Security
a. Is a user ID and password system in place?

b. Is the ID and password system properly administered (for
example, is the distribution of new IDs controlled, and are
terminated users promptly deleted from the system)?
c. Are users aware of the responsibilities associated with their
password (for example, are they required to sign computer-use
and confidentiality agreements, and are they instructed to
maintain password secrecy and not to choose simplistic or
easily guessed passwords)?
(continued)

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

25

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

d. Are passwords changed regularly (for example, every 90 days)?

e. Does the system monitor and control use (for example, by
restricting users to specific terminals or specific times,
automatically logging-out inactive users, limiting the number of
log-on attempts, and recording all usage for later follow-up and
investigation if required) ?
f. For especially sensitive systems, is security to control remote
access in place (for example, callback devices or one-time
password devices)?

g. Is a person or persons assigned to be responsible for the
security function, including regularly checking Internet sources
for information on fraud prevention and fraud techniques?

3. Data Security
a. Is access to on-line data limited to authorized individuals only,
through built-in software restrictions or screening?
b. For extremely sensitive data, has data encryption been
considered as a security measure?

c. Are data files stored on magnetic media (including all backups)
kept in a physically secure location away from the computers,
to which only authorized persons are allowed access?
d. Are all printed reports subject to appropriate control and
appropriate destruction (for example, shredding) when no
longer required?
4. Software Integrity

a. Is access to production versions of all software tightly
controlled by a production librarian or similar authorized
person?
b. Is access to all software programming code controlled so that
programmers or others cannot subsequently alter tested and
approved software?

c. Are appropriate policies in place to guard against computer
viruses (for example, prohibiting the installation of any copied
or borrowed software, and screening all software with virus
detection programs)?

d. Are controls in place to ensure that the organization is not
using unlicensed (pirated) software?
5. Operations Security

a. Do detailed operator instructions (for example, manuals) exist?

b. Is computer activity logged and is any unusual operator
activity investigated?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

c. Are computer-operations personnel prohibited from altering
the program code and the Job Control Language, which
matches the program and data files to be run?
d. Are all software and data storage media clearly and correctly
labeled, including dates, to avoid errors?

e. Are data files reconciled from run to run?
f. Are all data storage media (including hard disk drives) erased
(wiped clean) before being disposed of?
6. System Recovery

a. Are copies of all data files and software made on a regular
basis (for example, weekly, with daily backups of transaction
files)?
b. Are guidelines in place to ensure that all employee work is
saved to the network-server to ensure a complete backup of all
data files?

c. Is at least one backup copy of all data files and software stored
off-site?
d. Has training been provided and do written instructions exist
for the disaster recovery procedures?

e. In the case of catastrophic failure, do alternative processing
arrangements exist?
f. Have the backup plans been tested in a realistic simulation to
provide assurance that they can work if needed?
g. Is adequate insurance in place covering computer equipment,
software, recovery expenses and business interruption?
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CHAPTER 5:
Internal Fraud

5.1

Asset Misappropriation from Within
As difficult as it is to believe, many experts are convinced that the worst threat to business
is from the people who work there. Fraud committed against an organization by a
perpetrator from within that organization is probably the most common form of fraud.
Certainly it is the most widely recognized.
It is estimated that at least one-third of all employees steal to some degree. In retail
organizations, shoplifters are responsible for only thirty percent of retail losses; employees
steal the remainder. Probably the worst case of insider misappropriation is the infamous
U.S. Savings and Loan scandal; the billions of dollars stolen by trusted insiders has no equal
in history.

5.1.1 Classification of Fraud
Regardless of the industry, you can classify internal fraud in several different ways. One
way is by the method of concealment, including on-book and off-book frauds.

On-Book Fraud
On-book fraud principally occurs within a business when an employee creates an audit trail
(which is sometimes obscure) that inadvertently aids the employer in detection. Examples
include phony vendors and ghost employees. On-book fraud is normally detected at the
point of payment.

Off-Book Fraud
Off-book fraud occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is likely to
exist. Examples include bribery and kickbacks. If an employee receives a bribe for
selecting a certain vendor, that payment would be made by the vendor and, therefore,
would not be reflected on the books of the affected company. These frauds are detected in
an indirect manner (that is, responding to other vendor complaints, investigating the life
style of the person receiving the bribes, and so on). If you suspect that an employee is
receiving illicit payments, examining the employee’s personal finances should prove this.

5.1.2 Cycles
You can classify fraud occurring within the business environment by one of the five cycles
in the accounting system. These cycles are:
1. Sales and collection
2. Acquisition and payment

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

3

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

3. Payroll and personnel
4. Inventory and warehousing
5. Capital acquisition and repayment

All of these cycles flow through the cash account. Accordingly, cash misappropriation is
discussed separately in this chapter. The following sections discuss the more common
frauds occurring within each cycle.

5.2 Sales and Collection Cycle
The sales and collection cycle deals with the billing of goods or services to customers’
accounts receivable and the collection of funds relating to those receivables.

5.2.1 Functions
The functions of the sales and collection cycle include:

•
•
•
•
•

Receiving orders from customers

Administering credit approvals
Invoicing customers
Collecting receivables

Adjusting sales and receivables for allowances, returns and write-offs

5.2.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Sales revenue on the income statement and accounts receivable and cash on the balance
sheet are affected by the sales and collection cycle. See Chapter 10 for further information
on reducing the risk of financial statement fraud.

5.2.3 Perpetration
Frauds in the sales and collection cycle most commonly involve the theft of cash, the theft
of other assets, and kickbacks to customers. It can also involve off-book fraud in a situation
described as front-end fraud, that is, when an employee diverts company revenue before
entering it on the books.

Theft of Cash
By far, the most common sales-cycle fraud is the theft of cash. The main schemes include:
not recording sales, under-ringing sales, lapping, theft of funds from voids and returns,
overbilling and keeping the difference, simple theft of cash, writing off receivables as
uncollectible, and issuing bogus credit memoranda.

For example, in one lapping fraud, a cashier was able to misappropriate cash receipts
totaling over $35,000 and cover the shortage by subsequent receipts. The prelisted receipts
were not compared to the deposits by an independent person, allowing the fraud to go
undetected over time. This scheme was eventually discovered as a result of a CPA
following up on the clearing of deposits in transit listed on the year-end bank
reconciliation.
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Theft of Other Assets
These schemes include ordering and shipping company goods to the residence of the
employee, and ordering goods for personal use.
Kickbacks to Customers
The most common schemes for kickbacks to customers include underbilling for
merchandise and splitting the difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company
for a fee.

Front-End Fraud
A front-end fraud occurs when a company’s customers are improperly directed to take their
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have made.
Another example is the receipt of a purchase rebate that is misappropriated and not
deposited to the company’s bank account.

5.2.4 Detection
Generally, CPAs can best detect frauds in the sales and collection cycle by analyzing cash
or inventory, or both.

Theft of Cash and Front-End Fraud
Following are some methods for detecting the theft of cash and front-end fraud:

• Investigate customer complaints.
• Insist that customers examine receipts.

• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices.
• Compare receipts with deposits.
• Follow up on deposits in transit at the end of each period.

• Account for consecutive sales orders and cash register transactions.
• Compare volume of credit memos by period.
• Verify independently customers who don’t pay.
• Examine gross margin by product.

• Use a computer to—
— Identify missing invoices by number.
— Match shipping documents, sales invoices and customer orders.
— Verify numerical sequence of documents.
— Analyze sales volume by employee.
— Match daily deposits with customer credits.

For example, in one fraud case, a CPA for a retail client noted a skip in the perpetual
transaction count for one of the cash registers. During a one-year period an employee had
destroyed sections of cash register tapes totaling $17,000. The irregularity was directly
related to the company’s failure to institute and maintain adequate internal controls and
procedures over cash register tapes.
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Theft of Other Assets
You can detect theft of other assets by using the following methods:

• Resolve customer disputes.
• Conduct periodic surprise inventory counts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices, including examining the shipping address.
• Use a computer to—
— Match sales invoices with customer orders.

— Compare customer names and addresses with employee names and addresses.
— Verify delivery addresses against addresses of customers.
Kickbacks to Customers
You can use one or a combination of the following to detect the common schemes in
kickbacks to customers:

• Follow up on customer disputes.
• Conduct statistical sampling of sales invoices by contacting customers regarding prices
and terms.
• Conduct computer analysis of—
— Prices charged by product to customer.
— Credit granting approval versus actual sales to customers.
— Customer balances versus sales.
— Customer balances versus length of time doing business with the customer.

— Receivable write-offs.
— Credit memos to customers.
— Time between order and delivery.
— Discounts to customers in descending volume of purchase.

5.2.5 Prevention
Employers can generally prevent sales and collection frauds by using adequate internal
controls. More specifically, the following methods typically form part of an overall
prevention strategy:

•
•
•
•
•
•
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Separation of duties
Physical safeguards over assets
Proper documentation
Proper approvals
Independent checks on performance
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Honesty Testing
The legality of using certain kinds of honesty testing as part of the hiring process varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, since the advent of the U.S. Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, generally it has been unlawful to require preemployment
polygraphs of prospective employees. A number of companies have turned to pencil and
paper honesty tests, which their designers tout as accurate.

Separation of Duties
Employers can prevent most frauds by properly segregating the custody, authorization, and
record-keeping functions. In the case of sales and collections, it is important to separate the
functions of credit granting and sales. In addition, the functions of sales, record keeping,
and cash handling should also be separate.

Physical Safeguards over Assets
If assets and records have physical safeguards, misappropriation is much more difficult. In
the area of computers, physical safeguards such as restricted access, locks, and similar
controls are especially important.

Proper Documentation
Proper documentation requires adequate records, including prenumbered checks and
invoices, to make fictitious entries more difficult. Documentation in sales and collections
should include the following prenumbered documents:
• Sales orders
• Shipping documents
• Sales invoices
• Credit memos
• Remittance advices

Proper Approvals
Approval should be sought and evidenced before each of the following:

1. Granting credit

2. Allowing write-offs
3. Shipping goods

Independent Checks on Performance
In addition to a necessary independent review of employee adherence to internal controls,
you should make the potential perpetrators aware that their performance is being
monitored. Independent verification steps include reconciling bank accounts, audits and
supervision.
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5.2.6 Sales, Receivables and Receipts System
The sales, receivables and receipts system is the part of the accounting system that records a
company’s sales and revenue collections. Individuals can use false books and supporting
documentation for sales, receivables and receipts to perpetrate a fraud on a company. This
section covers three such methods:

1. Front-end fraud

2. False sales invoices
3. Lapping

Front-End Fraud
As discussed in section 5.2.3, employees may divert company revenues before that money
ever reaches the sales, receivables and receipts system, thus circumventing the accounting
system entirely. This is commonly called front-end fraud.

A front-end fraud occurs when company products are sold for cash, the sale and the receipt
of the cash are not recorded, and the cash is diverted—usually, directly into the pocket of
the perpetrator. A front-end fraud also occurs when a company’s customers are improperly
directed to take their business elsewhere, thus depriving the company of profits. Finally, a
front-end fraud occurs when an employee receives and misappropriates special or unusual
revenues and cost reductions, such as a purchase rebate.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are:

1. Do recorded sales represent all company sales? Where no sale has been recorded, there
is nothing in the sales accounting system to red-flag an unpaid or overdue account. As a
result, unrecorded sales are difficult to detect; however, actual inventory on hand has
been depleted. Therefore, if the company has a good inventory accounting system,
unrecorded sales may be detected.
2. Has the company unexpectedly lost some of its oldest and best customers?
3. Are all revenues recorded? Service businesses, such as parking lots, theatres and movie
houses operate primarily with cash sales and have no inventory systems. Front-end
frauds in these kinds of businesses, therefore, are extremely difficult to detect.
When allowed under local law, a review of a suspected perpetrator’s personal bank
accounts may reveal unexplained cash deposits, which could be important in establishing
circumstantial evidence of front-end cash skimming. Otherwise use of the net worth
approach may be necessary to establish that the suspected perpetrator has benefited.

Investigators should analyze the sales records and other supporting documents of the victim
company for the period both before and after the assumed occurrence date of a front-end
fraud. When possible, the investigators should interview customers as well.
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“Taxes ‘R Us” Case Study

Jane Brown and Jack Smith were cashiers who worked at a county tax office.
Investigation revealed that, over a two-month period in 1997, thirteen individuals
apparently paid tax for vehicle tags and did not receive an official receipt.
On a review of all the official receipts issued during this period of time it was found
that:

1. The numerical continuity of the prenumbered receipts was complete; that is, all
of the issued receipts were accounted for in the bureau’s records.
2. There were no receipts to support the thirteen payments made by those
individuals identified as exceptions.

The county tax office’s banking records were then reviewed for the days on which
people reportedly paid for their tags but did not receive a receipt. The review
disclosed that the amount of cash and checks relating to the tax deposited to the
county bank account totaled only the amount of receipts issued for that date.
Five of the individuals who reportedly paid for their tags, but were not issued an
official receipt, paid by check. In the case of each of these five individuals, the
checks were deposited to the county bank account, but the checks, upon deposit,
were applied to cover actual receipts issued. With respect to those individuals who
were known to have paid for their tags by check, but who did not receive an official
receipt, it was noted that a like amount was included on the county tax office
deposit slip.

During the same period, cash totaling $4,600 was deposited to the known bank
accounts ofJane Brown. The source of that deposited cash was not identified.

Front-end fraud of this type is very difficult to detect. Larger frauds may be uncovered if the
perpetrators become too greedy because the resulting unusually low daily deposits may
highlight the problem. In fact, skimming of small amounts may be detected only through
customer complaints: as in the case study, by the lack of an official receipt. This illustrates
the need to thoroughly investigate similar complaints and any other irregularities.

False Sales Invoices
Employees can alter a company sales invoice to show a lower sale amount than what was
actually received. They can misappropriate the difference between the real sale amount and
the adjusted lower amount without the accounting system showing a redflag.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud include:

1. Are recorded sales amounts the actual sales amounts?
2. Can customers confirm the sales?
3. Are sale amounts reasonable in the circumstances?
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Investigators should obtain and examine all original copies of invoices and all the related
books of original entry. Again, the investigator must become familiar with the accounting
system in effect and understand the accused’s position within that system. Did the accused
have the necessary authority to perpetrate this crime? Did the accused have the
opportunity?

“Ms. Wanda Cash” Case Study
Wanda Cash was the bookkeeper for Anytown Animal Center. She looked after all
customer records including preparing bills and collecting payments. The owners of
the business became suspicious when daily bank deposits were not as high as
expected considering the level of business. Upon investigation by the owners, the
police and forensic accountants, it was discovered that Wanda Cash, through
altering sales invoices, had misappropriated approximately $11,700.
The investigation revealed that:

1. The 183 customer copies of sales invoices showed a total-charge amount higher
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash receipts journal. The customer
copy of sales invoices indicated total charges to be higher by $2,579 than the
amount recorded in the cash receipts journal.
2. The 549 office copies of the sales invoices indicated a total-charge amount higher
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash-receipts journal. The office
copy total-charge amount was higher by $8,941 than the amount recorded in the
cash-receipts journal.
3. Approximately 68 office-copy invoices were apparently altered so that the total
charge after alteration balanced with the total charge recorded in the cash
receipts journal.

To uncover this fraud and measure its magnitude, investigators compared the
following:
• Customer copies of invoices obtained by the investigating officer
• Office or accounting copies of the company’s sales invoices
• Entries in the customer ledger cards and the cash-receipts journal

The result was that the amount of the total charge on the customer copies of sales
invoices exceeded the amount of the total charge recorded in the cash-receipts
journal by an aggregate amount of $2,579. An examination of these documents
disclosed that in 54 separate cases the corresponding office copy of the invoice was
altered so that the altered amount agreed to the total-charge amount recorded in the
cash-receipts journal.
Investigators compared the office copies of the sales invoices with the total charge
recorded for those invoices in the cash-receipts journal and found that the total
charge amount on the office copy exceeded the total charge amount recorded in the
cash receipts journal. In aggregate, the excess was $8,941.
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This case illustrates the need for close supervision in small businesses, in which adequate
division of duties is difficult to achieve.
Lapping

Lapping occurs when cash receipts from Customer A are misappropriated and the
misappropriation is subsequently concealed by recording the receipt of monies from
Customer B to the credit of Customer A (to the extent of the earlier misappropriation).

The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are as follows:
1. Are the amounts recorded as owing to the company actually still owing to the company?
2. Are deposits from Peter being used to cover Paul’s debts?

To handle these questions, the investigator should understand the organization’s system for
receiving customer payments, making bank deposits, and preparing entries to customer
accounts. The following is a guide to understanding an organization’s account management.

1. Who first received the payments?
2. Who prepared the company bank deposit?

3. Who updated the customer accounts?
4. Has an individual written offany accounts?
5. Who approved the write-offs? (It is also often necessary to contact customers and obtain
their records of payments, including paid checks and remittance advices.)
6. Do the customer’s records show payment of specific invoices that are shown as unpaid
in the victim company’s records?

“Ms. B. A. Lapper” Case Study

Jones Transport Company operated a trucking terminal in Norcross, GA. Their
accounts receivable clerk, Ms. B.A. Lapper, had been a loyal employee for over
eight years. The terminal manager often complimented her for the extra effort she
put into the business, evidenced by the amount of work she frequently took home.
This employee was so loyal that her only time off was attributable to sickness.

Ms. Lapper was responsible for preparing the day’s deposit to the bank and for
preparing input to the computer systems for updating payments on accounts
receivable. (The processing of the sales invoice as an account receivable was outside
her control.) Every month the head office in Atlanta forwarded aged listings of
accounts receivable to the manager’s attention at the terminal. He gave the analysis
to the accounts receivable clerk—Ms. Lapper—satisfied that the aged analysis was
relatively current.

Investigators determined that Ms. Lapper had conducted a lapping scheme over a
period of six years. The lap grew so large during this period that she had to take the
aged receivable analysis home in the evenings, along with the paid and unpaid sales
invoices. There, she would set aside invoices for payment during the next day to
ensure a favorable aged receivable analysis in the following month. As the lap grew,
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the new cash receipts were no longer sufficient to cover the previously
misappropriated funds. Accordingly, Ms. Lapper began to apply checks received
from the larger customers of the company to cover up the already-paid sales
invoices.

Investigators examined the known personal bank accounts of the accused and her
husband. An amount of $35,000 was found deposited to these bank accounts over
and above personal income during the relevant period.
Accounts Receivable Routines: Ms. Lapper’s main function each day was to
balance the cash with the pro-bills (sales invoices) and prepare a cash deposit for the
bank in Norcross and a cash report for processing by the head-office computer. She
would process all incoming checks from charge account customers by matching
checks to the applicable pro-bill control copies and preparing a deposit for the bank
in Norcross and a receivable report for the head office. She would present the
deposit slips and receivable reports to the manager for his signature, along with the
customer’s checks and cash in an envelope.

The supporting documents were always in sealed and stapled envelopes for each
report. The envelopes were not opened and verified by the manager. If the total of
the bank deposit agreed with the total of the receivable report, he would sign the
report. One copy of the report, the bank deposit slip, and pro-bills were then
forwarded to the Atlanta head office, while a second copy of the report and the
remittance copies of pro-bills were retained on file at the Norcross terminal.
Ms. Lapper would work on the company’s Accounts Receivable Aged Analysis, a listing
of all outstanding pro-bills prepared at the Atlanta head office, and would appear to
question certain delinquent accounts for payment. She would often take the analysis
home because she said she was too busy during the day to perform this function.

The Atlanta terminal manager would look at the receivable analysis printout and
tell Ms. Lapper to question certain delinquent customer accounts, which she
appeared to do. She would inform the manager of checks arriving after her contacts
with the customer. For instance, in regard to the Best Quality Cheese account, she
informed the manager that Best Quality was having serious problems converting to
a computer accounting system and as a result had requested that Jones Transport be
patient with the amount of old outstanding receivables.

Jones Transport hired a new person to replace Ms. Lapper when she became
seriously ill. Her replacement began the collection work on the two largest charge
account customers, Best Quality Cheese and Anyco Inc. Successful collection of
these accounts would immediately reduce the analysis’ sixty- and ninety-day totals,
which had become very high.
Customer Best Quality: Best Quality was advised that their pro-bills dated July
and August were still outstanding on the receivable analysis. Ms. Brown asked Best
Quality if they were having computer problems and the response was negative.
Subsequently Best Quality informed Jones Transport that the pro-bills mentioned as
outstanding were all paid by checks issued in July and August.
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Jones Transport then examined copies of the reports around the dates of the Best
Quality checks, together with check stubs and supporting pro-bills. Although the
pro-bills that were paid with the Best Quality checks were all Best Quality, all were
dated April and May. Jones Transport wondered if Best Quality had made an error,
because their August check, which was paying July and August pro-bills, did not
appear to apply to the pro-bills in the deposit that were all dated May and June.
Best Quality responded that there was no error on their part, and they could not
understand how there could be a mistake because they had attached all the
applicable pro-bills with their remittances.
Customer Anyco: Jones Transport then called Anyco Inc. and asked when they
would be paying certain outstanding pro-bills. Anyco indicated that these bills had
been paid by checks that had been issued and received as paid. When Jones
Transport checked their copies of the reports, they found that Anyco checks were
deposited, but that the checks were applied to older Anyco pro-bills and other
customer pro-bills and not to the pro-bills submitted by Anyco with its checks.

The outstanding pro-bills totaled about $47,000 at Best Quality and about $12,000
at Anyco. At this point Jones Transport recognized that the customer checks were
not applied to the pro-bills as intended by the customer. Instead the checks were
applied either to the customer’s older pro-bills or to other customers’ pro-bills.
Further investigation revealed that these other customers were normally cash
paying customers.

Examination of the Amount of Money Due Jones Transport: To determine the
correct amount of money owing to them by all their customers, Jones Transport
communicated directly with each customer, based on their accounts receivable
analysis. For each customer, Jones Transport prepared from their analysis a list of
pro-bills by number, date, and amount that the customers had not paid and
requested verification that the information concerning the outstanding pro-bills was
accurate.
A reply made by all customers indicated that several pro-bills shown in the analysis
of Jones Transport were, in fact, paid and were, therefore, not outstanding. This
finding confirmed the evidence of the samples and the discussion by Jones
Transport with both Best Quality and Anyco, that a customer’s check was applied
not to his current pro-bills as intended by the customer, but rather to a combination
of the customer’s older pro-bills and other customer’s pro-bills that had been paid in
cash.
From the information provided by the customers, the investigators determined that
the dollar value of the pro-bills, which had been paid by these customers, was
$115,132.

Jones Transport fell victim to a fraudulent scheme commonly called lapping. Cash
and checks were received at the Hamilton terminal of Jones Transport and
controlled by Ms. Lapper. The cash was removed from Jones Transport while the
checks were applied to the pro-bills that were to have been paid by the cash.
Consequently, the pro-bills remitted with the checks remained outstanding on the
accounts-receivable analysis published at the end of each month.
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As a result, the amount of the outstanding pro-bills, which Jones Transport found
through direct communication with their customers to have been paid, represented
that amount of the cash that had been misappropriated over the time period under
investigation, that is, $115,132.

Victims most often detect lapping frauds through accounts-receivable reconciliations or
confirmations, or both. Supervision is also important. Organizations can prevent lapping by
appropriately dividing duties (for example, assigning someone other than the accounts
receivable clerk the duty of handling cash receipts). You should also consider establishing a
policy of mandatory vacations, which could be helpful.
5.3 Acquisition and Payment Cycle

The acquisition and payment cycle includes the procurement and payment of all goods and
services except for payroll and capital acquisitions. This cycle is especially vulnerable to
fraudulent transactions because this is the point where funds flow out of an entity.

5.3.1 Functions
The functions of the acquisition and payment cycle include:

• Processing purchase orders and dealing with vendors.
• Receiving and recording goods and services.
• Accounting for the liability of items or services purchased.
• Processing and recording cash disbursements.

5.3.2 Financial Statements Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment cycle:
• Cash
• Inventories

• Prepaid expenses
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Land
Buildings
Equipment
Accumulated depreciation
Accounts payable
Deferred taxes
Other payables
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Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment
cycle:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cost of goods sold
Advertising expenses
Travel and entertainment expenses
Miscellaneous expenses
Income tax expenses
Professional fees

All expense accounts
Gains and losses on sales of assets

5.3.3 Perpetration
By far the most common fraud in the acquisition and payment cycle involves the
purchasing agent (buyer), who is especially vulnerable to the temptation of accepting
kickbacks and gifts from outside vendors.

One study revealed that companies who caught employees accepting small gifts were
hesitant to discharge their employees. Two percent suspended the employees, while only
12 percent fired them. Sixty-six percent reprimanded the employees and made them return
the gifts.
There are three general kinds of acquisition and payment-cycle frauds:
1. The buyer-employee acts alone, and without outside assistance.
2. The vendor acts alone.
3. The buyer acts in collusion with the vendor. As is the case with other methods of
prevention and detection, the collusion between both parties is the most difficult to
prevent and detect.

Buyer Acting Alone
Noncollusive purchasing frauds usually involve the use of a nominee entity, commonly
called a shell company, that is, an apparent third party owned by the buyer. Examples
include the use of a nominee entity to submit fictitious invoices (the most common fraud),
or to order goods for personal use.
Shell company schemes can be quite sophisticated using bank accounts, corporate filings,
and mail drops to assist in the fraud. One common shell company failing is using a post
office box rather than a street address. The post office box address has come to be
recognized as a red flag.

In one case, a 61-year-old employee of a major department store was indicted for allegedly
stealing $2 million from the company. His responsibilities included leasing buildings to
house the retailer’s stores. On twenty-two leases over a two-year period, through a nominee
company, he altered leases to receive overpayments, and forged invoices billing the
company for fictitious legal and building services.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In another example, an executive was indicted for defrauding a large cosmetics company
of $1.1 million over four years. During this period, he allegedly approved more than 150
vendor invoices for services that were never rendered in connection with a newsletter the
company was going to publish. The executive (whose salary was $124,000 per year) helped
set up two nominee printing companies, which bilked his employer with the fraudulent
invoices.
Finally, a director of customer-service technology was able to defraud his employer of over
$2 million in one year by taking advantage of defects in internal control. The fraudster set
up a legitimate agreement with a legitimate vendor to provide certain equipment. Then he
set up a fake distributorship and told the vendor the company would purchase only from
this one distributor. The vendor was content to have the business and proceeded to invoice
the distributor. The fraudster, through his nominee distributorship, then inflated the
invoices and billed them to his employer. The fraud was possible because the employee
had the authority to set up the agreement, and to approve invoices for payment. The fraud
was discovered by a manager who thought it was strange that the employee was delivering
the invoices to accounts payable by hand.

Buyer and Vendor in Collusion
Nearly all collusion between buyer and vendor involves some form of secret commission
or kickback from the vendor to the buyer. In these cases, secret benefits are given by a
vendor in order to buy business, or are requested by the buyer for direct financial benefit.
Collusion fraud often involves more than one kind of scheme perpetrated over time. Of
course, there is always the question of who took the initiative, that is, the buyer or the
vendor.

For example, one case started out involving inferior goods and later graduated to inflated
invoices. A county purchasing agent was responsible for acquiring a long list of janitorial
supplies, including mops, pails, soap, plywood, rakes, and paper goods. Area paper
jobbers—experienced connivers—approached the purchasing agent with a deal. “Without
changing our invoice price,” they told him, “if you agree, we can deliver a cheaper brand
of paper towels. Half the extra is for us; the other half is for you.” Once the purchasing
agent accepted a lesser brand, the vendor began squeezing for more by raising the price on
the invoice and billing for five times the amount of merchandise actually shipped.
Monetary payments are not the only benefit that can be offered. Other common ways of
corrupting a buyer include products or services; gifts, trips, or sex; promises of subsequent
employment; reduced prices for personal items; and employment of friends or relatives.

Vendor Acting Alone
Common schemes used by vendors include product substitutions, billing for work not
performed or services not provided, undershipping, padding overhead charges, and
courtesy billings.

5.3.4 Detection
Because of the difficulty of detection, fraud awareness and prevention is the best policy,
that is, know your vendors, and have an effective tendering process for all contracts. Fraud
in procurement contracts always poses special problems, and detection is difficult.
Common red flags include sole source contracts, unhappy purchasing agents, significant
price changes or changed orders (especially after a contract is awarded), and vendor
complaints.
16
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In one case detected through vendor complaints, a buyer with six years’ seniority obtained
purchase requisitions from various departments at his plant. He then created a nominee
company and placed orders with this firm. The nominee company would place real orders
with a legitimate vendor and have them ship the merchandise to his employer. The
merchandise would be billed through the buyer’s company at 150 percent of the real
amount. The scheme was unraveled when the buyer failed to pay one of the vendors, who
then complained to the buyer’s employer.

Sometimes you can also detect schemes through a computer analysis of the following:

•
•
•
•
•

Timing of bids
Patterns of bids
Amount of work performed by vendors
Patterns of hiring new vendors
Vendors with post-office-box addresses

In an example involving post-office-box addresses, a junior buyer, who had been with his
company for two years, created five nominee companies that he then placed on an
approved vendor list. Thereafter, he did business with these phony companies, placing
various orders with them. The scheme was unraveled when the auditors noticed that these
particular vendors all had post-office boxes for addresses and were not listed in the
telephone book. The amount of money lost was in excess of $250,000 over a period of
more than a year.

If you suspect that a buyer and vendor are in collusion, consider the following items:
•
•
•
•
•

Assessment of the tender process, if any
Patterns of business and bids
Noncompetitive pricing
Products of inferior quality
Buying unnecessary goods or services

• Lack of competitive bidding

5.3.5 Prevention—Key Controls
As previously noted, prevention of procurement fraud can be achieved best through fraud
awareness, effective tendering and budgeting, and knowledge of your vendors. Other
prevention controls include proper documentation, approvals, and segregation of duties.

Proper documentation includes prenumbered purchase requisitions, purchase orders,
receiving reports, and checks. Proper approvals should include detailed background
information on the vendor; ideally, purchase contracts should include a right-of-auditaccess clause to the vendor’s books. In addition, conduct both irregularly scheduled audits
of the purchasing function as well as assessments of the performance and happiness of the
purchasing agent.

5.3.6 Prevention—Policies
Organizations should have established prevention and detection policies. The following are
some policies to consider implementing.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Accepting Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the acceptance of gifts and gratuities:

“Employees, and members of their immediate families, should not accept gifts,
favors or entertainment that might create or appear to create a favored position
for someone doing business with the company. Advertising novelties or trinkets
are not considered as gifts and are excluded from these restrictions.
Gifts that are received by an employee should be returned to the donor and may
be accompanied with a copy of this policy. Perishable gifts should be donated to
a charitable organization and the donor notified of the action taken.

It is not the intent of this policy to preclude the acceptance by the company’s
employees of occasional meals or refreshments that are provided in the normal
course of business-work relationships, with other individuals. Discretion must be
used, however, in the limited acceptance of meals, refreshments or incidental
hospitality to avoid situations that could create a conflict of interest or appear to
do so.”

Providing Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the giving of gifts:

“Occasionally, it may be appropriate for employees, acting for the company, to
provide people outside the company with promotional items, meals, refreshments,
transportation, lodgings or incidental hospitality. Expenditures for such purposes
should be moderate and should be done only within the framework of good taste. All
expenditures are subject to the overall company policy that an employee shall avoid
constituting improper influence over others.”

Use of Hotlines
You should study the feasibility of installing hotlines to monitor complaints by employees
and other vendors. Make sure the hotline staff is not associated with either the purchasing
or payment functions. Failure to take this precaution could result in the fraudster receiving
the whistle blower’s call.

Disposition of Materials
The purchasing department normally should not be in charge of disposing of obsolete
inventory, scrap, or fixed assets.

Rotation ofJobs
Rotate buyers frequently within a department to keep them from getting too close to
vendors. In addition, enforce a mandatory vacation policy.

Competition in Bidding
Ensure that bidding policies and procedures are thoroughly reviewed. Whenever possible,
enforce competitive bidding.

Compensation of Buyers
Buyers should be well paid to reduce the motives and rationalizations for fraud.

18
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5.3.7 Purchasing, Payables and Collection Systems
The purchasing, payables, and collection systems are part of the accounting systems that
record a company’s purchases and expense payments. Employees can falsify books and
supporting documentation for purchases, payables and collections to perpetrate a fraud on
their employing company. This section covers three categories of perpetrating fraud:
1. False expense reports
2. False supplier invoices
3. Other false information

False Expense Reports
Expense reports prepared and submitted to the company for payment are false if they
include any of the following:

• Overstated items
• Fictitious items
• Duplicate items
An employee could use a company credit card for personal items. If the company pays the
entire amount of an employee’s account, that employee may be committing a fraud.
Ultimately, the answer depends on the first accountability for the disbursements.
Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:

1. Is the expense item an allowable business-related expense? It is necessary to determine
the company’s policy regarding allowable business expenses.
2. Is the expense amount the actual amount incurred? It is necessary to obtain the
suppliers’ copies of the original expense vouchers and compare them with those
submitted in support of the expense report.

3. Is the expense ultimately charged directly to the business? If yes, is there evidence of
any reimbursement?
It is also necessary to understand the approval and payment system in effect. Who
approved the expense reports? How were the expense reports categorized in the accounting
records? Were the expense reports adjusted at a later date to reflect those items of a
personal nature? Was there any pattern in the submission, approval or recording (or any
combination thereof) of the fraudulent expense reports?

“Manny Miles” Case Study

Manny Miles had been the Business Administrator and Secretary-Treasurer for The
County Hospital since shortly after it was formed in 1983. In addition to overseeing
the administration of the hospital and its 145 employees, Miles’ duties included
preparing budgets. He had check-signing authority and payment approval for the
hospital’s annual budget of about $5 million.
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The governing body of the hospital consisted of a board comprised of twelve
members; eight were elected and four were appointed as representatives of the
county. In 1993, the board members hired Dr. Jane Wilson as Medical Officer.
Almost immediately Miles and Wilson developed a severe personality conflict;
accusations and negative feedback caused a division between the personnel of the
hospital and members of the board. Attempts to terminate Dr. Wilson’s services
failed due to the intervention of the hospital board members on her behalf. The
hospital conducted studies to improve conditions but never implemented any
recommendations.

In mid-1996, during its audit, the auditors found irregularities in travel claims
submitted by Manny Miles, and the hospital referred the matter to the police for
investigation. In December 1996, and January 1997, the police executed search
warrants not only on the hospital but also on the residence of Manny Miles. They
seized the hospital’s financial records along with Miles’ personal banking records.
Examination of the records revealed that from 1993 to 1996, Miles had continually
made claims for travel expenses while using a hospital car. Additionally, he claimed
mileage from both the hospital and the county for the same trips. Furthermore
Miles had used his hospital credit card to repair his own vehicle and purchase
numerous personal items, including restaurant meals on weekends, when he was
not working. The card was in Miles’ name but the hospital paid the bills.
As business administrator, Miles could approve his own expenditures and authorize
the checks. To conceal his spending, Miles had authorized the listing of these
expenditures in the hospital’s financial records under other categories. Invoices
were missing for some checks issued and for credit-card expenditures. The financial
records of the hospital did not show any reimbursement by Miles to cover the vast
majority of his personal purchases, although on several occasions he had made
restitution for small purchases on the hospital card.

The Manny Miles case shows that independent approval and division of duties is essential
in the payment of all travel claims and other expenses. Employees should not be able to
approve their own expense reports. In addition, check signers should not be the same
people approving expense reports.
False Supplier Invoices
Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the company are false if either:

1. No goods have been delivered or services rendered
2. The quantity or value (or both) of the goods are inflated
The delivery of goods or services to a location other than a business location (for the use
and benefit of the perpetrator) is a common technique, as is the payment to a friendly
supplier when no goods or services were actually provided. Payments of inflated amounts
to suppliers often reflect the existence of secret commissions.
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:

1. Were goods and services actually provided? Find out, first, whether the supplier
company actually exists and next, whether any goods or services were in fact provided.
If they were provided, determine to whom.
2. Did the company receive the benefit? It is often necessary to obtain the bills of lading,
that is, the freight companies’ proof-of-delivery slip, to confirm where the goods and
services were delivered.
3. What was the approval and payment system? As with false expense reports, you should
understand the approval and payment system.

“Credit To You Inc.” Case Study
In January 1993, Jones and Smith signed an agreement to start Smith Construction,
a business that primarily consisted of erecting service stations. It was agreed that
Smith would provide the financing while, for a salary of $600 per week plus
expenses, Jones would manage and operate the business. Smith and Jones were to
share equally any profits from the business. The business progressed well and
showed a profit for the first three years.

Smith did not take an active part in the construction business, as he continued to
operate his own plastering company. Smith Construction operated as a division of
Smith Plastering Corp. Smith initially invested $42,000 as capital to start the
construction business, and as sole signing officer, would attend the Smith
Construction office regularly to sign checks, some of which were blank when
signed.

Jones tendered and obtained contracts, hired subcontractors, hired and fired
employees and purchased the goods necessary to operate the business, without
interference from Smith. Jones could also purchase material he required for himself
through the construction business and charge these amounts to himself on the
business books as a form of salary.
Smith was aware that over the years Jones had erected a bam on his farm,
renovated other buildings including his residence, and continued to operate the
farm. Jones informed Smith that he had obtained a grant from the government of
$300,000 to finance these endeavors.

In 1998, Smith Construction had difficulty paying its suppliers (creditors) and was
eventually forced into bankruptcy by creditors in June 1998. The company’s debts
exceeded $300,000. Jones gave no explanation for the shortage of funds except to
say that he had miscalculated the actual cost of various construction jobs. An
examination of Smith Construction’s books, canceled checks and available
supporting documentation revealed that Jones had defrauded Smith Construction
of $861,000 by various means.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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As general manager, Jones was responsible for the day-to-day operations and in this
capacity, he was afforded a degree of trust. At the same time, Smith, the absentee
owner, retained signing authority over all checks and, thus, thought he had control
over all policy decisions.

In his private life as a farmer, Jones incurred debts with suppliers who also dealt
with him as general manager of Smith Construction. Jones personally owed one of
these suppliers, Credit To You Inc., more than $25,000. In June 1997, Jones
purchased a $12.30 item, documented by the supplier invoice made out in pencil.
Later, the penciled information on this invoice was erased. Information was typed
onto the invoice, indicating instead that the company, Smith Construction, had
purchased $9,500 worth of material for a job then in progress. On the strength of
this typed document, Smith signed a check for $9,500 to the supplier, believing, of
course, that the disbursement was for the benefit of Smith Construction. When the
supplier received the check, on Jones’ instructions, he credited Jones’ personal
account, reducing the debt to $15,500. This altered document was the prelude to a
fraud of more than $861,000.
The alteration of documents (erasures, stricken information, or both) is at times the
only indication of a fraud as it can disclose a change of mind (intent) by the person
making the entry. Such alterations frequently occur in the earlier stages of a fraud as
the perpetrator has yet to perfect the scheme.
Acme Products Inc. invoiced Smith Construction for the sale of roof trusses, with
delivery scheduled for a gas station being built by Smith Construction. However, a
description of the route to Jones’ farm appeared on the back of the invoice. The
building of Jones’ barn required roof trusses. A review of the bill of lading
confirmed the redirection.

Investigators can also review delivery instructions as another technique for identifying
fraudulent transactions.

Other False Information
A business receives vast amounts of information, and subject to the existing systems of
internal control, relies on it in making decisions, initiating, executing and recording
transactions. If this information is false, a business can be deceived, resulting in deprivation
of some sort and hence the company is put at economic risk.

Examples of false information that businesses may rely on include:
• False financial statements (See Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement
fraud.)
• Overstated accounts receivable listings
• Overstated statements of income and net worth
• False general journal entries
• Altered internal company records
• Fictitious customer credit information
• False asset valuations
22

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Chapter Five: Internal Fraud

Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the summary information presented (accounts receivable listings, financial statements)
consistent with the underlying books and records, and are the real assets on hand? It is
necessary to determine the representation made by the person or entity under
investigation and the understanding reached between that person or entity and the
victim. Once accomplished, you can examine the books and records supporting the
summary financial information in question from the appropriate perspective.
2. Have the correct authorities properly approved entries in the general ledger? Are the
entries appropriate and consistent with the facts?

3. Can customers confirm transactions?
To address the second and third questions above, you should understand the accounting
systems in effect. Also, you should contact third parties to review and discuss with them
their books and records, and then compare that information to the victim’s information.

“Ms. I. O. Much” Case Study

Ms. I.O. Much was the office manager of Anyco Inc. from May 1995 to May 1998.
As office manager, Ms. Much, together with the general manager and president of
the company, had check-signing authority for the company payroll account.

While Ms. Much was office manager, the company’s auditors frequently had
difficulty completing their audit work primarily because of the poorly maintained
books and records. Finally, Ms. Much was replaced with a new office manager, who
found irregularities in the company’s bank reconciliations. After the company,
police, and forensic accountants completed an investigation, they determined that
I.O. Much received unauthorized payments from the company totaling at least
$11,195. These payments were covered up in a variety of ways.
After examining banking records for the payroll account of Anyco Inc.,
investigators noted all checks payable to the order of I.O. Much. They found that
eight checks totaling $9,126 were paid to I.O. Much but were not recorded in the
payroll journal.
June 15, 1997: A check dated June 15, 1997, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to
I.O. Much but not recorded. Attached to the December bank statement was a note
dated June 15, 1997, which stated, “This is to certify that I.O. Much received a loan
of $2,500 from Anyco Limited to be repaid before the end of the year.” The bottom
of the note had a legend stating “paid Dec. 28/97.” It appeared that no record had
been made of this apparent loan transaction until December 1997.
A review of relevant accounting records disclosed that on December 28, 1997, a
deposit of $2,500 was made to the Anyco general bank account. The deposit slip for
this $2,500 showed that the deposit consisted of three checks, as follows: $350,
$178, and $1,971. The sources of the three checks noted on the deposit slip
appeared to be as follows:
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1. William Smith—$350: A check was issued to Anyco on the account of William Smith,
dated September 8, 1997. The current office manager at Anyco stated that this check
was a repayment to Anyco as a result of an over-advance of funds to Smith, an Anyco
employee.

2. Anybank—$178: A check was issued from Anybank to Anyco Limited.
3. Bank draft—$1,971: The check was a bank draft purchased from Otherbank. When this
deposit was recorded in Anyco’s records, someone apparently recorded it as a reduction
of the company loan to I.O. Much. This loan was reflected in the books as having been
advanced and repaid in the same month, that is, December 1997.
March 1, 1998: A check dated March 1, 1998, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to
I.O. Much but not recorded in the payroll journal. It appeared that a journal entry
was prepared to record this check. This journal entry suggested that the $2,500 was
paid with respect to five different accounts as follows:

1. Account #99-6, salespeople’s salaries, Boston
2. Account #99-2, salespeople’s salaries, Dallas
3. Account #99-7, salespeople’s salaries, Washington, D.C.
4. Account #199-12, delivery salaries, New York

5. Account #99-8, salespeople’s salaries, Seattle
The journal indicated that this entry was “to record checks cashed but not recorded
or deposited.” The only check apparently not recorded in March 1997 was check
#2000 for $2,500 payable to I.O. Much.

It is significant that the checks paid to I.O. Much in 1997 and 1998, which were not
noted in the payroll journal, were not available in the corporate records.
Investigators obtained copies of these checks from the microfilm files at Anybank.
A review of the payroll records indicated two apparent discrepancies related to I.O.
Much. The April 7, 1997, payroll records indicated “income tax withheld” of $200
more than apparently had been withheld from I.O. Much’s pay. Similarly on
August 11, 1997, payroll records indicated $1,000 more income tax withheld than
apparently had been withheld to date. In that time period an offsetting adjustment
was made to the net pay figure, thereby indicating that the net amount of money
paid to I.O. Much was $1,000 less than apparently had been paid to her at that
time.

The effect of these adjustments was an apparent benefit to I.O. Much of $1,200. Her
W2 for the year ended December 31, 1997, indicated that she paid $1,200 more
income tax than she had actually paid. The Anyco Limited employee deduction
account was not reconciled at the time of the investigation, and thus it was not
readily apparent how the $1,200 tax benefit was accounted for in the company’s
books.
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While the amounts involved were not terribly large, this case points out a number of internal
control weaknesses that can result in fraud, including lack of supervision, inadequate division
of duties, and failure to perform appropriate accounting reconciliations.

5.4 Payroll and Personnel Cycle
The payroll and personnel cycle handles the hiring, firing, and payment of employees,
along with timekeeping, expense-account and travel reimbursements, and insurance
matters.
The hiring function can play an important role in reducing the risk of potential fraud
through the careful vetting of employment applications. Adding an employee whose
resume is not truthful is opening the business’s door to a potential fraudster.

5.4.1 Functions
The functions of the payroll and personnel cycle are as follows:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Personnel and employment
Preparation of timekeeping and payroll
Payment of payroll
Payment of payroll taxes and other withholdings
Reimbursements of expense accounts and travel expenses
Processing and payment of employee insurance, pension withholdings, and other
employee benefits

5.4.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle (see
Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement fraud):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Cash
Salaries payable
Payroll taxes payable
Other withholdings payable

Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Travel and entertainment expenses
Salary and commissions expenses
Payroll tax expenses
Medical and insurance expenses

5. 4.3 Perpetration
Payroll is particularly ripe for internal fraud. Common schemes include nonexistent or
ghost employees, fictitious hours and overtime abuses, overstating expense accounts, and
fictitious or overstated medical claims.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In one case, approximately one month after the payroll check date, Mr. Smith attempted to
pick up his check from Ms. Doe, who was responsible for all departmental check
distributions. Ms. Doe stated that the check was lost and that she would process the paper
work necessary to obtain a new check. She then entered false payroll data in order to
generate the check. Within a few weeks, Mr. Smith received a new check. However, upon
reviewing his year-to-date earnings, he discovered that the lost check amount was included
in his earned income. When confronted with the situation, Ms. Doe admitted to her
supervisor that she had forged Mr. Smith’s name and cashed the check for personal
reasons. Ms. Doe, who had been with the company for seven years, had her employment
terminated.

Expense accounts are easily and frequently abused. For example, the president of a
subsidiary submitted requests for business travel and entertainment advances with the
parent company. The chief accountant issued the checks for the requested advances. After
one-and-a-half years, the president had not repaid the advances. When pressed, he could
not support the advances with proper business receipts. He confessed that he had none.
The president who had ten years of service, had his employment terminated. The amount
involved was $120,000.

5. 4.4 Detection
Organizations typically discover ghost employees when payroll checks are hand-delivered,
and extra checks are left. For businesses employing vigorous payroll fraud detection
procedures, investigators can perform significant computer and statistical analysis. For
example, time card approvals, which are the same as signatures and endorsements on
checks, can provide items for further investigation. Computer-generated detection methods
could indicate:

• Payments to employees not on the master lists
• Payments to employees versus those not authorized for payment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Write-offs of employee accounts
Duplicate payments to employees
Overtime by employee
Password use during vacation
Social security numbers listed in descending or ascending order
Employees with no withholding
Each kind of withholding in descending order
Salary expenses in descending order
Hours worked in descending order
Time-card hours versus authorized job orders
Hours worked by employee by pay period
Pay rates in descending order
Dates of employment versus authorized dates of payment
Travel reimbursement by employee overtime
Travel reimbursement compared to other employees
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• Travel reimbursement for specific function by employee
• Travel reimbursements by kind of expense, that is, rental car, hotel, airfare, and so on
• Date of travel reimbursements compared to dates employee worked
• Numerical sequence of employee travel reimbursements

5.4.5 Prevention
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation for payroll purposes includes time cards for appropriate employees,
prenumbered travel reimbursement forms and payroll checks, and verification of medical
services.

Proper Approval
Proper approval includes hours worked and wage rates, hiring and terminations, overtime,
medical benefits, and travel allowances.

Separation of Duties
At a minimum, you should consider separating the following duties to reduce the
possibility of one employee acting alone.
• Accounting for hours worked and processing checks

•
•
•
•

Processing and distributing paychecks

Hiring and firing from timekeeping
Claims processing, approval, and payment
Travel expense approval and payment

Independent Verification
Independent verification is especially important for preventing payroll and personnel
fraud, and includes the following:

• Using time clocks wherever possible, and verifying the hours worked against the clock
• Ensuring hours worked are approved by someone other than the employee
• Conducting surprise audits of the personnel and payment cycle
5.5

Inventory and Warehousing Cycle
The inventory and warehousing cycle includes functions relating to the purchase and
warehousing of merchandise for manufacture and resale. Because of the volume of activity
and funds involved, fraud represents a significant risk.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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5.5.1 Functions
The functions of the inventory and warehousing cycle include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Processing purchase requisitions.
Receiving raw materials and finished goods.
Storing raw materials and finished goods.
Cost accounting.
Processing goods for shipment.
Shipping finished goods.

5.5.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Inventories on the balance sheet and cost of goods sold on the income statement are
affected by the inventory and warehousing cycle. (See Chapter 10 for further information
on financial statement fraud.)

5.5.3 Perpetration
The more common frauds in the inventory and warehousing cycle include: ordering
unneeded inventory, appropriating inventory for personal use, theft of inventory and scrap
proceeds, and charging embezzlements to inventory.

For example, a loading-dock employee and delivery-route driver were able to steal
$300,000 of inventory through collusion over a six-month period. The load sheets at the
dock were either not filled out or inaccurately completed by both employees (control
procedures required the dock employee and route driver to verify the quantities loaded
and sign a load sheet). The products were transported to an independent distributor and
subsequently sold. The defalcation surfaced when outside sources informed the company
that certain products were being stolen as the result of collusion between particular
employees and an independent distributor.
In a case involving a theft of inventory, an inventory records supervisor and a security
guard colluded to steal $400,000 from a jewelry warehouse over a two-year period. The
security guard stole the merchandise, and the supervisor concealed the theft by
manipulating inventory records. An undercover investigator, who was hired because of a
significant increase in year-end inventory shortages, eventually discovered the theft. After
this experience, and following a consultant’s recommendation, the company started to
perform surprise physical inventories at varied times during the year.

5.5.4 Detection
The three primary ways for detecting inventory and warehousing frauds are: statistical
sampling of documents, computer analysis, and physical counts.
Statistical sampling includes looking for inconsistencies and discrepancies in purchase
requisitions, as well as receiving reports, perpetual inventory records, raw material
requisitions, shipping documents, job-cost sheets and similar documents.
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Computer analysis includes identifying the following items:

• Purchases by item
• Purchases by vendor
•
•
•
•

Inventory levels by specific kinds
Inventory shipped by address
Costs per item over time
Direct labor per inventory item

• Direct materials per inventory item
• Overhead per inventory item
• Disposals followed by reorders
• Shortages by inventory item

• Shipments by address

5.5.5 Prevention
Prevention is critically important in the case of inventory and warehousing fraud because
of the amounts of money involved and the relative ease with which this kind of fraud can
be concealed. Prevention includes: receiving reports, keeping perpetual records, using
prenumbered and controlled requisitions, raw material requisitions, shipping documents,
and keeping job-cost sheets.
Someone independent of the purchase or warehousing function should handle approvals of
purchasing and disbursement of inventory.

Separation of duties becomes critical in preventing this kind of fraud. Authorization to
purchase should be handled by someone not performing the warehousing function.
Someone other than the individual responsible for inventory should handle the receipt of
inventory.
Independent checks on performance are also important prevention measures. Someone
independent of the purchasing or warehousing functions should conduct the physical
observation of inventory.

Physical safeguards include ensuring that merchandise is physically locked and guarded,
and that entry is limited to authorized personnel.

5.6 Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle
The capital acquisition and repayment cycle, sometimes referred to as the financing cycle,
includes borrowing money and accounting for the debt of an entity.

5.6.1 Functions
The functions of the capital acquisition and repayment cycle include: borrowing funds and
accounting for debt, accounting for and paying interest, accounting for and paying
dividends, accounting for stock transactions, and equity financing.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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5.6.2 Financial Statement Accounts
The following balance sheet and income statements are most often associated with the
capital acquisitions and repayment cycle (see Chapter 10 for further information on
financial statement fraud):
• Cash

• Notes
• Mortgages
• Accrued interest

•
•
•
•
•

Capital stock
Capital in excess of par value
Retained earnings
Dividends
Dividends payable

• Interest expense

5.6.3 Perpetration
The common schemes in this cycle include borrowing for personal use, misapplication of
interest income, and theft of loan and stock proceeds.
In one case, a factoring company obtained a credit facility from a regional bank to fund the
purchase of qualified assets, primarily accounts receivable. The vice president of the
company, in collusion with a customer, purchased fictitious accounts receivables with the
proceeds of the credit facility. Part of the purchase proceeds was wired to offshore bank
accounts beneficially owned by the vice president. The activity was discovered when the
bank manager reviewed the bank account of the factoring company and saw wire transfers
made to Caribbean tax havens. He hired forensic accountants who discovered the bank
had been defrauded of $9.5 million over a two-year period.

5.6.4 Detection
Most frauds in the capital acquisition and repayment cycle involve tracing the proceeds of
loans to ensure that all of the proceeds go to the benefit of the company. This can be
accomplished by tracing loan proceeds to the bank deposits, and tracing authorization for
borrowing from the minutes of the board to the loan ledgers. In addition, a computer
analysis can do the following:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Compare addresses of interest payees.
Match borrowings with repayments.
Check the schedule of late repayments.
Check the schedule of authorization of loan proceeds.
Check the list of loan recipients.
Check the list of addresses where loan proceeds were delivered.
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5.6.5 Prevention
Proper documentation of loan documents, journal entries, interest coupons and stock
certificates can aid in prevention of capital acquisition and repayment frauds.
Proper approvals include receiving approval of the board of directors for: borrowing,
paying dividends and refinancing debt. Physical safeguards include keeping stock
certificates and loan documents under lock and key. Also, conduct independent checks on
the transfer agent and registrar.

Segregation of duties is also important in prevention. The authorization to borrow should
be separate from handling cash and accounting. Authorizations to issue stock should be
separated from the handling of cash; and accounting should be separated from handling
cash, and dividends and interest.
5.7

Cash Misappropriation
Although not a cycle, cash is the focal point of most entities. All other cycles flow through
the cash account. Because there are so many different ways to misappropriate cash, this
section covers cash exclusively.
Most organizations can divide their cash into two major categories: petty cash and demand
deposits. Petty cash consists of cash on hand that is accounted for separately. It is
reimbursed periodically, and the expenditures are then booked to the various accounts.
Demand deposits consist of checking accounts maintained by the entity; savings or interest
bearing accounts; and certificates of deposit and all other liquid investments that can be
easily converted to cash.

5.7.1 Perpetration
Frauds perpetrated on the cash accounts are normally committed in conjunction with other
cycles. The most common are the theft of petty cash and the theft of bank deposits.

Theft of Petty Cash
Petty cash thieves usually forge or prepare fictitious vouchers for reimbursement from petty
cash. As an alternative, perpetrators frequently borrow from the petty cash account and
fraudulently represent that the petty cash account is intact.
For example, the head security officer had custody of petty cash. He had altered legitimate
receipts—primarily for postage—to reflect higher amounts. Postage is an overhead item
that was loosely monitored. At a surprise count of the fund, only about $700 in currency
and receipts were on hand of the $4,000 fund. Polygraph examinations were given to all
security officers, but the head officer resigned before his test. A promissory note for the
approximately $3,300 shortfall was executed by the former head officer. He had been with
the company for seven years. The company estimated the loss at $12,000 but was unable to
prove that this amount had been stolen.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Theft of Bank Deposits
Many times employees steal cash receipts prepared for deposit. In some instances, they
change the amount reflected on the deposit. In other cases, they make no attempt to
conceal the theft.
In one case, an employee of a food services business received daily receipts from sales
along with the cash register tapes from two or three cashiers. The employee mutilated the
tapes so they could not be read, then prepared the transmittal of funds for the comptroller,
but kept the difference between the amount transmitted and the amount submitted to her
by the cashiers. She sent the mutilated tapes to the comptroller with the deposit. The
comptroller’s office did not compare the deposit with the cash register tapes. The fraud was
detected when one of the cashiers noted that the transmittal to the comptroller was small
for a comparatively busy day. When questioned about tracing the transmittal amount to the
cash register tapes, the perpetrator was unable to show completed tapes. The employee,
who had been with the company two-and-a-half years, was fired but not prosecuted.

Employees, officers, and even outsiders can steal checks, both blank and signed. One case
involved an employee—a grandmother—who was the sole bookkeeper for an electrical
supply company in Omaha, Nebraska. She wrote the company’s checks and reconciled the
bank account. Over a period of five years she stole checks totaling $416,000, which she
spent on herself and her family. In the cash receipts journal, she coded the checks as
inventory; in fact, however, she wrote the checks to herself using her own name. When the
checks were returned with the bank statements, she would simply destroy them. She
confessed after she had a nervous breakdown, caused by continuous guilt from stealing,
which she knew was wrong.

5.7.2 Detection and Prevention
Because cash can be counted exactly, most detection methods involving cash relate to its
timely counting. The proof of cash is a standard audit technique that compares cash in the
bank to reported cash on hand. Properly done, the proof of cash can not only account for
theft, but also show overstatements or understatements by expense classification.
Timely and regular bank reconciliations by a person not responsible for handling cash will
frequently reveal discrepancies. Good reconciliation methods include examining
endorsements and dates, and if staff and time permit, referencing the checks to invoices,
orders, and other relevant documentation.
For example, a misappropriation of funds was detected through a reconciliation of bank
deposits with a collection log, which was normally kept by the accounting clerk, who at the
time of the reconciliation was absent on sick leave. Because the accounting clerk prepared
the collection log, the daily cash report, and the bank deposits, she was able to alter
individual accounts receivable records and misappropriate almost $24,000. She
accomplished this by preparing daily cash reports that reflected fewer cash receipts
collected than were actually received, and depositing the lesser amount in the company’s
bank account. The accounting clerk processed virtually the entire accounting transaction.
After the discovery of missing funds, she was fired, prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was
sentenced to ten years’ probation. She had been with the company three-and-a-half years.
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Auditors frequently use cutoff bank statements to ensure that expenses and income are
reported in the proper period. Surprise cash counts sometime turn up situations of
employees borrowing or floating small loans. It is critical that these counts be done on an
irregular basis.
Cash thefts are sometimes reported by customers who have either paid money on an
account and have not received credit, or in some instances when they notice they have not
been given a receipt for a purchase.

As an example, a client of a branch of a large bank complained that there had been a
$9,900 forged savings withdrawal from her account. The client indicated that she had
recently made a $9,900 deposit at the branch and suspected that the teller who accepted the
deposit may have been involved. The employee was interviewed and admitted to forging
and negotiating the savings withdrawal. The teller had obtained the client’s mother’s
maiden name and birthplace, fabricated a duplicate savings receipt book, and on an
unscheduled work day went to the domiciling branch and posed as the client. The
employee did not have any identification, yet was persistent enough to obtain an approval
on the savings withdrawal.
Computer analysis of the following categories can sometimes turn up fraud in a cash
account: checks that are missing, checks payable to employees, checks that are void,
comparisons of deposit dates to receivables, and listings of cash advances.

It is absolutely imperative to implement tight control of cash and to maintain the duties of
accounting, authorization, and custody.
In one case a fraud occurred at one of several campus cashier’s offices maintained by a
university for collecting and processing student tuition bills and other related charges. The
perpetrator was employed as a teller for approximately five years before being promoted to
head cashier. This position required reconciling daily cash register receipts to the cash
transmittal and bank deposits, as well as preparing deposits for funds received from outside
departments, such as the bookstore or dining service operations. These deposits involved
substantial amounts of cash. As head cashier, the employee also prepared the initial
accounting documents that served as the input to the various general ledger accounts,
including accounts receivable.

The perpetrator’s extensive knowledge and experience, coupled with the employer’s trust,
resulted in diminishing supervision, particularly of the cash register reconciliations. As a
result, the perpetrator was able to manipulate the documentation and the control
procedures necessary to conceal the continued embezzlement of funds. The employee, who
had six-and-a-half years’ service, was fired and prosecuted for stealing an estimated
$66,000.
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6.1

Fraud Perpetrated by Outsiders
Fraud is not merely the product of internal thieves acting against their employers. Fraud in
the accounting records may originate with outside suppliers and service providers as well.
It is not possible to determine the number of persons and bogus business operators
engaged in crimes of this nature. Suffice it to say that the problem is extensive. By some
estimates, nearly everyone at one time or another has been either a direct victim of such a
crime, or an indirect victim through higher fees or income taxes.

6.1.1 Classification of Internal and External Fraud
As introduced in chapter 1, for the purposes of this Handbook, commercial fraud can
generally be classified into two categories:
1. Internal fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by its employees,
officers, or directors
2. External fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties
(either individuals or corporations) who are outside the organization
Noncommercial fraud and other forms of white-collar crime also exist in which the
fraudster is unrelated or external to the victim (an individual).

The Impact of Collusion
Some forms of external fraud can also be committed with the help of an internal
fraudster—someone internal to the organization who is willing to assist the external
fraudster commit his or her crime. Generally, internal personnel would need some form of
an incentive—often in the form of a secret commission, kickback, or bribe—in order to be
induced to assist in this manner.
Fraud involving parties both internal and external to an organization are sometimes
referred to as collusive frauds. Another form of collusive fraud involves fraud committed by
a group of people within an organization. Both kinds of collusive frauds exist because most
internal controls are based on the principle of segregation of duties—this is circumvented
by collusion.

Another form of collusive fraud, committed totally externally, is price fixing. When
competitors agree to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their products or
services are sold, it is price fixing. The victimized customer of the colluders usually is not
aware of the price fixing unless there is a whistle blower. And, as markets are served by
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fewer and fewer entities resulting from mergers, price fixing will probably become a bigger
problem.

6.1.2 Reasons for Classification
Without some form of classification, the numerous kinds of fraud would overwhelm and
confuse the student of this topic. Learning is enhanced when long lists are grouped and
classified—for instance, students of a foreign language don’t start at a in the English
translation dictionary. Instead they start by studying the common elements of verb
conjugation, pronouns, nouns and adjectives so that they can grasp a wider cross section of
the language, and then put it all together when they begin to speak it. Of course, languages
have many exceptions to the rules. Similarly, most foreign-language pocket guides present
phrases by topic. For instance, phrases relating to money are separate from phrases relating
to restaurants, travel, shopping and health; however, certain phrases could be applicable to
more than one situation.
Much the same way, this Handbook’s approach to grouping and classifying fraud enhances
the CPA’s ability to learn about the numerous kinds of fraud. As a result, you should have
a greater appreciation for the wide variety of fraud that can occur, and should be better
equipped to recognize the signs of fraud at first sight. However, some frauds are difficult to
classify, fall into more than one category, or don’t exactly fit into any of the established
categories. These instances are mentioned as appropriate within the body of this
Handbook.

6.1.3 Classification of Fraud in this Handbook
In chapter 5, we discussed a restricted group of frauds—those committed against an
organization by its employees, officers or directors—otherwise known as internal fraud.
External frauds cover all remaining forms of fraud and represent a wide variety of frauds.
This chapter covers those external frauds that can be classified by perpetrator. These frauds
include:

1. Fraud committed primarily by individuals against a company, government, or other
individuals; this is referred to as externalfraudfor personal gain.
2. Fraud committed primarily by a company against another company, government, or
individuals; this is referred to as commercial crime.

Note that individuals using a corporate veil could also conduct certain of the frauds
presented in this chapter. Similarly, chapter 7, which primarily covers fraud by
corporations, includes fraud that could be conducted by individuals directly.

6.2 Individuals versus Individuals and Corporations
Individuals can commit many kinds of fraud against other individuals and corporations. Most
of the victims of the crimes described in this section are generally manufacturers, retailers,
wholesalers, service companies or other individuals; however, in some instances, victims
can also include governments, financial institutions, and insurance companies.

4
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6.2.1 Lawyers’ Schemes
Overbilling for Time
Lawyers can easily commit fraud, largely because of the nebulous nature of the services
provided. As one commentator indicated: the law lends itself to confidence scams.
Contrasted to a plumber, for example, whose failure to make the contracted repair is
quickly noticed, a lawyer’s performance of an agreed to service is not always discernable. It

(Text continued on page 5)
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could be merely some advice, a brief phone call or any number of innocuous,
commonplace actions.
The victims of overbilling can include the lawyer’s clients who are unable to assess whether
the time billed by the lawyer is reasonable, and can also include government funded legal
aid programs whose organizers are unable to assess whether the services billed were
actually performed. When in doubt, a lawyer’s invoices can be vetted; that is, they can be
assessed by another lawyer for reasonableness regarding whether the services billed needed
to be performed, and whether the time taken to perform the services was excessive or not.

Misappropriation of Trust Funds
Lawyers have access to funds provided to them by clients in trust to complete transactions.
There are many cases of lawyers borrowing client funds because they are in personal
financial difficulty. The most common crime associated with lawyers’ trust funds is the
misappropriation of client funds held in trust and the use of the money for the lawyer’s
personal purposes (for example, to subsidize a business, pay gambling debts, or support a
life-style).
There are three kinds of misappropriation:
1. Single transaction: Client funds can be traced to an unauthorized disbursement
(one-shot).
2. Several transactions: All trust-account activity is analyzed to determine which clients funds
were used for unauthorized disbursements (lapping).

3. Trust-account chaos: Usually, this kind of misappropriation is caused by poor record
keeping. Actual misappropriation of funds may or may not be found. Is the chaos the
result of poor bookkeeping practices? Are there reasons for the failure to account (such
as bad health, bankruptcy, intent to defraud, or loss of control due to numerous
misappropriations)? The answers to these questions may emerge after a complete
analysis of the trust account’s activity has been made. According to the ethical rules of
most states, if not all states, any use by an attorney of funds held in a trust account other
than that for which the funds were placed in trust is considered a serious breach of
professional conduct that may lead to disbarment, suspension or possible prosecution.
There can never be a legitimate misappropriation of funds that an attorney holds in a
trust account.

To uncover a case involving misappropriation of trust funds, the accountant should realize
that lawyers regularly maintain two sets of bank accounts and related records, consisting of:

1. One or more bank accounts, books of account, and supporting documentation for the
law practice itself.
2. A trust account together with any records reflecting the trust-account activity carried out
on behalf of the lawyer’s clientele. These are the most relevant records for investigating
alleged misappropriation of trust funds. The primary documentation required for trust
account activity consists of bank statements and bank reconciliations for the trust bank
account; the client’s ledger, which outlines all receipts and disbursements made by the
lawyer on behalf of the client concerning a particular transaction; and the client’s file,
which contains evidence of the transactions (for example, correspondence, the lawyer’s
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reporting letter, statement of receipts and disbursements, statement of adjustments,
mortgage documents, out-of-pocket vouchers, and billings).

CPAs conducting an investigation of an attorney’s trust account might also want to review
the financial statements for the law practice. These records can be used to assess the
successfulness of the lawyer’s practice, and are most relevant when the lawyer is a sole
practitioner.
See table 6.1, below, for an example of a misappropriation that would only be uncovered
by a detailed investigation of the banking transactions conducted within a trust account.

Table 6.1 Evidence of a misappropriation of a trust fund.
January 1, 1991

Deposit of $30,000

Agrees with client file

January 5, 1991

Withdrawal of $10,000

Unauthorized by client

January 29, 1991

Deposit of $10,000

Unauthorized by client

January 31, 1991

Balance of $30,000

Agrees with client file

At the end of the month the trust liability to the client, as disclosed in the client file, is
$30,000. However, $10,000 was temporarily removed during the month by an
unauthorized transaction. Thus a misappropriation of the trust fund occurred.

Skip Towne, Esq. Case Study
After twenty years in practice, a lawyer, Skip Towne, Esq., had built up a large
client base, including friends, business people and fellow church-goers. Mr. Smith,
who was selling his home, retained Mr. Towne’s services. At the time the
transaction closed on August 3, 1998, Mr. Towne received $176,574 from the
purchaser’s attorney for deposit into the Skip Towne, Esq. trust account. Mr. Towne
disbursed $5,000 of the funds in his trust account to cover various closing
adjustments including outstanding utilities and tax bills. Mr. Towne also distributed
$21,176 to his own account to cover the legal fees and other disbursements related
to the closing. The balance ($150,398) due to Mr. Smith, as shown in the Closing
Statement, was apparently paid in two distinct disbursements to Mr. Smith: an
initial amount of $65,000 on August 10, 1998, with the balance of $85,398 on
October 13, 1998. This final payment to Mr. Smith was, however, financed by the
deposit into the trust account of funds that Mr. Towne received from new clients
and other nefarious acts.

The specific funds in question, that is, $85,398 on hand as of August 10, 1998—were
not paid to the benefit of Mr. Smith. Between August 10, 1998, and October 13,
1998, Mr. Towne made a payment of $80,000 to himself that he used to invest in his
own real estate venture, and a payment of $5,398 to his other clients, to replace trust
funds that had already been spent on unauthorized disbursements. To keep the ball
rolling, Mr. Towne had to misappropriate funds from a number of other clients in

6

Chapter Six: External Fraud for Personal Gain

order to repay Mr. Smith, in addition to producing false mortgage documents,
forging signatures, and resorting to other acts of deceit.

Ultimately, Mr. Towne cleared out his trust account, abandoned his law practice,
and disappeared, leaving behind at least eighty-five clients who had been
defrauded. He has not been heard from since.

6.2.2 Directory Advertising Schemes
Perpetrators of directory advertising schemes usually target businesses. In this scheme the
fraudster sells advertising in a nonexistent magazine or directory, and absconds with the
proceeds. Many directory advertising schemes are perpetrated out of storefront operations.
A fake (or in some instances, real) directory is presented to the potential victim. The victim
contracts for the display or classified advertising, which will appear some months hence. By
that time, the fraudster has collected the funds and disappeared.

6.2.3 Property Improvement Schemes
Fly-by-night operators, promising repairs to property at bargain rates, are a particular
problem for elderly victims. The typical fraudster is a professional con artist who obtains
business primarily from door-to-door solicitations. The tools of the trade are not hammers
and saws, but bogus business cards and counterfeited or preprinted contracts involving the
payment of up-front money. Note that these property improvement scams are a subset of
procurement fraud, which is covered in more depth in chapter 7. Various forms of this
scheme include substituting products, charging for false labor or overhead charges, and
absconding with retainers and down payments.

Substituting Products
In a product substitution fraud, the fraudster typically promises a property owner a
particular product or brand, and charges him or her for it but then substitutes an inferior
brand without an appropriate price reduction. Thus the perpetrator reaps a windfall profit
through this deception.
Charging for False Labor or Overhead
Many repair contracts call for labor, materials or overhead to be charged at cost, plus a
specified contractor’s profit as a percentage of that cost. Obviously the more the repairs
cost, the more the contractor makes. By fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of
bogus labor charges or overbilling of materials, the fraudster not only increases the profit
but also can keep the difference between the actual and inflated costs.

Absconding With Retainers and Down Payments
The preferred method that seasoned professionals use is to simply negotiate money in
advance, then disappear. This is essentially an advance fee swindle perpetrated specifically
in the property-improvement or repair market. This method is advantageous to the
perpetrator because it requires the least amount of capital: no storefront, props, or other
accoutrements necessary—-just “get the money and run.”
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6.2.4 Personal Improvement Schemes
The term personal improvement fraud covers the many schemes that prey on people’s natural
tendency to want to improve their job skills, appearance, education, or position in life.
Fraudsters in this category primarily use mail order as an integral part of the scheme. Some
common forms of personal improvement fraud are described below.

Vanity- and Song-Publishing Schemes
Vanity- and song-publishing schemes are common, and rely on the victim believing that he
or she has talent in a particular area, such as art or song writing. These schemes are
normally advertised in magazines or by direct mail. They usually offer to evaluate, for free,
the victim’s talent. Of course the victim is told after the evaluation that he or she is the
newest undiscovered artistic genius. And for a hefty fee, the talent company will promote
the artist’s work. The artist then remits the fee, and the fraudster uses the funds for personal
benefit, providing little or no services in the process.

Modeling Schools
Modeling schools appeal to the natural vanity of some people. Typically, the modeling
school tells the student that he or she must have a portfolio of portraits to send to potential
customers, ostensibly to enhance the victim’s potential for getting modeling assignments.
The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a photographer to take the pictures for
the portfolio. Many modeling schools are not legitimate. They sometimes tout connections
to famous people, or claim they have placed famous people, when in fact they have not.
These schools get most of their business through mail order or newspaper advertising.
Once a particular area is fleeced, the school pulls up stakes and moves on.

Diploma Mills
For a fee—usually a hefty one—a diploma can be granted to those persons who apply. The
fraudsters usually claim the heavy fee is for processing the application or for verifying the
experience necessary to acquire a degree. The hallmark of a diploma mill is the ease with
which the degree is obtained, and the related cost. Victims usually apply for an advanced
degree to enhance their career skills; however, diploma mills are not accredited, and their
diplomas are therefore essentially worthless. Given the nature of this kind of business, there
is usually some culpability on the part of the so-called victim.

Correspondence Schools
Legitimate correspondence schools offering advanced education do exist. However, there
are also many correspondence schools with the same modus operandi as diploma mills,
providing substandard education at superior prices. They are generally not accredited and
offer little hope of job advancement.

6.2.5 Insider Trading Schemes
Insider trading involves the use of nonpublic information to make stock trades on a
securities or commodities market. It could include purchasing shares prior to a good news
release and can also include selling shares prior to a bad news release. The perpetrators of
such crimes get rich, while other investors are unable to share in the wealth. Some might
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argue that this is a victimless crime, while others would say that the victims are the market
as a group, because each and every trade is part of the market.

Criminal charges for insider trading have become the trademark of economic crime
enforcement efforts during recent years. These efforts seek to encourage the confidence of
investors in the fairness of the markets.

A surge of prosecutions for illegal insider information transactions began in the late 1980s
when stock transactions were first subjected to sophisticated computer review, enabling
investigators to identify unusual stock movements. Soon afterwards, when some meaningful
piece of financial information about a company was released, investigators could quickly
determine who had traded the stock heavily before the news release. If, for instance, a
firm’s president executed a transaction, it seemed likely, (though not assured), that he or she
had acted on the information before it was publicly disseminated. The insider trading laws
require that specified officers or directors of a corporation must report their trading
activities. The fraudster, however, conveniently forgets to file the required information.
Of course, the notable cases of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remain the most infamous,
and illustrate the staggering sums of money to be made from illegal stock trades. Boesky,
the Wall Street arbitrage king, was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $100
million. In his plea agreement, he gave information that led to the indictments of so-called
junk bond king Michael Milken, who eventually pled guilty to insider trading and was fined
$600 million.

6.2.6 Homicide-for-Profit Schemes
Homicide cases are quite different from white-collar crime cases in that the perpetrator is a
violent criminal, whereas most fraudsters are not violent. The tools of a murderer are guns,
knives, ropes, water (for drowning), fire (for arson) and poison, whereas the tools of a
fraudster are documents, books and records, computers, and calculators. The victim in a
homicide case loses his or her life, whereas a fraud victim generally only loses some money.
But there is one main similarity, particularly when there is a financial motive for the
homicide—the use of forensic accounting in homicide cases is similar to its use in fraud
cases and may involve corporate- or personal-financial assessments, or both.
Generally, forensic accounting may be applied in homicide investigations for one or any
combination of the following three purposes:

1. To analyze and determine a possible financial motive for murder.
2. To analyze financial documentation for possible investigative aids that may assist in
proving murder.
3. To identify possible payments on a contract for murder.

Assessing Financial Motive
In determining a possible financial motive, the investigator must direct the accounting
analysis primarily toward establishing and measuring any financial benefit to the accused as
a result of that person’s association with the murder victim. Benefit may be shown in any
one or combination of the following methods:
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• Payments by the victim to the accused (extortion).

• Assets such as real estate, collectibles, or antiques transferred to the accused.
• Insurance proceeds paid to the accused as a beneficiary under a policy.

• Other benefits, such as obtaining equity in a business or transferring of a partnership
interest to the accused.
• Other motives that don’t equate to a direct financial benefit, such as the imminent loss of
assets, involvement in drug trafficking, or marital infidelity.

Accounting evidence is not generally as significant as viva voce evidence. It may, however,
provide circumstantial evidence of a financial motive.

Assessing Financial Evidence to Assist in Other Ways in the Investigation
When assessing the financial matters of the victim in order to assist in a police investigation,
the forensic accountant may seek to determine:

• The victim’s business and social relationships and the identity of people with whom he
or she had dealings.
• The existence of any debts owed either by or to the victim, and whether evidence exists
to suggest the victim or debtor was resisting payment on them.
• The possibility of eliminating financial matters as a direction in which to pursue in the
investigation.

Investigators should examine business and personal financial records, as well as financialrelated evidence from the local real estate deed-mortgage recording office, lawyers, the will
of the deceased, and insurance policies.

Robert Kilbride Case Study
On March 29, 1998, Mary Kilbride, wife of Robert Kilbride, a veteran police officer, was
found dead outside her condominium complex. She had fallen from the twentieth floor
balcony of their condominium. Eight days later, Robert Kilbride flew to the South Pacific to
join Ms. Cathy Smith, whom he later married in May 1999 in Europe.
Ms. Sleuth, a forensic CPA, was called in to assist with the investigation. The police
suspected Mary’s death was not an accident—there was a $275,000 life insurance policy on
her life that was paid to Robert Kilbride in late September 1998.
By way of background, Ms. Sleuth was told that in July 1997, Kilbride resigned his
position from the police force. Friends and acquaintances said that about this time it
was evident that Robert and Mary Kilbride were having marital problems.
Ms. Sleuth then worked with the investigating officer to determine all she could
about the Kilbrides’ life-style. The primary objective of Ms. Sleuth’s accounting
assistance was to summarize Robert Kilbride’s financial activity for a period of
approximately one-and-a-half years prior to Mary Kilbride’s death, because of the
allegation that Robert had murdered his wife Mary for the insurance proceeds. No
summary books and records were available, a not uncommon situation in
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investigations of personal finances. Therefore, Ms. Sleuth had to reconstruct the
financial facts before they could be interpreted.

The volume of financial documents was considerable. Kilbride had numerous
credit cards, bank accounts and brokerage accounts in the United States, Canada
and Europe. Kilbride was also involved in numerous business deals of varying
nature and purpose.
In order to prove Kilbride’s financial affairs, Ms. Sleuth completed the following:

1. A summary of Kilbride’s financial history.
2. An analysis of Kilbride’s estimated net worth as of the end of July 1997 and
September 1998, based on bank statements, brokerage statements,
correspondence, contracts, appraisals, loan applications and other financial
documentation.
3. A source and application of funds analysis of Kilbride’s financial activity from
March 1997 to December 1998, primarily based on Kilbride’s banking
documents, credit card statements and brokerage statements.
4. A report on Kilbride’s monthly deficiency based on the information in the
source and application of funds analysis.
5. Graphs showing the cumulative deficiency from just prior to Mary’s death to
late September 1998, when the insurance proceeds were received.
These analyses revealed the following, which the investigating officer corroborated
by viva voce evidence from former coworkers, friends, neighbors and other people
who knew the Kilbrides.

1. When he left the force, Kilbride had no known source of steady income.
2. The Kilbrides’ combined annual salaries were less than $60,000, yet they lived in an
expensive condominium and had a leased luxury sports car.
3. After leaving the force, Kilbride’s net worth declined considerably. He began to borrow
heavily and sell off certain assets, including a rental property. He was also involved with
various unsuccessful business ventures.
4. By March 1998, substantially all of Kilbride’s net worth was represented by assets he
owned jointly with his wife. These assets included the equity in their condominium,
furniture, furs, jewelry and household effects.

5. Between the time of Mary’s death in March and his receiving the life insurance
proceeds in September, Kilbride spent more than $100,000 traveling throughout the
United States, Canada and Europe. Although Kilbride had no known employment
income, he and Ms. Smith rented a villa on the Mediterranean coast. He had
approximately $15,000 in other income during this period. Kilbride financed his life
style primarily by selling more assets, obtaining further loans and making heavy use of
credit cards.
6. In late September 1998, Kilbride received the $275,000 in life insurance proceeds from
Mary’s death.
7. Also in September 1998, Kilbride sold the luxury condominium; he and Ms. Smith
continued to live in the Mediterranean villa until he returned to the United States in
January 1999, when he was arrested.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In summary, the accounting evidence revealed that Kilbride enjoyed a life-style he
could not afford. He was living well beyond his means—his expenses so greatly
exceeded his income during the months before and after Mary’s death that he
would have been virtually bankrupt if he had not received the insurance money on
Mary’s life.
This evidence was very useful in establishing a motive for murder, and weighed
heavily at Kilbride’s murder trial at which he was found guilty.

6.3 Individuals versus the Government
Fraud against the government is a general term for several kinds of schemes perpetrated
against federal, state, and local governments or government agencies. Typically, frauds
against the government committed by individuals involve one of the following: income tax
fraud and benefit-program fraud. (See chapter 7 for a discussion of frauds against the
government committed by corporations.)

6.3.1 Income Tax Fraud
According to some estimates, most taxpayers do one of the following:
1. Fail to disclose all their income
2. Take deductions to which they are not entitled

The most common income tax frauds involve categories of individuals who receive their
compensation in cash. These categories include waiters, restaurant owners, bartenders, and
bellhops.

For the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be successful with a claim for income tax fraud,
intent must be proven—it is perfectly legal for taxpayers to manage their affairs to
minimize their taxes—it is illegal for them to do so in a deceitful manner.

6.3.2 Benefit-Program Fraud
Another major category of fraud against the government generally involves making false
statements of various kinds in order to obtain funds. The United States and other countries
with strong social assistance programs are easy targets for fraudsters. The specific programs
targeted include:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Welfare benefits
Medicare and Medicaid benefits
Unemployment benefits
Disability programs
Student loan programs
Housing programs

Often, rings of fraudsters apply for government benefits, resulting in very high losses to the
government, and ultimately to the taxpayer through increased taxes.

12
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According to a January 2001 report, the U.S. government has taken an increasingly active
role in pursuing health care fraudsters. The rate of criminal convictions quadrupled from
1992 to 1999. At the same time, recoveries from civil fraud cases increased by more than
50 percent, and of the $1.5 billion the government recovered from fraud cases, $840
million was from health care cases, both public and private.

6.4 Individuals versus Financial Institutions
Fraud committed externally against a financial institution can take many forms and can be
committed by anyone who deals with such organizations, including individuals and
corporations. The most common offenses committed by individuals—and sometimes
corporations—are credit fraud, loan fraud, false mortgage security, real estate fraud, money
transfer fraud, money laundering, and check fraud. These and other frauds against financial
institutions, committed by individuals, are described below.

6.4.1 Financial Institutions and Fraud
Definition of a Financial Institution
For the purposes of this Handbook, a financial institution is any organization, whether
domestic or international, that is engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying,
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money. This
also includes safe deposit facilities, custodianships, agencies and trusteeships.

Under the broadest concept, the term financial institution may be applied to institutions,
such as cooperatives, export-import banks, investment bankers and mortgage bankers.

Legal Aspects of Bank Fraud
In most jurisdictions, financial institutions are insured by an agency of the government and
are governed by related criminal statutes. For example, in the United States the broadest of
all federal statutes is Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1344. It covers all assets owned or
controlled by a bank, as well as employees and outsiders. It prohibits any action that would
defraud the financial institution, such as embezzlement, misapplication, false statements
and related fraudulent behavior.

6.4.2 Credit-Card Fraud
Generally, credit-card fraud can be divided into two categories. In some instances, the
fraudster uses credit information from one individual to obtain credit for use by another.
For example, John R. Fraud, with bad credit, obtains the credit information ofJohn Q.
Smith, and applies for a credit card under the name ofJohn Q. Smith, using John R.
Fraud’s address. John R. Fraud then makes charges on the account. When John Q. Smith
protests, the credit-card company attempts to locate the real user of the credit card, John R.
Fraud, who has since absconded.

The other common credit-card fraud involves duplicating credit cards and then using them
to purchase high-value merchandise, for instance, jewels, furs, and other items that can
easily be resold before the credit-card company catches up with the fraudster.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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More attention should be paid to credit-card fraud because it is growing in volume and
taking on international aspects. No longer is credit-card fraud local; the Internet has
opened the door to global possibilities. A merchant extending credit on an Internet
transaction has to rely on the honesty of the purchaser and the limited comfort a bank
authorization provides. All too often, the merchant is stuck for the shipped merchandise
and no payment.

6.4.3 Loan Fraud
Borrowers sometimes provide false information to a lending institution in order to obtain
funds to continue business activity, or simply to fraudulently get money that they have no
intention of repaying. Some of the most common schemes include loans to nonexistent
borrowers, false applications with false credit information, bribery of a loan officer,
borrower misapplication of funds, and single family housing loan fraud.

Loans to Nonexistent Borrowers
In a loan-to-a-nonexistent-borrower fraud, the borrower uses a false identity to obtain a
loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower, or with the assistance of
an insider, such as a loan officer.
Fraud committed by individuals can be difficult to detect, particularly if the identity
documents of the fraudster match his or her details as provided on the loan application.
Warning signs include:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The borrower is unknown to bank personnel.
No public credit report is available.
The borrower or loan officer requests unusual loan terms.
Loan application information does not check out.
The proposed security has an inflated value.
The proposed inventory (security) has an unrealistic value.

There is no CPA associated with the financial statements.
The loan officer’s bonus is based on volume of loans funded.
The proposed collateral is located outside the bank’s market area.
The loan proceeds are distributed prior to the loan’s closing.

False Applications with False Credit Information
False information on the credit application can include overstated assets, nonexistent assets,
understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue and understated expenses. For example,
a borrower with marginal net worth might inflate the asset and income figures on his or her
personal financial statements to convince the loan officer of his or her credit worthiness.
The loan officer and others involved in the bank loan approval process can often detect
these schemes by observing one or more of the following:

•
•
•
•
14

Appraisals-valuations that defy common sense and local knowledge
Appraisers who are paid on basis of appraisal amount
Large loans beyond experience and expertise of the loan officer
Borrowers who default on the first payment
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• Numerous payment extensions, or payments that are placed on nonaccrual status
• No audit trail for verifying application information
• Applicant reports receiving loans from many other banks

Bribery of Loan Officers
Statutes (for example, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 201) prohibit any officer, director,
employee, agent or attorney of a bank from knowingly soliciting or receiving things of
value in connection with bank transactions. In the usual scheme, a borrower offers an
officer an inducement to grant a loan that would not otherwise be made (for instance,
because the borrower has little or no credit, or because the borrower is not using his or her
real name).
(Text continued on page 15)
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Senior loan officers can often detect these schemes by observing one or more of the
following:

• The life-style of the originating loan officer is beyond the means provided by normal
compensation.
• The loan officer has unreasonably high productivity.
• The loan officer’s compensation is based on volume productivity.
• Loan agreements contain terms unreasonably favorable to the borrower.
• There is a pattern of disbursements to particular agents, brokers, appraisers, finders, and
so on.
• There are multiple loans to the same borrower with the same agents involved.
• The loan or other bank officer has a financial interest in the customer’s project, or
stockholdings in a bank subsidiary profiting from the business.

Borrower Misapplication of Funds
Borrower misapplication is most common when the borrower has little or no personal risk
in the collateral, for example, real estate. The highest risk real estate loans are those in
which the lender provides all the funding on a nonrecourse basis. The most common ways
borrowers misapply loan funds are as follows:

• Kickbacks or profit interests in construction activities
• Brokerage or real estate fees
• Property management fees
• Related-party vendors
• Closing-statement prorations of rent, taxes, and other items

• Land flips
• Sale of property rights, such as laundry or cable TV
• Misappropriation of operating proceeds or loan proceeds
• Misappropriation of escrow payments

Single Family Housing Loan Fraud
One variation of the misapplication-of-funds fraud is the borrower who purchases single
family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality as rental property or in some
instances for resale. When applying to a financial institution, the fraudster usually
misrepresents his or her ability to finance the property and make payments. Usually loan
officers uncover these frauds by observing one or more of the following:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

There is an unrealistic change in commuting distance.
A high-income borrower has little or no personal property.
New housing expense is 150 percent or more of the previous expense.
Bank deposits are listed in round amounts on application.
The borrower reports overlapping dates of current and prior employment.
The previous employer is listed as out of business.
A high-income borrower does not use a professional tax preparer.
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• The appraisal shows a tenant as the contact person on an owner-occupied house.
• The initial title report shows delinquent taxes.

6.4.4 Real Estate Fraud
Real estate fraud is essentially a specialized form of loan fraud committed either by
individuals or corporations. Financial institutions, especially the savings and loan
associations in the United States, were badly hit in the 1980s due to fraud committed in the
real estate area. These schemes are often perpetrated in concert with the insiders of
financial institutions.

Land Flips
A land flip is the practice of buying and selling a parcel of land very quickly, often in a
single day or month, at a successively higher price to related parties, until a lender—who
believes the transaction is at arm’s length—provides financing on an unrealistically inflated
loan amount. The key components of the scheme in sequential order are as follows:
1. The same piece of property is sold back and forth between a borrower—the fraudster—
and dummy or shell corporations.
2. Each time the land is sold, the price is inflated.

3. To support each sale, the borrower secures an appraisal based on an unrealistic or
favorable set of assumptions, or performed by a friendly, incompetent or dishonest
appraiser.
4. The borrower goes to a financial institution—the victim—and mortgages the property
for its appraised value, keeping the grossly inflated loan proceeds.
5. The fraudster defaults on the loan.

False Appraisals
Fraud perpetrators use false and inflated appraisals to support loans larger than the true
value of the property. Appraisers are either parties to the fraud or paid off, or they are
merely unqualified—that is, easily fooled by bogus transactions like land flips—to perform
the appraisal.

Nominee Loans
Nominee loans are those made in the name of a straw (dummy) borrower or agent—that is,
a borrower having no substance—while the identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to
the lender.

Double Pledging Collateral
This scheme involves fraudulently pledging the same collateral with different lenders,
before the related liens are recorded and registered. This obviously hinders the lender’s
ability to look to the collateral as a source of recovery when the borrower defaults.

Real Estate Fraud Detection
Lenders or other interested parties can often detect real estate fraud by observing one or
more of the following warning signs:
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• A single borrower has received multiple loans.
• The same appraiser has appraised two or more different properties for the same
borrower within a short period of time.

• The same appraiser has made successive appraisals of the same property at high values
in a short period of time.
• The property was bought or sold many times in a short period.
• The borrower is a shell with no real substance or a holding company whose substance
lies hidden in its numerous subsidiaries.
• The buyer is obviously shopping for a loan instead of a long-term banking relationship.
• The seller of the property is another bank.
• The borrower has a prior default history.
• The borrower has a history of loan payoffs by obtaining other, larger loans.
• The loan application contains requests for several loans to different persons on the same
property.
• The borrower requires the loan as a condition before delivering large deposits to the
bank, with the loan being the inducement for establishing a continuing banking
relationship.

6.4.5 Money Transfer Fraud
Wires totaling two to three times a bank’s assets may be processed every business day. It is
rare that wires do not at least equal a bank’s total assets, and they can sometimes be ten
times the assets for banks that have a large correspondent network. The process is highly
automated at most banks.
In the most common money transfer fraud, an outsider or bank employee with access to the
correct identification numbers needed to wire transfer funds, steals the funds. In one case in
Chicago, a bank insider with knowledge of the wire transfer codes and procedures
conspired with his friends to wire nearly $70 million out of the country. The scheme was
detected (early enough to avoid a loss to the bank) when the transfer was made from a
customer’s account, thereby overdrawing the account balance.

Warning signs for this kind of fraud include:
• Clerks rather than more senior personnel perform actual processing.
• Managerial personnel conduct frequent overrides of the established approval authority
controls.
• There is evidence of wires to and from offshore banks in countries known for their bank
secrecy laws.
• There are routine high volume, high dollar transfers.
• There are frequent wires for persons with no account at the bank.
• Access to the wire room is often not properly restricted.
• Employees become very comfortable with the routine of the job and with their
coworkers.
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Variations of these schemes involve misrepresenting the customer’s identity. The fraudster
will use pretext telephone calls to obtain correct account information from the bank. Then
the fraudster obtains the codes from an insider. Thereafter, the fraudster makes a telephone
call to transfer the funds out of the bank.

6.4.6 Money Laundering
Money laundering refers to the process of turning dirty money into clean money. The primary
objective is to conceal the existence, source or use of illicit money and thus the underlying
offence—whether the offence is trade in illegal narcotics, robbery, fraud, illegal political
contributions, tax evasion, prostitution or any other criminal activity. Money launderers
may also want to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from forfeiture, and evade
taxes.

Perpetrators may launder money in the country in which the crime is committed or where
the funds originated; more often, however, they send the money across an international
border. Usually they deposit the money in a bank or other institution in a tax haven and it
comes back clean in the form of salaries, loans, fees or services.

Money Laundering Methods
There are three main methods for laundering money:
1. Through legitimate fronts

2. Through couriers and smurfs
3. Through the cooperation of a bank insider who ignores the reporting guidelines
Each of these methods has certain unique characteristics; however, they also have some
common characteristics:
1. Large cash shipments
2. Large volume of wire transfers to and from offshore banks (However, not all offshore
wire transfers involve money laundering—see below.)

Legitimate Fronts. Many money launderers open a legitimate front business that handles a
great deal of cash—for instance, a casino, restaurant, parking lot, vending machine
company, or pawnshop—and then deposit the ill-gotten gain along with the legitimate
income of the business. Perpetrators then commingle the illegal cash with the legitimate
receipts thereby disguising any illegal sources. They then withdraw the cleaned money or
wire-transfer it to a final destination.
Interested parties, for example a bank or bonding company, can usually detect this kind of
fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Accounts accumulate deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• Cash deposits from sources are not identified as customers of the business.
• There is a sudden and unexplained increase in the volume of cash deposits.
Money launderers can use gambling casinos. The ill-gotten cash is used to purchase chips.
Later the launderers exchange the chips remaining at the end of a controlled (carefully
limiting losses) gambling session for money and receive the proceeds in the form of a check
from the casino, thereby creating a seemingly legitimate paper trail.
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Smurfing. One variation of the money laundering scheme is to use special couriers, called
smurfs, to make relatively small deposits and withdrawals. For example, cash deposits of
$10,000 or more must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a special form
called a Currency Transaction Report (CTR). To avoid this reporting requirement, smurfs
make deposits or withdrawals just below this threshold amount.
Banks and other interested parties can usually detect this kind of fraud by observing one or
more of the following warning signs:

• Withdrawals made in numerous transactions just under $10,000.
• Customers who are not account holders exchanging large amounts of small bills for
large denomination bills.
• Inquiries as to policies of the bank regarding reporting currency transactions.

• Large dollar volume of cashier’s checks and money orders sold for cash to customers
who are not account holders.
• Persons shown as unemployed and self-employed on a CTR.
Breaches ofthe Reporting Guidelines. In still another variation, the money launderer conspires
with a bank insider, who agrees to make deposits for the money launderer and forego the
reporting mechanisms. The bank gets free use of the deposited funds, and in some
instances, the bank officer is compromised through a bribe or kickback. Banks can usually
detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:

• An account with many different individuals making deposits, and only a few making
large withdrawals.
• Accounts with accumulated deposits that are subsequently transferred out.

• High dollar limits and large numbers of bank customers exempted from CTR
requirements.
• An incorrect or incomplete CTR.

Money Laundering Mechanics
Although laundering and offshore banking conjure up images of financial wizardry and
international tax lawyers and accountants, most illegal activity involves the simple addition
of some layers to the basics common to ordinary business transactions. In essence,
laundering works like this.

Party A, who has come by the dirty money (or legitimate money that needs to be
laundered) gives it to Party B, who is the laundryman. Party B sends the money offshore
where it is deposited and funds are subsequently disbursed or laundered and then returned
to Party A for use.
During the laundering, Party B, having received the money from Party A, sets about
concealing it. Having the money in currency upon receipt makes the job easier. If the
money is in paper (checks, and so on), Party B may have to first start the laundering process
by converting it to local currency. Party B has, or sets up, one or more local companies, of
which he or she is the owner, manager or employee, depending on the relationship to Party
A.
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Now the offshore part of the process begins. Party B goes to a tax haven lawyer and
establishes an offshore company: loan companies, finance companies, or trusts are
preferable. Party B’s name does not appear anywhere in the legal documents.
The company in the tax haven opens an offshore bank account. Party B travels to the
haven with the currency, and Party B or the lawyer buys a cashier’s check at the bank with
the tax haven company as remitter. The lawyer then draws up the necessary loan
documents to show a loan from the haven company to Party B’s local company. Party B
then returns home with the cashier’s check. Thus, the money is brought back home as a
loan (which being capital, not revenue, is not taxable) and is clean.

Party A on his own, or through Party B, now makes use of the laundered funds by drawing
out salaries, obtaining loans from Party B’s local company, paying dividends, opening a
corporate expense account, using a company car, and so on.
Party B’s local company files appropriate tax returns and makes note of payments, or at
least interest payments. Interest is deducted on the company’s tax return. If the company
loses money, it has a tax offset. Party B does nothing illegal in the local country and, of
course, makes interest payments on the loan payable to the offshore company, allowing
further funds to be moved.

If a law enforcement agency questions the loans, the company will obtain full
documentation from Party B’s attorney in the tax haven. Inquiries beyond documents will
be blocked by the haven’s secrecy requirements.

Offshore Banks and Tax Havens
There are many reasons, some legitimate and some not, why money launderers transfer
money and other valuable securities from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that has
secret banking privileges. These foreign jurisdictions are commonly referred to as tax
havens because, in addition to bank secrecy laws, they had no income taxes so people or
companies first used them to (legally) minimize or to (illegally) evade taxes.

Tax haven is now a misnomer, since funds may be deposited for reasons other than escaping
tax. Tax havens have grown in popularity in recent times as one of the few means of
placing funds beyond the reach of creditors or other investigators. It did not take long for
criminal organizations and individuals to exploit the sanctuary of the tax haven. With the
development of multinational banking systems and international business and commerce, it
became easy to put together sophisticated laundering schemes to move the proceeds of
crime to foreign banks protected from intrusion by law enforcement officials.
The World’s Tax Havens. Switzerland has a long history as an international tax haven,
imposing little financial regulation and strict secrecy laws. Many other countries have
jumped aboard the bandwagon. The key tax havens include—

• Bermuda and the Caribbean: Antigua, Bahamas, Caymans, Montserrat, Netherlands
Antilles, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos.
• Central America: Panama and Costa Rica.
• Channel Islands: Guernsey and Jersey.
• Pacific: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vanuatu.
• Other locations: Liberia, Bahrain, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Cyprus.
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Offshore Facilities. Typically, the tax haven’s biggest domestic industries are banks, financial
institutions, companies, trusts, agents, accountants and attorneys who collectively constitute
offshore facilities. Facilities that are available in tax havens include—

• Banks. There are two classes of banks. Class A banks conduct local business transactions
in the tax haven. Class B banks exist on paper only, as they conduct no local business
transactions.
• Companies and trusts. Companies can be incorporated in the tax haven; trusts (such as
family, estate, or other kinds) can be set up.
• Offshore agents, accountants and attorneys. These are an essential element of the offshore
facilities in a tax haven.
The Tax Haven’s Rationale. Tax havens encourage offshore facilities for economic, political
and social reasons, all of which benefit their residents. For example, offshore facilities
generate up to 20 percent of the Caymans’ revenues, balance the budget in Montserrat
(through licensing fees) and have a huge impact on local economies, particularly those of
economically emerging countries.

For example, in 1964 the Caymans had one or two multinational banks and virtually no
companies. By 1981 they had thirty multinational banks, 300 Class B banks, and about
13,600 companies, the latter handled by a small number of lawyers, accountants and
agents. The Caymans’ total population in 1981 was about 15,000.

Many havens claim that the United States blames them for problems that it is unable to
solve domestically. Furthermore, offshore competition is so stiff that it is estimated that if
one country were to cease being a tax haven three more would start. (When Switzerland
relaxed its secrecy laws, Bahamian and Caymanian business grew at a rapid rate.) Also,
bank brokers move from island to island as laws tighten or loosen.

A local Bahamian bank executive summed it up when he said
The Bahamas must do things which are not allowed in the United States because
to do things which are allowed in the United States is noncompetitive, since in
every instance the United States does it better than the Bahamas do. The
Bahamas are therefore compelled in banking and trust operations to appeal to
unallowable activities and by inference to appeal to activities disallowed in the
United States.
Secrecy. The vital characteristic of a tax haven is that it allows offshore facilities to conduct
their affairs behind a veil of secrecy. Tax havens offer not only secret, numbered bank
accounts but also corporate laws and secrecy provisions that prevent law enforcement
officials from intruding. In addition, lawyers from tax havens offer a further level of secrecy
because they too are shielded by the haven’s secrecy laws, they maintain attorney-client
privilege, they sometimes do not know who their clients are, or they may be coconspirators,
or any combination thereof.
Tax havens view secrecy as a necessity for keeping offshore business. Business people from
various parts of the world (the Middle East and South America, for example) consider
secrecy to be a normal characteristic of business affairs. Flight capital (money being sent out
of politically unstable countries) has to be transferred secretly. Thus, it is not only criminals
but also politicians and governments to whom secrecy is attractive.

21

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Civil secrecy exists in common law as the result of a British case, Union v. Tournier (1907).
This case established that a banker had a duty to treat his customer’s affairs as confidential.
Many havens follow this law. Some jurisdictions have passed stringent, criminal laws to
buttress Tournier—for example, the Bahamas and the Caymans. Corporate laws in the
havens also aid secrecy by permitting nominee owners and bearer shares, prohibiting
disclosure of the beneficial owner, not requiring financial statements and audits, and
allowing the purchase of companies off the shelf.
Quite apart from the law, secrecy prevails in some tax havens by virtue of inadequate
records, unskilled administrators and corruption.

Vehicles Used to Transfer Funds to Tax Havens. Individuals or businesses can use several kinds
of institutions to transfer funds to tax havens. These include banks with international
branches or facilities, smaller trust companies and banking institutions, shipping companies,
real estate companies, travel agencies, money changers, insurance companies, finance
companies, brokerage and investment companies, international trading companies, holding
companies, and multinational corporations. The transfers themselves may be legal or
illegal. The transfer can be accomplished by means of letters of credit to a bank in a tax
haven, a bank draft, a wire transfer, or the transport of cash itself.
File Folders. Money launderers can purchase a set of legal papers in tax havens—for
example, legal documents, financial statements, and banking documents dated some years
before they are purchased. These documents make it appear that the company has been in
business for several years. In reality, of course, it never previously existed. These
companies have no substance.
Tax Havens and Law Enforcement. The combination of offshore corporate entities and secret
bank accounts in tax havens permits entities to construct a maze of financial transactions.
The tracing of assets becomes a very complex task. The transferring of questionable funds
from one tax haven jurisdiction to another greatly compounds the complexity.
Enforcement problems are pervasive, affecting not only criminal but also civil actions (such
as divorces, bankruptcies, and so on). Investigating cases takes a tremendous effort, and
conviction is by no means certain. There is no central clearing house to handle offshore
inquiries.

Investigations into Narcotics Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking is currently the primary source of laundered funds. The sophistication
and complexity of laundering schemes are virtually infinite and are limited only by the
creativity and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise the schemes. Organized
crime uses banks and other financial institutions in the course of laundering as routinely, if
not as frequently, as legitimate businesses use banks for legitimate purposes.
Previously, much of the investigation into narcotics trafficking occurred on the street in
which the drugs were followed to identify the dealers. Although this led to many successful
prosecutions, it seldom exposed the leaders of the organizations. The problem with a street
investigation is that the authorities generally cannot make a buy from, or a sale to, the top
person in the organization without the use of an informant, who is generally unreliable.
Furthermore, because the sentences received by drug traffickers were often so light,
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perpetrators considered the risk worth taking—and the leaders of the organizations
continued to be insulated.

Currently, law enforcement authorities obtain financial documentation during seizures in
order to establish that certain individuals possess goods that far exceed their known sources
of income. This technique has made possible the successful prosecution of the leaders in
drug trafficking schemes. Generally investigators use two methods to prove the flow of
funds obtained from narcotics trafficking:
1. Net worth analyses
2. Sources and uses of funds

6.4.7 Check Fraud
Check fraud is a general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial
institution. Typically con artists prey on banks in an attempt to negotiate fraudulent or
fictitious instruments. Common kinds of check fraud include forged, altered, and stolen
checks; new account fraud; and check kiting.

Forged, Altered, and Stolen Checks
Most attempts to defraud banks involve one or more of the following:
1. Checks bearing the forged names of makers, endorsers or payees.

2. Altered checks showing increased amounts.
3. Counterfeit checks.

4. Stolen checks passed by others.
Bank officers and other investigators can detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more
of the following warning signs:

•
•
•
•
•

Obvious written alterations on checks
Illegible maker, endorser or officer signatures
Checks imprinted with a maximum amount, or the term void, or nonnegotiable

Unprofessional printing
Business checks presented for cash instead of deposit

New Account Fraud
Check fraud is much more likely to occur in new accounts than in established accounts.
Bank employees must make special efforts to properly identify the potential new customer,
without offending existing customers. Banks should establish screening criteria that must be
enforced by everyone handling new accounts. These employees must take prompt, decisive
action to manage or close (or both) apparent problem accounts.
Most perpetrators of new account fraud use false identification. Examples include
fraudulent birth certificates, fraudulent passports, duplicate social security numbers,
fraudulent voter registration cards, stolen credit cards, stolen driver’s licenses, stolen
paychecks, front (shell) businesses, fraudulent student-identification cards, and disguised
identities (including post office box mail address, lock box rental, mail forwarding,
telephone answering service, and rented office space).
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New-account criminals are professionals. They use false identification to open new accounts
and steal money before the bank collects the funds. Bank officers can normally detect newaccount fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:

1. The customer resides outside the bank’s normal trade area.

2. The customer rushes to open an account and obtain a loan.
3. The customer’s dress or actions, or both, are inappropriate for his or her stated age,
occupation or income level.

To help prevent this kind of fraud, banks should consider adopting the following
procedures:
1. Implement well-defined procedures for increasing employee awareness of new-account
fraud.

2. Establish specific guidance about acceptable identification and its reporting.
3. Require detailed verification of customer’s information, including—
— Previous checking account history (internal and external investigation).

— Credit reports and credit scoring systems.
— Dun & Bradstreet reports.
— Better Business Bureau reports.
— Special requests for no mail contact.
— Post office box or hotel address.
Check Kiting
Check kiting is a term for building up large apparent balances in one or more bank accounts,
based on uncollected or floated checks drawn against similar accounts in other banks. As
banks decrease the amount of time taken to clear checks, this kind of fraud is becoming less
common. Although many individuals engage to some degree in kiting, a commercial
customer can perpetrate this scheme by using several bank accounts to increase available
cash reserves.

The brokerage firm, E.F. Hutton, committed one of the most significant check-kiting
schemes perpetrated in the United States. They engaged in a $20-million kiting scheme to
decrease the cost of their funds during the late 1980s. The resultant bad publicity eventually
led to the company’s demise.
Check Kiting, Illustrated. In commercial bank accounts established over a period of time to
avoid suspicion, a fraudster starts with little or no money in Bank A and Bank B, and writes
$5,000 in checks on each for deposit in the other:

Apparent Balances
Actual Balances
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Total

Bank A

Bank B

$5,000

$5,000

$10,000

-0-

-0-

-0-
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The process is quickly repeated (for example, the next day) with $8,000 in deposited
checks:

Apparent Balances

Actual Balances

Bank A

Bank B

$13,000

$13,000

$26,000

-0-

-0-

-0-

Total

A $6,000 down payment is made on a Mercedes from a check written from Bank A.

Bank A

Bank B

Apparent Balances

$7,000

$13,000

$20,000

Actual Balances

($6,000)

-0-

($6,000)

Total

The next day additional checks for $4,000 each are written and deposited into each
account:

Bank A

Bank B

Apparent Balances

$11,000

$17,000

$28,000

Actual Balances

($6,000)

-0-

($6,000)

Total

The balances are then paid to a travel agent, and the fraudster takes a long trip:

Apparent Balances
Actual Balances

Bank A

Bank B

-0-

-0-

-0-

($17,000)

($17,000)

($34,000)

Total

Check Kiting Characteristics. Bank personnel usually uncover check-kiting schemes by
observing one or more of the following warning signs:

• Frequent deposits and checks in same amounts.
• Frequent deposits and checks in round amounts.
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• Frequent deposits of checks written on the same paying bank, which is not the deposit
bank.
• Little time lag between deposits and withdrawals.
• Frequent Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) account balance inquiries.
• Many large deposits made on Thursday or Friday to take advantage of the weekend.
• Large periodic balances in individual accounts with no apparent business explanation.

• Low average balance compared to high level of deposits.
• Many checks made payable to other banks.
• Bank willingness to pay against uncollected funds (note that not all payments against
uncollected funds are check kites, but all check kites require payments against
uncollected funds).
• Cash withdrawals with deposit checks drawn on another bank.

• Checks drawn on foreign banks with lax banking laws and regulations.

Slowing the Bank-Clearing Process. Before the days of sophisticated computer systems, a
check-kiting scheme could develop using less paper, fewer financial institutions, and smaller
amounts than are commonly used today. Banks can still be hit with large losses when a
fraudster slows down the bank clearing process. Typical fraudsters’ procedures include—

• Using counter checks without any computer or Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
(MICR) coding.
• Providing insufficient information on checks (for example, using an incomplete name of
a bank and branch, leaving out the account number, giving an illegible signature).
•
•
•
•

Making errors on the face of checks such as date and figures.
Defacing the check (for example, by using staples).

Placing stop payments on certain documents.
Having accounts in institutions other than chartered banks (that is, trust companies and
credit unions).

New Techniques. It is now very difficult to effect a check-kiting scheme employing the same
procedures as in the past. Banks are reluctant to accept counter checks; more significantly,
checks usually take only one day to clear. This is true even for checks issued on out-of-town
or out-of-state banks. The financial institutions claim that, in the near future, checks will
clear instantaneously. To counteract the tightening of bank procedures, the fraudster has
had to increase the number of financial institutions used, the dollar amounts, and frequency
of checks issued.

Check-Kiting Scheme Investigations. The main issues to be addressed when investigating a
check-kiting scheme are as follows:
1. The loss does not necessarily occur at the time of detection. Banks are usually put at
increasing financial risk over a period of time.
2. Accounting evidence must show that—
a. Control was exerted over a number of accounts.

b. A loss did occur.
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c. Economic risk has increased as shown by day-by-day analysis.
d. Every time the perpetrator withdraws money from the system of accounts (in excess
of the deposits put into the system), the bank incurs a loss or risk of loss.
e. The volume of inter-account checks is high.
3. The bank must determine whether it gave implied credit to the accused through daylight
overdraft privileges, which allow an overdraft balance at the end of a business day to be
cleared up before the close of the next business day to cover the previous day’s
overdraft.
4. The timing of the investigation and the availability of legible microfilm documentation
are important.
5. Documentation of the modus operandi needs liberal use of visual aids.
Accounting Assistance. When investigating check-kiting, the CPA should—

• Identify the fraudster-controlled accounts because the financial institutions where they
are maintained risk suffering economic losses.
• Identify and demonstrate the loss. This task is difficult because there is a mistaken
tendency to regard loss as occurring at the termination of the check-kiting scheme. In
fact, however, the risk of loss usually builds up day by day, over a period of several
months. Recognition of the economic loss occurs when the perpetrator abandons the
fraudulent activity for whatever reasons (this is equivalent to the game of musical
chairs—the loss isn’t recognized until the music stops).
• Perform a day-by-day analysis to show both the buildup of the loss and the increase in
economic risk to the financial institutions.
• Recognize that a check-kiting scheme could take place over an extended period of time
without the knowledge of the bank. This is an issue that is frequently raised in court.
This component is an educational aspect for many: lawyers, police, bank officials,
laymen, and even CPAs find check kiting difficult to understand.
• Try to accomplish the difficult task of demonstrating to a court of law that this case was
not merely an unbroken circle of checks and that this shell game, which was apparently
tolerated by the financial institutions, resulted in economic loss to them.

Mr. I.M. Kiter Case Study
Recently, between January and the middle of March, an extremely busy, wellrespected professional, Mr. I.M. Kiter, operated a massive check-kiting scheme that
employed at least eight bank accounts at three separate financial institutions. For
two-and-a-half months he was able to falsely inflate the value of his accounts by
issuing checks to or from his various accounts.
About four weeks before the scheme was uncovered, one of the financial institutions
was sufficiently concerned about the status of Mr. Kiter’s accounts that it would
only accept certified checks for deposit. This had the effect of reducing the clearing
time to zero days or in certain instances to minus one day (the check was certified
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the day before it was deposited). Despite these restrictions, Mr. I.M. Kiter was able
to continue his check-kiting scheme for the following reasons:

1. The other financial institutions did not require deposited checks to be certified.
2. Some overdraft privileges were permitted.
3. Mr. Kiter spoke with the financial institutions daily and explained away his
suspicious conduct.

4. Checks were not return marked not sufficient funds (NSF), as required by bank
policy, because the bank’s normal policies were changed for Mr. Kiter, a good
customer.
5. The bank permitted daily daylight overdraft privileges.
Forensic accountants performed an analysis of the deposit and disbursement activity
in the various bank accounts. With the exception of the closing bank overdraft, the
deposits totaled about $87.5 million, of which more than $85 million represented
money circulated among the eight accounts controlled by Mr. Kiter. The total
amount of actual deposits from noncontrolled accounts only amounted to about
$2.5 million. The ending balance in one of Mr. Kiter’s accounts at Anytown Bank
was a negative $1.7 million. This overdraft balance resulted in a loss that was fully
absorbed by Anytown Bank. Forensic accountants also performed an analysis of an
account maintained by Mr. Kiter at Bigtown Bank for the period March 1 to March
10. This analysis indicated that Bigtown Bank permitted ongoing overdraft
privileges to Mr. Kiter in amounts up to almost $1 million. Closer inspection
revealed the extent of Mr. Kiter’s abuse of the daylight overdraft privileges.

This practice was confirmed by the review of Bigtown Bank’s credit
correspondence, and demonstrated that the departure from Bigtown Bank’s policy
allowed Mr. Kiter to continue the check-kiting scheme in an uninterrupted fashion.
In fact, when the kiting scheme fell apart, it provided Mr. Kiter with a defensible
position for court purposes (that is, his conduct was condoned or blessed by Bigtown
Bank).
The practices of Bigtown Bank also raised the questions as to whether the economic
loss suffered by Anytown Bank was because of the check-kiting scheme, or because
of the conduct of Bigtown Bank. Evidence introduced during the trial did not
establish that the banks were aware of the kiting scheme. However, there was
evidence that Bigtown Bank knew that Mr. Kiter was having some cash flow
difficulties pertaining to closing a number of real estate deals. Handwritten
comments from the Bigtown Bank branch manager to his credit department
indicated that—

The bank closely monitored Mr. Kiter’s account.
The bank allowed certified checks to cover the overdraft daily.
The bank tolerated daily overdraft amounts of approximately $ 1 million.
The bank received substantial revenues via overdraft and service charges (an
example of the bank greed factor).
5. The bank indicated at a meeting held with Mr. Kiter on February 25th that it
would permit the overdraft arrangement to continue for another sixty days.

1.
2.
3.
4.
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6. Mr. Kiter had social connections and was a source of business for the bank.

Although Mr. Kiter was found guilty, the judge’s ruling implied that prior
knowledge of the check-kiting scheme on the part of one of the banks weakened
the prosecution’s case.

6.5 Individuals versus Insurance Companies
Insurance fraud generally consists of a presentation to an insurance company of a
materially false or misleading written statement relating to either an application or claim
for insurance. Fraud occurs not only when there is an actual loss (that is, a claim is made
based on bogus information), but also when there is a risk of loss. This distinction is
important for insurance fraud because insurance policies relate to risks. Accordingly, if an
insurance policy based on a material misstatement is placed, the insurance company is the
victim of a fraud because there was the risk of a claim, even if no claims are made on the
policy.

Some insurance policies relate to risks faced by individuals, whereas others relate to risks
faced by corporations. This section deals with both kinds.
Computers have become an important tool in discovering insurance fraud. The most
common use is to let the computer discover clusters or interrelated data; for example, an
unusual number of claims filed from the same address. This kind of screening is effective in
insurance scams because the fraudsters often work in consort, for example, with doctors or
auto repair shops, to file inflated claims that a search engine seeking commonality can
discover.

6.5.1 Life Insurance Fraud
Life insurance is a policy that pays the insured’s beneficiary a predetermined amount of
money in the event of the insured’s death. Common life insurance frauds include homicide
fraud, staged-death fraud, preexisting health condition fraud, and double-indemnity fraud.

Homicide Fraud
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy may commit homicide to collect benefits. In these
cases, there are actually two victims—the person who has been murdered (see section
6.2.6), and the insurance company, which is required to make a payment on the policy.

Staged Death Fraud
An insured might fake his or her death in order to collect benefits. A variation of this
scheme occurs when a policy is taken out on an insured who is already dead.

Preexisting Health Condition Fraud
An otherwise uninsurable person obtains a life insurance policy through false health
statements on the application describing preexisting health conditions. The normal,
minimal medical examination would not be sufficient to expose the condition. The insured
hopes to die of causes unrelated to the feared condition—that is, a condition that would

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

29

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

otherwise prevent the policy from being issued—and without an autopsy being performed,
so that the insurer will pay the policy benefits.

Double Indemnity
In some cases, a beneficiary of a life insurance policy will report the death as having been
accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the policy. A variation of this scheme
occurs when a beneficiary attempts to make a suicide appear to have been accidental.

6.5.2 Casualty Insurance Fraud
Casualty insurance covers the personal injuries and property damage that result from an
accident or other covered occurrence. While accidents can occur anywhere and at any
time, a large number of casualty claims involve injuries sustained in traffic accidents. The
following are the common casualty insurance frauds:
•
•
•
•

Staged accidents
Mortgage insurance fraud
Legitimate accidents with false claims
Personal injury insurance fraud

• Fraudulent claims

Staged Accidents
A staged accident is one in which, for example, an individual will purposely pull out into
the path of an oncoming vehicle or will allow themselves to be rear-ended in order to cause
a collision. A fraudulent claim is then made for nonexistent personal injuries or a falsely
inflated claim is made for real injury. These kinds of insurance fraud usually involve rings of
individuals, including unscrupulous doctors, attorneys and claim adjusters.

Mortgage Insurance Fraud
Mortgage insurance is a policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the
purchaser of the property defaults on those payments because of death or disability. A
typical mortgage insurance fraud is a variation on a staged accident fraud—for example, an
employee who is laid off from work claims that he is disabled, so his mortgage is paid via
his mortgage insurance policy.

Legitimate Accidents with False Claims
In many cases, an individual is involved in a legitimate accident and later exaggerates his
or her personal injuries (usually soft-tissue injuries) to bilk the insurance company.

Personal Injury Insurance Fraud
Personal injury insurance fraud usually involves lying about the circumstances of the cause
of an injury so as to bring it within the insurance coverage. For example, a worker covered
by workers compensation insurance injures his back while working at home but reports it
as a job-related injury to come within the workers compensation insurance coverage.

Fraudulent Claims
A fraudulent claim is one in which, for example, an insured’s auto is brought into a body
shop for repair after a legitimate accident. The body shop inflates the claim, typically to
30
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cover the deductible. The body shop may then pay a cash bribe to the claims adjuster or
intentionally cause additional damage to the car to maximize its profit.

In another example, an insured seeks the cooperation of a scrap yard that has the
capability to crush autos. The insured has his auto crushed and files a theft claim. If the
auto is not recovered within a reasonable span of time, the claim is paid. The insured then
pays the scrap yard for destroying the vehicle without a trace.
In still another variation, a wrecked vehicle is located and insured. A bogus accident is
concocted and a fraudulent claim is filed. Using the same vehicle, this scheme is often
repeated with different insurance companies.

6.5.3 Health Insurance Fraud
Health insurance is a policy that covers someone’s health in the event that the person is
injured or becomes ill. Common health insurance schemes include mobile labs, bundling
and unbundling claims, and collusion between an insured and a provider.

An insurance industry representative reported, in January 2001, that fraud claims in both
the public and private sector reach about $53.9 billion annually. The U.S. government has
increased the funding of law enforcement agencies in the health-care fraud area, with some
U.S. attorneys offices setting up special health-care fraud units. According to one U.S.
attorney, health-care fraud is the most active area of white-collar crime, which includes
going after clinical labs and individual doctors, among others.
A growing fraud related to credit-card fraud is debit-card fraud. Many banks are now
issuing a combination ATM/debit card/credit card rather than three separate pieces of
plastic. Although merchants, generally, cannot check whether there are funds in the bank
supporting a debit card purchase, they can check a credit card with a phone call. No doubt
as the problem grows, protective steps will be installed to stop the fraudsters. Until the
preventive measures catch up, prosecuting and publicizing the fraud will help slow the
growth of this new threat.

Mobile Labs
In the usual mobile lab scam, a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a
blue-collar, low income area, often where English is the second language. They then pass
out fliers in the parking lot of a minimum wage manufacturing firm, offering free physicals
to people who have medical insurance. After filling out a family history, the insured is
subjected to extensive tests for a variety of maladies, and the average physical ends up
costing the insurer three to four thousands dollars. When the insured returns for the results
of the tests, the lab is gone.

Bundling and Unbundling Claims
Bundling and unbundling claims is the practice of physicians or clinics billing separately
for medical services performed at the same time. For example, an insured woman has a
hysterectomy performed and at the same time she also has her appendix removed. The
physician, however, bills the insurance company as if the appendectomy was a completely
separate procedure.
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Insured-Provider Collusion
In collusion between an insured and a provider, the provider furnishes the insured with a
bill for services not actually rendered. The insured makes an application for reimbursement
to the insurance company, and the proceeds are divided between the insured and the
provider.

6.5.4 Property Insurance Fraud
Property insurance is a policy that covers an individual or corporation’s property from loss
(whether stolen or destroyed), up to a predetermined amount of money. Common property
insurance schemes include: staged false theft, repossessed household goods, pawned
personal property, and arson.

Staged False Theft
In staged false theft, an insured secretes property he or she owns and reports it stolen, or
alternatively reports property stolen that he or she never owned.
In a recent case involving Michael Jackson CDs, a music distributor had misjudged the
demand for the CD and had excess inventory on hand. A theft was then staged in order to
offload the excess stock, which was then destroyed. When forensic accountants revealed
the lack of demand and the excess inventory, the distributor dropped his claim.

Repossessed Household Goods
Repossessed household goods fraud occurs when, for example, household items (furniture,
appliances, and so on) are repossessed, and the insured reports the property was stolen.

Pawned Personal Property
When pawning personal property, a fraudster may inflate the value of his or her personal
belongings, insure them, and then pawn them for a lesser amount of cash. The fraudster
then reports them stolen and files a claim. Once the insurance payment is received, the
fraudster then redeems the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance
payment, and pockets the difference. These schemes can be risky to the perpetrator,
however, because in most states pawnshops are required to check customer identification
and keep records of their transactions, in order to facilitate police investigations of reported
thefts.

Arson
Arson is the purposeful destruction of property by fires, sometimes for profit. For example,
an insured may be about to lose his or her house, car, or business due to an inability to
make loan payments. The insured sets fire to the property to collect the insurance
proceeds. Alternatively, an insured may replace an item with something less expensive
when he or she remodels after the fire.
Arson can also be committed by companies, which then file claims under their property
insurance policies as well as their business interruption policies. This is covered in
chapter 7.
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Commercial Crime

7.1

Overview

7.1.1 Definitions
The terms white-collar crime, economic crime, and commercial crime are not legal ones and are
often used interchangeably. This chapter covers the distinctions between these terms.

White-Collar and Economic Crimes
Although scholars differ widely in their definition of white-collar crime, the Dictionary of
CriminalJustice Data Terminology, published by the U.S. Bureau ofJustice Statistics, defines
white-collar crime as: “non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of
deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semiprofessional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also non
violent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having special
technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the
person’s occupation.” This definition includes most if not all of the crimes and behaviors
described in this Handbook.
Economic crime has a similar definition regarding its objective and methodology, that is,
crime committed for economic gain by means of deception; however, economic crime is
broader in its scope than white-collar crime: it could also include violent crimes committed
by people without any particular occupational status—for example, armed robbery.

Commercial Crime
The term commercial crime is frequently used as a substitute for the terms white-collar
crime and economic crime. However, for purposes of this Handbook, a more restrictive
definition is adopted: that is, commercial crime is white-collar crime committed by an
individual or a group of individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and,
indirectly, themselves.
This distinction, that is, between fraud committed against a business or commercial entity,
and commercial crime committed by a business or commercial entity—is a useful one.
Historically, our legal system, institutions, and even the procedures adopted by auditors
have tended to focus more on conventional fraud committed purely for personal gain. In
recent years, however, awareness has been heightened to the possibility of the business or
commercial entity itself being the perpetrator.
Frauds against investors and environmental crime are two examples that have received
increasing, media attention.
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7.1.2 Victims of Commercial Crime
Victims of commercial crime can include—

• Customers—for example, through false advertising and price fixing.

• Competitors—for example, through industrial espionage and intentional copyright
infringement.
• Creditors—for example, through a planned bankruptcy.

• Investors—for example, through false financial statements and other securities fraud.
• The general public—for example, through environmental abuse.

In addition, the practice of organizational bribe giving may victimize any one of the above
groups—for example, the general public when a bribe is given in the awarding of a
government contract.

7.1.3 Extent of Commercial Crime
Two decades ago commercial crime received much less media attention than today, largely
being confined to a short paragraph or two in the business section of the nation’s
newspapers, if it was mentioned at all. Today’s front-page stories are a testimony to the
current widespread public interest in and concern about commercial crime. Scholars
attribute this growing emphasis to, among other things, a greater skepticism about the
behavior of persons in authority. The alleged crimes of Whitewater involving President
Clinton and his associates only deepen the mood of distrust of those in prominent places.

Statistics suggest that there is some reason for distrust. For instance, KPMG Peat Marwick’s
1998 Fraud Survey reported that false financial statements caused losses of $1 million or
more in 42 percent of the reported instances, whereas in the 1994 survey, losses of this
magnitude represented only 24 percent of the total losses.

While it is true that surveys only deal with reported crime, what is clear is that the extent
and value of reported commercial crime is on the increase. Many experts believe that many
frauds go unreported and that the extent of unreported commercial crime is also on the
increase.

7.1.4 Responsibility for Commercial Crime
Some scholars debate whether individuals should be held responsible for crimes committed
on behalf of their organizations. Although some direct benefit accrues to the perpetrator, far
more benefit accrues to the organization.
Regardless of whether the organization is held liable, the frauds are a direct result of some
human action or interaction: if a business is like a dynamite charge, someone must push the
plunger.

Most criminal statutes require that the guilty person have the required criminal intent.
However, an organization can be held liable even if it were unaware of or did not
participate in the fraud. The law recognizes two theories of organizational responsibility:
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1. The identification theory. The organization is held liable when the employees and
organizations can be viewed as one and the same, for example, a small business owner
who has incorporated.

2. The imputation theory. The organization is held responsible for the actions of its
employees through the doctrine of respondeat superiour, a seventeenth century doctrine
that means “let the superior respond.” The legal theory was developed from civil
lawsuits to prevent employers from denying financial responsibility for the acts of their
employees.

7.1.5 Characteristics of Commercial Crime
While commercial crime can take many forms, often it is distinguished by one or more of
these characteristics: tolerance, diffusion of harm, and rationalization.

Tolerance
While awareness of commercial crime has increased in recent years, there still remains a
somewhat greater tolerance for this form of crime as compared to violent crimes such as
armed robbery, or those involving drugs. This greater tolerance may stem not so much
from the nature of the crime itself, but rather from the perception of the perpetrator as
being somehow more civilized. Anybody with strength, decent aim, or access to poison, can
commit murder, but only a limited number of respectable corporate executives or directors
are in a position to violate antitrust legislation.
Diffusion of Harm
Another notable characteristic of most kinds of commercial crime is that there are often
numerous victims who are frequently unaware that they have been harmed. Death from
smog or asbestos poisoning is very likely to be slow and insidious, and its victims will be
hard-pressed to relate their terminal illness to its precise cause, given the complicated
nature of other possible contributing factors. A factory worker with cancer is not likely to be
certain whether it was the toxic chemicals that he handled for fifteen years, the fact that he
smoked too many cigarettes, or bad genes or bad luck that will shorten his life.
In many other cases of commercial crime, the harm tends to be widely diffused and, for
each person, rather insignificant. But these can still be significant crimes. Companies can
earn millions over the course of a year by charging higher prices for products that do not
meet the standards they are alleged to attain. Few people who pay for a package of onehundred thumb tacks will take the time and energy to count the contents of the package to
be certain that they have gotten their money’s worth; it would be an easy and safe venture
to put ninety-two tacks in each package, and some merchandisers find the temptation
irresistible. Similarly, a customer will most likely remain unaware that the gasoline pumps
at a service station are calibrated so that they get fewer gallons than those for which they
are charged. Even if they come to know about these kinds of issues, most customers would
shrug them off as not worth the trouble it would take to do something to remedy the
situation; at most, they might take their business elsewhere.

5

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Rationalization

Perpetrators of white-collar crime are known for providing elaborate excuses for their
crimes, and the nature of such explanations may be a major distinguishing mark between
them and street offenders. It has been posited that embezzlers typically claim that they are
only borrowing the money; they intended to repay it once they had covered the bills and
other financial demands vexing them. Commercial criminals will similarly rationalize their
behavior; for example, antitrust violators usually maintain that they are seeking to stabilize
an out-of-control price situation when they conspire with others to fix prices, and they are
likely to insist that power-hungry prosecutors and investigators are singling them out.

7.1.6 Investigation and Prosecution of Commercial Crime
The diffuse nature of most commercial crime poses a particular law enforcement dilemma.
Without complaining witnesses, policing has to be proactive instead of reactive; that is, the
enforcement officials themselves have to decide where the offenses are being committed
and how to go about stopping them. Enforcers obviously cannot cope with all the violations
and must decide on rules to guide their efforts. Should they go after the behaviors that
cause the most harm? Should they take on the bigger offenders, or concentrate on the
smallerfry, where their chances of success are much better? They can readily accumulate ten
convictions in a year against ten insignificant companies, whereas it might take three years
to win a victory over one huge corporation. Besides, the resources of the large organization
might allow it to win its case, regardless of the lawless nature of its behavior.

7.1.7 Causes of Commercial Crime
Because businesses are bottom-line driven, it has been posited that they are inherently
prone to committing crime, yet not necessarily criminal. Without necessarily meaning to,
organizations inherently invite commercial crime as a means of obtaining goals. For
example, a department manager’s concern with reaching assigned goals, may lead the
manager to maximize his or her department’s own interests to the detriment of the
organization, or to the detriment of society as a whole.

Organizations can also be criminogenic—prone to producing crime—because they
encourage loyalty. Accordingly, this is because—
The organization tends to recruit and attract similar individuals.
Rewards are given out to those who display characteristics of a team player.
Long-term loyalty is encouraged through company retirement and benefits.
Loyalty is encouraged through social interaction such as company parties and social
functions.
5. Frequent transfers and long working hours encourage isolation from other groups.
6. Specialized job skills may discourage company personnel from seeking employment
elsewhere.

1.
2.
3.
4.

These reasons in turn cause company personnel to sometimes perceive that the
organization might be worth committing crime for.
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Another aspect that makes companies criminogenic is their compensation structures,
particularly for corporate executives who are most likely to be the perpetrators of
commercial crime. Compensation packages for senior personnel usually include a
component based on the results of their company or department, either through stock
options or bonuses. Typically, senior executives have a greater amount of compensation
tied to results than do other employees. Because commercial crime is so diffuse, and the
likelihood of being caught is low, senior executives may perceive that the incentives to
“enhance the success of their organization” through commercial crime will outweigh the
risks.
7.2 Forms of Commercial Crime
Today, the realm of commercial crime can be said to primarily involve offenses against
laws that regulate either one or both of the following: the marketplace or the established
standards of conduct for professional and political life. Some of the most common forms of
commercial crime are described in this section, along with Case Studies and other
examples that illustrate the salient features of such crimes.

The first two cover shams, which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “.. . an imitation or
counterfeit purporting to be genuine [noun]....” and “to act intentionally so as to give a
false impression [verb].”1 Shams are the result of the activities of a confidence trickster or
con artist who has been able to obtain money from the public by various means. Generally,
there are two kinds of shams: corporate shams and investor fraud.
Although these shams are discussed separately in this chapter (due to the size of each
section), in many cases the perpetrator (the corporate con artist) and the victim (individuals)
of the shams have similar characteristics, as does the way in which the sham is operated.
However, they have two major distinctions:

1. In the corporate sham a corporation exists from which the pitch is made. This is in
contrast to an unincorporated individual making a pitch, not on a corporation’s behalf,
but on his or her personal behalf.
2. In investor sham the nature of what is being sold to the victim differs. For example, an
investor sham typically involves making a speculative investment, whereas a corporate
sham typically involves the purchase of something tangible.

The remaining sections of this chapter include the following kinds of fraud as committed by
companies: procurement fraud, industrial espionage, finance fraud, securities fraud,
environmental abuse, economic extortion, health care fraud, and possession of property
obtained by crime.

7. 2.1 Corporate Shams
Corporate shams generally involve something counterfeit or false. In this case the corporate
sales pitch appears to offer something genuine, yet there is no underlying substance. The
perpetrator of the crime is often a con artist acting through a corporate entity. In fact, by
using the corporate veil as a shield from the public, the con artist gains an appearance of

1Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 1993.
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respectability and substance that he or she would otherwise lack. The con artist’s wares may
consist of one or more of the following:
• Products oriented to individual consumers (as opposed to products that companies
would buy) that are sold by false advertising.
• Franchises or distributorships that the victim purchases in order to run a business.
• Solicitation of money donations towards a charitable or religious cause.
Generally, shams that are carried on through an incorporated business involve pyramid
sales schemes, mail order sales, advertising to be placed in charitable programs or flyers, or
donations to charitable organizations. Newer forms of corporate shams that are becoming
more common are the selling of franchises, and other get-rich-quick schemes, such as the
selling of vending or arcade game machines: the purchasers then set up their own business
using the franchise or the equipment bought.

When a con artist hides behind a corporate veil, some or all of the following characteristics
may apply:

1. The con artist uses expensive letterhead, emblazoned with a worldly name and a classy
address, to impress potential victims.

2. The company has a very informal corporate structure, and a very short life span.
3. The company’s accounting systems are primitive or nonexistent.
4. The company conducts an extensive and appealing advertising campaign.
5. If a product is offered, the product itself may be of questionable value, and there is
seldom, if any, post sale servicing.
6. The customer is expected to pay for the product via cash or readily negotiable checks on
(or before) delivery.
7. Once received, the cash is quickly removed from the company through the payment of
commission expenses, salaries, bonuses or management fees, so that the con artist can
reap the immediate benefits of the scheme.

The key to the corporate sham, as with any sham, is the effectiveness and the speed with
which the sales pitch brings results. The method of delivering the sales pitch may range
from telephone solicitation (via a boiler room operation), to either cold calls, or advertising
in local newspapers, or both.
Possible red flags for a corporate sham include elaborate representations that demonstrate
the quality of the product, proposed earnings that are excessively high for the franchise, or
an apparently hard-sell pitch to raise money for a purported charitable purpose.

Finally, you should be aware of the arguments put forward by defense counsel in corporate
sham cases. Some of the issues defense counsel might raise include:

• Caveat emptor—let the buyer beware.
• Some of the money received was in fact directed to the promoted charitable purpose.
• The investor is at fault: that is, for not working hard enough at a franchise operation to
make it succeed, or for not waiting long enough to receive the goods that would have
eventually been shipped, and so on.
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Merchandise Swindles or False Advertising
Merchandising frauds include all frauds perpetrated against purchasers of merchandise and
services. If you have ever paid for an item and received something less than advertised, you
have been the victim of a merchandising swindle or false advertising.
These frauds generally fall into one of the following four categories:

1. Representations that the purchase is a bargain when in fact it is not—for example,
department stores raise the price of a product significantly one day and then the next
day drop it back to where it had been, maintaining in their advertising that it now is on
sale.

2. Collection of money for one product and substitution of another of lesser quality or
cost—for example, claims have been made that shoes are alligator when in fact they
were made of plastic.
3. Misrepresentations regarding the quality of the product—for example, a company
selling glass demonstrated in television commercials that its car window product was so
perfect that when you looked through it you could hardly believe there was anything
between you and the outside scene; it was later proved that the ads were filmed from
inside a car with the window rolled down.
4. Failure to deliver the product or service—for example, in bait and switch tactics, stores
advertise a specific product at a strikingly low price, but then, when the customer tries to
buy the item, it is no longer available. It is the customer’s presence and attention they
want to attract—once they have him or her listening, they assume that slick sales tactics
can accomplish the rest of the deceit.

Defraud You in Writing Case Study

Between September 1997 and June 1998, Smith and Jones, partners of Defraud You
in Writing Inc. committed fraud by obtaining funds from the public for goods they
did not intend to supply.
Smith and Jones operated the business through telephone solicitation whereby
books were offered for sale, and customers’ names were entered into a drawing for a
trip to the Caribbean via Acme Tours. Door-to-door sales people would follow up
on the calls and try to obtain orders for the books. The orders set forth the terms,
the method of payment, the time and method of delivery, and an announcement for
a drawing on a certain date. The drawing date was inserted in a blank on the order
form, the first draw being December 31, 1997.
From the evidence of Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, during the period between
October 1997 and May 1998, the actual net cash receipts from orders by members
of the public totaled $75,291 (after allowances for returned checks) on 1,867 orders.

Defraud You in Writing’s suppliers were not paid during this period, so the total
number of orders filled was 311. In fact, during the three months with the largest
sales, (December, February and March) no books were ordered from Defraud You’s
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suppliers. Instead, substantial effort was being made to increase the sales force (and
thus the revenue), and new premises were being sought

The judge in this case believed that Defraud You in Writing used the 311 orders to
create a camouflage for the business’ real activity: to obtain funds for orders they
never intended to fulfill.
As for the drawing, no arrangements had been made with Acme Tours to enable
the winner to take the trip.

Franchise and Distributorship Frauds

Both franchise and distributorship frauds are characterized by a get-rich-quick business
opportunity that involves a large up-front purchase of equipment, supplies, and
promotional materials. Many such schemes are part of a pyramid scam.

CookieVend & Run Inc. Case Study
CookieVend & Run Inc. was incorporated in March 1997 to sell cookie vending
machines. CookieVend’s headquarters were located in New York City. Its office
staff generally consisted of the president, general office manager, secretary
treasurer, bookkeeper, and three typists.

Shortly after CookieVend’s incorporation, a series of ads were placed in newspapers
across the country. These ads offered a substantial guaranteed income, which could
be earned for an investment of $3,000 to $9,000. Although the ads differed
somewhat from paper to paper, they all offered a part-time job that could net the
right person an income of $2,000 per month or more.

In addition to the office staff, CookieVend employed a sales staff of approximately
ten people to interview the respondents to the ads. These sales reps traveled
independently of each other and were provided with a corporate brochure and
other material that instructed them on what to promise the new distributors.

Some 180 people purchased these distributorships for an investment of between
$3,000 and $9,000 each, depending on the number of vending machines purchased.
Supplies of cookies and insurance were also purchased. CookieVend’s total sales
from April to December 1997 were approximately $1.2 million.
In the ensuing year, not one distributor was successful in his or her business. The
complaints were generally as follows:

1. The quality of the vending machines was very poor.
2. Three distributors never received their vending machines (twenty-three
machines in all).
3. Cookies were stale when received by the distributor.
4. The price of cookies increased from fourteen cents to twenty cents each soon
after the distributors purchased their machines.
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5. The company did not honor claims of damage to machines in accordance with
the insurance protection policy on the agreement.

6. The company did not honor its three-year repair warranty on vending machines.
7. The company did not attempt to address any reasonable complaints.
Evidence ofFraud. All of CookieVend’s management personnel were found guilty of
fraud and received jail sentences. The evidence that formed the basis for the case
against them was as follows:

1. CookieVend’s revenues and expenses showed that its level of profitability was
directly attributable to the sale of machines. This also showed that the sale of
cookies resulted in losses, thus CookieVend had a motive to sell machines rather
than cookies.
2. CookieVend’s primary disbursements were for commissions, advertising, travel,
and business promotion. These expenditures occurred during a period when the
distributors’ complaints about product quality fell on deaf ears.
3. The profit-loss experience of the distributors was much worse than the profit-loss
statements represented in the newspaper advertisements. One of the highest
performing distributors realized a gross profit, assuming all cookies were sold, of
$375, on an investment of $7,941 over a period of eighteen months.
4. CookieVend never purchased a liability policy although the distributors’
purchase agreements represented that a policy did in fact exist.
5. The distributor agreement set out a nonrescission clause specifically stating, “The
distributor is not relying on any oral or written expressions, promises or
warranties made by anyone to consummate this transaction.”

Charity and Religious Fraud
Jim Bakker, former head of the defunct PTL (Praise the Lord Club) has brought
international attention to religious fraud. The essence of his scheme was to sell “lifetime
partnerships” in a luxury hotel, which his followers could use for life. Prosecutors were able
to show that Bakker’s plan was completely unworkable, because many more partnerships
were sold than could ever be accommodated. Bakker used the money to pay himself and
his lieutenants millions of dollars in salaries and bonuses. He was convicted under federal
mail fraud statutes.
Other kinds of charity and religious groups resort to fraud as a way of obtaining
contributions. In the most common of the schemes, fraudsters operating in boiler rooms call
unsuspecting victims and raise funds for allegedly good causes or for worthwhile
organizations. The funds collected are not used for their intended purpose, or the fraudsters
fail to disclose that they keep the majority of the funds raised for administration costs and
give the sponsoring charity or religion only a small portion of the money collected.
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Rob M. Blind Case Study
Between January 1997 and July 1998, Rob M. Blind and I. Swindle committed
fraud by developing a scheme through the medium of telephone solicitations that
induced the public to contribute funds allegedly for charitable purposes—to benefit
the blind.

The operation, Help the Sightless Associates, carried on by Rob and his associates, was
reasonably simple. They hired three or four blind musicians, who joined other
sighted employees for a tour of several cities. In each city they planned to visit, they
conducted a telephone solicitation campaign: literally by going through the yellow
pages and calling every business listed. The firms solicited were asked to buy an ad
in a program, which was to be distributed at a concert to be held in that city.
If the firm refused to advertise, it would be asked to buy tickets to the concert that it
could use, give away, or allow to be given away on its behalf.
The Help the Sightless Associates was not a charitable organization and never applied
for registration as such. There is no record of them donating anything to the blind
other than paying the musicians who gave the concerts.
As for the dollar amount of the fraud, according to Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, the total
gross receipts for 1997 and part of 1998 were $252,327. These funds were used in the
following manner:

Payments to the blind musicians

-50 percent

Payments unaccounted for

-48 percent

Expenses

Total

-2 percent

100 percent

7.2.2 Investor Frauds
Like corporate shams, investor frauds use techniques designed to produce a quick return or
benefit to the company that is the subject of the con. The techniques generally used are
telephone solicitation, personal cold calls, or spreading the sales pitch by word of mouth
among a particular group of individuals, such as doctors or dentists—who typically have
high incomes or high net worth, or both, but possess limited financial or investment
expertise. The con artist may succeed in persuading a member of the group to introduce
him or her to other members, thus creating confidence in both the scheme and him- or
herself. The investors are actively encouraged to spread the word to their close friends
about this opportunity for an investment. These activities are often perpetrated through a
pyramid or Ponzi scheme—both of which are described below.
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The key to the con is generally a direct pitch to the investors’ greed—that is, promises of
high returns within a short period. The scheme may entail investment in precious metals or
precious or semiprecious gems, and has been known to embrace items, such as antique
coins and commodity futures. Investor frauds have even extended to what is commonly
known as flips of real estate.

Although many of the characteristics of a corporate sham discussed in section 7.2.1 apply
equally to investor frauds, there are two characteristics that are unique to investor frauds:
1. An extensive and appealing get-rich-quick advertising campaign is conducted,
suggesting to the victims that easy money can be made with very little effort.

2. Investors, once the investment is determined to be a con, do not want any publicity that
would expose the foolishness of their investment.

Chain Referral (Pyramid versus Ponzi) Schemes
Chain referral schemes are based on the same idea as the well-known chain letter. This is a
particular kind of sham, which could involve products, or may involve only investments. In
one example of a chain letter, the con artist starts the chain letter by sending a letter to five
or more people requesting (on some pretext—often preying on people’s superstitions) the
recipients to mail money to the con artist. The letter also instructs each recipient to send the
letter to a further five people with the request that money be sent to the names in the first
two tiers of the pyramid. The third tier recipients in turn repeat the process of mailing the
request for money and adding themselves to the bottom of the pyramid. Often there is an
instruction that only four or five tiers should receive the money; the top name dropping out
with the addition of a new name(s) at the bottom. By the time the chain reaches the seventh
or eighth level (if the chain continues that long), the multiplier effect creates enormous
wealth to those higher up in the chain, because they receive money from the geometrically
growing lower tiers.

Of course, things other than money can be the objects of chain letters. Some involve
recipes, Christmas cards, and other harmless items. However, chain letters don’t work
indefinitely. That is because someone in the lower level inevitably fails to mail out his or
her five letters, and the chain is then broken; usually only those in the upper levels profit.

Chain referral schemes, also called pyramids or Ponzi Schemes (after the notorious Charles
Ponzi who successfully employed the scheme in the early twentieth century), are based
largely on the same principal. The difference is that some are legitimate and some are not.
Pyramid sales structures are generally legitimate, and Ponzi schemes are usually
illegitimate.
For example, many products sold exclusively in the home, such as Amway merchandise,
can be legitimate forms of pyramids. Individuals are recruited to sell merchandise. They in
turn recruit their friends and colleagues to sell, and get a cut of their commissions. This
recruitment continues on down, with those in the upper levels receiving a portion of the
commissions from several different layers of sales personnel. However, because of the
turnover in sales personnel, most people fail to achieve a sufficient level in the chain or
pyramid to make the touted commissions. They often get discouraged and quit, further
depressing the chain.
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Illegal pyramids (Ponzi Schemes) exist as well. One common variation is for a fraudster to
place mail order ads promising wealth to individuals for performing work in their homes
for services such as stuffing envelopes. When the victim responds to the ad, they are
informed that the opportunity requires sending in money. In return, he or she receives a
letter suggesting the victim place a similar ad and collect money in the same way, using the
same letter. In other words, the fraudster is telling the victims in effect, “do the same thing
to others that I just did to you.”
Another typical Ponzi scheme involves the diversion of investment funds. This fraud words
as follows: A company will open its doors as an investment firm, promising better than
average returns on its investment. When the company receives money from investors A
through G, the money is diverted to the personal benefit of the principals. When additional
money is received from investors H through L, those funds are used to pay off investors A
through G. When funds are received from investors M through Z, this money is used to pay
off investors H through L, or at least to pay interest, and so on. The money paid out to the
early investors, therefore, is not from returns achieved on investments, but rather a
diversion of new investments. This pyramid continues until the scheme collapses.

Many operators simply set up a mail or telephone operation, collect funds, then close the
operation and move, only to reestablish a similar operation and repeat the scheme. Law
enforcement officials acknowledge a significant problem with chain referral schemes, but
readily admit that they are incapable of adequately controlling the problem.
These schemes, or variations of them, cannot go on indefinitely because they require a
constant stream of money to cover the diverted funds. When the flow of new investments
fall below that level, there is insufficient cash to pay off old investors, and the scheme
collapses. The chain referral schemes are not dependent on a particular product or service,
but rather on the method of diverting funds. Common chain investment schemes include
franchising, sales distributorships, investment and securities of various kinds, and
merchandise.

Finally, it should be noted that many chain referral schemes involve small amounts of
money that are taken from many victims. Because victims typically feel foolish about being
fleeced, they frequently do not file charges. And even when complaints are made, the
police do not give these crimes priority because of staffing and budgetary commitments. As
a result, many chain referral operators stay around a long time.

7.2.3 Finance Fraud
False Mortgage Security
False mortgage security is a term used to refer to security that turns out to be nonexistent or to
have a value far lower than was represented. This is a kind of loan fraud whereby the
perpetrator is usually an individual acting through a sham corporation, and the victim could
be a bank, but is more likely an individual or another corporation.

The usual characteristics of false mortgage security fraud are as follows:
• An investor is persuaded to make a loan or invest funds on the assurance that repayment
of the loan or investment will be fully protected and secured in some way.
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• When the touted investment fails to materialize, the investor discovers that the assets
supposedly securing the investment do not exist, are worth much less than the investor
had been led to believe, or were pledged to numerous other investors rendering them
virtually worthless.
• The investor is often a financially unsophisticated individual who does not review the
transaction papers in detail and may not understand them but is persuaded to invest by
the prospect of a high return (for example, a well above average interest rate).
• The investor usually relies on the promises of the perpetrator or the apparent protection
afforded by the security.

It should be noted that some assets pledged as security (that is, land or stock) may lose
value for legitimate reasons such as fluctuations in their market values. In cases of false
security, however, there is intent to deceive on the part of the person soliciting the funds.

Accounting evidence in most cases can establish and document the funds’ flow in situations
of this nature. It is more likely that evidence establishing the intent to deceive will be
obtained by conducting interviews (viva voce evidence) than through the analysis of the
accounting records. It is often through the interview process that the true nature and intent
of the transactions are revealed. The nature of the documentary evidence required to
establish the economic benefit to the fraud perpetrator, and to trace the flow of funds are
dictated by the nature of the fraud scheme.

Trust Our Paper Inc. Case Study

Trust Our Paper Inc. commenced its syndicated mortgage program in 1995. The
program expanded rapidly, particularly during 1998, to include loans for property
development in Plainville. The company solicited—in appropriate private
offerings—funds from the public for investment in specific mortgages, with certain
representations made about the nature of each loan and the mortgaged property.
Unbeknownst to the investors, the mortgaged property was not as marketable or
valuable as had been represented because it did not have the necessary local
governmental approval for development.

During 1998, the period of its most rapid expansion, Trust Our Paper experienced
an increasingly severe negative cash flow from operations. This condition persisted
until March 1999, when Trust Our Paper went into receivership primarily as a
result of—
1. The apparent inability of the mortgagors (borrowers) to make interest payments.
2. The apparent inability of the mortgagors to pay principal amounts upon
maturity.
In reality, the face amount of the mortgages were much higher than the underlying
value of the property secured by the mortgages.

The problems in this case are best illustrated by a transaction that commenced in
the summer of 1998, when Trust Our Paper purchased land in Plainville at a price
of $400,000. It planned to build a 300-suite apartment complex on the land. Before
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the closing of the transaction, Trust Our Paper had been unsuccessful in obtaining
mortgage financing through normal channels because of an inability to get zoning
approval for its plans. The location of the land and environmental concerns proved
to be insurmountable obstacles.

Trust Our Paper then provided a loan of $1 million to ABC Developments Ltd., the
developer of the property, secured by a first mortgage on the property. Funds were
solicited from the public—in a properly registered offering—for investment in this
mortgage. Trust Our Paper represented to the investors that it had used the
mortgage proceeds for interim construction of a 300-unit residential complex.

However, an examination of the mortgage proceeds revealed a different story. Out
of the proceeds, $400,000 was used to reimburse Trust Our Paper for the cost of the
property. Thus, the purchase was financed entirely by the investors through their
loan to Trust Our Paper. Of the remaining funds, $115,000 was disbursed in
November 1998 to Green Investments Inc., a troubled company with a deficit of
$296,000. The balance of $485,000 was disbursed in a similar manner.
The underlying security given to the Trust Our Paper investors was highly
questionable in light of the following:

1. The mortgage for $1 million was on land purchased for $400,000.

2. The mortgage guarantor advised that the property was unsuitable for financing.
3. The property remained undeveloped.
4. The developers were unable to obtain alternate mortgage financing.

5. The mortgage proceeds were not used as purported.
Thus, the proceeds raised from the public offering were diverted from their
intended use, that is, to develop the property. This diversion diluted the value of
the security and jeopardized the achievement of the appraised potential that was
offered as security.

Advance Fee Fraud
Generally, advance fee schemes involve paying bogus corporations an up-front finder’s fee
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan. The victims of these kinds of
schemes can be both individuals and corporations. Often if an individual is seeking loan
funds but for whatever reason cannot obtain funding from traditional sources, he or she will
turn in desperation to these fraudsters.

Once the fee is paid, the perpetrator disappears. In some cases, desperate institutions are
offered access to illegal money, and they typically do not report the loss of the advance fee
when the deal falls through. General characteristics of these schemes include one or more
of the following:
• Deals too good to be true often are not true.
• The agent requests documents on bank stationery, or signatures of officers, or both.
• The bank is asked to give nondisclosure agreements to protect the agent or other parties.
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• The agent asks for an irrevocable agreement to pay commissions, expenses, and a fee.
• There are several complex layers of agents, brokers, and other intermediaries.
• The perpetrators often describe the offerings as special one of a kind offers and state that
the deal will be killed if anyone is contacted to verify the deal.
• The deal often involves foreign agents, banks, and other sources, such as an unnamed
wealthy person or government.

Debt Consolidation Schemes
People who find themselves hopelessly in debt frequently turn to debt consolidation
agencies out of desperation. Debt consolidation agencies do not advance loans, but rather
act as an intermediary between the debtor and creditor. Some are legitimate, but many are
not. Bona fide debt consolidation agencies make money by organizing the debtor’s affairs
and collecting a percentage of the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.

In the typical scenario, the debtor contacts the consolidation agency, and provides a
complete list of their creditors and the amount of monthly payments currently owed. The
agency then usually writes letters to the creditors, requesting a debt work-out plan
providing for lower monthly payments spread out over longer periods of time. The
creditors are often motivated to accept the arrangement provided they think that the entire
debt, or the major portion of it, will be repaid or that the debt consolidation plan will
prevent a bankruptcy filing or default by the debtor. The debtor then makes a lump sum
monthly payment to the consolidation agency, which then distributes the money to the
creditors.

Unscrupulous debt consolidation schemes are perpetrated when the agency collects money
from the debtor but does not forward it to the creditor. In some instances, it is months
before the debtor finds out that the money has been misappropriated. The victim debtor
has not only lost money to the unscrupulous agency, but still owes the original debt.

Bankruptcy Fraud
Bankruptcy is designed to give every corporation or individual encumbered by mountains
of debt a fresh start. In a liquidation or Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all assets and liabilities are to
be listed on the bankruptcy petition and a trustee is appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Trustee’s Office in the district where the petition was filed. The role of the trustee is to
liquidate the assets of the estate and distribute the funds to the creditors pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code.
Generally there are three common kinds of fraud committed by companies or individuals
filing for bankruptcy; they are:

1. Fraudulent conveyances. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, cash or other assets
are transferred to friends, relatives or business associates. Once the bankruptcy court has
discharged the debtor’s debts, these assets are then transferred back to the debtor. This
kind of transfer is often referred to as parking assets. These prepetition transfers are often
disguised to appear as bona fide business transactions.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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2. Concealing assets or asset stripping. The debtor could: convert assets to his or her own
benefit, simply fail to disclose certain assets in the bankruptcy schedules, or deny the
existence of such assets when meeting with the trustee or at hearings before a
bankruptcy judge.
3. Planned bankruptcy. The debtor’s affairs are structured in a way that gives the appearance
of a failing business, but is actually a lucrative business that needs to avoid the
circumstances of a particular obligation, litigation, or labor dispute. This is often
accomplished through the use of transfer pricing or management fees from related
companies, which may or may not be disclosed to the trustee.
Planned Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be attributed primarily to one or a combination of the
following causes:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Incompetence of management
Lack of managerial experience
Neglect
Severe economic recession or depression (macro or market sector)
Disaster
Fraud

Fraud is not the cause of most business failures.
The victims, regardless of the cause of a business failure, are customers and creditors:
customers who have ordered or paid for goods that are undelivered at the time the business
goes belly up, and the various creditors of the business that remain unpaid at that time. On
many occasions the employees are also victimized because they lose their jobs or are
unable to collect unpaid wages or both.
A business experiencing financial difficulties can pursue several remedies either to rectify
the situation or to conclude the operation of the business. The owner may cease business
voluntarily, or an unpaid creditor may precipitate the closing down of the business through
the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.

Ask the following questions when considering whether a bankruptcy was planned:
1. When did the company realize it would fail? A business failure may appear to be the
result of management incompetence, inexperience and neglect. Notwithstanding the
reasons for the financial difficulties, it is crucial to establish whether management
carried on the business after a point in time when they knew, suspected or should have
known that business failure was imminent. In that case, the fraud occurs when they
solicit funds from the public, including creditors, in spite of knowing or suspecting that
the company might be unable to fulfill the representations and commitments made. The
business, however, may have continued in the honest belief that it would turn around
(the rainbow syndrome).
Establishing the point in time at which management knew, should have known, or
suspected that business failure was imminent requires a detailed review and analysis
of the financial position of the business. Financial statements, accounting records
and banking records have to be scrutinized. (See Chapter 10 for further information
on financial statement fraud.) The examination would disclose not only the
financial position and any deterioration in it, but also the level of management’s
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knowledge about the situation. Correspondence and other documents from customers
and creditors, expressing concern or demanding delivery or repayment, together with
viva voce evidence may also be useful.
2. Did the company pursue remedies? In determining whether fraud exists, the forensic
accountant must consider whether the remedies available to the business in financial
difficulty, as noted above, were pursued. In addition, the accountant must ask if honest
attempts were made to resolve the difficulties or merely to give the impending business
failure the appearance of legitimacy.
3. Has the business committed an act of bankruptcy? Bankruptcy law defines specific
activities on the part of a debtor as constituting an act of bankruptcy. These activities
include one or more of the following:
• The transfer of assets to a trustee or other third party for the benefit of creditors

• A payment to one creditor in preference over another
• The fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property
• An attempt by the debtor to abscond without paying debts
• A failure to redeem goods seized under an execution order issued against the debtor

• The presentation at a meeting of creditors of a statement of assets and liabilities
indicating insolvency, or a written admission of the debtor’s inability to pay his or
her debts (the filing of a bankruptcy petition), or both
• An attempt to move or hide any of the debtor’s property
• Notice to any creditors that the debtor is suspending payment of his or her debts

• A failure to meet liabilities, generally, as they become due
• Default in a proposal made as part of the bankruptcy proceedings
4. Was the business failure planned? A planned business failure occurs where management
has converted the assets of the business to its own, that is, personal benefit and then tries
to conceal the conversion through formal bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the
debtor induces vendors to sell goods on credit when the debtor knows that it has neither
the intent nor the capacity to pay the creditors. Characteristics of a planned failure
include one or more of the following:
• The business has developed a reputation for trustworthiness in the business
community. This reputation may have a short history, and may have been
established for the express purpose of inducing companies to sell goods to the
business on credit.

• The business sells tangible and highly marketable products.
• The business seeks to sell, or convert the goods to cash as quickly as possible with
little care about the selling price because they have no intention of paying the
suppliers for the goods.
• The proceeds from operations are moved out of the business so as not to be
identified as an asset of the business at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.
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• The business has little net worth.
• The business has not been a financial success.

• The business departs from its normal business practices with regard to purchasing,
payments to suppliers, sales, and the granting of credit to customers.
The typical changes in business conduct of a planned failure include:

• The volume of inventory ordered from existing suppliers increases significantly. The
suppliers will probably extend credit up to sixty days, largely as a result of their wish
to retain the customer and the established reputation of the company.
• The unsuspecting suppliers will receive little or no payment. They may receive
payment for the initial order but not for subsequent shipments. The scam will
probably be completed within sixty days of the date of purchase of the inventory.
After that time, the suppliers are likely to become suspicious and might take action of
some kind.
• The company will refuse to sell the inventory to its customers on credit; that is, it will
sell on a cash-on-delivery (COD) or other cash-up-front basis only. To get customers
to pay cash, the selling price per unit is commonly at or below the company’s cost
price per unit, as shown on the supplier’s invoice.

• If inventory still remains after the company has approached its usual customers, the
inventory may then be offered to new customers. These sales tend to be non-arm’s
length and may be in cash. Although the sales invoices may indicate the payment
was made in cash, the deposit of the cash into the business’ bank account does not
necessarily follow.
• If, after all these efforts to sell, inventory is still left at the site, it can be physically
removed. The trail will be covered to prevent obvious detection.
A planned bankruptcy is designed, of course, to benefit those in control of the debtor
entity. The fraudster will make every effort to ensure that no trail is left behind to enable
the trustee in bankruptcy to retrieve the proceeds of the fraud and return those proceeds
to the creditors. The techniques employed to block the path of the trustee are limited
only by the perpetrator’s imagination and will vary according to the circumstances.

7.2.4 Arson for Profit
Arson and a planned bankruptcy share some similar characteristics. In both situations,
business problems exist and are acknowledged to exist by management. Arson, like
planned bankruptcy, can become the means of a criminal making the best of a bad
situation. The perpetrator will, of course, seek to commit the crime without leaving a trail of
criminal conduct.

The following are the chief characteristics of cases of arson:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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The fire is of an incendiary nature.
An insurance policy is in force.
There is a financial or other business-related motive.
The financial motive may not be readily apparent.
Exclusive opportunity to commit arson may or may not be evident.

Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime

6. The prosecution’s case will often be based on circumstantial evidence.
7. Efforts may have been made to destroy some or all of the accounting and business
records.

Without a confession or an eyewitness, the evidence in a case of arson is almost always
circumstantial in nature. The prosecutor usually must depend on circumstantial evidence,
which must be sufficient to rebut every reasonable hypothesis other than a willful and
intentional burning. However, evidence supporting the incendiary origin of a fire is often
interwoven with other evidence that tends to connect the accused with the crime. The
connection to the accused is often the presence of a motive and the opportunity of the
accused to perform the act.

Historically, insurance companies have been reluctant to challenge the veracity of loss
claims arising from major fires that have damaged or destroyed commercial, industrial,
recreational or residential establishments. The reasons given for this reluctance include the
following:
• Court proceedings are protracted and expensive, and the ultimate decision is often
favorable to the insured.
• The insurance company (like a bank) is often perceived as the big, bad guy, thus, the
insured sometimes gets the benefit of reasonable doubt because they are perceived as
the little guy.
• The punitive damages awarded to a claimant often far exceed the loss claim if the courts
feel that there has been an unreasonable delay.
• The only evidence is circumstantial.
• The alleged arsonist has been acquitted in a related criminal proceeding.

Accounting Issues and Evidence
The forensic accountant in arson-related matters should differentiate the business position
of the company and its owners from the financial position. Although the financial position
may have a considerable bearing on motive, motive is better understood in the context of
the business itself and the owners, through an overview of all aspects of the operations and
ownership of the business.
Ultimately, the financial analysis is designed to determine the mindset of the company, the
money of the company, and the worker in the company. Accordingly, it is usually
appropriate to obtain as much background information as possible. A starting point may be
the acquisition of a business or the commencement of a new business venture. A review of
the annual financial statements and associated working papers will disclose the company’s
yearly performance and any underlying business problems. Motive not apparent from an
analysis of the company’s financial transactions may become apparent from an
investigation of the social relationships found within a business.

Any review of the status of a business must be objective. It should identify not only matters
that are unfavorable to management and the owners of the company, but also matters that
are favorable. The unfavorable matters may well be obvious, for example, a steady decline
in sales, worsening creditor relations, or a significant withdrawal of funds immediately
before the fire. On the other hand, an owner may have put a substantial amount of his or
her own money into the business shortly before the fire.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Accounting evidence is likely to be extremely significant in establishing motive. The fire
may have destroyed some or all of the accounting and financial records, as well as
correspondence and file material that could have a bearing on the case. These records will
have to be reconstructed to the extent possible; thus, third-party documentation will have
to be obtained and interpreted.
Issues and Sources ofInformation. A review of several recent judgments shows that the main
characteristics in an arson investigation to consider, investigate, and establish in evidence
are as follows:
1. Ownership, including business structure, style, and relationships
2. Financial motive, that is the financial position of the owners and business, and existence
of an insurance policy
3. Current events at or around the time of the fire, including the establishment of exclusive
opportunity, and the origin of the fire as incendiary

Information will be sought from people directly and indirectly connected with the business,
possibly including its bankers, lawyer, accountant, customers, suppliers, insurers,
government agencies, and realtors.
The owner should always be given the opportunity to volunteer any personal or business
records that he or she might have.
See below for a list of questions to consider and documents to examine.

Accounting Evidence. Forensic accountants can assist by investigating several issues, in
particular those involving ownership and financial motive. They can analyze information
from several sources and construct a chronology of the financial events leading up to the
fire. They can analyze the financial records of the owner, the business, and third parties,
and demonstrate the company’s position at the time of the fire, comparing it with earlier
periods.
The forensic accountant looks for significant detail when attempting to determine whether
a financial motive exists. If little or nothing is available in the way of accounting books and
records and supporting documentation, the forensic accountant will pursue other third
party sources to secure information for the examination.

Obviously, any financial and accounting records of the business that are available will have
to be examined and analyzed. As previously noted, it is important to provide the owner the
opportunity to volunteer whatever personal or business records he or she has. Beyond this,
the forensic accountant will seek information from others directly or indirectly connected
with the business.
Key questions to consider include the following:
1. What financial condition was the business really in?

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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Who maintained the accounting records?
What accounting records would have been available?
What is the ownership structure?
Is the financial position of the owner solid?
What was the business’s cash flow?
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7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Does the business support the owner?
Does the owner support the business?
Have the essential matters been established?
Is the potential defendant cooperative?
What is the history and pattern of earnings?
Could ownership benefit from selling out to the insurance company?
What did the owner know about his financial state at the time of the fire?
Did any significant events occur at or around the time of the fire?
Who are the major suppliers and what were the business’ relations with them?
Who are the major customers and what were the business’ relations with them?
Who are the bankers and what were the business’ relations with them?
Who is the external auditor?
Who is the outside legal counsel?
Is the business for sale and are negotiations currently being conducted?
Have there been any recent changes in insurance coverage?

Third-party documents to investigate include:

• Government (usually the Secretary of State of the state of incorporation or of a state in
which the corporation is registered to do business) business registration records
• Recorded documents (for example, for land or other property)
• Work papers and files of accountants, auditors, or both
• Any secured transactions registered under the commercial code of the relevant state
• Tax returns
• Correspondence with customers and suppliers
• Bank credit files
• Credit files from other creditors
• Bank statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, credit memos, and debit memos (paper
or microfiche records)
• Payroll information
• General ledger records
• Real estate listings

7.2.5 Procurement Fraud
All organizations including manufacturers, financial institutions, governments, and retailers,
as well as private individuals are involved in the procurement process to acquire goods or
services. For each and every kind of purchased item, ranging from commodities and
equipment to a professional’s time via a consulting services contract, there is a different
kind of procurement fraud that can be perpetrated by the provider of the goods or services.
The risks and warning signs associated with each kind of procurement fraud vary
depending on what is being purchased, and also by the kind and stage of the procurement
process: Questions to ask when examining procurement fraud include:
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• Is the purchase competitive or noncompetitive?

• What pricing method was used: fixed fee, cost per unit, cost-plus, or a combination
thereof?
• Did the fraud occur at the requirements definition stage, the bidding and selection stage,
or the contract performance and evaluation stage?
Some of the more common kinds of procurement fraud include:

• Bid rigging or price fixing

•
•
•
•

False invoices
Inflated costs
Product substitution
Secret commissions and kickbacks

Bid Rigging or Price Fixing
Bid rigging or price fixing, is the process of setting the price or terms of the contract
between the various bidders without the knowledge or consent of the purchaser.

For example, bidders on a highway construction project may secretly meet before bids are
submitted. During their meeting, they decide who will submit the low bid and what the bid
should be. They may also decide who will bid on what jobs. This is known as bid rotation.
Bid rigging is usually characterized by the lack of independent competitive bids, or by prices
that are close together. The entity seeking the bids is victimized by having to pay higher
prices than the amount that would have been charged had there been no collusion.

False Invoices
Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or for services
that have not been performed are false.

Inflated Costs
Contractors often use a pricing method in which they invoice on a cost-plus basis. That is,
the contractor receives payment for the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on
a percentage of the costs. Clearly, the successful bidder has a vested interest in keeping the
costs high: the higher the cost, the higher the profit.

Typically, in order to obtain inflated profits, contractors falsify the cost of the product or
service. This can be done through simple or complex means. Examples of the former
include adding labor charges for nonexistent (ghost) employees or adding charges for
materials not actually used. In the more sophisticated schemes, the costs are inflated
through overhead allocations.

Product Substitution
Procurement contracts sometimes call for very exacting specifications on the materials used
on the job. Contractors frequently believe the contract specifications are too rigid and,
therefore, feel justified in substituting a less costly product or service, and keeping the
difference.

24

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime
In one scheme, a contractor bid on a new runway for an airport authority and won the bid.
The contract called for the depth of the concrete covering the runway to be a certain
minimum. After hearing rumors from competitors that the contractor was pouring less
concrete than the minimum, the authority’s auditors checked the work orders and
discovered that the paperwork reflected the concrete depth to hundredths of an inch. The
auditor reasoned that concrete could not be poured so exactly, checked the actual work,
and found the depth to be less than the contract specifications. The auditors concluded that
the contractor was submitting false reports to the airport authority, and was reaping excess
profit because it was supplying less material than that called for in the contract.

Secret Commissions and Kickbacks
Secret commissions and kickbacks are one of the most common forms of procurement
fraud, and also one of the most difficult to detect. It involves the receipt of a secret
payment, usually from one company (the vendor-payer) to a corporate executive (the agent)
of another company (the procurer): the agent then exercises influence on the decision
making of his or her employer in a way that favors the vendor-payer. For example, a
vendor submits false or inflated invoices for payment, which the procurer’s corporate
executive knowingly approves. This process is often described visually by the triangle of
dishonesty shown in figure 7-1.
The key point to note is that secret commissions and kickbacks are a kind of fraud that
generally accompanies other forms of procurement fraud (such as those described in this
section).

Figure 7-1. Triangle of dishonesty

Vendor
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Employer

Employee

(Principal)
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7.2.6 Organizational Bribe Giving
The two main kinds of bribes that benefit organizations are:

1. Bribing politicians and giving illegal campaign contributions.

2. Implementing commercial bribery as related to procurement fraud. Also included here
are bribes for industrial espionage—that is, paying someone to reveal trade and other
secrets about competitors.
Political Bribery

There are three generally recognized characteristics of political bribe giving:
1. Government benefits are often extremely valuable (or, for penalties and sanctions, very
costly), but the demand for benefits can exceed the supply.

2. The government is the sole purveyor of the benefits and sanctions; you must do business
with the government.
3. The bribe is an attempt to both bypass and guarantee the result of the normal processes,
which are often lengthy, costly, and uncertain in result.
The most common form of political bribe giving is illegal campaign contributions, which
have made headlines during the Clinton Administration.
Paying foreign politicians and governments was (and perhaps still is) common in order to
conduct business in many countries. Since the mid-seventies, when the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was enacted, paying bribes to foreign officials except in cases of national
security has been unlawful.

Commercial Bribery
Commercial bribery involves making payments in exchange for the award of a contract, for
industrial espionage, or for both.

In the triangle of dishonesty, a payment from a vendor to an employee would encourage
the employee to influence the decision regarding the recipient of a lucrative contract.
Several federal and state laws address the practice of commercial bribery. Both the act of
asking for or the making of a payment constitutes an offense. In some instances commercial
bribery may also be a violation of the restraint-of-trade laws. For example, certain industries—
notably the liquor industry—are specifically prohibited from paying for business. Over the
years, many well-known, major businesses have been guilty of commercial bribery (a listing
of names would not add learning other than the giants of industry are involved from-timeto-time in nefarious activities).
Industrial espionage can involve direct payments to third parties to secure valuable
competitive information. It can also be accomplished indirectly, for example, through the
hiring of a competitor’s employees. In one case, several U.S. military procurement agents
were charged with giving defense contractors information on more than $500 million in
Navy purchases that were going to be the subject of the competitive bidding process.
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7.2.7 Industrial Espionage
Industrial espionage is a term that is broadly applied to activities whose main purpose is to
obtain information or related assets from competitors or potential competitors. The classic
forms of industrial espionage are trade-secret theft and copyright piracy.

Trade Secrets
There are three basic elements to a trade secret: novelty, value, and secrecy. Secrecy,
concerns whether an organization handled its alleged secret in a protective manner. If a
judge deems that an organization failed to protect a secret, that organization will not win
judicial support if it charges an employee with theft of that secret
Patent laws seek a compromise between capitalistic self-interest in a trade secret and social
well-being by granting a seventeen-year monopoly to developers of innovative ideas. The
U.S. Supreme Court, in its only ruling on trade secrets (Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
1974), declared the likelihood “remote indeed” that a company would not patent valuable
information that it had developed. However, the Court overlooked the advantage, wellknown to most companies, that trade secrets can be hoarded far beyond the seventeen-year
patent limitation, a matter well documented by the success and secrecy of the formulas for
Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, among others.
Leakage of trade secret information is said to be particularly likely from employees who go
to work for competitors, careless secretaries, gregarious field sales personnel, and high-tech
computer whizzes who often are more loyal to their equipment than to their fellow
employees or employer. Temporary help is regarded as especially vulnerable: these
employees do not have any company loyalty and can be planted for purposes of trade
secret theft. Sharing sensitive information among two or more individuals, neither of whom
knows the full secret, is one way to reduce the possibility of compromising sensitive
information. Another method can be used to protect mailing lists. By including at least one
decoy address in a list, if the list is compromised, whoever uses it will be sending material
to a fictional person at an address that actually is the list-owning company’s mail drop.

A review of court cases on trade-secret theft shows that defendants are typically smaller
corporations that have hired scientists from larger organizations where they had previously
worked for six to ten years. There also appears to be an unusual amount of trade-secret
theft from family-owned businesses. The defendants in these cases claim that because they
were outsiders, they believed their chances of advancement were hopeless, so they stole the
proprietary information to benefit (ingratiate themselves with) their new employers.

Copyright Piracy
Copyright piracy is defined as the infringement of another’s copyright or other business
rights. It is an activity usually undertaken by manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers that do
not have any legal right to manufacture or copy the product, but who want to earn a quick
profit (greed motive) or to ease a financial difficulty (need motive).
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Bigtown Video Case Study

From August 1997 to May 1, 1998, John Smith was the owner, principal
shareholder, director, president, and general manager of Bigtown Video Inc., a
video store with three retail outlets. During this time Jack Brown was also a
shareholder and secretary-treasurer of the company.
Bigtown Video’s business included the sale and rental of prerecorded videocassettes
as well as the sale of blank cassettes. The videotapes sold and rented by Bigtown
Video fell into two categories: legitimate and “counterfeit.” The legitimate tapes
were obtained from sources authorized to manufacture and distribute the tapes in
compliance with all copyright and distribution rights. They were packaged with
stylized printed jackets showing the nature and content of the particular film. The
counterfeit tapes had been duplicated from legitimate tapes, many of which had not
yet been released to the public in videocassette form. The packaging of the
counterfeit tapes was like that of a blank cassette package with the title of the film
handwritten on the side panel. The legitimate tapes were displayed in the front of
the stores. The counterfeit tapes were kept in the back rooms of the stores in a closet
or in a drawer.
When cross-examined at trial, Mr. Brown testified that he and Mr. Smith had jointly
decided to deal in counterfeit videocassettes in late 1997. The decision was made as
a result of customer demands and financial difficulties. Mr. Brown would buy
counterfeit cassettes from various sources and make duplicates of them. These
actions were done with Mr. Smith’s knowledge and consent. Mr. Smith rented the
counterfeit videocassettes at rates of $5 or more and sold them for prices ranging
from $60 to $100 or more. From January 1998 until May 1998, the gross profit
made by the company from each of the three stores was approximately $1,500 per
week, of which about 60 percent was attributed to the distribution of the counterfeit
videotapes.
In Mr. Smith’s cross-examination, he revealed that he was fully aware of the
illegitimate origins of the counterfeit videocassettes supplied to him and that neither
he, his suppliers, nor Bigtown Video had the right to distribute, rent or sell the
cassettes. Mr. Smith knew that by dealing in these counterfeit tapes he was
effectively depriving their owners of copyright and distribution revenues, which
they would otherwise have been likely to earn but for the use of these illegitimate
tapes: he was prejudicing the economic interests of the real owner. Mr. Smith made
no attempt to contact the owners of the copyright or distribution rights in order to
contribute revenues for his counterfeit use, to obtain these rights, and he had no
intention of so doing.
Bob Green, a vice-president at Star-Studded Studios, testified about the effect of
pirated videocassettes on the revenues of his company. He focused on four areas of
impact and said:

1. That the inferior quality of pirated or counterfeit videocassettes tends to provide
the viewer with a poor opinion of the film and the consequent negative publicity
is harmful to the theatrical market.

28

Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime

2. That people who have seen a counterfeit videocassette are unlikely to buy the
legitimate cassette upon its release.
3. That for extremely high-grossing films, much of the profit arises out of repeated
viewings of the film by the public. The effect of a counterfeit videocassette in
such a situation is to diminish the theatrical value of the film by eliminating the
possessor’s desire to return to the theater.
4. That with respect to distribution in other territories, the markets for legitimate
cassettes have vanished due to the heavy influx of counterfeit videocassettes in
those territories. In cross-examination Mr. Green admitted that he could not
quantify the loss of profit by theatres from counterfeit videocassettes, nor could
he reliably estimate the extent of loss for a given film or a given year.

7.2.8 Securities Fraud
There are four main kinds of securities fraud that fall within the category of commercial
crime:

1. Knowingly providing misleading or false information in financial statements of a traded
business enterprise. (See Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement
fraud.)
2. Churning: An activity of brokers who buy and sell their clients’ securities for the sole
purpose of generating commissions.
3. Mixing (commingling) of funds.
4. Manipulating the market for a stock by altering the stock’s price through influencing the
factors that affect the market price or by controlling the pool of shares available for sale
or purchase.

Misleading or False Financial Statements
In large companies, upper level management, whose intent is not necessarily to steal, often
manipulates financial statement information. These managers wish to manipulate data to
enhance profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, or to impress the brass at
headquarters, or to impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals
imposed by senior management. In small companies, where false financial results can
create a direct benefit for senior management, the intent of management is often sinister.
Intentionally falsifying financial statements can be accomplished by one of the following
methods:
1. Misstatement of financial information by arbitrarily raising profits or lowering costs
using techniques such as plugging sales or ending inventory, incorrectly capitalizing
current expenses, deferring necessary repairs, falsifying sales invoices, and altering cost
invoices.
2. Misrepresentation or omission of significant information.
3. Misapplication of accounting principles.
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In the MiniScribe fraud, the company knowingly inflated inventories to deceive the
auditors as to the value of assets on hand; the primary goal was to maintain and drive the
share price of the company up in the public market.
In more recent instances, particularly in the high tech environment, channel stuffing (that is,
just before year end, shipping inventory to distributors and dealers whether or not ordered,
and booking the shipments as sales) was a popular method used to inflate sales to achieve
projected and expected revenue goals. In many instances, product recorded as sold was
returned shortly after year-end.

Heinz Catch-Up Case Study
Heinz has been a household name representing quality food products for more
than one hundred years. The company had been well managed, profitable and
socially responsible. But in the late 1970s, it received considerable unfavorable
publicity for accounting irregularities. Some of its profit-center managers engaged
in reducing its profits to create a cushion for the next year. The total amount of
these pseudo-profit reductions was quite small ($8.5 million) when compared to
overall sales ($2.4 billion). However, annual sales and profits were not what were
reported to the IRS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and company
stockholders.

The disclosure of these irregularities occurred as a result of an antitrust suit brought
by Heinz against Campbell Soup. In Campbell’s discovery efforts, it snagged
evidence that Heinz’ advertising agency was billing for services that had not yet
been rendered. When a Heinz executive was questioned about the matter, he
pleaded the Fifth Amendment.
The antitrust suit was settled shortly afterwards, but the disclosure caused Heinz
headquarters’ personnel to launch an investigation into the accounting practices of
several subsidiaries. Being highly decentralized, headquarters’ personnel claimed
they were unaware of the lower-level fudging. Headquarters monitored
performance through budget forecasts of sales and expenses and an incentive
compensation plan that paid off if high-end profit goals were met. Headquarters
also monitored consistent growth in profits. Top management was committed to
that overriding goal and, the company’s earnings did rise consistently: for example,
1978 marked the fifteenth consecutive year of record profits.
Heinz had an explicit policy that prohibited its divisions from having any form of
unrecorded assets or false entries in its books and records. And Heinz didn’t
measure short-term performance alone. The top nineteen executives, including
division general managers, had long-term incentive plans in addition to the oneyear plan.

What existed here initially were income transferals aided and abetted by vendors
who supplied invoices one year for services that were not rendered until the next
year. When that wasn’t enough, false invoices were submitted one year and then
reversed in the following year. But the amounts involved did not have a material
effect on the company’s reported profits.
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Strangely, the problem at Heinz started in 1974 when it appeared that profits in the
Heinz USA division would exceed those allowed by the wage and price controls in
effect at the time. World headquarters sought a way to reduce the division’s profit
Losses in commodity transactions did not reduce profits enough, so the division
booked $2 million in advertising services. Yet, instead of treating the expense as a
prepaid item, the company charged the advertising expenses off immediately.
Despite the lower profits of the division, world headquarters decided that the
division had achieved its goal and paid the relevant bonuses.

By 1977, the following practices had evolved at the Heinz USA division:
1. Employees delayed year-end shipments until the beginning of the next year to
ensure accurate invoicing dates.
2. Employees handled customer complaints about the delays by making the
shipments, but misdating the shipping and invoice documents.

3. Employees did not record credits from vendors until the following year.
4. Income management became a way of life. One employee was given the task of
maintaining private records to ensure the recovery of amounts paid to vendors
on improper invoices.
5. The practice of delayed shipment and prepaid billing to assure that departmental
budgeted amounts were met permeated the division down to the departmental
level.
6. Ten separate vendors joined in supplying improper invoices.
7. Employees used other questionable tactics to manipulate income including
inflated accruals, inventory adjustments, commodity transactions and customer
rebates.
What can be learned from this case? First, exerting pressure for continuous growth
in profits may foster improper accounting practices, particularly if coupled with an
incentive compensation plan that rewards and reinforces continuous growth on the
high side. Second, autonomous units with independent accounting capabilities
might be tempted, under the above circumstances, to manipulate performance data.

Heinz isn’t the only case in which autonomous accounting or pressure for performance led
to manipulations of records. There were similar episodes in the 1980s at McCormick and
Company, J. Walter Thompson, Datapoint Corporation, Saxon Industries, Ronson
Corporation, Pepsico, AM International, U.S. Surgical, and Stauffer Chemical. More
recently, companies like Sunbeam and Cendant have been in the news for the same kind of
earnings manipulation.

Churning
Churning occurs when a broker buys and sells stock for a client to generate fees, rather
than to protect the best interests of the client. Broker discretionary accounts are especially
ripe for churning because they can be used to generate fees for both the brokerage firm and
the broker, without much involvement or control by the actual investor.
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In one case, two sisters gave brokers $500,000 each to be held in discretionary brokerage
accounts. The brokers executed more than 1,400 stock trades, allegedly earning themselves
$400,000 in commissions, while leaving the sisters with $70,000.

Mixing of Funds
Another scheme involves mixing (commingling) client funds with the funds of the
brokerage firm, or broker, or both. In these cases, brokers will use the client’s stock as
collateral for corporate or personal loans, and post the winning trades to themselves, while
posting the losses to their clients. Some brokers also resort to out-and-out embezzlement of
their client’s money and stock.

Manipulating the Stock Market
Stock market manipulation is a crime perpetrated by a promoter who artificially influences
the market price of shares in a company for self-benefit or for the benefit of his or her
holding company at the expense of the investing public. In most cases, the promoter flogs
his or her holdings to the public, the public pays an artificially high price for the stock, and
the resulting increase in price lines the pockets of the promoter.
Promoters of the stock are usually self-styled financiers who start off owning the majority of
the stock. Often other conspirators join the promoter, forming a control group consisting of
financiers, warehousers, or brokerage salespersons, some or all of whom might be acting
under a corporate umbrella.

To increase the stock’s price, the promoter subjects it to a multipronged attack. The
promoter uses such weapons as influencing the demand for the stock and controlling the
supply of the stock, warehousing the stock (parking), paying secret commissions, wash
trading, and issuing fictitious press releases, all of which are intended to stimulate more
trading than would otherwise occur.

The victim is the investing public. In many ways this particular fraud is similar to other
investment scams that rely on telephone solicitations (boiler room operations) and high
commission rates (which are often secret).
Reasons to Study This Kind of Crime. It has been argued that stock market manipulation is a
very specialized kind of crime, restricted to the larger financial centers and, therefore, few
CPAs are likely to come across them. Nevertheless, because of the great increase in stock
market investments, residents anyplace in the country may become victims of stock market
manipulation and may look to their CPA for advice. Further, an increasing number of
CPAs are providing financial planning services, including investment advisory services, to
their clients. These CPAs must be aware of stock manipulation schemes to protect both
their clients and themselves.
In addition, stock market manipulation and the modus operandi may resemble other kinds of
scams in which the price of an investment is influenced by the laws of supply and demand.
Therefore, CPAs should be aware of this kind of crime. They could be called upon to speak
to the public about prevention of white-collar crime in general or investment scams in
particular. Also, they may become an investor in the stock market themselves.

Possible Red Flags. Red flags possibly signaling stock market manipulation, with the possible
exception of churning and commingling of funds, are not as readily apparent as they are in
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some other kinds of economic crime. Most red flags seem to originate from an informant
close to or aware of the control group. In contrast, the regularly required reports investors
receive should be reviewed on receipt to assure that there are not patent red flags, that is,
there is no churning or commingling of funds. Of course, if the fraud involves falsifying
these reports, discovery will probably be delayed until the fraudster is caught, by which
time, the investor could well be wiped out.
The SEC and stock exchanges usually carry out investigations to detect this type of crime
and the investigations are mainly analytical. Unusual price increases or large commissions
earned by salespeople may be investigated, as may press releases or assets reported on
financial statements.

Price as Determined by the Law ofSupply and Demand. The law of supply and demand states,
in essence, that the price of an item will rise when demand for the item exceeds the
available supply of that item, and the price will fall when supply exceeds demand.
Throughout a stock manipulation, the promoter attempts to control both the supply of, and
the demand for, a stock in order to move the price higher. As supply is restricted, the price
increases. As demand is stimulated, the price increases.
A stock market is a composite of the interests of many individuals and corporations offering
to buy and sell shares. Individuals, however, are influenced not only by information
(whether accurate or not), but also by motives such as greed or fear and by perceptions that
may have little to do with facts or reason. Investors are capable of changing their
investment decisions quickly, purchasing recklessly in a down cycle or staying out of the
market entirely in anticipation of disappointing financial information. The common desire
is to make profits and to prefer investments that are perceived as likely to produce profits,
whether or not these perceptions are based in reality.
Thus, investors will often overreact in seeking to take advantage of price changes or in
attempting to correct their errors. A single item of speculative news may dramatically
change the number of people who are willing to purchase, hold or sell a particular
investment, dramatically changing the demand for the shares. It is important to note that
large volumes of shares are often exchanged. Accordingly, time is of the essence in keeping
losses to a minimum and gaining the greatest possible profits. Precisely when a buy or sell
transaction takes place can make a big difference in the value of the purchase or sale.
Market prices are generally influenced by the release of corporate information, such as
news about profits, the announcement of a new product line, or the discovery of a new oil
reserve, as well as by changes in government policy, forecasts, prospectuses, and in general,
matters that occur in the ordinary daily conduct of a business.

In summary, the investing public, through the medium of publicly held stock, whether
traded on an exchange, the NASDQor over the counter, is able to place a value on a share
and to decide to buy or sell accordingly. As more people seek to buy shares, the price of a
share will increase if the number of shares for sale on the market remains the same.
Conversely, the price will fall if an excess supply of shares is available or if the public
demand for the shares drops.

The Manipulation Process. Generally, a manipulation begins with the promoter falsely
increasing demand and restricting or controlling the supply. The combined effect of this
process is an increase in price. After a certain point, called the blow off, the promoter
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attempts to increase supply and dampen demand in order to reduce the price, allowing the
promoter to repurchase at a profit. Throughout, the promoter must act as a control valve in
releasing the stock in order to control the market price, and hence the profits.
Manipulation may be motivated not only by a promoter wanting to make more money, but
also by the desire to make the asset side of an investor’s balance sheet look good or to
improve the performance of an investment portfolio.
A promoter may use any combination of the following tactics to encourage the public to
buy stock at higher and higher prices:

• Using buy or sell pressure by stock brokers who may be receiving secret commissions
• Distributing false press releases and rumors
• Releasing false ownership information
• Promoting fictitious or grossly exaggerated profits, assets or future prospects (or any
combination thereof)
• Warehousing to help restrict the supply of shares
• Using wash trading (that is, trading that results in no change in beneficial ownership) to
stimulate public interest due to high trading volumes

• Controlling the first or last trade of the day in order to set the highest possible price for
the stock
• Dumping into foreign markets

Some or all of the activities generally used in the manipulation process are shown in figure
7-2.
Figure 7-2. Activities frequently used in the cycle of manipulating the stock market
Price Increase:

Price Decrease:

• Obtaining control

• Backdooring

• Setting up a distribution network

• Blowing off

• Warehousing

• Short selling

• Using wash trading

• Issuing bad news releases

• Issuing good news releases

• Repurchasing

A promoter who wanted to manipulate the price of a stock might use any combination of
the activities listed below

7. Obtaining Control: The first step that a promoter usually takes is to gain control over an
existing company’s shares of stock to ensure that the public’s selling off large quantities
of the stock does not undermine his control over the supply of shares. Generally, 70-to90 percent of the voting shares that are issued and outstanding must be acquired to
exert effective control. The promoter can gain the necessary control by using one or a
combination of the following:
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• Buying the shares of an inactive company that is already listed on an exchange
(commonly known as cleaning up the market). The shares of the promoter’s unlisted
company (which do not meet the requirements for listing on an exchange) can then
become listed by merging the corporations and exchanging the unlisted shares for
shares of the listed company.
• Buying a shell company that may have been inactive for a number of years.
• Underwriting an issue of new shares of a somewhat controlled company. This
underwriting usually consists of a new issue of shares in an amount that far exceeds
the original number of outstanding shares. To a promoter, this is the least desirable
method, as it requires a prospectus, financial reporting, and an insider trading
report. In addition, the promoter will have to arrange for his friends to purchase the
new shares and hold them (park them) on his behalf an unequivocally fraudulent
transaction.
2. Setting up a Distribution Network. A distribution network is set up with the promoter at
its head. Immediately underneath the promoter are several distributors in cities that
have stock traders or brokerages. Each of these distributors has access to a brokerage
house’s salespeople who then have access to the active traders. Via this network, the
promoter now has control over what happens in the promoted stock’s market. Secret
commissions are sometimes paid to ensure that the network complies with the
promoter’s demands.

The traders let the salespeople know when trades are pending and keeps them
informed as to the price movement of the promoted stock so that the promoter can
take compensating action. The salesperson’s job is to give the public a sales pitch as to
why they should buy the stock and, once in, why they should stay in. In addition, the
salesperson’s activity will affect the daily trading volume. What members of the public
do not know in this situation is that the shares they are purchasing are those of the
promoters.

3. Warehousing: Warehousing places shares into the hands of people who are friendly to
the promoter. This is essential in order to maintain control of the shares and continue
to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available. This is often accomplished by
having friends buy new offerings of the stock and continuing to hold these shares until
the promoter instructs them to sell.
4. Wash Trading. To promote the public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted
stock, the promoter manipulates the volume of stock traded through wash-trading.
Essentially, this procedure consists of a stock purchases and sales with no change in
beneficial ownership. Wash trading can be accomplished through nominee accounts:
accounts at banks or trust companies set up under the names of trustees, friends,
aliases, or false company names. The promoter sells a block of shares and at the same
time a nominee enters a buy order to match the sell transaction. While the stock is kept
out of the public’s hands, this active, ostensibly normal trading is reflected in the
volume numbers the public sees. Hence, the market in the manipulated stock appears
to be an active one in the public’s eyes.
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5. Issuing Good News Releases: One or more timely news releases may be issued to promote
the stock, attracting further public interest. The news releases may include verifiable
information but may also consist of unsubstantiated rumors, such as:

• Anticipation of good results from drilling tests in resource-based companies

• Expectations for a likely acquisition of rights to explore property close to existing
known resources
• Plans for diversification into a glamour industry

Generally the good news may be described as an intangible promise of future results.
There is nothing of immediate value today. These good news releases are designed to
stimulate the public interest and encourage them to buy shares, even at a high price.
6. Backdooring: Backdooring occurs when friends operating as a warehouse, which the
promoter has previously set up, start selling their shares while the price is still
increasing—contrary to their agreement with the promoter—before getting the word
from the promoter to sell. The friends are backdooring the promoter, effectively
double crossing the promoter. In order to sustain public demand, the promoter has to
buy the backdoor shares at the market price if the existing public demand is not
sufficient to support these sales.
7. Blowing Off. After the promoter has successfully stimulated demand, members of the
public buy significant numbers of shares and then wait for the price to continue its
anticipated rise. The promoter has already picked a tentative price at which he wants
to dispose of his holdings. He starts selling his shares, as well as those of his nominees
and friends. In these circumstances, the sale of unusually large amounts of stock is
referred to as a blow off. The public, expecting a continued price rise, buy the
promoter’s shares over a relatively short period of time.

The price at which the promoter actually begins to blow off his holdings depends
primarily on how much public demand the distribution network has created and how
long the demand is sustained. By blowing off, the promoter has withdrawn all active
support of the stock price. He ceases wash trading, the reported trading volume
decreases, and the price begins to fall quickly as supply far exceeds demand.
8. Short Selling. Short selling is the act of selling stock that one does not yet own and is a
legitimate market activity. The seller is gambling that the price will decrease and that
he or she will be able to buy back the shares at a price lower than the current-selling
price. In this situation, the promoter can safely sell short, because he or she knows that
the price will go down. Thus, the promoter realizes a profit both as the price of the
stock goes up and again as the price goes down.
9. Issuing Bad News Releases: At this point, the promoter often issues a news release about
the company’s misfortunes. The exact reverse of the good news release, the promoter
intends the bad news release to drive down the price of the stock rapidly.
10. Repurchasing. The stock price has now reached rock bottom, and the public is willing to
sell at any price. The promoter often buys back control of the company when the
shares reach this low price and changes the name of the company in order to start the
process again. The same company, under a new name, will go through the cycle again
in a period of one to two years.

36

Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime

Secret Commissions. Secret commissions were previously mentioned in the distribution
network discussion. Generally, secret commissions or bribes are given to people in the
securities industry to induce them to push or promote the shares in the promoter’s
company and to advise the promoter of orders to purchase shares before the orders are
entered. Secret commissions may also be paid to the wash traders in order to keep their
support. Generally, secret commissions are paid in one or more of the following ways:
• By a check drawn on either a personal or a corporate bank account and payable to the
recipient, to cash, or to a third party. If the check is paid to a third party, it will be
endorsed by the named third party and cashed, with the cash being passed on to the
true recipient of the secret commission.
• By a free delivery to the recipient of stock in signed-off or street certificate form, which
can then be sold by the recipient on the market.
• By the issuance to the recipient of call options on the stock at a fixed price below the
current market price.
• By selling a block of stock to a salesperson or another recipient at a fixed price and
allowing that buyer to sell that block back at a higher price.
The Significance ofAccounting Evidence. Accounting evidence is generally very significant in
the prosecution of stock market manipulation cases because—

• The accountant can perform an analysis to determine whether change in beneficial
ownership occurred (a wash trading analysis).
• Accounting evidence may be instrumental in identifying payments or receipts of secret
commissions, if any.
• Accounting evidence can be used to establish the percentage of the public’s participation
in buying and selling shares when compared to the total transactions in the stock by the
control group.
• Accounting evidence may assist in establishing that the perpetrators have benefited from
the sale of the stock.
However, accounting evidence may not be as significant as viva voce evidence in initially
identifying the control group, establishing the secret commission structure, and identifying
who was paying and receiving these commissions.

Possible Preventive Measures. Perhaps the most significant stock manipulation preventive
measure is to make the investing public aware that a salesperson’s pitch will be persuasive,
will play on the investor’s greed, and will convey a sense of urgency. The following are
questions that an investor should ask a salesperson to answer on the record concerning the
specific representations being made about the investment. The answers given should help
in identifying poor or fraudulent investments.

1. How risky is this stock?
2. What direct costs are paid out of the investors’ funds, such as for commissions, or
advertising, or both?
3. Can I get written documents (the prospectus at a minimum), and can you mail them to
me?
4. What is the specific destination (that is, bank account, brokerage account) of my funds?
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5. How can I sell the stock if I choose to do so, and how long will it take to dispose of the
investment?

6. What are the names of the principal owners and officers of the salesperson’s firm, and
what are the names of the owners and officers of the company in which the investment
is being made?

Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. Case Study
In early 1998, Jack Smith started to promote a company called Acme Mines Co., a
shell company listed on the Westville Stock Exchange. Smith had effective control
of the outstanding shares. In order to promote public interest and buying, Smith
made announcements—through investor bulletins and statutory statements to
regulatory bodies—to the effect that Acme was about to diversify into the movie
production business and other ventures. The announcement touted:

• An investment of $175,000 in the production of a movie, which would return 25
percent of the profits to Acme
• A purchase yielding 58 percent control of a movie theater business called
Everytown Theaters Ltd.
• An acquisition of distribution rights to Krazy Kandy, a confection that would be
sold from automatic vending machines across the country
On February 4, 1998, Smith changed the name of the company from Acme Mines Co.
to Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. (GPY-Movies) to reflect its new objectives.

Smith’s next step was to stimulate trading activity in GPY-Movies’ stock on the
Westville Stock Exchange. To accomplish this, offices were maintained in Bigtown
and Westville and were operated by Mike Jones, a securities desk-trader, and the
controller, Dave Brown. Their objectives appear to have been to maintain the
market with effective control, match orders to create activity (wash trading), and
systematically sell off the stock for profit.
Smith would tell Jones when to buy or sell. Jones would follow through via a series
of controlled nominee accounts. Brown’s job was to keep track of all the accounts,
meet corporate requirements, and generally manage the money and the office in
Bigtown. The nominee accounts were all in corporate names and could be traded
by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones or Mr. Brown.

The office in Bigtown was in the name of Anyco Investment Corp. The accounts at
brokerage firms in both Westville and Bigtown were in the following names:
1.
2.
3.
4.
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At this time Smith was either an officer or director of each company and effectively
controlled them. Stock positions in GPY-Movies were established through
numerous Bigtown and Westville brokerage firms.

The eventual objective was to sell off or distribute the stock for a profit without
causing an obvious decrease in the market price. To achieve this goal, Smith hired
Robert Green who started to work out of the Bigtown Office around April 2, 1998.
Smith instructed Green to sell stock through the accounts of Anyco and Metro
Trading and to limit the price to $1.26 until an underwriting was effected, which
was to occur on April 18, 1998.
Green’s procedure was to prearrange all the buy orders so that they could be
matched with any one of Smith’s selling accounts. Whenever Green learned of a
buy order, he would notify Jones of its size, price and the name of the brokerage
firm. This meant that Green had to be in contact with sales reps or their distributors
who would notify him of forthcoming buy orders. In order to secure their
cooperation, Smith specifically authorized Green to pay sales reps a 15 percent
commission over and above the amount sales reps would normally receive. In
addition, Green, with the assistance of Smith and Brown, arranged for Wally
Chang, a brokerage house manager, to use his sales force to distribute 300,000
shares of GPY-Movies throughout the United States for a 12½ percent commission.

On occasion, Smith arranged to provide cash to Green in order to make payments
to sales reps. Brown made the checks payable to cash and drew them on one of the
companies’ accounts. Green made his own arrangements as to where and when to
pay the sales reps.
Smith convinced two sales reps, Black and White, to set up an account in their firm.
Whenever Black and White were able to persuade one of their clients to buy GPYMovies shares, the offset would come out of Smith’s account in the name of Metro
Trading. In this way, Smith was able to sell off his position and pay Black and
White with shares that they in turn sold through nominee accounts. Paul Wilson, an
analyst, provided Smith with inside information on who was bidding or offering, as
he was indebted to Smith for a substantial loan.

Thus, Smith and Jones, in an effort to generate personal gain, created a misleading
appearance of active public trading in shares of GPY-Movies, both by wash trading
and by the use of secret commissions. The result was a loss to the investing public.

7. 2.9 Environmental Abuse
Generally there are two main kinds of environmental abuse that a company can commit:
1. Pollution
2. Misuse of natural resources
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Pollution
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has
recently focused on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer—
for instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated
in many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the added costs incurred.
Amount ofPollution. The amount of pollution and how it is determined depend on the
nature and source of the pollution. For example, a perpetrator may have dumped garbage
at an authorized site but in quantities greater than the dumping license permits. Or, a
perpetrator may have dumped garbage at an unauthorized site. Or, a perpetrator may have
polluted the environment in some other way, for example, dumping toxic substances into a
river, or exceeding the specificed limits of emission of certain substances into the
atmosphere.
Regardless of the nature and source of the pollution, the alleged offender’s accounting and
administrative records are likely to yield pertinent information about the physical quantities
of substances that are themselves pollutants or that result in pollution. Financial records can
also provide useful evidence as to the alleged offender’s knowledge and intent. For
example, an accounts receivable listing would reveal the names of the company’s
customers, but additional documents would be needed to assess the extent of the polluting
activities. These documents might include invoices, bills of lading, weigh tickets, contracts,
production reports, and so on.

Depending on the nature of the abuse, the financial records may help to put a dollar value
on the cost of the damage done. For example, if you can establish that a company dumped
in excess of the 5,000-ton-garbage limit permitted by its license, the courts can calculate the
cost of the excess from the company’s accounting records. This cost provides the judiciary
with a yardstick against which to determine damages.

Dumping Unlimited Case Study

Dumping Unlimited was a carting company that had a license to dump waste
material at a landfill site near Anytown. The company’s license permitted dumping
a maximum of 150 tons of material per day at the landfill.
Dumping Unlimited maintained a fleet of garbage trucks, which dumped the
company’s waste at the landfill site, and they also accepted waste material from
other haulers on a daily basis.

Based on an analysis of weigh tickets, it was clear that the company was dumping
quantities in excess of the permitted amount. To determine the value of these
quantities, the excess tonnage was priced at the highest and the lowest price charged
by the company, giving a range of values attributable to this offence.
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Financial Capacity. Companies that are fined for noncompliance with antipollution laws
often claim that they cannot afford either the costs of compliance at the time when the
pollution was generated or the costs associated with cleaning up the after effects of the
pollution.
Both of these issues are best examined by a CPA and involve examining financial
statements and budgets.
There are relationships between various components in the financial statements, which help
to identify historical issues relating to both profitability and viability. A review of the
financial statements for a number of accounting periods will be helpful in determining
trends that would enable a CPA to compare the company’s financial results with the costs
required to comply with antipollution laws.
In order to assess whether a company can afford the costs of cleanup (particularly when
that company claims it cannot), a CPA would need a crystal ball. In the absence of a crystal
ball, the CPA should examine the company’s budgets.

Management predicts the future by way of the budgeting process. Most enterprises that take
the time to prepare budgets use them as tools for making financial and operating decisions.
The range of budgets include operating budgets, capital budgets and cash flow budgets. A
comprehensive operating and cash flow budget enables management to plan future
operations and to decide how the company will pay for them. Access to past budgets,
together with the corresponding historical results, allows the forensic accountant to interpret
the proficiency of the company’s budgeting process and to determine whether a company
can or cannot afford the cleanup costs.

Mine Cleanup Case Study

In the 1990s the federal government filed suit against Mine Cleanup, a uranium
mining company, for failure to clean up a former site. The mining company
claimed it would be put out of business if it was required to pay the $30 million
required to clean up the site. Mine Cleanup management was attempting to set
aside the clean-up order.

A thorough review of the company’s financial statements, operating budgets, long
term forecasts, and cash flow budgets revealed that the company was unable to pay
the costs in the short term, but that it was possible for the company to comply with
the cleanup order over an extended period. A negotiated agreement was reached
between the federal government and the company wherein the government
essentially provided the long-term financing for the cleanup so that the cleanup
operations could commence immediately.

Natural Resource Abuse
Laws with respect to natural resource abuse (over-fishing, hunting, logging, mining, and so
on, as well as neglecting the endangered-species legislation) vary from jurisdiction to
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jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial harvesting of
animals, marine life, and endangered species. Accounting evidence has little relevance to
noncommercial activities; thus the focus in this section is primarily on commercial activities
involving the following three areas:

1. Fur trapping and fur dealers
2. Commercial fishing

3. Endangered species

Note that companies that are involved in these commercial activities need to be aware that
conservation officers appear to have a much broader right of access to business premises
than that available to law enforcement officers. Generally, the legislation allows the officers
to search any aircraft, vehicle, vessel, camp, or office, without the requirement of a search
warrant, if they believe that any fish or game has been killed or taken in contravention of
the applicable state laws.
Fur Trapping and Fur Dealers. Fur trappers must be licensed to practice their trade in each
state in which they operate. They are assigned maximum quotas for different kinds of wild
life. They are generally required to have each pelt examined and registered, at which time a
stamp is affixed to the inside of the pelt. The trapper is not required to submit written
reports to the state; the next level in the distribution system does that.
The fur dealer obtains a license to purchase, receive, sell, or otherwise dispose of fur pelts.
With a few limited exceptions (domestic animals, road kill, and so on) the fur dealer must
ensure that the pelts being purchased have been examined and suitably stamped. Monthly
reports are generally required from the fur dealer specifying:

1. The pelts purchased or received, including the name of the trapper or hunter from
whom the fur dealer purchased or received the furs; the date on which such pelts were
obtained; and the number and the kinds of animals, for example, beaver, mink, lynx,
and otter.
2. The pelts sold or disposed of, including who the pelts were sold to by name, address,
and license number; the date on which the pelts were sold, tanned or disposed of; and
the number and kinds of animals.

The most common form of abuse is the handling of unauthorized pelts, which are
purchased from a trapper or hunter, that are typically excluded from both of the monthly
fur dealers’ reports—that is, they are excluded from the report of pelts purchased, and from
the report of pelts sold. These pelts typically bear no authorized stamp. The transactions
often involve some financial consideration to the purchaser, for example, lower prices or
secret commissions, which could be ascertained upon a review of the fur dealer’s books and
records. The unauthorized pelts are typically disposed of by being included in bundles of
authorized fur pelts submitted to a fur auction outlet, or by being directly supplied to a
tanning operation owned by the fur dealer.

Commercial Fishing. Commercial fishermen are generally licensed to work in designated
regions within the United States and its waters, and are assigned maximum quotas by fish
species and poundage. These fishermen are generally required to submit a monthly report
that accumulates information on the port where the fish were landed, the weight of the
catch by species, and the average price of fish sold.
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Unlike the far dealer, the commercial fisherman is not required to submit a report stating to
whom the fish were sold.

The most common form of abuse involves the fisherman exceeding his quotas and failing to
report the excesses in his monthly reporting. A review of the cash receipts, disbursements,
and sales journals of the commercial fisherman should detect the abuse even though many
purchases and sales are cash transactions that take place off the company’s books. Because
the reporting required is done by weight rather than by supplier or number of fish, it is
necessary to reconcile the weight of fish caught to the weight of fish purchased by
customers after allowing for wastage.
Endangered Species. In most jurisdictions, endangered species of fauna and flora are
protected by laws that prohibit the killing, injuring, interfering with, taking, or attempting to
do any of the above to any of the identified species of fauna or flora or their natural
habitats.
Currently one of the major abuses is the exporting of certain endangered species of wild
birds, particularly falcons, to other countries at an exorbitant profit to the perpetrators.

7.2.10 Economic Extortion
Economic extortion is a crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through
intimidation or persistent demands.
Some of the forms of crime described in this section of the Handbook could involve an
element of economic extortion. For instance, bribes could be required in order to obtain a
lucrative contract; an owner of a company could be squeezed out by one or more of its
creditors for reasons other than insolvency; an employee could be forced to divulge an
employer’s trade secrets; or a company could be forced to pay a contractor to keep quiet
about its environmental pollution problem. The common element in each of these
situations is that the likely outcome of noncompliance with the extortionist’s demands is
perceived to be worse than the actual outcome of compliance.

Often, an extortionist’s methods involve threats of physical violence, public disclosure of
something that the victim would rather keep private, or financial ruin.

A Piece of the Action (Sport Megaplace) Case Study
In early 1994, Sport Megaplace was established as a state-approved organization to
control the sale of lottery tickets in Megaplace and to apply the net proceeds from
these sales to the development of amateur sports within Megaplace.

At that time the sale of lottery tickets included the sale of Tinylotto tickets, which was
under the control of Mr. Johnson, and the sale of Biglotto tickets, which was under
the control of Mr. Williams. These men were responsible for dividing Megaplace
into wholesale distributorships so that both kinds of tickets could be sold regularly
through wholesalers to retailers and then to the public.
However, Johnson and Williams only allowed others to obtain wholesale
distributorships if they secretly agreed to pay 50 percent of the future profits to a
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holding company under the control of Johnson and Williams. The silent-ownership
payments were structured as payments for management, consulting services and for
office space.
The new distributors were led to believe that this arrangement was legitimate by the
existence of a wholesale distributor agreement with Johnson and Williams’
company, a reporting letter from a lawyer’s office, a declaration of trust agreement,
a power of attorney agreement, working papers from an accountant, banking
resolutions and signature cards.

7.2.11 Customs Duty Fraud
Although customs laws vary from nation to nation, there are common threads and patterns
of fraud that are inherent in transborder transactions. The following material describes
typical customs fraud scenarios in Anyland.
The Customs Act applies to goods imported into Anyland. The Act categorizes imported
goods by tariff schedules and prescribes rates of duty applicable to each item depending on
its nature, the country of origin, and international treaty arrangements.

The duty payable to Anyland’s Customs Service is a percentage (the duty rate) of the
imported item’s Value for Duty. Prior to January 1, 1998, the Customs Act based its
determination of the Value for Duty amount on the fair market value of the goods at the
time of export in the exporting country. In practice, this fair market value was usually the
amount indicated on the commercial invoice. Customs officers did, however, have the
option of disregarding the commercial invoice amount and determining a fair market value
to be used for Value for Duty purposes using other information sources.
This fair market value determination for applying duty rates to imported goods did not
comply with international trade agreements to which Anyland was a party. Thus, effective
January 1, 1998, a revised procedure for determining the Value for Duty amount was
introduced. The new basis, called the Transaction Value Method, specified the Value for
Duty amount to be the price paid or payable to the exporter where the exporter and
importer are dealing at arm’s length. For imports between related parties, the onus is on the
importer to prove that there was no influence on the commercial invoice price. In these
situations, Value for Duty is determined on the following sequential bases:
1. Transaction value of identical goods
2. Transaction value of similar goods
3. Deductive value based on a gross profit reduction of the importer’s selling price

4. Computed value
The abuse generally arises when the importer causes the Value for Duty of the imported
product to be falsely understated, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid.
Importers abusing the customs regulations may vary in size of operation, ranging from
small sole proprietors to large national distributors. The benefits from understating Value
for Duty amounts can be enormous. In one case, the fine paid totaled $25,000,000, arising
from a conviction of evading customs duties over a fifteen-year period. There was also a
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civil court claim for $105.2 million against the same company for unpaid duties on goods
imported over a period of years. Even on a small scale, with duty rates ranging up to 30
percent or more, understating the Value for Duty amount may provide the importer with a
10-to-15 percent cost saving and a trade advantage over its competitors.
Because the Value for Duty amount generally is supported by both a commercial invoice
and customs invoice prepared by the exporter, the duty and sales calculations rely on the
integrity of the exporter’s documentation. Many customs investigations have determined
that the documents prepared by exporters understate the actual value at which the goods
were sold.

Current customs practices continue to be conducive to fraud. Importers of legally
importable goods are aware of the enormous volume of imports, the emphasis placed on
illegal drug shipments, the shortage of customs officers, and the officers’ inability to fully
inspect all entries that provide a perceived window of opportunity to perpetrate fraud.

Investigation Issues
Red Flags. Customs investigations have uncovered various schemes to falsely reduce
collectible duties. The presence of one or more of the following red flags may assist in
identifying a customs under valuation.

1, Apparent excess insurance: Insurance coverage for the in-transit goods substantially exceeds the
declared Value for Duty of the same goods.
2. Competitor’s complaints: Competitor’s complaints to customs or any other agency
governing fair trade that it cannot match the importer’s wholesale or retail prices.
3. Poor quality documents: The integrity of the exporter’s documents may be suspect if any
invoice is: printed on tissue paper, hand typed, not preprinted, or not prenumbered.

4. Letters ofcredit or bank drafts: Payments for the imported goods exceed the declared
Value for Duty amount.
5. Presence ofblank invoices: If Anyland customs invoices or export declarations, or the
exporter’s supplier invoices are known to exist at the importer’s place of business and
are found to be blank except for the exporter’s authorization signature, the importer
may be preparing such forms for presentation to Anyland’s customs.
6. Related exporter. The importer and exporter are related parties and, therefore, do not deal
at arm’s length; there could be price collusion.
7. A andB Commercial Invoices:. Total costs for the imported goods may be apportioned
between two separate invoices (often having consecutive invoice numbers, or having the
same invoice number with A and B suffixes), only one of which is submitted to customs
for purpose of Value for Duty determination.
8. Unreasonably high values allocated to nondutiable export costs: The dutiable cost of product is
artificially understated and the nondutiable cost of freight, for example, is overstated on
the commercial and Anyland customs invoices.
Significance of the Accounting Evidence. After performing an overview, the forensic accountant
can provide details for each entry and a summary schedule for all entries. This schedule
quantifies the apparent Value for Duty shortage and calculates the apparent duty shortages,
thereby determining the amount withheld.
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In preparing this quantification, the forensic accountant assumes that documentation other
than that used in the customs declaration in fact provides the true Value for Duty. The
forensic accountant may need to obtain expert-witness evidence to substantiate this basis for
valuation—perhaps a specialist from the Customs Service or from a lawyer.
In addition, in reviewing the importer’s accounting books and records, the forensic
accountant may be able to provide further support for the alleged undervaluation and may
be helpful in refuting possible defense claims.
Testimony: Viva Voce Evidence. The forensic accountant may seek evidence from various
other sources. Employees of the importer may be interviewed to provide evidence as to the
inner workings of the importer and to settle issues of ownership or control of the importing
company. A customs’ broker may provide testimony that, if presented with the documents
on which the forensic accountant’s calculations were based, a higher Value for Duty would
have been declared.

7.2.12 Health Care Fraud
There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been the subject of media
attention. Many such cases are outside the scope of this section—that is, they relate to fraud
committed by individuals rather than by corporations. Health care fraud committed by
corporations typically involves one of the following:

1. Violations of occupational health and safety laws (OSHA).

2. Marketing of drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test results
have been falsified.

7.2.13 Possession of Property Obtained by Crime
This offence refers to either the actual possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the
possession of proceeds from the disposal of property obtained by a crime.

When a business is suspected to be in possession of stolen inventory, an examination of the
financial records should be able to establish whether this inventory had been legitimately
purchased.
A reconciliation of the inventory purchased and sold needs to be performed and compared
to the inventory on hand at both the beginning and end of the period in question: the end
date is usually set shortly after the date that the stolen inventory was allegedly obtained.
The purchases and sales should be ascertained from the company’s purchases and sales
records, and also from updated accounts payable and accounts receivable listings. If there is
a positive variance, it could result from an accounting discrepancy, which would need to be
examined further, or it could result from the possession of property obtained by crime.
If the purchases, on the accounting records, appear to be legitimate, then the integrity of the
supplier invoices must be assessed. Often, stolen inventory can be made to appear
legitimate through overstatements on supplier invoices.
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Don’t Fence Me In Case Study
Acme Industries was acting as a fence for stolen car parts. These parts were stolen
by third parties and were sold by Acme to authorized car dealerships at prices
considerably lower than normal wholesale prices. When Acme’s premises were
searched on December 8, 1998, parts valued at approximately $667,900 were
seized.
Forensic accountants were retained to determine, by means of the available books
of account and supporting documents, whether these parts were purchased legally
or otherwise. Here are the steps followed to make the requested determination.

1. The accountant began by performing a period examination. The disbursement
journal disclosed that a payment had been made to a firm of CPAs for services
rendered to Acme. An interview with this firm revealed the existence of a draft
set of financial statements for Acme, dated February 28, 1998. These financial
statements, which were never issued in final form, disclosed inventory valued at
$16,500, with a note stating, “no physical inventory taken; inventory estimated
for accounts.” The draft financial statements established the opening date of the
time period. The closing date was determined by the date of search and seizure,
December 8, 1998. The period March 1, 1998, to December 8, 1998, was,
therefore, the period examined.
2. The accountant then updated the financial records of Acme to the date of search
and seizure. This step disclosed purchases from various suppliers totaling
$886,167. A similar updating of the sales of Acme resulted in a sales figure of
$1,007,815.
3. To calculate the book value of inventory, the accountant created a schedule,
identified as Apparent Inventory of Acme as of December 8, 1998. It set out the total
value of the goods available for sale of $902,667 (opening inventory of $16,500
plus the purchases made, during the period, of $886,167).
The schedule set out the updated sales figure and a gross profit margin (sales
minus cost of sales divided by sales) ranging from 10-to-30 percent. By deducting
the gross profit margin, an apparent cost of goods sold was calculated, ranging
from a high of $907,000 at the 10 percent level to a low of $705,470 at the 30
percent level. A comparison of the apparent cost of goods sold to the value of
goods available for sale showed that there should have been no inventory as of
December 8, 1998 at a 10 percent gross margin. At a 30 percent gross margin,
the value of inventory at December 8 would have been $197,197.
4. To perform a valuation of the parts seized, the accountant compared the goods
seized to the inventory on hand calculated at the 10 percent gross margin level,
indicating an excess quantity of physical parts on hand of approximately
$672,200. When a gross profit margin of 30 percent was applied, the excess on
hand was approximately $470,000. Based on the above procedures, Acme had
in its possession an excess quantity of parts ranging in value from $470,000 to
$672,200.

Interviews with three suppliers indicated that the invoices used in the calculation of
purchases between March 1 and December 8, 1998 had been inflated or padded so

47

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

that the invoiced value of goods purchased by Acme was greater than the actual
value of the goods received. The padded portion of the payments Acme made to its
suppliers were paid to the wife of Acme’s owner in cash.

Padding the supplier’s invoices made the stolen goods on hand harder to detect or
easier to explain away, or both. The inflated purchase prices also allowed cash to be
removed from Acme, tax free, under the guise of an expense. The payments to
suppliers were converted into cash with the excess (padded) portion of the invoiced
price being returned to the owner’s wife as cash.
This disclosure made it necessary to revise the calculated value of inventory as of
December 8, 1998, to reflect the alleged nonpurchases in Acme’s dealings with the
three suppliers who were padding their invoices. These alleged nonpurchases
totaled some $263,000, thereby increasing the value of the excess quantity of parts
in the possession of Acme to a figure between $735,000 and $935,000. These
findings not only placed the onus on the owner of Acme to explain the source of the
excess quantity of parts seized but also disclosed the existence of a fraudulent
scheme involving the three suppliers.

7.2.14 Coupon Redemption Fraud
Coupon redemption fraud involves the fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons
designed to promote various kinds of merchandise. For example, a newspaper coupon for a
box of cereal may require the purchaser to present it at a supermarket to receive twenty-five
cents off the purchase price of the cereal. Normally, the manufacturer reimburses the
supermarket for the discount it paid plus a token fee, perhaps several cents, to cover the
cost of processing the coupon and returning it to the manufacturer.

Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will collect coupons, in some cases from an
intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise has been purchased from them,
when in fact, it has not been. Although the individual amounts can be small, the volume in
most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these schemes.
7.3 Prevention of Commercial Crime

Four forces can operate to reduce commercial crime:
1. Increased awareness—that is, decreasing the likelihood that a victim will be “taken.”
2. Formal deterrence—that is, the fear of formal, officially imposed sanctions (conviction
and punishment by the government).
3. Informal deterrence—that is, the fear of informally imposed sanctions, such as the loss of
respectability or a career.
4. Ethics—that is, the internalization of values that discourage violations of legal codes.
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7.3.1 Increased Awareness
Increased awareness is achieved through education and by experience. However,
experience can be a costly way to increase awareness. With increased awareness, the
investor, customer, competitor, and general public are more likely to closely scrutinize a
situation and ask questions that would raise alarm bells and prevent them from suffering a
loss. For instance:
• Investors should be wary of schemes pitching high rates of return in a short time.

• Investors also should be wary of schemes with foreign intrigue.
• Investors should thoroughly examine franchise opportunities before any funds are
invested. Brochures and marketing pitches should be viewed with skepticism,
particularly in the case of new or unconventional franchisers. Detailed financial
information, including costs and profit margins of the franchiser for any goods and
services they are contracting to provide, should be reviewed to determine the motives of
the franchiser.
• Investors should ask stock promoters a series of questions about the stock the promoter
is pushing to determine the extent to which that promoter is tied to the stock.

7.3.2 Formal Deterrence
A crime control strategy has little chance of success unless offenders are punished.
However, formal levels of current enforcement are, by all measures, extremely low. One
novel approach is enforced self-regulation. Under this idea, the government would compel
each company to write unique rules for itself or its employees. A governmental agency
would monitor compliance. Two examples of successes in the noncriminal area are the
Federal Aviation Administration, which monitors self-regulation for the U.S. airline
industry, and the Federal Trade Commission, which monitors rules that the U.S.
advertising industry has largely set for itself.

However, there are problems with self-regulation, and the industries that attempt to
regulate themselves have spotty records at best. In one study of the 320,000 physicians in
the United States, an average of only seventy-two medical licenses per year were revoked.

It may be that increased enforcement can only come at the expense of a complete and total
revision of the criminal justice system. Many commercial criminals have little fear of
detection because of the constant barrage of information that demonstrates the police and
courts simply cannot keep up with the pace of criminal offenses. Until potential offenders
have the perception that they will be caught and punished, we should not expect a reversal
of this crime trend.
However, many researchers believe there are better deterrents to commercial crime than
incarceration of the individuals who are directly involved. They argue that the most
effective deterrents are:

• Monetary penalties
• Adverse publicity
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The following remedial steps could be adopted to deal with commercial crime:

1. Strengthen consent agreements and decrees (under which companies do not admit that
what they were doing was wrong, but agree to stop doing it) to provide substantial
remedies for violations of the agreement and to include systematic follow-ups.
2. Increase fine ceilings, assessing fines according to the nature of the violation and in
proportion to the company’s annual sales.

3. Enact stiff criminal penalties for violations of health and safety or environmental
regulations that recklessly endanger the public or employees.
4. Introduce stronger statutes to prohibit companies that previously had violated federal
laws from receiving federal contracts.
5. Promote mandatory publicity for corporate civil and criminal violations.
6. Increase more extensive use of imprisonment with longer sentences. Replace
community service with incarceration, except for unusual circumstances.
7. Prevent convicted corporate offenders from being indemnified by their companies.
8. Prohibit for three years management officials convicted of criminally violating
corporate responsibilities from assuming similar management positions in their
company or others.
9. Make directors liable, but not criminally, for being derelict in their duty to prevent
illegal corporate actions.
10. Enact a new commercial bribery statute to help prosecute corporate executives who
receive kickbacks from their customers or suppliers.

7.3.3 Informal Deterrence
Most commercial criminals, compared to more traditional offenders, perceive the informal
sanctions of the loss of career and prestige to be a greater deterrent. They are, therefore,
theoretically more deterred from misbehaving by those consequences than by
incarceration.
For example, a bank president, who was told he was about to be indicted, spent most of his
time asking whether the charges were going to be made public. When told that indeed the
charges would be public, the banker, promptly committed suicide.

Informal sanctions often exist without formal sanctions. The imposition of formal sanctions,
however, will usually lead to additional informal sanctions.

7.3.4 Ethics
Behaviorists generally conclude that one of the single most important factors influencing
group behavior is the attitude of management, who—in many reported instances—have
been claimed by employees to have exerted pressure on them to engage in unethical
behavior.

One prime example is the famous Equity Funding Case, which occurred in the early 1970s.
It was uncovered when a disgruntled former employee went to the authorities. For nearly
ten years, the Equity Funding Corporation falsified more than 56,000 life insurance policies
and overstated their assets by $120 million. It was estimated that fifty to 75 employees, who

50

Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime

managed to keep the scheme a secret for several years, were involved. The trustee
appointed to sort out the massive fraud, Robert Loeffler, said, “Of almost equal importance
was the surprising ability of the originators of the fraud to recruit new participants over the
years.”

Teaching people that certain behaviors are illegal and therefore inappropriate is
uncomplicated and extremely effective in reducing crime. Moral education that discourages
illegal behavior, from the top to the bottom of an organization, must be continuous. Simply
put, people must be informed as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not so that they
can alter their actions appropriately.
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CHAPTER 8:
Computer Crime and Computer Criminals

8.1

Overview
The advent of the computer has made certain kinds of crimes more efficient, harder to
detect, and very difficult to prosecute. Add to this the fact that, in a global corporation,
computers are likely to be operated all over the world; even where a company operates in
only one country, access to the Internet connects the company to the world.
A computer-related crime is simply one in which a computer is used either to commit a
crime, or as the target of a crime. Crimes committed using computers may include:
embezzlement, larceny (theft of property and proprietary information), fraud, forgery and
counterfeiting. Crimes committed targeting computers may include sabotage, vandalism,
electronic burglary, wiretapping, and the gaining of illegal access, either by impersonating
an authorized user or by exceeding one’s authority.

Some people incorrectly assume that in order to commit a computer crime, which carries
with it the risk of a substantial prison sentence, a person must be a computer scientist,
information technology specialist or programming genius. However, anyone with access, or
who can gain access, to a computer managing assets or confidential information is in a
position to commit the crime.
Until a few years ago, computer crime was something most people considered to be in the
realm of science fiction, or one that involved cyber-wizards in lab coats doing
incomprehensible things to giant computers. Today, nothing could be further from the
truth. Surveys show losses from computer crimes in the billions of dollars. The high
valuation that the investment community places on companies providing computer security
solutions is testimony to the importance that computer security plays in the modem
organization.

8.1.1 Security
Assuring security for a computer system is no different than having appropriate security for
manual accounting files. Because of the disparity in technology, each system requires its
own particular tools and methods to implement security, but the objective is the same: to
achieve a reasonable and cost-effective control environment in which an unauthorized act is
likely to be detected.
Of course, that technology has changed radically over the last decade, as companies have
moved from large central systems to interconnected local and wide area networks (LANs
and WANs), and since the Internet has made email and communications a part of almost
everyone’s lives. Security measures from years past that were accomplished by locking up
the room containing the mainframe don’t work today. One central machine has been
3
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replaced by hundreds of PCs (each probably exceeding the power of that old mainframe in
many ways) connected into internal networks, and likely interconnected to the outside
world as well. Terms such as firewalls (programs designed to prevent invasion of a system
by an outsider), which had no real applicability to the world of computers as little as five
years ago, are now essential requirements for any reasonably managed corporate or
government computer operation.

8.1.2 Evolution of Computer Crime
In looking at computer crimes, it’s important to remember that computers are just machines
that carry out instructions programmed into them. When a crime involves a computer, it
isn’t the computer suddenly deciding to become a criminal, but the person manipulating
the program or using the computer to perpetrate an act that has been defined in law as
being criminal. Computers are an instrument of the crime, in the same sense that a phone
or fax machine can facilitate the commission of an insider trading offense. And while
certain kinds of crime would not be possible without a computer-for example, planting a
computer virus, others are new versions of old crimes that are facilitated by modem
computer technology. As technology advances, those with a criminal mindset will,
inevitably, continue to look for new ways to exploit the computer for their own ends.

For example, consider the theft of a new computer chip design. Printed out, the details of
the design might require a dozen thick notebooks and a large roll of detailed circuit
diagrams. That same information in computer form would easily fit on a small tape cassette,
smaller than the common audiocassettes used for music. Or, in minutes, the information
could be transmitted via the Internet, either as a file or as an attachment to one or more
email messages.
Most experts agree that computer crime is a growing problem, and that the tools to prevent
it are evolving, but so are new ways of committing those crimes. Feeling confident that your
systems are 100 percent secure is never a good idea, but given the speed of computer
evolution, today, it is downright dangerous!
This chapter should provide you with an understanding of computer crime, how it has
evolved, and the ways that computer criminals are likely to attack organizations like yours.

8.2 Computer-Related Crimes
In today’s organizations, virtually every asset, from money to proprietary and confidential
information, is likely to be recorded on some computer’s hard drive, on a computer tape or
on a disk. Every day trillions of dollars are transferred between bank accounts relying on
computerized records. Millions of individuals essentially never see the inside of a bank.
Their pay is deposited directly into their accounts, and when they need cash, they head for
the nearest automatic teller machine (ATM). Yet money may not be the most valuable
commodity on the computer.

8.2.1 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property, which can range from business plans to trade secrets, can have
immense value. There are unique differences between stealing information and stealing
almost anything else. If $100 is stolen from you, the thief has deprived you of your money.
4
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Similarly, if your car is stolen, the thief has it and you don’t. With information, however,
particularly information stored on a computer, a thief can steal the information and you can
still have it. If the thief is a really good crook, your information can be stolen without you
ever knowing that an incident has taken place. So computers can be used to facilitate the
theft of money (for example, by manipulating banking or accounting records), the theft of
goods (by manipulating inventory, shipping records or receivables records) or information
(usually by copying it). This category includes computer-based implementations of
traditional crimes (theft, insider trading, and so on) and of newly defined crimes such as
economic espionage in which company secrets are stolen for the benefit of another
organization, or computer intrusion, which criminalizes the unauthorized access into
another organization’s computers.

8.2.2 Computer Hardware
Another class of computer crime attempts to target the computers themselves. If a
perpetrator can put a computer virus into your computer, the virus can cause a huge
disruption of your business when it is triggered to destroy data (particularly if you haven’t
been backing up that data regularly). In some cases, criminals may take more direct action
to damage your computer. These attack profiles are sometimes referred to as denial ofservice
attacks, because they are designed to deprive the rightful users of the use of their systems’
resources.

8.2.3 Computer Crimes and the Law
Whether a target of an attack is the computer itself or the information residing in the
computer, the attempt may well be a crime. But what if it isn’t?
To be a crime, there has to be a law that declares a particular course of action to be a
criminal act. Until the passage of specific computer crime laws over the past twenty years,
prosecutors had to find ways to apply traditional laws, such as, wire fraud or mail fraud, to
high-tech crimes. And it is important to remember that laws only apply within the state or
country in which they are promulgated. Because the Internet can be accessed from
anywhere in the world, perpetrators can carry out crimes from anywhere, including from
countries that have weak computer crime laws, or from which extradition is unlikely. Some
laws specifically require the victims to show that they had safeguarded the information
stolen or provided notification that the information was not in the public domain.

Unfortunately, in our society, there are too few law enforcement and prosecution personnel
who are specialists in computer crime investigation. There are very specific procedures that
must be followed in handling and analyzing computer files and equipment if the evidence
of the offense is to be admissible in a court of law. Failure to do so may cause a prosecution
to fail. Corporations should be aware that attempts of their in-house technical or
investigative personnel to examine computers involved in an offense, however well
intentioned may result in evidence being rendered inadmissible. Once a crime occurs, a
court is going to apply the rules of evidence to determine whether any actions taken could
have modified the evidence or otherwise damaged its credibility.
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8.3

A Brief History of Computer Crime
No one knows who the first computer criminal was. However, computer-related crimes
certainly have been around since the early 1970s. Throughout the rest of that decade,
computer crimes tended to focus on the manipulation of computer records to obtain
money. In the 1980s, we began to see cases in which the target of the crime was the
information on the computer. Insider trading was facilitated by the relative anonymity with
which information could be accessed in many systems.

In one of the largest early cases, an insurance company took advantage of its accounting
firm’s computer naivete to perpetrate a huge fraud. The insurer created thousands of bogus
policies, which it could identify through special policy numbers. When the auditors, as part
of random checks, wanted to see some of these nonexistent policies, they were told the
policies would be available the next day. That evening, the perpetrators busily created the
appropriate documentation to prove the validity of the policies. Millions of dollars were
funneled out of the company through this scheme. This case marked the period when
auditors learned that it was vital to include computer systems in their audit plans.

In another noteworthy case, the chief teller of a bank located in Brooklyn, NY, devised a
plan to manipulate dormant accounts using the bank’s new computer system. He
discovered that he could move money in and out of those inactive accounts simply by using
his supervisor’s key. He withdrew several hundred thousand dollars. Even though the
manipulations all showed up on accounting reports, there were so many thousands of
irregularities as a result of the complex new systems that the internal auditors were not able
to keep up with the volume, and ignored what they considered low-priority items, like
dormant account transactions. Unfortunately for the perpetrator, he was a dedicated (but
spectacularly unsuccessful) horse-player. When the Attorney General of New York State
conducted a raid on his bookmaker, the volume of his gambling was discovered, and the
source of his funds uncovered. He was convicted of theft and imprisoned.
In another case, in California, a young man discovered that the phone company had
installed a system that permitted their employees to order equipment to be delivered to job
sites using a push-button phone. He obtained the requisite code numbers from manuals
recovered from the phone company’s trash. Using the codes, he ordered the computer to
arrange the delivery of equipment to downtown manholes. He then collected the valuable
materials with his own truck, and eventually sold the valuable equipment to foreign phone
companies. His scheme was discovered when he refused to give his truck driver a raise, and
the driver turned him in. It was shown that he had stolen about $1.1 million in equipment.
He was tried, convicted, and after a short 90-day stay in jail, promptly established a
business as a consultant to attorneys who defended computer criminals. His ads proudly
proclaimed that he had “actual courtroom experience.”

Today, computer crime has progressed from crimes committed by individuals against
individuals and companies to a topic of great concern to governments: information warfare
has emerged as a real threat to national infrastructures.
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8.4

Computer Crime Today
Computer crime is in the news. Whether it is the arrest of the creator of a damaging
computer virus or a person using computers to sell child pornography, the media has
realized that our society has become worried about technology failures. This media
attention has had an unintended effect that can be a problem.

If you were to believe the media, hackers are the number one cause of computer crime
problems. In fact, however, the major problem is computer-facilitated crime committed by
employees and others who have been granted access to a system. Because the common
perception of threats is one of the key inputs people use for deciding how to spend their
security dollars, this misperception may lead to an inappropriate distribution of resources,
so that risk does not match security measures. Today many companies are realizing that this
may well be the case.
The problem of preventing computer crime is no different than that of preventing any other
crime against a business. After all, crimes were committed against business long before
computers. Accountants worked to discourage these crimes by requiring separation of
duties between people handling cash or other assets and those making the entries in the
books of the company concerning the assets. By dividing access to assets and the records of
those assets, the theory was that two or more people would have to conspire to carry out a
fraud, thus increasing the likelihood of detection.

Along with separation of duties, accountants have traditionally depended on the paper trail
of records that document transactions. This paper trail required that all transactions be
entered into journals that would be backed up by source documents, such as invoices,
purchase orders, receiving reports, canceled checks, sales receipts and vendor invoices.
Of course, in spite of the best efforts of the accountants, fraud did occur. Accounting
systems are neither foolproof nor fraud proof. Determined criminals could still find ways to
circumvent or override controls.
Computers haven’t really changed anything. A crook is still a crook. Fraud, theft and
embezzlement are still possible in the age of computers. Indeed, some argue that crime has
become more likely, as traditional paper trails are replaced by computerized trails, which
are not as easily verified by traditional methods. The speed of processing took precedence
over effective control, according to some writers. CPAs should determine how and what to
do to validate the information stored in computer systems. And that has become more
difficult as computer architectures have evolved from central mainframe computers to
networks of hundreds or even thousands of PCs and file servers distributed throughout the
company.

As stated earlier, surveys, including those conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Computer Security Institute, and the American Society for Industrial Security, show
that computer crime is responsible for billions of dollars of loss each year. Many of these
surveys indicate that the average loss in a computer crime is higher than in noncomputer
based crimes. It is often more difficult to prosecute a computer crime than a traditional
crime. Evidence on a computer is very difficult to connect to an individual because
computer data can be manipulated; therefore, providing proof not only that the crime
occurred but also how it was accomplished can be a complex process. Part of the problem
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is that there are a limited number of police and prosecutors who are trained in the
investigation and prosecution of computer crime.

In fact, new opportunities for theft, fraud and embezzlement have been created by
computer technology. Accounting records, once kept under lock and key in the accounting
department, are now stored on computers that can be accessed remotely. Not only are the
systems available to authorized users (employees who have a job-related requirement to
access and use the accounting system) but also by data entry clerks, computer operators,
systems analysts and programmers. If the computer’s access control security system is not
set correctly, unauthorized employees or even outsiders could gain access to the system.
With the proper skills and a criminal inclination, systems can be manipulated, and
programs changed to eliminate records of the fraud.

8.4.1 Classification of Computer Fraud
Generally, there is no accepted chart-of-accounts for computer fraud. If there were, it would
constantly be changing. But certain computer-fraud activities that could affect a business’
chart-of-accounts should be recognized: manipulating computer inputs, manipulating
programs and tampering with outputs.

Manipulating Computer Inputs
One of the most frequent bases of computer crime involves the falsification of computer
inputs. Those inputs may involve putting false transactions into the system, modifying
actual transactions, or in some schemes, not putting information into the system.
From an accounting standpoint, the main reasons for manipulating inputs are to overstate
or understate revenues, assets, expenses and liabilities. The objective of the perpetrator
determines the manipulation necessary. Sometimes the objective is to provide false data to
managers, stockholders, creditors or government agencies. Sometimes the manipulation is
part of an embezzlement, for example, entering false invoices into an accounts payable
system. There can be little question that the manipulation of data is the most common form
of computer-related fraud.
Input fraud should be among the easiest to detect and prevent with effective supervision
and controls. These include:

• Separation of duties
• Audit trails
• Control totals and access controls (both those that limit access to data entry screens and
those that place limits on values that can be entered)
Manipulating Programs
Another major class of computer crime involves altering the instructions that computers use
to manipulate input files and databases. These can range from schemes in which programs
are designed to process fraudulent entries without making audit trail entries, to those
featuring deliberate miscalculations (for example, to shortchange depositors of a bank of
fractions of a cent of interest, which can be accumulated and stolen).
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Tampering with Outputs
Yet another category of computer fraud involves tampering with the results of computer
activity: reports and files. This category includes theft of confidential or proprietary
information (customer lists, research and design [R&D] results, company business plans,
employee information, secret formulas, and so on). According to the previously mentioned
surveys these intellectual property thefts are apparently escalating as competition increases
globally. Computers have undoubtedly facilitated the thefts, because they have provided
the capability for fast copying of huge databases, and at the same time provided, through
data communications, the capability for moving the copied data globally at tremendous
speeds. Intellectual property theft by computer is a unique crime: someone can steal your
data, but it’s still where it originally was, and there may be no record of the crime.

8.4.2 The Most Common Computer Crimes
With all of the hype concerning hackers, you would think they represent the major threat of
computer crime, but nothing could be further from the truth. Regardless of the evolution of
computer technology, the manipulation of inputs and outputs is still the most common form
of computer-related crime.

Computers are frequently manipulated to get to assets, the most popular of which are either
cash or information that can be converted to cash, or both. In terms of cash, input is
frequently manipulated through submission of falsified documents, such as invoices from
vendors, suppliers or contractors; claims for government benefits; refund or credit claims;
or fraud involving payroll or expenses. The phony claims can involve anyone from clerks
to senior executives, although employees in either the claims approval or accounting
functions are most often involved. From an accounting viewpoint, the false claim is a fake
debit to an expense so that a corresponding credit can be posted to the cash account to
cover the issuance of a check or funds transfer.

Executive Computer Crimes
In the higher levels of an organization, the nature of fraud changes. Rather than simply
grabbing cash, fraud may be designed to overstate profits by fabricating data such as sales
(which are simply overstated or which are booked before the transaction is really
completed), or by understating expenses (either by simple reduction of the numbers or in
improper deferral to a later accounting period). There is a nearly infinite range of variations
on these themes, based on the ingenuity of the perpetrators. For example, profits may be
overstated by increasing ending inventory of manufactured goods or merchandise held for
sale. That results in understatement of the cost of goods sold and raises the net profits.
Manipulation of operating results is probably more highly motivated today than ever
before. With increasing market volatility as well as an insistence on continuous growth and
on beating analyst expectations every quarter, managers may turn to manipulation to
borrow time in order to turn around what they may believe to be temporary problems.
With so much of their personal wealth tied up in company stock, there is a tremendous
motivation to keep the numbers where the market perceives they should be. Or it may be
done to make the company a more attractive merger or acquisition target, with the
assumption that in the course of the merger the falsification would be overlooked or
attributed to some undefined error. Or it may be done for personal greed; in some
companies, the executive compensation plan is directly tied to reported results.
9
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8.5

Computer Criminal Profiles
Who commits computer crime? It would be useful to have a profile of the offender so that
we could perhaps predict who will commit the crimes.

8.5.1 Predictions
In the 1980s, criminologists, who focused their attention on white-collar crime, argued that
the perpetrators tended to be trusted employees with unresolvable personal problems,
usually financial in nature. These included indebtedness as a result of illness in the family,
or problems with alcohol, narcotics, gambling, expensive tastes, or sexual pursuits
(according to the police, the three Bs: booze, babes and bets).

At about the same time, various studies provided a profile of the computer criminal. In this
profile the culprit—
1. Is male, white, and between 19 and 30 years of age.
2. Has no prior criminal record.
3. Identifies with technology more than with the employer’s business.
4. Is bright, creative, energetic, willing to accept challenges, and highly motivated.
5. Is employed in the field of either information processing or accounting.

6. Feels a desperate need for money because of personal problems.
7. Feels exploited by his or her employer and wants to get even. The culprit feels that
promotions, salary increases, bonuses, stock options, and so on, are not fairly
distributed. Others have gotten more than they deserve through various forms of
favoritism.
8. Does not intend to hurt people, just the employer, who is perceived of as cold,
indifferent, uncaring and exploitive.
9. Does not have a self-image as a criminal.
10. Believes that actions against the establishment are justified for political or social reasons.
11. Perceives beating the system as a challenge worthy of his or her efforts.

In addition, there are four frequently cited characteristics that are symptoms of trouble:

1. High living: Not too long ago, eyebrows were raised at the programmer who showed up
in the company parking lot in a new Mercedes convertible. However, in the turn of the
century marketplace, programmers who have been through one or two initial public
offerings (IPOs) can easily afford any car they want. Nonetheless, a discrepancy between
life-style and income must be regarded as suspicious.
2. Ultradedication to the job: The bookkeeper or computer programmer who never takes a
vacation is either very dedicated (increasingly less likely in today’s business
environment) or afraid that some scheme would come to light if he or she were not
around to control things.
3. Aging: As some people age, they grow increasingly resentful of perceived wrongs; for
example, the awarding of increased salaries and stock to younger employees. Therefore,
they may feel justified in making a big score if they think they can get away with it.
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4. Chronic Lateness: The common wisdom held that people who were constantly late with
their work were late because they were trying to fabricate or cover up something they
were doing.

In today’s environment, how valid are these assumptions? We do know that most
perpetrators who are caught committing computer crimes are male. They also tend to be
young. But there are not a lot of reliable indicators in the above lists that provide any kind
of predictive ability. Does this mean that the perpetration of computer manipulations is
unpredictable?
Certainly, there is no simple test that will detect whether a person, who has never
committed a crime in the past, will or will not commit one in the future, given the proper
circumstances and motivations. However, a review of cases over the past few years reveals
one interesting phenomenon: those who committed these offenses often had problems with
former employers who were glad to be rid of them. Companies that do not perform
background checks that include contacting former employers and checking for falsification
on employment applications are the fraudster’s friend. The perpetrators can ignore their
pasts and start anew at a company that appears to have weak security. Certainly, former
employers can lie about an employee or refuse to give any reference beyond confirmation
of employment, but a good background check should pick up at least some potential
problem employees.

Three other things to say about perpetrators are important. First, an offender does not have
to be a computer genius to pull off a major fraud. Anyone who can gain access to a system,
either because he or she is authorized to use it, or because the security controls are weak,
can potentially manipulate that system for personal advantage. Even if they cannot directly
access the computer, if they can fake the data, they can manipulate it.
Second, it is easy to limit consideration of risk to employees. Many companies today,
particularly in high-tech industries, make considerable use of temporary employees and
independent contractors. All too often, because they are not carried on the books as
employees, they are not subject to the same background checks and security measures. It
should be clear that computers don’t care if they are manipulated by employees or
independent contractors. If a person has access, they should be subject to the same controls
as regular employees.
Finally, there are offenders you will never meet, who will never meet you, but who may
cause you great difficulties. These are the virus writers and virus distributors who develop
and spread them simply because they can.

8. 5.2 Reasons for Committing Computer Crimes
Criminologists, in looking at why crimes are committed, often use a four-element model,
sometimes called Motivation, Opportunity, Means, and Methods, (MOMM).
Motivation represents the reason why one is willing to commit a crime. Motivation can be
related to both personal (or internal) conditions and external conditions. Personal
motivation factors include:
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• Economic Motivators: Economically motivated perpetrators act to fulfill the need or desire
for financial gain, for money or for other assets (or information) that can be turned into
money.
• Egocentric Motivators: Egocentric perpetrators have a need to show off their talents in
committing what may be perceived by others as a complex crime. Money or other assets
are sometimes part of the crime, but frequently they are not the underlying motivation.
Certainly, assets symbolize a measure of the success of the venture, which is important
in demonstrating the prowess and ingenuity of the criminal. Many hackers fall into this
category. But for many others, their downfall is the need to brag about their exploits and
thus gain favor in the eyes of their peer group.
• Ideological Motivators: Ideologically motivated perpetrators feel compelled to seek
revenge against someone or something they perceive as oppressing or exploiting either
them personally or other individuals possibly unknown to them. Terrorist bombings of
computer centers is an extreme example of this mindset. Sabotage against systems by
disgruntled employees or exemployees is a frequently encountered motivator.
• Psychotic Motivators: Psychotic perpetrators (that is, people suffering from mental disease)
may view the company through a delusional state of mind that does one or more of the
following: distorts reality, validates feelings of grandeur or of persecution, or exaggerates
hatred or fear of the organization or of particular people in the organization (often direct
superiors) to the extent that they may commit extreme actions against their perceived
enemies to relieve their anxieties. One way of acting out these feelings is exemplified by
the person who shows up at the office with a gun and kills those he or she believes are
“out to get them.” Another way this kind of troubled individual may lash out at these
imaginary adversaries is to attack the computer systems that may be perceived as
facilitating the work of supposed enemies. The subject of workplace violence is an
important one, but is outside the scope of this Handbook.
Environmental Motivators
Environmental motivators are those conditions in the environment of the company (or
sometimes of society in general) that are claimed as motivators. But no external motivator
forces anyone to commit a crime. It would be fair to say that environmental motivators may
aggravate personal motives. These include the work environment, reward systems, levels of
interpersonal trust, corporate ethics, stress and weaknesses in internal controls, or security
systems that may make a person believe that they can get away with a crime.

It was indicated earlier that there are no guaranteed ways of spotting a computer criminal
any more than any other kind of criminal, and that people commit offenses for many
different reasons. Does this mean that there’s nothing we can do to prevent computer
crime? Nothing could be further from the truth. We may not know specifically who will
commit a crime, but we know that given the right circumstances, someone is likely to try. In
the next section, we will look at the things a business can do to reduce the chance that it
will be victimized by a computer criminal.
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8.6 Controls for Preventing and Detecting Computer Crime

It would be nice to assume that everyone associated with a business is honest. Certainly, it
would eliminate the need for controls to prevent crime. Of course, that assumption is not
viable. People will commit crimes for many reasons, some of which are rational, others of
which may make no sense to the observer. The larger the organization, the more likely it is
that someone is out to commit a crime. Managers who subscribe to this belief are not
necessarily paranoid. In fact, most managers can name their disgruntled employees.
There are those who will steal under the best of employment circumstances. Others would
not steal even if they were unfavored employees of Ebenezer Scrooge (before the events in A
Christmas Carol, of course.)

8.6.1 Internal Control and Security Systems
Internal control and security systems are designed on the basis of past experience both in
the company in which they are installed and in other companies. The challenge here is to
build in enough controls to discourage and catch criminal behavior without breaking the
bank in costs or going overboard on security. Companies that have been victimized often
react by increasing controls to the point at which the controls can become oppressive and
actually interfere with company operations. While rational companies set up rules to define
acceptable and unacceptable behavior, too many constraints make people feel oppressed,
distrusted, and under constant surveillance.

Our society is based on freedoms and rights. We highly value our freedoms of speech,
religion and assembly, but these freedoms are not absolute. We can speak our minds, but
we cannot freely slander or libel another individual. We cannot, as one famous jurist put it,
feel free to yell “FIRE” in a crowded theatre. We cannot trade on inside information (unless
we like prison food) or release secret company information (unless we like having the
opportunity to spend time as a defendant in both the criminal and civil courts.)
Well-designed controls should provide similar checks and balances. We need to consider
the risks, threats, and other vulnerabilities in today’s marketplace and technological
environment, while simultaneously taking into account our responsibilities to employees,
the value of their contributions, and their need for satisfaction in the workplace, including
the provision of a work environment that encourages outstanding performance,
profitability, and efficiency.
A competent systems analyst or information security specialist can design layer upon layer
of controls. But controls in excess of those required by the nature of the risks are not costeffective and can place undue burdens both on those who must work under them and those
who must monitor and control them. So a company’s requirement for an effective internalcontrol environment does not represent a justification for a siege mentality or the
construction of an impregnable fortress. Done effectively, the development of internal
controls is a matter of proper balance and equilibrium, not of the implementation of
paranoia.
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Looking at the potential for theft and fraud and the actions available to prevent crime,
brings forth several conclusions:

• Most prevention efforts concentrate or focus on building more accounting and access
controls or physical security controls.
• It is vital to recognize that there are limits to technological and procedural controls.
Given the speed with which computer and data communications technology evolves and
the complexity of modern systems, it is difficult for improvements in protection and
detection mechanisms to keep pace.
• It is also important for companies to recognize that improvements in the working
environment, including a positive ethical climate and strong interpersonal trust, help to
discourage criminal thinking and behavior and, as a result, are a part of the control
environment. Some factors in the business environment are likely to encourage
computer crime. Other factors discourage crime. Clearly, we want to minimize the
criminal behavioral motivators, and maximize the noncriminal behavioral motivators.

8.6.2 Factors That Encourage Computer Crime
The factors that enhance the probability that a company will be the target of theft, fraud,
embezzlement and corruption, including computer crime, can be either motivational
(related to the corporate reward system and company policies) or personal (relating to the
personal character of a particular employee).

The following are motivational factors that encourage computer crime:
• Inadequate rewards including pay, fringe benefits, stock and stock options, bonuses,
incentives, perquisites, job security, meaningful work and promotional opportunities.

• Inadequate management controls, including failure to communicate expected standards
of job-related performance or on-the-job behavior, and ambiguity in relationship to
work roles, relationships, responsibilities, and areas of accountability.
• Inadequate reinforcement and performance feedback mechanisms, including lack of
recognition for good work, loyalty, longevity and effort; lack of meaningful recognition
for outstanding performance; delayed or nonexistent feedback on performance
inadequacies or unacceptable on-the-job behavior.
• Failure to offer counseling when performance or behavior falls below acceptable levels.
• Acceptance of mediocre performance as the standard.
• Inadequate support and lack of resources to meet standards, such as not providing
authority to hire sufficient personnel to meet requirements for quality, quantity, and
timeliness of work produced.
• Inadequate operational reviews, audits, inspections, and follow-throughs to assure
compliance with company policies, priorities, procedures, and government regulations.

• Condonation of inappropriate ethical norms or inappropriate behavior.
• Failure to control hostility generated by promotion or destructive competitiveness
among departments, offices, or personnel.
• Failure to control bias or unfairness in selection, promotion, compensation and
appraisal.

14

Chapter Eight: Computer Crime and Computer Criminals

The following are personal or personnel-based encouragements of computer crime:
• Inadequate standards of recruitment and selection.
• Inadequate orientation and training on security matters and on sanctions for violating
security rules.

• Unresolved personal financial problems.

• Unresolved problems relating to personal status.
• Failure to screen and background check personnel before appointing to sensitive
positions. This includes verification of prior employment, verification of educational
qualifications, verification of financial stability, and examination of character.
• Inadequate control of the level of job-related stress and anxiety.

8.6.3 Factors That Discourage Computer Crime
Computer crime can be discouraged through measures that are designed not only to
prevent crime but also to detect attempts to engage in computer crimes. The recommended
prevention measures are—

1. Internal accounting controls. These are the traditional measures that discourage crime,
and they are as important in an automated environment as in a manual-processing
environment. These include:
• Separation and rotation of duties. Remember that as personnel change jobs, it is vital
to update the list of computer applications that they can access, so that their access at
any given time matches their current job requirements.
• Periodic internal audits, surprise inspections and computer security reviews.
• Absolute insistence that control policies and procedures be documented in writing.
• Establishment of dual signature authorities, dollar authorization limits, expiration
dates for signature authorizations, and check amount limits. These authorities also
should be examined on both a routine and surprise basis.
• Offline controls and limits, including batch controls and hash totals.

2. Computer Access Controls. These controls may include:
• Authentication and identification controls, including keys or smartcards, passwords,
biometrics, callback systems, one-time passwords, time and day constrained access,
and periodic code and password changes.
• Compartmentalization, also known as need to know.
• Use of encryption to protect data while stored or in transit.
3. Use of firewalls and similar safeguards to prevent unauthorized access through the
Internet.
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The measures to detect attempts to commit computer crime include:

1. Logging and follow-up of exceptions. The system should be designed to log unusual
activities, and procedures should be in place to follow up on reported exceptions, such
as—

• Transactions that are out of sequence, out of priority or otherwise out-of-standard.
• Aborted runs and entries, including repeated attempts to unsuccessfully enter the
system.
• Attempts to access applications or functions beyond a person’s authorization.
2. Logging and following up on variances that indicate a problem may have occurred or is
occurring.

3. Awareness of employee attitudes and satisfaction levels.
4. Sensitivity to reports that particular individuals are having problems, living beyond their
means, or talking about getting even for perceived slights.
5. Use of newly developed intrusion detection systems that use artificial intelligence
capabilities to detect unusual transactions flowing through a system. These are evolving
and have the prospect of being an order-of-magnitude improvement in crime detection
technology.

8.6.4 Security Countermeasures to Computer Crime
The focus of chapter 4 of this Handbook is computer security in general. The focus of this
section is the specific measures that are often used to prevent computer crimes by those
either inside or outside an organization. While some measures are applicable to almost all
situations, it is vital that each organization consider those controls that are appropriate to its
particular circumstances.

Security Holes
One of the unpleasant realities in today’s systems environment is that the systems we use,
including operating systems, firewalls and security packages, and application systems, are
not perfect when they are released by the manufacturers to their customers. On a continual
basis, security problems are discovered. Information about ways to exploit security holes is
quickly reported worldwide by independent bulletin board systems, government-funded
sites (such as the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon
University), and the manufacturers. Sometimes the problem and the ways to exploit it are
reported before a repair patch can be developed. It has become, therefore, absolutely vital
that every organization monitor these information sources to be certain that all relevant
holes in security are understood and closed as soon as possible.

If the hole is not closed, and experience indicates that this is often the case, a company can
continue to operate with known holes in its security. It is also vital that the internal auditors
understand the importance of monitoring and closing software holes, and that this is
included in the review plan.

16

Chapter Eight: Computer Crime and Computer Criminals

Computer Access Control
Controls that allow only authorized people access to sensitive systems include—
• Passwords. Use passwords that are long enough to be difficult to guess. Passwords
should not comprise simple words, names of relatives, and so on, and should be
changed regularly.

• Compartmentalization. Restrict users to the specific files and programs that they have a
job-related need to access.
• Use ofbiometrics. Use fingerprints, iris recognition, hand geometry and other new
technologies for added measures of control.
• Use of one-time passwords. Use hardware or software that generates a new password for
each access.
• Automatic log off. Use this measure to prevent unauthorized access to the system when
authorized users fail to log off.
• Time-day controls. Restrict personnel access to those times when they are supposed to
be on duty. An extension of this concept for companies using automated time-clock
systems is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an
employee is not shown in the time clock system as being present.

• Dial back systems. Use these systems when access is through a dial-up system. On
accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials a preestablished
number at which the approved user is standing by. This is very helpful when a
person works at a predictable location, for example, the home office of a
telecommuting employee.
• Random personal information checks. Implement this means of identifying unauthorized
log-in attempts. The system randomly transmits a question that only the authorized
individual could answer and denies access unless the right answer is received. If
several dozen personal questions are on file, this technique can be very useful.
• Internet authentication. Use this control for telecommuting employees. With
telecommuting on the rise, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost, highbandwidth Internet connections, such as Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines, which
offer download speeds of up to 1.5MB per second and uploads of 400KB per second
for nominal monthly charges, which includes continuous access, twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week. This technology, which identifies a specific Internet user and
sends information across the Internet securely, is rapidly evolving.

8.6.5 Solutions
When investigating computer crimes, investigators and forensic accountants often discover
what could have been done to prevent the crimes. The following are some of the most
frequently found items. The organizations failed to:
• Have written policies and security rules for the use of computers and systems.
• Have temporary employees and independent contractors follow the same security
rules as regular employees.
• Adjust access as people changed responsibilities internally.
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• Keep up with and close security holes in applications, firewalls, and operating
systems.
• Maintain virus protection on a fully updated basis.

Some of the suggestions to improve computer security include implementing:
• More effective policies for security over proprietary information.
• Better interaction between the human relations, systems and security functions.
• Better internal accounting controls.
• Better supervision of those with sensitive access to systems.
• Better education of computer users regarding security.
• Better computer audit software.
• Better software security.

• Better physical security in the workplace.
8.7

Selected Computer Crimes

8.7.1 Brief Case Synopses
It is useful to look at actual cases of computer crime to see the challenges businesses face if
targeted by an offender. In each of these brief case studies, consider how your
organization’s existing security system would have faired, how your own organization
would have reacted, and how likely it is that your current system of internal controls would
have identified the problem and traced it back to the guilty parties.

ER Fraud Case Study

A computer operator at a hospital was charged with embezzling $40,000 by
submitting false invoices that were processed through the hospital’s computer
system. At the same time, the hospital’s assistant data processing manager accepted
a $41,000 bribe from a consultant who stole an additional $150,000 by submitting
false invoices for computer services. Both the operator and the assistant manager
had prior convictions for computer-related crimes. Because computer personnel
were not directly involved in patient care, hospital policy did not require a
background check. An inexpensive reference check with previous employers could
have possibly prevented the crime because the offenders would probably not have
been hired when it was revealed that they had falsified their employment
applications.
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Even Experts Have Bad Days Case Study

A partner at a major international consulting firm received an anonymous call
suggesting that one of the firm’s senior information systems managers was
defrauding the firm through a scheme involving false invoicing for supplies like
laser toner cartridges and backup tape cartridges. A confidential internal
investigation was carried out and no problems were revealed. Every invoice could
be shown to tie directly to the actual material that had been delivered. The report
seemed to be false, but a member of the firm’s management committee decided that
someone independent of the company should take a second look. Investigators
were hired and they discovered that the material had been delivered, but they could
find no record of the firm that supplied the materials. A simple background check
on the vendor showed that it was just a shell formed by the senior information
systems manager. He had developed a scheme in which he would place orders with
the shell company (actually, with himself) and then order the same material from a
reputable supplier who sent it to his home overnight. He would open the boxes,
remove the original vendor’s invoices, insert his own invoices (which were exactly
15 percent higher than what he had paid) and then he reshipped them. This simple
scam resulted in a loss to the company of more than $300,000.
As shown in this case, vendor fraud can occur even in situations when all of the
materials were actually received. No employees had questioned why so many
orders were being placed with a company no one had ever heard of when major
vendors could provide the same material in less time and at a lower cost.

The Invoice Looked Good Case Study

The scam was brilliant. The accounting manager had found a way to get his
employing company to pay for his gambling losses in Las Vegas. Every time he
needed to send a payment, he simply created an invoice for services at some distant
office. The invoices were always from different companies, but on all of them he put
a stamp on which he wrote their vendor number in the company’s system. Of
course, the vendor number was one the accounting manager had assigned to the
holding company that owned the casino. Of course the casino was always glad to
see him on his quarterly visits: it didn’t care whether the check was made out to it or
to its parent company. Because the computer system wouldn’t reject the invoice as
long as the vendor number was valid, the computer generated the check in the
weekly check run; it was signed by another machine, and mailed out with thousands
of other checks.
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The scheme worked for years, until the outside auditors decided to conduct an
internal control review, and determined that there was no match between vendor
names on invoices and vendor numbers. In checking a vendor list, one of the
auditors recognized the name of the casino’s parent company, and wondered why
this unlikely organization would be a vendor. The manager told the auditor that the
company held meetings at the casinos owned by the company. Unfortunately for
the manager, the auditors checked his story, and the scheme was revealed.

Breaking the Bank Case Study

A European bank sustained losses estimated at $65 million over a two year period
when the head of the foreign currency transfer department and her assistant, who
had broken the bank’s computer transfer codes, were able to move money into
outside accounts. The fraud was discovered through an audit, and the two
perpetrators were arrested. Afterwards, everyone questioned how it was possible for
such a large amount of money to be stolen with no one noticing and raising the
alarm. Further investigation showed that the bank was involved in complex money
laundering and tax evasion activities. Apparently the two managers believed that
with all of the manipulation going on, no one would notice their independent
scheme, and they were almost correct.

A New Form of Fraud Case Study

An employee of an insurance company in Florida had the dubious honor of being
one of the first people convicted under that state’s computer crime law. The
employee was a benefits clerk with the company, and used her expertise in the
company’s systems and procedures to steal more than $200,000 in two years. She
filled in the forms that benefits examiners used to approve claims and entered them
into her computer terminal. She used a variety of names and policy numbers-all
real-and created the paperwork to back up the claims. Her mistake was always
using, as the mailing addresses for the checks, one of three addresses: her own, her
father’s, or her boyfriend’s. The security department of the company discovered the
fraud by looking for unusual patterns of payment addresses.
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Welfare? It Was for our Own Welfare! Case Study

It may be impossible to discover exactly how much they stole, but a State
Department of Social Services learned that one of their supervisors worked in
collusion with a clerk to steal $300,000. This was a simple matter of input
falsification. The clerk and supervisor submitted dozens of false claims for benefits
and collected the payments. The fraud was discovered when a data input clerk
noticed that the authorization data on one of the forms she was entering was
incomplete. She called the eligibility worker, whose signature had been forged by
the supervisor, to check on the incomplete form. When that person denied
authorizing the claim or signing the form, an investigation was performed and the
fraud was discovered.

When Time Stood Still Case Study

Wouldn’t it be great to get the results of horse races before they ran? Imagine
always betting on long shots when you know the winner. Just a dream? Not for the
computer operator at a government-run betting agency in Australia. He figured a
way to reverse time. Just before certain races, he reset the system clock to read three
minutes earlier than it actually was. As soon as the race was run, he called his
girlfriend, who was an off-track telephone betting clerk. She immediately entered
bets on the winner. Because the computer believed that the race had not yet started,
the bets were accepted. Then, the operator would reset the clock. Unfortunately, we
can’t report that the scheme was uncovered by brilliant work by internal auditors,
external auditors, corporate security personnel, or even brilliant police work. The
operator’s girlfriend turned him in when she discovered he was seeing another
woman.

8.7.2 Case Study: A Closer Look
There are thousands of cases of serious computer crimes on the books. Some were
presented in the previous section. To provide a closer look at the way these cases are
investigated, one full-length case study is included. This case involves deliberate actions by
an insider who disrupted the email capabilities of an organization.

The Case of the Suicidal Computers Case Study

It happened, as do so many unpleasant things, in the dark of night. A dozen
computers—each dedicated as an email router for a major financial services firm—
apparently made a mutual decision, precisely at 5:00 A.M. one morning, to commit
suicide. At that time, each of the computers suddenly and without warning,
proceeded to completely reformat each of their hard disk drives. From that moment
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on, email within the huge global organization stopped. Any message that went
outside of the local office was not going to be delivered.
Within an hour, the problem was noticed. Within two, it was apparent that the
problem was not small and was not going to be easy to fix. Because many of the
important daily operating communications of the company went through email, it
was clear that a back-up plan would be needed to replace the damaged
communications links. While one group of managers developed a plan to keep the
organization functioning, the Chief Information Officer passed the word to the
company’s communications manager to fix the problem. The data communications
manager immediately contacted the manufacturer. Because the organization was a
large and valued customer, the manufacturer put two systems engineers on the next
available flight.
At the same time, the Director of Corporate Security recognized that, while it was
possibly an accident—perhaps a programming bug—that caused this crisis, it was
probably a deliberate act of sabotage. If it were, he knew he would need proof to
determine who had caused it. The Director of Corporate Security also understood
that proof requires evidence that could be admitted in a court of law. Unfortunately,
the director had previous experience in computer fraud cases in which evidence that
might have existed was destroyed in the attempt to fix software problems.
Therefore, two calls were made: The first was to the CEO of the company, who
gave him authority to investigate the incident and, if it were shown to be deliberate,
to identify and punish the perpetrator. The second call was to a private
investigations firm that specialized in high-technology incidents.

The investigators understood that they could not interfere with the repair efforts;
nevertheless, they immediately went to the data center. They briefed the repair
team, and made a simple request: Please don’t destroy or change anything that
might be the cause of the incident without checking with us first, and keep detailed
notes of your findings.
Over the two days it took to identify the problem and complete repairs, the
investigators collected evidence, both in the form of software, and in written
statements from the software engineers.

During the investigation, it was discovered that one email server had not
reformatted itself. Because of a hardware problem, it had been shut down when the
incident occurred. When the engineers discovered this, they examined the unit.
One of the company’s technicians noticed that the program that controls the
processing of daily backups indicated it had been modified a few weeks earlier.

The technician who was responsible for backup knew that she had not changed the
program in months. Yet the program had been changed. It still performed its
normal backup, but there was a new routine that checked the date every time the
program ran. On a specific date, the program had just two lines of code to be
executed, and those two lines instructed the computer to immediately reformat its
hard drives without warning, and without any report being generated. The
investigators took possession of the server, since it was now apparent that the act
was deliberate.
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Over a forty-eight-hour period, the problem was solved, and all systems were
checked for the existence of the deadly software. Before the engineers from the
computer manufacturer left, the investigators assigned them one additional task.
Using the notes they made during the previous forty-eight hours, each of the
engineers wrote a memo documenting his or her findings in the context of what was
now a potential criminal investigation. These statements were quickly reviewed, and
then signed and sworn to before a notary. This action converted a memo into a
sworn affidavit, which could have great value in any future court action.
With the email system back in operation, the data center management worked with
the investigative team to determine who could have inserted the killer code into the
dozen servers. Because of security measures built into the system, very few people
had the authority to make those changes. In fact, the investigators were told, only
four employees had that authority, and all were exemplary employees, so far
beyond suspicion that no one could conceive of any of them having done this. Yet it
had to be one of them. Who else could it be?

That was the question put to the head of the email management group, where the
four suspects worked. She was convinced that none of the four employees were
responsible; however, she had another candidate under consideration. He had
resigned some weeks earlier, but, as a member of the group, he would have had the
authority. Why had he left? Because he felt that he was misunderstood and
insufficiency appreciated. He believed he knew far more than the others in the
group, including the group head, about email technology. He had publicly gone to
senior data center management to request a promotion to group head. When his
managers decided that they would keep the present manager, this disgruntled
employee had given notice, telling others that the company did not deserve him.
An examination of the former employee’s computer revealed evidence of the
destructive code that had caused the shutdown. There were several versions of the
code found, including the key line that delayed the destruction until several weeks
after he left the company. On the evidence presented by the investigators, the case
was referred to law enforcement. The police accepted the case and reviewed the
evidence. The case was brought to the county prosecutor, who determined the
actions to modify the computer’s program were a violation of the state’s computer
crime laws and that he would prosecute.

8.8

Conclusion
One of the peculiar things about the field of computer crime is that one can say almost
anything and go unchallenged. The only thing people seem to agree on is that most
computer crime is probably never reported, either because it is never discovered or
because the company is embarrassed and chooses to handle it administratively. Often the
company will forego prosecution if the offender resigns and agrees to never discuss the
incident. This is why people who commit computer crimes can, in effect, get away with it
and go on to another company with their reputations apparently intact.
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In this chapter, we’ve tried to show that it does not require tremendous computer skills to
commit a computer crime. Any employee, temp, or independent contractor with authorized
access, as well as anyone with unauthorized access, can do it Since most computer crimes
involve input or output manipulations, the individuals most able to commit these crimes are
not developers but employees in departments that use the systems. This is not to say that
systems people don’t commit computer crimes; they do but they are not typically likely to
do so.

We have also tried to show that the commonly held belief that most computer crime is
committed by outside hackers, who gain access to systems through almost mysterious
abilities, is also a myth. Most of the incidents involve actions by insiders. Again, some
occurrences do involve those outside of the organization, and defensive systems, such as
firewalls, are absolutely necessary.
A third myth is that computer-related thefts, including fraud and embezzlement, are not
detected by audit, but by accident. If that were true, and it is not, it would imply that the
criminals are somehow more intelligent or more skillful, or perhaps more cunning than the
noncriminals, and this is not the case. Good internal security, accounting and audit systems
are very effective and do catch the bad guys. It is when these controls are not in place or
when they are not implemented with sufficient resources, that the criminals get the upper
hand.
As computer security becomes an increasingly important aspect of technology, it is likely
that better mechanisms to prevent and detect computer crimes will evolve. But to gain the
needed protection, it will be necessary for companies to adopt the technology and to
implement it properly. Again, those who fail to assign sufficient resources to prevent the
problem are destined for problems.
Finally, remember that once a security weakness is identified in a system, whether by
hackers or security experts and the knowledge of the hole becomes public, it is important
that it be closed quickly. There is nothing more discouraging than having to tell a victim
that it was hit by a perpetrator who used a well-known hole to enter its system, and that all
along there had been an easy-to-install, free patch out there, but that it was never installed.
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CHAPTER 9:
Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud

9.1

Overview

9.1.1 Purpose and Scope
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention, not fraud investigation. Likewise,
this Handbook is intended primarily for the CPA, whether in public practice or in industry,
who is responsible for fraud prevention, rather than the full-time fraud investigator.
However, professional fraud investigators will also find this Handbook useful in many ways,
and occasionally there may be some crossover between the two functions; nevertheless, the
distinction between the two is an important one. Prevention cannot come without an
understanding of how fraud is perpetrated and the means by which it is concealed. To
reach this understanding, it is necessary to have a firm foundation in fraud investigation
techniques.
The experienced fraud investigators achieve their status through professional training and,
most important, extensive experience in the investigation of fraud. It is well beyond the
scope of this Handbook—indeed, it would be a virtually unachievable goal for any text—to
synthesize the knowledge and expertise gained by an experienced forensic and
investigative CPA over many years. There is simply no substitute for experience.
Nevertheless, virtually all CPAs should be concerned with fraud prevention, investigation
and reporting, whether internally to an employing company, to a client, or to a court.
Occasionally and despite the best fraud prevention efforts, a known or suspected fraud
situation may surface. It is important in such circumstances that the CPA—

1. Be capable of acting competently: that is, perform the acts that should be performed and
avoid or not perform those acts that should not be performed.
2. Understand the role of the forensic accountant and others who may be called in as part
of the fraud investigation.

This chapter should serve to introduce the CPA to fraud investigation and reporting. It is
not intended as a substitute for professional expertise in fraud investigation. Until the
requisite experience is gained, in all cases involving fraud or suspected fraud, the
inexperienced CPA should seek the assistance of a lawyer knowledgeable about fraud and a
CPA experienced in forensic accounting.

3

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

9.1.2 Forensics and Forensic Accounting
The term forensic can be defined as, “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.”
This term describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a
forensic medical examiner would conduct autopsies to a standard required for court
purposes, and a forensic accountant would conduct financial analyses to a standard
required for court purposes. Thus, a forensic accountant may also be involved in civil
litigation cases, which do not necessarily involve fraud.
But what is that standard? Generally, the forensic standard involves considering all the
relevant evidence that could affect the professional’s opinion and yet withstand rigorous
cross-examination from counsel who is keen to undermine or disprove the professional’s
opinion so that the professional can properly assist the court reach its decision. It also
involves a strong understanding of the legal system.

It follows then, that forensic accounting is a discipline involving accounting to a standard
required by the court—the criminal and civil courts, as well as arbitration, mediation, and
other forms of business dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar
standard. It involves the application of financial skills and an investigative mentality to
unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it
encompasses financial acumen and a strong knowledge and understanding of business
reality and the workings of the legal system. In the context of a fraud case, extensive fraud
investigation expertise is essential. Its development has been primarily achieved through
on-the-job training, as well as experience with investigating officers (in fraud cases), legal
counsel and in the courts.
Accounting practitioners who concentrate their professional practice on matters requiring
them to testify in court as to the findings from an investigation of accounting and financial
evidence are termed forensic accountants. The ultimate test for the forensic accountant is
acceptance by the courts of law—both criminal and civil—of him or her as an expert
witness providing testimony in the area of accounting and financial matters.

While the American Institute of CPAs and the state Boards of Accountancy currently do
not prescribe any standard specifically related to forensic accounting, it is clear that the
standards for this practice are determined in the first instance by the courts of law. At the
same time, a CPA is required to meet the general standards of professional practice as
stipulated by the governing State Board of Accountancy and American Institute of CPAs.

9.2 The Five-Step Investigative Approach
Typically, there are five major steps in the forensic accounting and fraud investigation
process:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Planning.
Gathering evidence.
Analyzing and testing.
Reporting and testifying.
Case Resolution.

For a more detailed checklist, see the table at the end of this chapter.
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9. 2.1 Planning
As with almost all endeavors, planning is critical. A well-planned investigation maximizes
the chances of success; poor planning can lead to disaster. In the early stages of a forensic
accounting or investigative engagement, it’s especially important to (1) establish the
scenario, (2) identify areas of concern and uncertainty, and (3) define the nature and scope
of the investigation.

Establishing the Scenario
The amount of information available during the earliest phase of an engagement will vary
from case to case. Establishing what is known is of special importance. This is true because
it has a direct impact on the nature and scope of the investigation.

A known or suspected fraud almost always comes to light through one of the following
three broad scenarios:
1. Accounting irregularities. One of the most common irregularities is a discrepancy between
the book value of an asset and its value as determined through physical counts or
confirmations. For example, a physical inventory count may reveal a major shortage
compared to the perpetual inventory records, or accounts receivable confirmations may
reveal much lower values than the accounts receivable subledger. Other common
examples include bank reconciliations that do not balance, and complaints from
customers that their statements are incorrect. Any irregularity that comes to light during
an internal or external examination would also fall into this category. The common
theme in all of these examples is that the company’s records—its information system—
have raised a red flag that signals the possibility of fraud.
2. Immediate physical evidence. Physical evidence may be readily apparent or uncovered
upon inspection. Obvious examples include the aftermath of sabotage or arson. Human
or electronic surveillance techniques might also yield immediate evidence (for example,
with respect to employee theft or the diversion of inventory).
3. After-the-fact incriminating information. Incriminating information is a grab-bag category
that comes in various incarnations: outright confessions brought on by guilt, anonymous
tips, memos in brown envelopes, whistle-blowing employees, irate spouses looking to
get back at their fraud-perpetrating husband or wife, honest citizens just trying to do the
right thing, and so on.
In any fraud investigation the first step is to establish which of these three scenarios exists,
and the nature and scope of the related evidence.

Identifying Areas of Concern and Uncertainty
The next step in the planning phase is a blending of the Boy Scout motto: be prepared and
Murphy’s Law: whatever can go wrong, will Immediate areas of concern depend on the
scenario identified in the previous step. Dealing with sabotage requires the immediate
beefing up of security at other likely targets to prevent further damage. Dealing with a
specific employee who is suspected of fraud—such as an accounts receivable clerk who
might be perpetrating a lapping scheme, or a shipping department employee
misappropriating inventory—you would want to secure all possible evidence and remove
the suspect employee from the scene. Removing the employee from the scene need not be

5

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

done in a direct, accusatory way. For example, if the fraud red flag is not common
knowledge among the work force, the employee could be sent on a week’s training course.
Beyond the immediate concerns of asset protection and evidence preservation, it’s
important, to the extent possible, to identify the uncertainties in the investigation—any
pieces of the puzzle that are missing, so to speak. What are the major strengths and
weaknesses of the existing evidence and supporting material? What additional evidence is
likely to be available? What additional research, investigation and analysis are likely to be
required to obtain any needed additional evidence and make it useful? Without at least a
rough idea of where you’re going, you most likely will not arrive at any valid conclusions.

Perhaps most important, you should think of any constraints, obstacles and pitfalls you are
likely to encounter along the way. Obviously, forensic accountants and investigators need
to be concerned about legal constraints in conducting their investigation. For example, as a
general rule, only law enforcement authorities in possession of a valid search warrant can
legally search a residence or a vehicle. (There are several exceptions, but for practical
purposes none of them would apply to a fraud investigation.)
Less clear may be situations such as searching employee lockers. Judicial authorities have
established that if employees have been put on notice all along that their lockers are subject
to inspection, they probably can be searched. If this notice is lacking, legal counsel should
be consulted, which should be the rule followed in all cases. Other concerns of investigators
include lawsuits for false accusations or wrongful dismissal, and constraints imposed by
collective bargaining agreements. The point is that a fraud investigation can be a legal
minefield that must be navigated very carefully and deliberately, not haphazardly. To keep
from hitting a mine, the safest course to set is early consultation with appropriate legal
counsel and an experienced forensic CPA.

In addition to legal constraints, factors such as the company’s reputation and relationship
with its employees must be considered. For example, you would not want to alienate all
your employees through hasty implementation of draconian investigative or security
measures, just because of one bad apple.

Defining the Nature and Scope of the Investigation
The last step in the planning phase is to define the nature and scope of the investigation.
This should be a fairly simple and straightforward process if the first two steps—establishing
the scenario and identifying areas of concern and uncertainty—were properly thought out.
The nature and scope of the investigation are defined by several interrelated attributes
including—

• The nature of the main objective—for example, prevention of further incidents,
dismissal of the perpetrator, proving the case for criminal prosecution, establishing a loss
claim, and so on—and the ranking of the objectives when there is more than one.
• If a criminal prosecution is envisaged, the point at which to involve the police.
• The level of secrecy or cover required in conducting the investigation.
For example, if the scenario involves an anonymous but seemingly credible tip implicating
a purchasing employee in a kickback scheme, the objective may be to prove the case for
criminal prosecution. The nature of the investigation will be fairly secret, because the
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parties involved are unlikely to confess and you would not want to alert them to the
investigation. Because kickback (that is, secret commission) cases can be difficult to
establish, the scope of the investigation could become extensive, including background
investigations of both the bribe giver and bribe taker, surveillance, and possibly even
setting up a sting operation.

9.2.2 Evidence Gathering
Once the planning phase is complete, the general objectives of the investigation must be
translated into specifics, for example, identifying the documents and other information to
analyze, conducting interviews, and obtaining third-party information required for
corroboration.

Throughout the process, two important questions to keep in mind are what logical
alternative interpretations exist for the evidence, and what eventual use will be made of the
evidence. In particular, the forensic accountant must be able to understand the difference
between relevant and irrelevant information, and must be willing to apply the standards of
evidence required by the court.

Information Gathering Techniques
The forensic and investigative accountant is not a police officer. He or she does not have
the resources of a police officer and, even when working to assist the police, must work
within his or her own expertise, and within the rules governing professional conduct.
Among the most important investigative tools are those that enable the forensic accountant
to gather and analyze information available in the public domain in conjunction with other
information gathered during the investigation.

For example, in investigating an individual, it may be possible to gather background
information concerning certain aspects of an individual’s financial circumstances (for
example, mortgages and other secured debts, old court judgments, and so on), educational
and employment references, professional qualifications, and other details such as whether
he or she has taken his or her annual vacation. Also worth exploring is corporate
information such as jurisdiction of incorporation, authorized share capital, and the identity
of all officers and directors since incorporation can often be obtained from the appropriate
state office, usually the Secretary of State of the jurisdiction where the incorporation took
place. In some jurisdictions, shareholder identities can be obtained. In many instances,
private offshore corporations have less information available than publicly traded North
American companies.

Public domain information may also provide critical clues or evidence. For example,
comparison of a company’s statistics and trends to others in its industry, that is,
benchmarking, may identify unexplained variances that alert the forensic accountant to
possible questionable activities or that warrant further investigation. At the very least, the
background data will provide context for the detailed findings from the examination of
nonpublic data.
There are many sources of public information about organizations, industries, and
institutions. Very often a university reference library or a government resource center can
provide access to documents, reference textbooks, computerized databases, and other
sources of information that can assist in understanding and analyzing a case.
7
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Documentary Evidence
At the beginning of any case involving documentary evidence, there are two key questions.
What documents should be obtained? And where will they come from? These questions are
usually resolved after discussions with available witnesses and an initial assessment of the
findings to date. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to involve the
authorities to obtain a search warrant or begin legal proceedings so that a court could order
the seizing of documents.

The main goal is to gather all documents that might be useful, bearing in mind that
irrelevant documents can always be returned to their proper place. It is necessary to decide,
in consultation with legal counsel, whether to be selective (that is, review all documents but
take only those deemed necessary), or whether to remove or secure all of the documents
from the premises by taking the filing cabinets, and so on. It is difficult to lay down hard
and fast rules, but clearly the primary purpose is to obtain all documents that might be
relevant without resorting to a fishing expedition.
The minimum requirements for financial documentation, for the period under
investigation, are likely to be the following:
• Books and records, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining either to the
management of the company or to an individual.
• Documentation pertaining to the movement of assets into and out of a company.

• Relevant correspondence.
• Personal documentation, such as bank-account records.
Documents, including seized documents, should be properly identified and catalogued.
Documents must be handled carefully. They should not be written upon, altered, stapled or
unstapled during the course of the investigation. The investigating accountants, in
particular, should bear this in mind.

Documents should be examined in detail and categorized as follows:
1. Documents required for evidence.
2. Documents required for rebuttal of the defense arguments.
3. Documents required for other reasons.

4. Documents that can be returned.
Once the documents have been sorted into these groups, photocopies can be made to
provide working copies for the investigating accountant to use when preparing schedules,
and in general for the working paper files.

Documents will subsequently be selected, from among those photocopied, for use in the
presentation of evidence in a court of law. They should be compiled and assembled into a
document brief.

Admissibility of Accounting Evidence
It is important during the evidence gathering stage to consider the two forms of
documentary accounting evidence that may be presented in a court of law:
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1. Primary, that is, the original, individual accounting documents obtained from the parties
concerned or other sources.
2. Secondary, that is, summaries and schedules based on the original documents, which are
produced by an accountant after examining the primary evidence.
The issue of whether secondary accounting evidence should be admissible has been argued
in the courts for many years. Two opinions that allowed secondary accounting evidence,
are described below.

In the first case, the court ruled, and was upheld on appeal, that a summary of
documentary evidence was admissible. The court said, however, that the summary was in
itself not evidence of the underlying facts; rather, it was strictly an aid to understanding
primary evidence that had already been established. The judge made the following
observations about the use of secondary evidence:
1. No more reliance could be placed on the survey than was placed on the primary
evidence it was intended to summarize.
2. The summary did not prove the veracity and content of the primary evidence.
3. Any summary of primary evidence must show every weakness previously determined as
existing within the primary evidence.

In the second case, the court ruled that an exhibit prepared by an accountant, based on the
documentation before the court, be introduced into evidence because it helped to simplify
and trace the many transactions previously discussed in the court. The defense was
concerned that the exhibit expressed the independent opinions of the accountant who
prepared the material and, therefore, was not objective. However, the judge ruled that any
opinions reflected in the exhibit were opinions that were readily ascertainable from the
documents themselves—the primary evidence.

Interview Techniques
One of the more important tools for the forensic accountant is the interview process—this
is a complex subject area on which several books have been written, and which takes years
of experience for forensic accountants to master.

For the purposes of this Handbook, rather than attempt to explain the entire process, this
section provides highlights of a few of the skills involved:

• The interview process should yield evidence that is as clear, unambiguous and concise
as possible.
• Each interview, in order to be effective, should be carefully planned regarding the issues
to be examined. All supporting documentation relating to the issues in question should
be readily available to the interviewer in the event that the documentation is needed for
reference purposes during the interview.
• The forensic accountant should consider the timing of the interview in relation to the
extent of evidence gathered to date. Usually, it is best to gather as much documentary
and other evidence as possible before either confronting the suspect or suspects directly
or alerting those suspects by interviewing a parade of witnesses in a highly visible
manner.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

9

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

• The forensic accountant should consider all the physical aspects relating to the venue of
the interview—including the size, temperature and lighting of the room; the size and
positioning of the furniture within the room; and the seats to be occupied by those
attending the interview.
• The forensic accountant should be skilled at asking both open-ended and closed
questions, and should be able to distinguish when these kinds of questions would be
most effective.
• The forensic accountant must be able to differentiate between an inarticulate
explanation by a nervous individual and the evasive explanation offered by an
individual who does not want to have his or her actions or motives identified and
examined more closely.
• Discourse analysis, which involves the analysis of a person’s written and spoken words,
is an increasingly used technique in addressing suspected fraudsters. The theory of
discourse analysis is that every word, pause, and gesture is important. There are no slips
of the tongue. Thus, changing tense from present to past or person from first singular to
first plural could be a significant cue. Therefore, when taking a statement, whether
written or oral, it is important to have every last quirk—ums and pauses—recorded.
Discourse analysis, however, is not the end all: it is one of the tools available to the
investigator.
• The forensic accountant must be able to control and direct the interview process to
draw out further evidence, often from hostile or adversarial interviewees. Effectively, the
forensic accountant applies his or her own knowledge of the human element to assist in
this process.
• The forensic accountant must be expert at taking good notes.

Private Investigators
It may also be necessary to engage private investigators to conduct surveillance of
suspected perpetrators, for example, to observe their activity and record their presence at
various locations and times, including meetings with certain individuals.

Forensic accountants who regularly work with private investigators as part of their team
should be consulted for a recommendation regarding how to use investigators effectively,
and whom to use.

Search and Seizure Mechanisms
In criminal matters, law enforcement agencies often obtain a search warrant to obtain
documentary evidence. The forensic accountant may assist them in specifying on the
search warrant those accounting, banking and other records that are to be seized as
evidence of fraudulent activity. Depending on the jurisdiction, the forensic accountant may
also be named on the warrant to attend its execution at the premises to be searched, in
order to help identify those documents that are to be seized as evidence.
In civil matters, depending on the jurisdiction, different search and seizure mechanisms
may also be available. The forensic accountant could provide assistance in obtaining
evidence through the use of a seizure order, granted pursuant to a court application. Under
the court’s supervision, an order would permit counsel to recover documentary evidence
from the other party. This evidence could otherwise have been destroyed or concealed.

10

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Chapter Nine: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud

Similarly if there is a concern that the assets of an individual under investigation may be
dissipated, an injunction may be obtained from a court. This injunction would prohibit the
individual under investigation from conducting his or her affairs in a manner that would
financially prejudice the other party in a case prior to the court rendering its decision.

The rules governing civil suits in most jurisdictions allow discovery proceedings, which
include answering either orally or in writing questions under oath and the production of
documents, or some equivalent process. During discovery, the forensic accountant can

(Text continued on page 11)
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assist counsel in requesting documents to be produced by the other party and in
determining questions to be put to the witnesses for the other party.

The Role of Computers
Over the years, the role of computers in investigations has increased exponentially; for
example, the use of the Internet as a research tool and the development of faster, more
efficient software to assist in the investigative process.

Investigative software now includes many packages that are designed to assist the forensic
accountant, investigator or lawyer with his or her work. For instance, scanners can be used
to scan in huge volumes of paper evidence that can then be searched via keywords or
phrases and organized using a database for quick reference later in the case. Queries can be
generated in a matter of minutes, which search through databases of millions of
transactions, to identify the proverbial needles in the haystack. Similarly, specialized
software is now readily available for procurement fraud investigation and to recover file
fragments from personal computers.

The work product of the forensic accountant is also generated by computers and generally
includes a written report accompanied by various supporting information—for example,
document briefs, chronologies of events, accounting schedules (either summaries or
analytical schedules), graphs and charts.

9.2.3 Analyzing and Testing
During the analysis stage, the financial issues being investigated are evaluated in detail.
Appropriate conclusions are drawn, either in terms of a finding of fact (for example,
whether a particular transaction or event took place) or the resulting quantification of the
alleged fraud. If the investigation has been properly planned and appropriate evidence is
available and has been gathered, this step should go fairly smoothly.

The ultimate test of the evidence may come when the perpetrator is confronted with it. A
trained interviewer in possession of all the facts can often elicit an immediate confession
from an unprepared suspect. In many cases, the suspect is relieved that the matter is finally
over because he or she no longer has to endure the stress of covering up the fraud.
Of course, there are many cases that are not resolved as quickly, proceeding instead to
lengthy civil or criminal court challenges. The planning, evidence gathering, and analyzing
and testing phases of the investigation must yield a product that, in the end, can withstand
the court challenges.

9.2.4 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic accountant must be able to present his or her findings in a way that is
understandable, and must do so in an appropriate format. The American Institute of CPA
Practice Aids should be referred to when preparing the final report. In general, however, the
appropriate format might be one of the following:

• A reporting letter, for example, a communication to counsel outlining the scope of the
review and findings.
• An affidavit or deposition, that is, a sworn statement of findings with supporting
documentation.
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• A formal communication to the court, such as a report that sets out the forensic
accountant’s opinions and underlying findings, and that provides details as to how those
findings are substantiated.

Often the findings must be communicated through oral testimony in court. Once again, that
is why every phase of the investigation up to this point must be conducted with the legal
evidence standards in mind. Forensic accountants must be prepared for examination under
oath about all their activities. This examination can come at any time and in any form, for
example, as an affidavit, a deposition, or oral testimony at the actual trial. They must be
able to qualify as an expert witness based on their education, experience and knowledge.
Finally, they must be prepared to respond to cross-examination and to the submission of
different financial evidence and alternatives by the other side.
Keep in mind that conventional accounting evidence is only one part of a much larger pool
of evidentiary material, which includes one or more of the following:

• Testimony of witnesses.
• Police witness interview notes.

• Statements of claim.
• Statements of defense and counterclaim.
• Examinations or production of documents relating to a civil matter or search warrants.
Additionally, the forensic accountant may carry out research to identify any precedents that
may assist in reporting and presenting evidence.

Preparing and Presenting Accounting Evidence
Certain guidelines should be considered when preparing and presenting accounting
evidence. Although set out primarily from the point of view of the investigator or legal
counsel, forensic accountants (especially those who act as expert witnesses) should also be
aware of these guidelines, which include:
1. Make yourself fully aware of the evidence, or lack of it, from an accounting standpoint:
a. Be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case based on the available
documents.
b. Be aware of any investigation that may be needed to complete the accounting
picture.
2. Thoroughly familiarize yourself with the final accounting picture as set out in the
accountant’s report, schedules, and document brief.
3. Decide what accounting evidence to call, if any.
4. Prepare evidence for the court:
a. Request that the accountant prepare the appropriate report, schedules, and document
brief.
b. Request that the accountant prepare appropriate visual or other aids.
c. Make available, as required by the rules of procedure, to the other side accounting
material including the report, schedules, and document brief.
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d. Accomplish the following at the meeting with the other side.

• Explain the accounting material.
• Ensure that there is an opportunity for explanation and production of documents
by the other side.
• Consider the admissibility of accounting material without formal proof.

5. Conduct a final pretrial witness interview of the accountant:

a. Ensure that all documentation is introduced as exhibits.
b. Confirm that the accounting schedules are properly cross-referenced to the document
brief.
c. Review the format of the examination of expert witnesses, including:
• Areas to be covered.
• Sequence of examination.
• Exact nature of opinion evidence, if any.
• Use of visual aids.
6. Make final preparations for tendering the accountant’s evidence in court:
a. Place exhibits in proper numerical order.
b. Index the accountant’s document brief with exhibit numbers.

c. Confirm the logistics of using visual aids.
d. Confirm the availability and legibility of copies of accounting schedules and visual
aids.
Qualifying as an Expert Witness
The simulated testimony reproduced below shows how a CPA’s qualifications as an expert
witness can be established.

Examination—of Mr. I.M. Sleuth, CPA by Jim Jones, Esq. (Prosecutor)

Q. Mr. Sleuth, where do you reside, sir?
A. I live in Bigtown, Megaplace.
Q. And what is your occupation?

A. I am a CPA and a Certified Fraud Examiner.
Q. And do you practice on your own or with someone else?

A. I practice in partnership with other CPAs under the firm name of Sleuth &
Company.
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Q. And how long have you been operating the accounting partnership?
A. Close to twenty-two years now.

Q. And prior to that were you associated with any other firm?
A. Yes, prior to that I worked for a period of six years with a national firm
following my graduation from school.

Q. And in what year did you qualify as a CPA?
A. In 1972.

Q. And since that date have you had occasion to testify in court with respect to
accounting matters?
A. I have.
Q. And approximately how many occasions would that have occurred on?

A. An estimate of some fifty occasions.
Mr. Jones:

Your Honor, I offer Mr. Sleuth as an expert witness on the basis of his
qualifications that I have elicited.

Mr. Green (Defense Counsel): No objection, Your Honor.

His Honor: Thank you.

Q. Mr. Sleuth, I understand that you have prepared a number of documents
relating to various transactions dealing with Acme Manufacturing?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. Mr. Sleuth, I show you a document, a rather large document, marked Exhibit A.
I would ask you to look at that document and tell me if you recognize it?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. And did you prepare that document yourself?
A. Yes, I did, with the assistance of staff under my direct supervision.

Q. And I wonder if you would hold it in such a way that the jury will be able to see
the structure of that document itself. It appears to consist of a number of
columns, vertical columns, am I correct?
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A. That’s correct.
Q. And the document is headed what?

A. It’s headed, Analysis ofSales for the Period August 1, 1998 to October 5, 1998.

Observing the Accountant Witness: A Positive Approach
The following list presents the ideal a CPA should, under the direction of legal counsel,
strive for when giving oral testimony.

• The answers given should be responsive to the questions and as brief as possible,
without losing sense.
• The statement of qualifications as an expert witness should be well outlined, factual, and
not overly laudatory.
• There should be no show of bias when describing the scope and purpose of the services.
• The accountant should indicate the source of all documentation and acknowledge that
all documents used to support his or her findings are currently before the court.
• The accountant should be prepared to consider new evidence provided it is relevant to
the case.
• The accountant should be specific about the time period covered and the dollar amount
of his or her findings.
• The accountant should be able to articulate the basis for his or her opinion in an
organized and logical fashion that is easy for the judge (and if it is a jury case, a lay jury),
to follow.
• The accountant should make good use of visual aids.
• The accountant should speak slowly and deliberately, leaving sufficient time for the
judge (and jury) to absorb his or her evidence.
• The accountant should periodically check that the judge (and jury) is following his or her
evidence.
• The accountant should direct his or her answers to the judge (and jury) rather than to the
lawyer conducting the examination or cross-examination.
• The accountant should make a clear presentation.
• The accountant should be certain that the terms of the engagement are well organized
and clearly set forth.
• The accountant should see to it that the accounting schedules are well referenced,
including the visual aids, and can easily be tied to the supporting documents.
• The accountant should be calm and collected.
• The accountant should demonstrate knowledge of the documents and the case, and an
understanding of the testimony of the other witnesses preceding him or her; that is, there
should be a positive demonstration and total commitment and understanding of the
matter before the court.
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The Accountant Witness—A Negative Approach: What Not to Do
The following list presents the negatives an accountant can exhibit when giving testimony:
• Confusion.
• Lack of preparation.
• Self-described expert (that is, self importance: impressed with himself or herself and his
or her credentials).
• The accountant demonstrates bias in the presentation and explanation of the scope and
purpose of his or her services.

• Failure to present findings or conclusions.
• Lack ready notes in his or her file.
• Findings convey no definite time period.
• Findings convey no definite dollar amount.
• Poor visual image.
• Poor posture.

• Incomplete supporting documents.
• Argumentative and belligerent.

• Openly nervous.
• Off-hand answers to questions.

9.2.5 Case Resolution
Fraud is a crisis for an organization and its employees. Good crisis management demands
that the investigative process not end with the reporting of findings or the giving of
testimony. Briefly, this means the victim organization should—

1. Seek or enforce restitution from the perpetrator (for example, seize any assets pursuant
to a court order).
2. Learn and adjust from the experience—in particular, ensure that controls are
implemented to prevent a recurrence.
3. Keep channels of communication open between the crisis survivors—that is, the
organization and its employees—to ensure the crisis does not damage their relationship
or impair the organization’s ability to function effectively and efficiently.

4. Implement regular, diligent monitoring and follow-up on the above points.
9.3 Forensic Accountants

Forensic accountants must possess a range of skills in order to carry out their investigations
in a professional manner. These skills include not only thorough accounting knowledge but
also knowledge of business and an awareness of the legal process. With these skills, the
forensic accountant can investigate, analyze, document, report on, and testify as to the
financial aspects of an investigation into a fraud or other so-called white-collar crimes.
In many instances, the forensic accountant may be requested to quantify the amount of a
fraud loss in a criminal matter or the financial damages in a civil matter. While a criminal
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matter must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil matter must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. Both require a demonstration of similar techniques and
skills from the forensic accountant.

9.3.1 Professional Skills and Attributes
The seven major categories of a forensic accountant’s professional skills and attributes are:

1. Accounting and audit knowledge, including good business knowledge.
2. Fraud knowledge.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Law and rules of evidence knowledge.
Investigative mentality and critical skepticism.

Psychology and motivation awareness.
Communication skills.
Computers and information technology comprehension.

A closer inspection of each category follows.

Accounting and Audit Knowledge
Professional training in accounting and auditing provides not only accounting and audit
knowledge but also a practical understanding of business operations, business finance,
corporate structure, industry practices, and standards of conduct.

The majority of those who identify themselves as forensic accountants are CPAs. These
individuals have sought and found careers for themselves in an area that allows them to use
their skills as CPAs, together with other personal attributes that are necessary in
investigating business fraud and commercial crimes.

Audit skills are an important foundation for a forensic accountant. Due to the sensitivity of
the work involved, forensic accountants must be able to focus on the need for a 100 percent
substantive examination of all documentation related to a particular matter.
The accountant with good audit skills must have the ability to prepare and use complete
and accurate documentation; thus the accountant must know how to catalog the available
information. He or she must also be able to determine the other existing information
sources, which initially may not be available but which can, with research and diligence, be
uncovered, obtained, and utilized. With his or her accounting and audit skills, the
accountant can inquire about, locate and identify investigation-related documents—whether
they are present initially or obtained during the course of the investigation.
For most CPAs, audit experience includes both audit and nonaudit engagements covering a
wide cross-section of business enterprises and their operations, from small sole
proprietorships to large multinational corporations, both public and private. This familiarity
with business enterprise is an important element in the forensic accountant’s investigation
of business frauds and similar matters.

Fraud Knowledge
In addition to professional training in accounting and auditing, the most important aspect of
the forensic accountant skills mix is exposure to and knowledge of many different kinds of
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fraudulent transactions. This will allow the forensic accountant to identify red flags and to
piece together patterns and theories that may otherwise elude an accountant who has not
had the same degree of exposure to fraud.

Forensic accountants do not merely compute, they analyze. The analytical process is not an
easy one, as each case is unique and therefore calls upon the forensic accountant’s
experience, formal training, and other important attributes. Specifically, he or she must be
able to identify accounting problem areas, prioritize these problem areas or issues as
required, and refine or change the focus of the investigation as new information is obtained
and assessed. Often, an original theory may be only the beginning of an investigation, or it
may be refined to a specific issue warranting further review. In providing assistance to the
courts, this ability to properly focus the investigation is important.
The importance of experience cannot be overemphasized. The forensic accountant must
also be able to look beyond the form of the documentation, to understand its substance and
foundations, and to assess whether it is consistent with other business realities. The forensic
accountant must understand the nature of the documents that he or she is reviewing and
question their business reality. More than anything, a forensic accountant is distinguished
by having “been there before.” Knowledge of many different kinds of fraud, based on first
hand investigative experience, means a more effective plan of investigation, knowing when,
how, and who to interview as well as the format for communicating findings in reports to
clients and if necessary to the court.
Law and Rules of Evidence Knowledge
It is important for the forensic accountant to be knowledgeable about both criminal and
civil laws, since these laws have a direct impact on matters involving the forensic
accountant. Specifically, a forensic accountant must be able to understand both criminal
and other statutes that may have been contravened, in order to identify possible issues.
There is also a need to understand the rules of evidence to ensure that all findings are
admissible in court, if necessary. Specifically, investigative accountants must have an
understanding of the rules of evidence—for both civil and criminal matters—which consist
of:
•
•
•
•
•

What evidence is.
How it is obtained.
How it is preserved.
How it is presented before the courts.
How the forensic accountant’s own work can become part of the evidence brought
before the courts or before some other tribunal responsible for determining what has
occurred.

To provide accounting assistance in a matter involving fraud, the forensic accountant must
possess a general understanding of the issues by which the courts can judge an act to be
fraudulent. He or she must be knowledgeable as to the court’s tests for fraud—for example,
the presence of dishonest intent as seen in the perpetrator’s actions, or more particularly,
the mens rea or criminal intent of the perpetrator at the time the act occurred. He or she
must review and analyze accounting, banking, financial and other business records, and
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identify both specific acts and patterns of conduct that are suggestive of dishonest intent to
deprive a victim of an asset.

Investigative Mentality and Critical Skepticism
The forensic accountant must possess an investigative outlook, tenacity, and the ability to
identify indicators of fraud. Collectively, these attributes could be termed as the
investigative mentality. This mentality encourages the forensic accountant to seek substance
over form—to identify and analyze data and to conduct interviews to determine what has
actually occurred in a business transaction, rather than what simply appears to have
happened.

The investigative mentality is sometimes manifested by the smell test—the ability to assess
relevant transactions or events to determine their reasonableness and to the extent possible,
their veracity. In other words, in light of all the known facts, does a particular action appear
reasonable and logical? Is the action or pattern of behavior plausible in the circumstances,
or is there an odor that begs for further investigation?
The investigative mentality can also be thought of as professional, critical skepticism. It is
not a shotgun approach; rather, it is a specific and precise set of judgmental procedures
suitable for the circumstances that allows the forensic accountant to identify and assess all
relevant facts and develop hypotheses. These hypotheses can then be researched further
and tested more extensively as the investigation proceeds. The forensic accountant never
discounts any aspect of an investigation on face value: Only after examining all available
evidence and weighing its totality will he or she determine an item to be irrelevant to the
issues at hand.

Another analogy—that of the watchdog-bloodhound—further illustrates the forensic
accountant’s investigative mentality attribute. A CPA is more akin to a watchdog—he or
she looks for material misstatements in financial statements caused by error or fraud, but
will respond affirmatively if warning signs of fraud appear through audit procedures. The
forensic accountant, however, is more of a bloodhound—actively seeking out the presence
of evidence, all of which when viewed together may indicate the occurrence of a fraudulent
act.
While the investigative mentality requires a disciplined approach and a methodology, it
also requires creativity in being able to identify and seek out further sources of evidence
and to analyze this new information. Attention to detail is critical as the success or failure of
the case may depend on the identification of evidence that, on initial review, may appear
insignificant or irrelevant. The issues of materiality or sampling relevant in an audit
assignment do not restrict a forensic investigation. Those restrictions may cause fraudulent
acts to be overlooked, and they are inadequate in establishing evidence.

Psychology and Motivation Awareness
Another attribute of the forensic accountant is an understanding of the human element.
Documents do not commit fraud; computers do not commit fraud; rather, people commit
fraud. In assessing information, documentation and accounting records, one of the
seasonings that the forensic accountant can apply to the mix is his or her understanding of
individuals, including what motivates an individual to commit fraud and the attributes of an
individual who commits fraud. This understanding, together with the ability of the forensic

19

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

accountant to examine information not just from an accounting viewpoint, but also within
the context of the overall picture or business reality, is important
In general, it can be said that individuals react to satisfy needs. The forensic accountant
must recognize the presence of such needs during his or her investigation, whether it is the
need of an employee for greater income to maintain an extravagant lifestyle or the need of
a sales manager to maintain sales volumes in a declining market so as to ensure his or her
continued employment. Such needs often provide the motivation for acts that an employee
may label differently but which are, in essence, fraud.
In a situation where an individual has both the need and the opportunity, a fraudulent act
may be the result.

Communication Skills

Forensic accountants, as expert witnesses to the court in findings of fact, must be able to
clearly and effectively communicate information. This means that they must be able to
communicate without bias in written form, including the use of accounting schedules,
charts, and exhibits. They must also be able to communicate to others the nature and extent
of the work undertaken and the findings that have evolved from that work so that it can be
understood both in a court of law and in other forums.

When the forensic accountant testifies as an expert witness in court, he or she must be able
to explain the procedures, analyses, and findings of the investigation in such a way that the
basis for his or her expert testimony—both facts and, if necessary, opinion—is understood
by the judge and, if there is one, the jury. The forensic accountant’s knowledge of the
available evidence and possible alternate explanations of the events must be as complete as
possible, to ensure that the findings are not compromised on cross-examination.
Understanding Computers and Information Technology

Today’s computers have replaced yesterday’s ledgers, and in fraud investigation it is
important to be as up-to-date as the alleged perpetrators of fraud. Thus, the skills of a
forensic accountant should include the ability to understand the opportunities computers
provide to potential perpetrators of fraud as well as the ability to use computers in analysis
and documentation of an alleged fraud.
Because succinct presentation to the judge and jury is so critical, knowledge of computer
graphics is also helpful. The forensic accountant’s findings often include quantitative
analyses that are conducive to presentation in the form of graphs and charts that depict and
summarize the information. Typical graphs and charts include summaries of the source and
use of funds, as well as flow charts showing the movement of assets at various times.

9.3.2 Ethics
Independence and Objectivity
Independence and objectivity are integral concepts in the ethical training of CPAs. While
the need for these attributes is well established in the audit area, they are extremely
important in investigative work. The forensic and investigative accountant is not an
advocate; rather, he or she provides the skills and input of an independent expert. Even a
bias with respect to a single, small matter—whether actual or perceived—may call into

20

Chapter Nine: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud

question in the eyes of the court other unbiased evidence presented by the forensic
accountant. He or she must therefore report objectively at all times.
Respect for Access to Information and Privacy Laws
One factor that must not be overlooked in the role of investigator is that the information
that is gathered must be collected in an ethical and legal manner. One cannot misrepresent
one’s self when gathering information, nor can the process of collecting information be
abused.
Most important, the rights of an individual whose activities are being reviewed must not be
abused.

9.3.3 Kinds of Services Offered
Proactive versus Reactive Services
Forensic accounting services can be proactive or reactive. Proactive services include
training on fraud awareness and fraud prevention measures, presented elsewhere in this
Handbook. Reactive services are investigative and analytical in nature and are rendered
after the event. Much of the information in this chapter addresses reactive services.
Civil versus Criminal Services
Another way to identify the kinds of services that a forensic accountant renders is to
consider the forum in which a dispute is finally resolved. For example:

• A criminal forum must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• A civil case has a less onerous burden of proof than a criminal case. The trier of the facts
must reach his or her conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence.
• A nonjudicial tribunal, for instance, an alternative dispute resolution proceeding
(arbitration) can differ from a court of law by being either stricter or more lenient.
• Finally, if the circumstances are such that no reference is made to an outside tribunal,
but rather two parties are to resolve a matter on their own, then the level of proof
required is only what the other side will accept.

Other Categorizations
Services of a forensic accountant can also be categorized in other ways, for example by the
type of procedures performed. These procedures can include—
• Performing an initial review of documentation to determine whether further research or
investigation is required or necessary.
• Providing an affidavit or deposition outlining the results of a review of documentation.
• Providing a report identifying the scope of the work performed and findings.
• Assisting counsel in obtaining a search warrant (that is, in a criminal case).
• Providing expert testimony in court.

The nature of the industry in which a forensic accountant is performing an investigation can
be another method of classification. For example:
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• Service industries could include transportation, banking, securities brokerage, retail, real
estate, construction, professional services (such as services of CPAs and lawyers),
mortgage brokerage, and telecommunications.
• Manufacturing industries could include construction, farming, food processing, all forms
of manufacturing, mining, petroleum, and publishing.

The above classifications could then be further refined, and others added. For example,
government and nonprofit sectors are other areas where forensic accountants are called
upon to provide their services.

9.4 Checklist: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
CPAs can use the following checklist when dealing with a known or suspected fraud in their
organizations or in those of their clients. No answers may require investigation and follow-up,
the results of which should be documented. Use the
column to cross-reference the
checklist to the appropriate work papers.

The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If fraud is of vital
concern to an organization or if serious fraud is suspected, seek the advice of legal counsel and
a CPA experienced in fraud investigation.
Table 9.1 Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud Checklist
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

1. Planning

a. Has the main scenario of the fraud been established, including
the sources of information pointing to fraud (that is,
accounting irregularities, physical evidence, or incriminating
information)?

b. Have immediate areas of concern been identified, such as the
need to protect assets from further damage (for example, by
boosting security) and to preserve key evidence for further
investigation (e.g., by removing the key suspect from the
scene, through a leave of absence or other appropriate
means)?
c. Have legal and other constraints been identified, (that is, the
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement) and has
legal counsel been consulted?
d. Has a preliminary assessment been made to determine:

• The quality of the information currently available
• Additional information that is needed

• How to obtain the information
e. Have the nature and scope of the investigation been defined,
including:
___________________
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• The main objective(s)
• Whether (and when) to pursue criminal charges

• The level of secrecy required

• Administrative matters (for example, engagement letters; or
if external forensic accountants are used, budgets)
2. Evidence Gathering

a. Has a detailed list been prepared of the evidence that is to be
obtained or seized?
b. Have all sources of evidence been considered (for example,
books and records, documents, correspondence, public
domain information, background financial information and
personnel history, etc.)?

c. When evidence is obtained, is it assessed for:

• Relevance
• Alternative interpretations (for example, simple error)
• Eventual use and admissibility (for example, as court
evidence)

d. Are proper evidence-handling procedures in effect, (for
example, taking photocopies; not writing on, altering, stapling
or unstapling originals)?

e. Especially for larger investigations, has evidence been
categorized in a way that will facilitate its future retrieval and
use?
f. Has the nature, timing and scope of any interviews (especially
of suspects) been carefully considered?

g. Are interviews conducted by or with trained and experienced
interviewers, with appropriate safeguards to prevent bogus
harassment or other charges (for example, safeguards could
include leaving the door ajar during interviews and having
assistants interrupt at predetermined times)?
h. When appropriate, has the use of reputable private
investigators been considered?

i. For any evidence to be seized, does the search warrant or
court order have the proper scope so that all of the required
evidence falls within its reach?
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected
Fraud Checklist

j. Especially for larger investigations, have computer databases
and other appropriate tools been used to store and cross
reference evidentiary materials?
k. Has security over all evidence been established, including, if
appropriate, off-site storage of copies (electronic, paper, or
both) for key evidence and documents?

3. Analyzing and Testing
a. Has all evidence been systematically analyzed?

b. Were appropriate conclusions drawn?
c. Has the evidence been thoroughly checked and tested and
reviewed with legal counsel to ensure it is up to court
standards?

4. Reporting and Testifying
a. Has a forensic accountant prepared a well-organized,
unambiguous report, summarizing the findings of the
investigation?
b. Has the report undergone a quality-control review?
c. Has adequate preparation been done for testifying in court,
including a full run-through?
d. Is the person giving the testimony experienced, and if
necessary, has he or she previously qualified as an expert?

e. For expert witnesses, have fairness and impartiality, and the
appearance of such, been present throughout the process (for
example availability to both sides)?
5. Case Resolution

a. Has a plan and process been put into effect to seek and
enforce restitution from perpetrators?

b. Have controls and procedures been put into place to prevent a
recurrence?
c. Have channels of communication been kept open and other
appropriate steps taken to maintain good employee relations
and mitigate any other adverse effects of the crisis?
d. Has a program been established to monitor the results of the
above on an ongoing basis? __________________________
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CHAPTER 10:
Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud

10.1

The Pervasive Nature of Financial Statement Fraud

10.1.1 Overview
Financial statement fraud involves the alteration of financial statement data, usually by a
firm’s management, to achieve a fraudulent result. These altered financial statements are
the tools then used by a company’s managers to obtain some reward.1 The reward may
consist of direct compensation such as receiving a bonus that otherwise would not be paid
without using altered, incorrect financial data to embellish management’s operating
performance. On the other hand, the compensation may be less direct in that managers
avoid being fired for failing to achieve promised results. Compensation may also be
indirect; for example, management may use fraudulent financial statements to raise
additional capital that, in turn, allows a firm to expand and presumably enhance the value
of shares held by management.

10.1.2 What Constitutes Financial Statement Fraud?
What constitutes financial statement fraud has been the subject of much debate because the
lines between fraud and discretion are not always clear. It is easy to define fraud as a
conscious effort by management to produce financial statements with materially wrong
account data. It is almost as easy to identify as fraud misleading accounting entries that
management cannot justify under any applicable accounting standards. Fraudulent acts
become less obvious, however, when cloaked in the mantle of accounting standards that are
incorrectly applied. For example, the applicable accounting standard in the United States is
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and those principles may allow
management some discretion as to when to recognize revenue or expenses.

Honorable people can debate the most appropriate use of a principle when looking at the
gray or more broadly permissive areas of GAAP. Less-than-honorable people, however,
might make use of these gray areas to produce financial statements that mislead. This
practice is found most often in concert with other misleading applications of GAAP.
Fraudsters almost always fail to discuss this choice of GAAP principles in the notes to
financial statements.1
2 Without knowledge of the impact of GAAP gray-area judgments on
the financial statements, unsuspecting readers may mistakenly assume that revenues and
1 In this chapter, the term company refers to any legal or business entity that prepares financial statements,
including partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations.
2 Failure to disclose would be a GAAP violation; therefore, although the accounting for a certain transaction
may appear to be supported by GAAP, failure to disclose so as not to make the financial statements
misleading takes the company out of GAAP compliance.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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expenses were accrued in a manner consistent with prior financial statements when, in fact,
they were not. The end result may be that continuing operations appear to be profitable
while, in reality, there may be serious problems that the misuse of GAAP gray areas can
cover up for a short period of time. Thus, when accounting decisions purportedly in
conformity with GAAP produce financial statements intentionally3 designed to mislead the
reader, those decisions cross the line into fraud.

10.1.3 SEC Definition of Fraud
These concepts are codified in the U.S. securities laws and regulations, especially Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-54, which states the following.

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,

(a)

to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b)

to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c)

to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

Publicly traded companies must conform to GAAP and to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC under U.S. securities laws. The SEC drew heavily on accounting
literature when it recently addressed the issue of accounting gray areas. SEC standards
(discussed below) that have their origin in GAAP will provide substantial guidance to
determine financial statement fraud not only for publicly traded companies but also for all
firms issuing financial statements in conformity with GAAP.

10.1.4 Common Methods of Committing Financial Statement Fraud
Research carried out for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission (COSO),5 found the most common kinds of fraud were the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Overstatement of earnings
Fictitious earnings
Understatement of expenses
Overstatement of assets
Understatement of allowances for receivables

3 As with proving any type of fraud, one must show that there was scienter, meaning that the fraudster knew
that his or her actions were designed to mislead.
4 Promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
5 Mark S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson. Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997: An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies, published by COSO, 1999.
4

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Chapter Ten: Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud

6. Overstatement of the value of inventories by not writing down the value of obsolete
goods
7. Overstatement of property values and creation of fictitious assets

The following sections discuss the various kinds of financial statement fraud and the
corresponding motives for each kind, the early indicators of financial statement fraud (both
quantitative and qualitative) and the means to detect some of the most difficult-to-find kinds
of fraud. At the end of this chapter, there is a checklist that addresses internal control issues
designed to provide help in reducing the risk of financial statement fraud.

10.2 Kinds of and Motives for Financial Statement Fraud
Three Main Problem Areas
We will approach financial statement fraud looking at the following three broad areas:
1. Earnings manipulation

2. Earnings management
3. Balance-sheet manipulation
Financial statement fraud generally falls into one or more of the above categories.

10 .2.1 Earnings Manipulation
Earnings manipulation is the direct alteration of accounting data for the purpose of
fraudulently changing reported net income. For example, booking a sale that clearly does
not meet the requirements for revenue recognition increases revenues. Conversely,
capitalizing marketing costs as an asset, contrary to guidance in GAAP, decreases current
period expenses. Notice also that both examples affect the balance sheet as well:
recognizing fictitious sales would inflate accounts receivable; deferring marketing expenses
creates some type of amortizable asset. Because the primary intent of these manipulations
is, however, to increase earnings rather than create assets, these practices are classified as
“Earnings Manipulation.”

Motives for Earnings Manipulation
The motives for earnings manipulation usually stem from the need to report higher net
income. Management compensation agreements, for instance, may require the achievement
of some absolute level of net income or an increase in net income over some benchmark in
order to trigger bonus payments. Pressure to increase “shareholder value” may provide
another motive to create earnings increases. Because stocks are valued at some multiple of
price to earnings, an increase in earnings usually increases share price even if the multiple
stays constant. If earnings are growing rapidly, the multiple is more likely to expand.
Earnings manipulation may also help support the share price of a publicly traded company
while management and insiders sell their holdings. Such a reprieve may be important if
time restrictions prevented the granting or sale of those shares at an earlier date. Examples
of stock granting or sale restrictions include the following:
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1. Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans that postpone ownership

2. Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers from acquiring shares until
specified dates or the occurrence of specific events
3. SEC Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares that can be sold on U. S.
securities exchanges on a given trading day
4. Income tax provisions that afford more favorable tax treatment to long-term capital gain
on the disposition of shares that meet the holding-period requirements (the restriction
being that the government would receive more of the sale proceeds if the gain from the
disposition of the shares were classified as short-term capital gains)
5. Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding significant blocks of stock past
some event such as an annual shareholders’ meeting before they can be sold
Finally, earnings manipulation may help a company obtain or retain its listing on a stock
exchange. The initial and continued listing requirements of many exchanges provide for
some type of net income test. Although companies failing this test may qualify for initial or
continued listing under other tests such as overall market capitalization, companies whose
share prices have declined sharply in a weak market may find net income manipulation to
be their only hope. Losing an exchange listing may relegate the company to the over-thecounter market where there are no requirements for the presence of a minimum number of
market makers, that is, the securities firms that stand ready to buy or sell shares to maintain
an orderly market in the company’s stock. Without a minimum number of market makers,
investors face the prospect of greatly reduced liquidity. A shareholder wishing to sell his or
her shares risks having to wait a long time for a buyer to come into the market. Therefore, a
listing on a recognized exchange that mandates a minimum number of market makers is an
important benefit to a publicly traded company, a benefit that unscrupulous management
may implement earnings manipulation to retain.

10.2.2 Earnings Management
A subtler variant of earnings manipulation is earnings management. Although both involve
the manipulation of accounting data, the latter attempts to produce reported earnings that
conform to outside expectations. Corporate managements are under more pressure today
than ever before to increase “shareholder value,” that is, the price of the stock. Superstar
analysts raise performance expectations by generating earnings estimates that strongly
influence stock prices. Management, fearing the precipitous decline that can result if
analysts scale back their growth estimates, may believe that the company must massage its
numbers to meet analysts’ expectations.

In this environment, the moral issue of reporting earnings that truly measures the
company’s economic activity is a matter of management intent. The very nature of accrual
accounting leaves open the possibility that management judgment even within GAAP may
be colored by the intent to show the company in the best possible light. Accrual, deferral,
and allocation procedures designed to permit the relation of revenues and expenses, gains,
and losses across periods also allow management considerable leeway as to when to declare
any monies are earned. When, within this process, does discretion become the intent to
deceive? Within what limits should management be acting to permit investors to price the
company’s securities in the market? How much earnings smoothing actually misrepresents
the trend of economic performance as opposed to the irregularities of cash flows? Earnings
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management is fraudulent if improper accounting is used to hide true company
performance. Arthur Levitt, chairman of the SEC, expressed the Commission’s concern
about this subject in a speech in 1998.
Flexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business innovations. Abuses
such as earnings management occur when people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is
employed to obscure actual financial volatility. This, in turn, masks the true
consequences of management’s decisions.6
In SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, (the full text is included at the end of this
chapter), the SEC reviewed the U.S. accounting literature and presented the staff's findings
on earnings management.

Failure to Perform Punishes the Stock Price
Within this range of discretion, the managements of publicly traded companies, especially
growth and high-tech companies, have been under tremendous pressure to perform for the
last two decades from both analysts and investors. Failure to report continued profit growth
has resulted in dramatic punishment to the stock price even if the shortfall is by only a few
cents per share. Even performances that are good by historical standards can cause a price
decline if they are below analysts’ expectations. This kind of market reaction has been an
incentive for companies that are just meeting analysts’ forecasts or even falling slightly
below to show a modest increase in reported profit.

Companies reporting consistently rising earnings are rewarded with high price earnings
(P/E) multiples. As the chain of good quarters extends, the multiple tends to increase and
vice versa. P/E multiples are effectively inverted capitalization rates that have built-in
assumptions for future discount rates applied to expected future cash flows. If earnings grow
steadily from period to period, analysts are better able to predict future earnings. The
market tends to reward a company having a steady growth record with a lower discount
rate that reflects a lower level of uncertainty about future earnings. This lower discount rate
then increases the present value of future earnings and thus makes the stock or claim on
those earnings more valuable.

Managements Regularly Meet Analysts' Forecasts
Recent academic studies have shown the regularity with which managements meet analysts’
forecasts quarter after quarter and the small number of shortfalls. Managements themselves
can influence analysts’ estimates through meetings and other contacts with the result that
the whole earnings estimation process seems to be manipulated. It has also been observed
that analysts with underwriting houses tend to make higher growth forecasts than
independent analysts.
It is hard to resist the conclusion that managements are often driven to massage the earnings
components. Their bonuses are tied to operational performance and their stock options are
tied to stock price performance. In addition, their overall performance will determine
accessibility of capital for their companies. A good earnings report can improve the terms
of a security offering to the benefit of both the firm and its management. The fact that
shares of firms making seasoned equity offerings under-perform during the years
6 Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game,” a speech presented to the New York University Center for Law and
Business, Sept. 28, 1998. Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt .
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immediately following the offering suggests that accruals were maximized in the year of the
offering and earnings were allowed to deteriorate immediately thereafter.

Discovery of earnings manipulation can lead to the dismissal of senior executives, law suits
by shareholders and sharp declines in the price of the company’s stock. Other
consequences will be a decline in the number of analysts following the company and an
increase in the number of short sellers.7

Four Main Kinds of Earnings Management
SEC Chairman Levitt focused on the following four main fraudulent practices used to
enhance earnings.
Big Bath Restructuring Charges. Big bath restructuring charges are the large one-time charges
associated with a restructuring. Management may take a big bath charge on the assumption
that the company stock price will get pummeled whether the restructuring charge is large or
small. Using that logic (which may be correct), management opts for the big charge by
establishing large reserves for shutting down operations or shifting operations to other
areas. If the reserve estimates are too big and actual expenses do not consume all the
reserves, management can later reverse the unused portion back into income. As an added
bonus, the reversal back to income may occur at a time when earnings need a boost
because of disappointing current operating results. Hence, Chairman Levitt observed that
overestimation can leave charges that are “miraculously reborn as income when estimates
change or future earnings fall short.”
Writeoffs. After one company acquires another, research and development (R&D) work
performed in one or both of the companies may be redundant because of a change in
corporate direction under the new management. For that reason, companies may write off
some in-process R&D projects that have yet to be expensed because they do not fit into the
new corporate plans. A number of companies, however, have taken advantage of the
opportunity to write off substantial amounts of in-process R&D, by applying a principle
similar to the big bath restructuring charge. Management believes that the company can
take a large, one-time hit to earnings without further hurting its stock price when the
financial community is already expecting some writeoffs because of the acquisition. By
taking the writeoff at the time of the acquisition, these R&D expenses will not weigh on
future earnings.

CookieJar Reserves. Fraudulent managers tend to cloak their deception in an accounting rule,
although in reality the accounting rule is not properly applied or other accounting rules are
broken. The use of loss reserves is a good example of the abuse of a GAAP principle in
order to manage the final earnings figure. In a calendar quarter in which a company
expects to out-perform market expectations, it might create a reserve for future losses on
such items as long-term contracts to create the effect of lowering earnings closer to the
market consensus forecast. Then, in a future quarter, after the company has predicted that it
will not make enough income to meet market expectations, management can reverse out
some of the reserves on the grounds that future contract losses no longer appear probable.

7 For an excellent survey, discussion, and bibliography of the academic and practitioner literature on this
broad topic, see Patricia M. Dechow and Douglas J. Skinner, “Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views
of Accounting Academics, Practitioners and Regulators,” Accounting Horizons, June 2000, pages 235-250.
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On the surface and viewed in isolation, the creation and reversal of the loss reserves may
appear unrelated to earnings expectations. GAAP provides for the booking of loss
contingencies in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 5, Accountingfor Contingencies, provided the loss contingencies are
both quantifiable and probable. In reality, however, the possibility of losses on future
contracts most likely existed prior to the establishment of the reserve and continued to exist
after the reserve was reversed into income. The reserves then become an accounting artifice
used by management to manage earnings to meet market expectations. Moreover,
management violated GAAP, in this example, either by creating the reserve without
justification or reversing the reserve without any change in the degree of risk that the loss
would in fact occur. Such reserves are known as cookie jar reserves because management can
reach into the cookie jar and pull them into income whenever the need arises.
Materiality. Underlying the discussion of financial statement fraud to this point is the
assumption that the accounting manipulations cited are all material in that the
manipulations significantly change the information presented in the financial statements.
Much of the accounting literature contains provisions that except immaterial amounts from
a given accounting standard. However, the evolution of the definition of materiality has
introduced another element of judgment into determining whether or not there is fraud.

Fortunately, the SEC decided to weigh in on this matter when it issued SAB 99 (the full text
is included at the end of this chapter), which helped clarify some of the key materiality
concepts. One of those issues the SEC addressed head on was the use of quantitative
materiality to waive accounting violations. A blind application of quantitative materiality
essentially looks at the monetary amount of an accounting entry (or series of entries) that
was indefensibly improper. If the amount were less than some arbitrary standard such as
five percent of net income, neither management nor company auditors would insist on
changing that entry even though it blatantly violated accounting standards. The SEC said
that although quantitative standards may serve as a starting point for investigating potential
accounting irregularities, relying exclusively on an arbitrary percentage to avoid application
of appropriate accounting standards has no basis in accounting literature (or in U.S.
securities laws).

The FASB in 1980 issued Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative
Characteristics ofAccounting Information, which addressed materiality as follows.
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the
light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is
probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would
have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.8
In other words, materiality is viewed from the standpoint of the reader of financial
statements. If the correction of an erroneous accounting item would probably cause the
reader to come to a conclusion different from the conclusion reached upon reading the
uncorrected statement, then the item is material. Prior to the release of FASB Concepts
Statement No. 2, the U.S. Supreme Court, in reviewing a securities case involving
materiality issues, ruled that a fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the . . .
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
8 FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics ofAccounting Information, paragraph 132.
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‘total mix’ of information made available.”9 Therefore, both accounting literature and the
U.S. Supreme Court look to the reader or user of the financial statements and ask whether
it is probable or substantially likely that the reader would have come to a different
conclusion. If the answer is yes, then the item in question is material.

10.2.3 Balance-Sheet Manipulation
In addition to the creation of fictitious accounts receivable and improper capitalized
expenses as discussed above, management can also manipulate assets. The value of a
company can be misrepresented by any of the following:

1. Recording as purchases certain transactions for which title has not passed
2. Using improperly extended depreciation of useful lives

3. Failing to write down or write off useless assets
Management may inflate inventory by failing to bring the correct amount into cost of sales,
a practice that has the added fraudulent benefit of inflating gross profit and earnings as well.
Finally, management may manipulate capitalized acquisition costs through improper
purchase price accounting, a practice described in detail in Section 10.4.2, “Kinds of and
Motives for Financial Statement Fraud,” herein.
Management manipulates liabilities by failing to record amounts owed to others or by
keeping debts off the books. Management can also attempt to classify liabilities, especially
loans to shareholders, as equity.

The motives for balance-sheet manipulation usually relate to reporting requirements
established by lenders and regulators who tend to focus more heavily on balance-sheet
items. A bank loan covenant, for example, may require a certain amount of shareholders’
equity, a maximum debt-to-equity ratio, and/or a minimum current ratio. If the borrowing
company’s balance-sheet accounts violate the loan covenants, the company may be in
default under the terms of the loan and subject to accelerated repayment of the loan or be
precluded from any future loan advances. To make matters worse, a publicly traded
company probably would have to report to securities regulators that it was in default under
its loan covenants and as a consequence, suffer a decline in its stock price. Similarly,
companies in regulated industries such as insurance and banking must maintain certain
amounts of capital to meet regulatory requirements. Failure to do so may result in sanctions
or even closure by the regulators. Therefore, motives for balance-sheet manipulation, while
perhaps being more case-specific than those discussed previously for earnings fraud,
nonetheless pose a real threat to accounting integrity.

10.2.4 Reducing the Risk of Fraud in Closely Held Companies
Much of this chapter focuses on publicly traded companies for two reasons. First,
information about frauds committed in these entities is readily available. Second, regulators
have been in the forefront of both the detection and the reduction of risk of fraud in
publicly traded companies. Closely held private companies, however, can equally well
experience every type of fraud discussed here; only the motives and timing are slightly
different. Although the management of closely held companies might not have to worry
9 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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about securities analysts’ expectations, outside shareholders may demand better earnings
performance. These demands might lead management to employ any of the earnings
manipulation schemes discussed above. Of course, if management bonuses are a function of
increased earnings, there is a motive for earnings manipulation regardless of whether the
company is publicly traded or not. If the outside investors are passive, the moment of
performance assessment will most likely be the end of the fiscal year. Management of
public companies, on the other hand, may feel pressure to hit targets quarterly when they
have to report to regulators.
The need to value shares in a closely held company may also give rise to earnings
management. If shares are being valued for sale or any other purpose, such as collateral for
a bank loan to a major shareholder, earnings management may be employed to achieve the
appearance of a steady rise in earnings. This misleading rise in earnings could induce an
appraiser or stock valuations specialist to assign a higher growth rate to projected earnings.
It is just as likely, however, that the appearance of consistently rising earnings could suggest
the use of a lower firm-specific risk premium to calculate the present value of that projected
earnings stream since earnings would appear to be less volatile. The end result of earnings
management in a closely held company is thus similar to the effect of earnings management
on the P/E multiple of publicly traded companies.
For a closely held company, reducing fraud in the financial statements starts with requiring
that financials presented to the board of directors and to outsiders be in conformity with
GAAP. The timing of cash flows in cash-basis accounting can lead to the manipulation of
financial statements.1011
Accrual-basis accounting looks to economic events to determine
whether a debt is incurred or whether revenue is earned; the time of the occurrence of
those events may be quite different from when cash is paid or received. What limits the
possibility for fraud in accrual-basis accounting is the reduced opportunity to hide a debt or
record unearned revenue since the standards of recognition are more explicit than those for
cash-basis accounting.

It is difficult for both publicly held and closely held companies to communicate with
outsiders such as lenders and investors without producing GAAP-based financial
statements. In a sense, GAAP is the common financial language of the United States
because it contains a set of rules and standards developed and tested over many years that
are known to readers of financial statements. Certain foreign firms whose shares are not
traded on U.S. exchanges may use local accounting standards or International Accounting
Standards (IAS) for domestic reporting but would find raising capital in the United States
problematic without translating those statements into GAAP.11
Additional fraud reduction measures include the implementation of internal controls
discussed in Section 1.3 of this handbook and promoting an ethical environment, as
covered in Chapter 2. For middle-market firms,12 meaning, those with annual revenues of
$10 million or more, the findings of the COSO, discussed in Section 10.3.2, “Qualitative
10 For that reason, U.S. tax laws generally require corporations to report on an accrual basis when gross
receipts exceed an average of $5 million per year over the prior three tax years.
11 Indeed, if a foreign firm raises capital through the U.S. securities markets, it is required to issue financial
statements in conformity with GAAP.
12 Middle market is a term used by bankers to segment their lending markets, and that term is used here
because closely held firms frequently interact with banks on matters involving their financial statements.
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Predictors,” below, are especially applicable since research conducted for the COSO found
that smaller companies were more susceptible to fraud.

The importance of financial statement fraud reduction measures increases directly with
company size. For a very small company, fraudulent financial statements that slightly inflate
earnings or assets could be used to secure a bank loan or small investment but little else.
Steps taken to prevent fraud at that level should reflect the potential for damages resulting
from such misstatement. For larger, middle-market companies or small companies
fraudulently representing themselves as larger companies, potential damages are more
serious; steps taken to reduce fraud should therefore be more visible and systematic. For
example, a middle-market company should implement reviews of internal controls at least
once a year by outside CPAs and more frequently by internal accounting staff. If budgets
allow, a significant fraud-reduction measure would include hiring an internal auditor, who is
a CPA, to assess the effectiveness of the controls of each business unit. Assessments of the
adequacy of internal controls would help significantly with early fraud detection.

The reporting of irregularities to independent board members is one of the most important
fraud-prevention measures available to closely held companies. The opening of such a
formal reporting channel increases the likelihood that corrective action will be taken.
Without such a reporting channel, management, even if not directly involved in a fraud,
might be inclined to sweep the problem under the rug for fear of reprisal or
embarrassment. If the closely held firm has no outside directors (see Section 10.3.2 for a
discussion of the independence of outside directors), a significant step to reduce the risk of
fraud would be the appointment of such director(s).
10.3 Predictors of Financial Statement Fraud

Warning Signs
Faced with the apparent pervasiveness of earnings and balance-sheet falsification, the
problem for the CPA is to find any warning signs suggesting the risk of fraud may be
present. A number of recent studies (to be discussed in more detail below) have suggested a
group of indicators which, when taken together, give the generic profile of a company at
risk of fraud.13
The most typical fraud company is not listed on any of the major public stock exchanges. It
has assets below $100 million and is experiencing losses, barely breaking even or reporting
a small profit. The trend of net income is not an indicator since fraud can be committed to
hide losses or preserve profits. Internal audit controls are weak or nonexistent. This can be
attributed in part to the total absence of an audit committee or the presence of a weak one
made up of financially unsophisticated directors meeting as infrequently as only once a
year. More than 50 percent of the board of directors are insiders or “gray” directors,
meaning, members with a large equity ownership or family, business, or other connection
to the company or its board members. Few directors are on the boards of other companies
and, therefore, the level of general business experience on the fraud company’s board is
often quite low. Officers frequently hold incompatible positions such as chief executive
13 This portrait is drawn from Dechow and Skinner, and Levitt cited above, and important reports issued
recently by the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NYSE/NASD)
and COSO to be cited and discussed in Section 10.3.2 below.
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officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) simultaneously. Finally, there usually is a
change of CPA for the fraud period.

10.3.1 Quantitative Predictors
Messod D. Beneish, an associate professor at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana
University, has tried to develop quantitative fraud warning signs by analyzing a series of
ratios that might be used as predictors when seen as a pattern of irregularity on the books of
a given company.14 This model would distinguish manipulated from unmanipulated
earnings within the definition of earnings manipulation as a violation of GAAP. Beneish
studied seventy-four companies identified as earnings manipulators by the SEC or the
media for the period 1982 to 1992.

Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies
The typical manipulator in Beneish’s study was a young, rapidly growing manufacturing
company (see table 10.1). As a group, they were smaller in terms of assets or sales, less
profitable, more leveraged and growing faster than Beneish’s control (presumably
nonmanipulating) companies but with similar market capitalizations. Companies with poor
prospects were more likely to commit financial statement fraud. Earnings manipulation
typically occurred by recording fictitious revenues or inventory, unearned or uncertain
revenues, or capitalizing costs improperly.
Table 10.1 Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies Fiscal Year Prior
to Public Disclosure (1982-1992)
Manipulators

Non-Manipulators

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

$467.33

$43.20

$1,140.37

$ 95.84

Sales

469.87

53.56

1,295.22

122.54

Market Value

323.72

74.90

813.35

64.59

Working Capital to
Total Assets

0.26

0.28

0.30

0.31

Current Ratio

2.54

1.83

2.54

2.11

Total Debt to
Total Assets

0.58

0.58

0.51

0.52

-1%

3%

3%

5%

58

34
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Characteristics

Size (millions)
Total Assets

Liquidity/Leverage

Profitability/Growth
Return on Assets
Sales Growth

14 Messod D. Beneish, “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,” Financial AnalystsJournal (24)
September/October 1999, pages 24-36.
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Ratio and Index Analysis
Beneish identified a group of financial statement variables that capture actual earnings
manipulation or indicate the potential for manipulation. Of that group, the Quantitative
Financial Statement Fraud Indicators (see table 10.2), which are described in the following
sections, generate statistically meaningful results.
Days’ Sales in Receivables Index. The days’ sales in receivables index (DSRI) is the year-overyear comparison of the annual receivables/sales ratio taken as a ratio. This ratio like all the
other ratios in this study should be 1:1. If receivables are beginning to become large in
relation to sales, fraudulent sales practices may be being put into place. After allowing for
external factors, such as a more liberal credit policy that could have resulted in increased
sales, an exceptionally large increase in receivables relative to sales might suggest revenue
manipulation.

Gross Margin Index. The gross margin index (GMI) is the year-over-year comparison of gross
margins taken as a ratio. If the GMI is greater than one, gross margins have weakened.
Since the year-over-year deterioration of the gross margin is one of the most important
signals of worsening prospects for the company, a GMI of greater than 1 is a red flag that
financial statement manipulation may be about to occur.

Asset Quality Index. Asset quality is the ratio of noncurrent assets exclusive of property, plant
and equipment to total assets in any given year. The asset quality index (AQI) ratio
measures the proportion of assets whose power to produce future earnings is less certain.
The higher the proportion of these intangibles to total assets, the greater the risk to future
earnings growth. The AQI is the year-over-year comparison of these annual figures taken as
a ratio. An AQI greater than one indicates that more costs are being capitalized and thus
deferred and the door has been left open to earnings manipulation.

Sales Growth Index. The sales growth index (SGI) is the year-over-year comparison of sales
taken as a ratio. Mere sales growth does not necessarily imply manipulation. Nevertheless,
if a young growth company is under pressure from analysts, underwriters, and banks to
show continuing sales increases to support the stock price, the possibility of manipulation is
definitely present. Any dramatic increase in the SGI should alert the CPA to possible
problems.
Total Accruals to Total Assets. The total accruals to total assets (TATA) is the year-over-year
comparison of total accruals and total assets taken as a ratio in which total accruals are
defined as the change in working capital accounts other than cash less depreciation. The
presence of higher accruals, that is, less cash, is likely to be associated with earnings
manipulation.
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Table 10.2 Calculation of the Quantitative Financial Statement Fraud
Indicators*
Notation: Current-year income statement and balance-sheet items are indicated with a subscript t
and prior year items have a t-1 subscript. The change in account balances from one year end to the
next year end is denoted by A.

Days’ Sales in Receivables Index =
(Accounts Receivablet / Salest) / (Accounts Receivablet-1 / Salest-1)

Gross Margin Index =

[(Salest-1 - Cost of Salest-1) / Salest-1] / [(Salest- Cost of Salest) / Salest]

Asset Quality Index =
1 - [(Current Assetst + Net Fixed Assetst) / Total Assetst]

1 - [(Current Assetst-1+ Net Fixed Assetst-1) / Total Assetst-1]

Sales Growth Index =

Salest / Salest-1

Total Accruals to Total Assets =

ΔWorking Capital - ΔCash - ΔCurrent Taxes Payable - Depreciation and amortization,

Total Assets,

1 Adapted from Beneish, The Detection ofEarnings Manipulation, Financial Analysts Journal,
September/October, 1999.
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Look for the Pattern
Because of the interconnectedness of income and balance-sheet accounts, no single ratio
should be taken in isolation as an indicator of manipulation. It is the pattern that counts,
both among the accounts of one reporting period and over several periods. The broader the
pattern, the greater the likelihood of earnings manipulation. But care should be taken that
unusual ratios cannot be accounted for by acquisitions, shifts in strategy, or changes such as
improving economic conditions and other normal business events.

The findings indicate that manipulators (see table 10.3) exhibit certain financial-statement
characteristics that are detectable and different from nonmanipulators. The year-over-year
change in days’ sales in receivables, for example, was about 3 percent for nonmanipulators
but over 46 percent for manipulators. Manipulators showed an increase of about 42 percent
in days’ sales in receivables in sales over the average change for the nonmanipulator peer
group. The other indexes demonstrate similar though smaller increases for manipulators
over nonmanipulators. The TATA, however, was markedly different between the two
groups. The TATA measure, which reflects noncash working capital to total assets,
probably picked up the increases in receivables that typically accompany revenue
manipulation.
Table 10.3 Means Analysis of Manipulators and Nonmanipulators in the
Estimation Sample* *

Characteristic
Measures

Manipulators Nonmanipulators
Mean
Mean

Difference

Manipulators
Percent Increase
over
Nonmanipulators

DSRI

1.465

1.031

0.434

42.1%

GMI

1.193

1.014

0.179

17.7%

AQI

1.254

1.039

0.215

20.7%

SGI

1.607

1.134

0.473

41.7%

TATA

0.031

0.018

0.013

72.2%

**Adapted from data provided in Beneish.

These characteristic measures provide a quick and easy means of detecting the possibility of
financial statement fraud. They are indicators and do not by themselves prove fraud. CPAs,
however, are required to implement Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82,
Consideration ofFraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 316),15 may want to consider including these characteristic measures in their financial
statement analyses. Also, as an internal control, an internal auditor or controller could
apply these measures when reviewing financial information from subsidiaries and divisions.
An increase in any of the characteristic measures in the magnitude indicated in the above
table should trigger additional inquiries. Such inquiries may very well head off an incipient
fraudulent scheme.
15 Chapter 1 of this handbook discusses the auditor’s duty to detect fraud in detail.
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10.3.2 Qualitative Predictors
Internal Work Environment and Corporate Governance
The board of directors is a group of persons elected by the shareholders to represent them
at the highest level of corporate decision making and to monitor the work of management.
A report published in 1999 for the NYSE and NASD by the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) says explicitly that “the
board must perform active and independent oversight to be, as the law requires, a fiduciary
for those who invest in the company.”16 The board must be committed to the principles of
transparency and full disclosure and, one might add, to full compliance with GAAP and the
regulations of the appropriate regulatory bodies. If the board understands its independent
role, then it is likely the audit committee, a creature of the board, will also do its duty.
Companies proven to be earnings manipulators tend to be those with no audit committee
or a very weak and compromised one. About a quarter of all companies subject to SEC
enforcement action did not have audit committees.
The report sees the role of the audit committee as follows.
The committee’s job is clearly one of oversight and monitoring,
and in carrying out this job it acts in reliance on senior
financial management and the outside auditors. A proper and well-functioning
system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible
for financial reporting—the full board including the audit committee,
financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside
auditors—form a “three-legged stool” that supports responsible
financial disclosure and active and participatory oversight.

Characteristics of a Good Audit Committee
The BRC made numerous recommendations for the effective working of a good audit
committee. Despite the fact that the BRC’s mandate was to make recommendations for the
conduct of audit committees of companies big enough to be listed on the NYSE or the
National Association of Security Dealers and Quotation Analysts (NASDAQ), many of the
principles would apply equally well to smaller, private companies.
The foundation of a good audit committee is the independence of its members. Recent
studies have shown a direct correlation between audit committee independence and better
monitoring and a lower incidence of financial statement fraud. The BRC defines
independence as follows.
Members of the audit committee shall be considered independent if they have no
relationship to the corporation that may interfere with the exercise of their
independence from management and the corporation. Examples of such
relationships include:

• A director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the
current year or any of the past five years;

16 Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 1999. Available
at http://www.nyse.com/ and http://www.nasdaqnews.com/.
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• A director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its
affiliates other than compensation for board service or benefits under a taxqualified retirement plan;
• A director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is,
or has been in any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any
of its affiliates as an executive officer;

• A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or to which the
corporation made, or from which the corporation received, payments that are
or have been significant to the corporation or business organization in any of
the past five years;
• A director being employed as an executive of another company where any of
the corporation’s executives serves on that company’s compensation
committee.
Building on this foundation of independence, the BRC recommends that for listed
companies with capitalization in excess of $200 million, the audit committee should be
composed of a minimum of three financially literate and entirely independent directors.
The audit committee should have a charter approved by the full board describing its
structure and responsibilities. The outside CPA should be accountable to the whole board
of directors. The audit committee should be responsible for the selection of the outside
CPA. The audit committee should have a formal written statement from the outside CPA
describing all relationships between itself and the company. The audit committee should
discuss with the outside CPA all aspects of the effectiveness or lack thereof of the
company’s accounting practices. If the board of directors is weak and the audit committee is
weak or nonexistent, internal controls are likely to be deficient or lacking altogether.

COSO
The COSO, a voluntary private sector organization dedicated to improving the quality of
financial reporting, in its recently published Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997—An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies sought to identify and examine company and management
characteristics in corporations involved in financial statement fraud.17 The COSO examined
about 200 cases from which it drew a number of generalized conclusions about the
governance of fraud companies.
The presence and efficient functioning of internal controls is central to limiting the
opportunities for fraud. Unfortunately, the small size of many companies makes them
unable or unwilling to spend the money for proper controls or to pay for better trained and
more experienced senior executives. These smaller companies are also unlikely to have
strong audit committees capable of monitoring the nebulous but important matter of
pressure on senior executives to report aggressively to meet investment community
expectations or the numbers required to trigger bonuses. The CEO or CFO was involved in
83 percent of the reported fraud cases.

A strong audit committee is an essential element in fraud prevention. Among the fraud
companies surveyed, 25 percent had no audit committee and among those that did, 65
percent of the directors were not certified in accounting or had held no accounting or
17 http://www.coso.org/main.htm .
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financial positions. At the fraud companies, the committee usually met only once a year. (A
pliable, inexperienced, and inattentive board is often the creation of a domineering CEO.
Given the fact that in 83 percent of the reported fraud cases the CEO or CFO was involved,
the combination of a weak board and aggressive leaders could be an indicator of financial
statement fraud.)

The COSO report confirmed the findings of the BRC mentioned above concerning the
need for an independent board of directors. At the fraudulent companies, about 60 percent
of the board members were insiders or “gray” directors, meaning, outsiders with some
family, business, equity, or other tie to the company or its management. About 40 percent
of the boards had no directors serving on the boards of other companies. Directors and
officers owned about a third of the companies’ stock while the CEO or president owned
about 17 percent. In about 40 percent of the companies, there were family relationships
among the directors and officers. About 20 percent showed officers holding incompatible
positions such as CEO and CFO.
The average period during which fraud occurred was 23.7 months and often started with
the misstatement of interim statements. Therefore, it is important to review the controls
surrounding quarterly statement preparation. Because misstatements of accounts often
occur near the period ends, internal controls relating to transaction cutoff and asset
valuation should be tested.

The Boeing Company adopted recommendations from a previous COSO report entitled
Internal Control—Integrated Framework and came up with a list of criteria to be used to
establish an unsatisfactory rating.18 The following sections describe those criteria.
Control Environment. The criteria for the control environment are the following.

• Hard controls are missing or inadequate.

• There are verified instances of breakdowns or soft controls.
Risk Assessment. The criteria for risk assessment are the following.
• Management has not predefined relevant objectives.
• Such objectives are incompatible with broader objectives.

• Management has not identified relevant risks to achieving its objectives.
• Management does not have a basis for determining which risks are most critical.
• Management has not ensured mitigation of critical operating risks.
• Audit tests detect key risks not previously contemplated by management.
Control Activities. The criteria for control activities are the following.

• Key control activities are not functioning as intended.
• Management’s risks mitigation strategy is not adequately reflected within control
activities.

18 Dennis Applegate and Ted Wills, “Struggling to Incorporate the COSO Recommendations into Your
Audit Process? Here’s One Audit Shop’s Winning Strategy,” Internal Auditor, published by The Institute of
Internal Auditors, December 1999, http://www.coso.org/Articles/audit_shop.htm.
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Information and Communication. The criteria for information and communication are the
following.
• Key metrics are not identified, collected, and communicated.
• Employees’ misunderstanding of their control responsibilities is pervasive.
• Customer or supplier complaints and disputes are not resolved or remedial action is not
undertaken in a timely manner.

Monitoring. Management has not established a means of determining the quality of the
internal control system over time either through independent evaluations or ongoing,
structured, and independent process checks.

Overall. The ratings of all components should be considered to determine whether controls
provide reasonable assurance that management objectives will be achieved. Strength in the
internal controls of one component may compensate for a control weakness in another.

Buffalo Chips Inc. Case Study
When the accounts receivable accountant tripped over a box on the Buffalo Chips
loading dock in October 1997, she knew something was wrong at the company.
From the packing slip she recognized a $250,000 order she had invoiced in the
previous quarter. As it turned out, booking revenues before products were shipped
was only one of the fraudulent account practices used at Buffalo Chips to deceive its
CPAs and investors.

In 1979, Buffalo Chips was a small Silicon Valley startup with a promising patent
for semiconductor chips but the company had burned through its venture capital
without bringing a product to market. Soon after Jim Johnson, a former engineer
with defense and electronic-component firms, took over the company for no salary
but 20 percent of the stock, the company became cash positive and had sales of
nearly $2 million. Jim soon acquired the rest of the company. Mel Leeds was
brought aboard in the accounting department and quickly became CFO. Johnson
and Leeds had different personalities but shared a taste for expensive homes, cars,
and golf.
Johnson had built up sales in specialty resistors and capacitors assembled on silicon
chips by trading on his old connections in defense and electronics. Now he was
successful in winning contracts to supply components to major American
companies. Production capacity was increased by taking the company public and
purchasing a microchip manufacturing facility from another producer. By 1987,
revenues topped $30 million and 215 people were on the payroll. As the company
grew, management was under relentless pressure from analysts to expand the P/E
multiple and raise the stock price with a string of quarterly earnings increases.

Johnson was an overbearing manager who insisted on making decisions down to
the level of twenty-five-dollar purchases of office equipment. The turnover of senior
management was high with the result that the average level of executive experience
declined. As early as 1987, product ordered for subsequent quarters was being
shipped to meet current revenue objectives. Phony packing documents were created
20
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and product was stored onsite in empty offices and offsite in garages and elsewhere.
The external CPAs forced the company to restate 1989 earnings to correct “revenue
and expense cutoff errors” and recommended Leeds be fired. Johnson kept him on,
however, but changed Leeds’ title and some of his responsibilities, then raised his
salary. In 1992, a new president tried to correct the situation but without success.
He resigned after five months. The new CFO, Mario Innocente, who had been
unemployed for nearly a year before joining Buffalo, did not.
Johnson told the executive in 1993 he wanted to see double-digit revenue growth
every quarter because he wanted to attract new capital from a prospective partner
and could raise another $40 million through a secondary offering if the stock price
rose from its current $11 to $20. In 1994, Banzai Alloys bought 10 percent of
Buffalo, promised an infusion of $24 million, and agreed to sell Buffalo’s products
overseas. The stock price jumped to $21.25 per share and the value of Johnson’s
holdings increased to $40 million. Leeds sold some of his holdings and netted more
than $500,000. In the meantime, company executives booked bogus sales to both
real and fictitious companies, treated product returns as sales, and produced false
financial reports to deceive CPAs, bankers, and their own board of directors. False
annual reports and 10-Q and 10-K filings were signed off, and misleading
information was given to analysts.
Accounts receivable was now bursting with phony sales. To cover up, Innocente
prepared two accounts receivable reports, one for internal use and the other for the
board and investment bankers. The internal report showed that 51 percent of
receivables were actually current; the outside report showed 82.4 percent. Even
when a board member questioned the peculiar fact that receivables exceeded
quarterly revenues, he was fobbed off with the answer that the Asian distributors
had 180 days to pay and thus their receivable could be booked as current. He did
not know that Asian sales were booked to distributors who had an unconditional
right of return, that is, the products were, in effect, shipped on consignment. Cash
collections fell to 25 percent of the quarterly target.
With the books in such bad shape, a secondary offering was now out of the question
since the financial statements for the first nine months of fiscal 1998 could not
survive an audit. It was initially suggested that $3 million in uncollectable
receivables be written off but, toward the end of the fourth quarter, the amount had
ballooned to $8.3 million. In consultation with Leeds, the new CFO decided to
allocate the writedowns to product returns and bad debts. The writeoff would be
offset by recognizing revenues of $7 million from Banzai as nonproduct technology
sales.
When the figures were published, analysts became suspicious of the $8.3 million
and $7 million figures and began to ask questions about the accounting for
receivables. The stock price dropped to $13 from $22 in one day, and several
shareholders filed lawsuits. A press release from the board of directors explained
the accounting irregularities and the stock continued its downward path to $6.
Johnson, Leeds, and Innocente departed and new CPAs restated a $7.7-million
profit as a $16.6-million loss. Johnson and Leeds were indicted on the criminal
charges of fraud and insider trading and received sentences of thirty-six and thirtytwo months, respectively, and had to pay fines of $100,000 each. Johnson had to
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surrender his 1.5 million shares of Buffalo Chips valued at about $2.5 million in
restitution to shareholders.
Conclusion and Analysis. How did this happen? First of all, the company was led by
Jim Johnson, an ambitious and overbearing CEO, who found a compliant CFO in
Mel Leeds. This proved to be a potent mix of personalities. Johnson had indeed
shown great drive and competence in turning the struggling startup company into a
profitable concern under his leadership. But as the company grew and went public
in order to expand, it came under the scrutiny of Wall Street analysts. Management
was now under pressure to meet analysts’ earnings expectations. It was also
necessary to keep revenues and earnings up in order to attract a new partner and
raise additional capital through a secondary offering. Unfortunately, real revenues
and earnings could not support these ambitions.

As came out in court, the company concocted nearly a dozen revenue recognition
schemes. These included recording revenue on the following:

1. Goods shipped in subsequent quarters
2. Goods shipped before the customer agreed to accept delivery
3. Goods shipped to customers without receiving an order (These sales were not
reversed when the goods were returned.)
4. Shipments held at the freight forwarder or stored offsite, sometimes at the homes
of employees (Company shipping staff had deals with the forwarders to sign off
on the paperwork as if real deliveries had been made.)
5. Goods shipped to fictitious customers
6. Goods shipped to customers with unconditional rights of return, that is, goods
were shipped on consignment and recorded as sales

This scheme was concealed by the creation of a false accounts receivable report for
the board of directors and investment bankers. The bankers and the board were
deceived by the explanation that the high levels of receivables reflected large
shipments made at the end of a quarter. They were not told that a number of sales
were to customers with unconditional rights of return. After the whole scheme
collapsed, forensic CPAs discovered that Buffalo Chips had recorded $38 million in
phony revenue.
The SEC later alleged the CPAs had recklessly failed to comply with generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and had exercised improper professional
conduct in the audit of accounts receivable, inventory, and property. Accounts
receivable were overstated by $10.6 million or 162 percent; inventory was
overstated by $10.2 million or 197 percent; property was overstated by $3.0 million
or 40 percent. When restated, accounts receivable reduced net income by $9.7
million, inventory reduced net income by $9.3 million, and property and
equipment reduced net income by $2.7 million. The SEC alleged that the CPAs had
failed to exercise appropriate professional skepticism, obtain competent evidential
matter, or properly supervise audit personnel. For example, the CPAs did not
examine the writeoff of one third of the accounts receivable balance, an act that
should have signaled to the CPAs that a material misstatement was possible. The
SEC eventually brought Rule 102(e) proceedings against the engagement partner
and manager on Buffalo Chips’ 1994 audit.
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10.4

Special Areas of Financial Statement Fraud
Certain items on a firm’s financial statements appear to be especially vulnerable to fraud.
The following discussion highlights four major fraud-prone areas and the steps that can lead
to early detection:
1. Failure to record loss contingencies and asset writeoffs
2. Manipulation of acquisition reserves
3. Cost shifting to improve current operating results

4. Recognizing fictitious revenue
The common thread running through all these areas is that detection requires the CPA to
look for something not present in the financial statements. CPAs are accustomed to beginning
with a trial balance listing of all accounts and determining the procedures necessary to
complete the audit. An item that does not show up on that trial balance at all, however,
may never come to the attention of the CPA. For instance, in order to detect a failure to
book a loss reserve for a contingent liability, one must first discover the existence of the
contingency. From an auditing perspective, in the case of a failure to record a loss
contingency, there is no loss contingency balance to audit; the accounting entry simply
does not exist. Similarly, using acquisition reserves to hide current period expenses means
that the expense item or category is absent from the income statement and is buried in
some balance-sheet account relating to a prior business combination.
Cost shifting, meaning the movement of expenses from one entity or period to another, is
equally hard to find. If the CPA looks at the accounts for the one business as of a given
date, he or she does not see expenses shunted over to another affiliate or to another time
period. In the case of fictitious revenue, although the CPA does at least have income
statement revenue accounts to examine, the presence of side letters with customers, for
example, which grant those customers the right to return product, does not show up as a
contingency or in the footnotes. In practice, a CPA is not likely to be told that side letters
exist.

Clearly, these are the toughest kinds of financial statement fraud to detect. Nevertheless, for
each fraud discussed above, there may be some warning signs the CPA should look for.
Those red flags may be small in dollar amount but point to significant irregularities. The
following discussion assumes that a certain subset of management has attempted to
manipulate financial data and looks at these issues in the context of audit planning and
execution to determine what additional steps a CPA could take that might lead to detection
of the fraud.19

19 If financial statement fraud is traceable to a significant number of senior managers, the auditor should
consider taking additional steps. For internal CPAs, those steps would include discussions with legal counsel.
Outside CPAs should consider issuing a qualified opinion or, more likely, resigning from the audit
engagement altogether.
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10.4.1 Failure to Record Loss Contingencies and Asset Writeoffs
Loss Contingencies
A loss contingency is defined in FASB Statement No. 5, Accountingfor Contingencies, as “an
existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible ...
loss ... to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events
occur or fail to occur.”20 FASB Statement No. 5 continues to state that the “[r]esolution of
the uncertainty may confirm ... the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a
liability.”21

FASB Statement No. 5 lists examples of loss contingencies that include the following:
1. Collectibility of receivables
2.
3.
4.
5.

Obligations related to product warranties and product defects
Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
Threat of expropriation of assets
Pending or threatened litigation

6. Actual or possible claims and assessments
7. Guarantees of indebtedness of others
8. Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase related property) that have been
sold22
A firm is required to accrue a loss contingency when that contingency is both probable and
able to be estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 states the following.

An estimated loss from a loss contingency . . . shall be accrued by a charge to
income if both of the following conditions are met:
a. Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates
that it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a liability had been
incurred at the date of the financial statements. It is implicit in this
condition that it must be probable that one or more future events will occur
confirming the fact of the loss.
b. The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.23

A future event is probable if it is “likely to occur.”24
Having set the ground rules, we can examine some specific examples in the following
sections.

20 FASB No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, paragraph 1.
paragraph 1.
paragraph 4.
paragraph 8.
paragraph 3. Footnote disclosure of the loss contingency may be required if the future event is less than
probable but is “reasonably possible;” if the chance of a future event is more than remote but less than likely,
FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 10 requires disclosure in the financial statements of the nature of the
contingency and an estimate of the potential loss.
21 Ibid.,
22 Ibid.,
23 Ibid.,
24 Ibid.,
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Warranty and Product Claims Reserves. If a manufacturer experiences post-production
problems with a certain product, it may begin to experience higher-than-expected returns
or, more likely, claims for reimbursement or repair. Those claims may arise under a specific
warranty, under product tort law or under consumer protection laws and regulations. At
this point, the manufacturer must assess its overall cost exposure. It might be possible to
estimate the extent of future claims as a percentage of production based on past experience
with other products subject to similar problems. It might also be possible to estimate the
cost of each claim, meaning, the cost of replacement or repair for each defective unit of
product. If both an estimate of future claims and the cost of each claim are available, then
the amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 would require the
booking of a loss contingency if the future claims were likely to occur. If, however, the
manufacturer is already seeing large numbers of claims prior to or soon after the close of its
financial reporting period,25 it would be reasonable to assume that the likelihood of future
claims is high and that a FASB Statement No. 5 reserve should be accrued with a charge to
current earnings.

However, a manufacturer under pressure to achieve increased earnings may be very
reluctant to accrue a warranty or product claims reserve. Management may take the
position that the problem does not exist or cannot be quantified. But an alert CPA may
detect certain red flags that indicate a problem does indeed exist and that its extent can be
estimated. The red flags that indicate the existence of a contingency include the following:
1. The incidence of claims prior to the issuance of financial statements (discussed above)
2. Discussions with (and bills from) outside legal counsel
3. Internal correspondence within production and research staffs as to the need to address
a critical problem with a product already on the market
4. Internal correspondence among department heads of production, R&D, general
counsel, and senior management about post-production problems and product claims

5. External correspondence between the manufacturer and its customers about a given
product concerning special price concessions or special return privileges
6. The incidence of special or overbudget freight charges to accommodate returns and/or
the shipment of replacement product
7. Shifting of production schedules to manufacture replacement product
8. Halting manufacture of the product in question
9. Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects to applications engineering
relating to redesign of existing products
10. Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to customers on a regular basis
over a period of weeks or months that indicate some arrangement to compensate for
product defects

25 Actually, FASB Statement No. 5 requires the assessment of contingencies arising from “information
available prior to issuance of the financial statements” (emphasis added). Therefore, if claims relating to a prior
period come to the attention of management during the preparation of financial statements for that prior
period, management should consider booking a contingency as of the end of that period.
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Once the existence of a loss contingency has been established or that it is likely to occur,26
the next step is to determine whether the potential loss can be quantified. In this
case, if the firm itself does not have actual experience with product claims or if that
experience is not relevant to the product in question, the CPA should look outside the firm.
Industry statistics on product liability and the incidence of claims are generally available
from trade associations, government regulators, or independent research organizations. In
the course of examining internal correspondence between department heads and within
departments, however, the CPA will likely find some internal estimates of the extent of the
problem. This becomes especially obvious if the correspondents are attempting to justify
the allocation of additional staff and financial resources to combat the problem or to
explain why production was shifted or halted. In short, the members of management not
directly involved in manipulating the financial statements may speak quite frankly about
the loss contingency.

Asset Writeoffs
An asset is not always worth its balance-sheet carrying value. Even if an appropriate
depreciation schedule is established when the asset is acquired, over time the needs of the
business enterprise may change. Because of rapid changes in engineering and materials
applications, for example, manufacturing processes may need to be updated to remain
economically competitive. The machinery used in the old processes may become obsolete
well before the machines themselves actually wear out and are depreciated down to salvage
value. Similarly, changes in customer demand may force a manufacturer to discontinue a
certain product line and render useless equipment specially designed to build that product.
Firms operating in highly competitive markets may lose business to a low-cost competitor
and be forced to idle production lines. Occasionally, in order to obtain or retain a customer
relationship, a firm may even deliberately quote a price for its products that does not cover
the cost of acquiring and operating the equipment used to produce those products. In all
these cases, management should assess whether the equipment carrying value is impaired,
especially if there are no reasonable prospects of finding an alternative use for the
equipment. In the event an impairment loss should be taken, however, management may
fraudulently postpone that charge if it causes earnings to fall below a managed earnings
target.27

To detect this fraud, the CPA must be particularly adept at seeing through management’s
pretensions to get to the facts. The best place to begin is to review fixed assets with
divisional or production personnel. FASB Statement No. 121, Accountingfor the Impairment of
Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of the standard for impairment of long-lived assets, provides
the following list of possible events that may give rise to an impairment:
1. A significant decrease in the market value of an asset

2. A significant change in the extent or manner in which an asset is used or a significant
physical change in an asset
26 For purposes of this discussion, we focus on failure to accrue a probable loss contingency. However,
violations of GAAP (and securities laws if the company files with the SEC) may occur if the firm has a
reasonably possible loss contingency, according to FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 10, but fails to make
the required disclosure of that contingency in its financial statements.
27 In this section, we are discussing asset writeoffs in the course of operations. Acquisition-related writeoffs are
discussed in the previous section entitled “Big Bath Restructuring Charges.”
26
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3. A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the business climate that could affect
the value of an asset or an adverse action or assessment by a regulator
4. An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the amount originally expected to
acquire or construct an asset
5. A current period operating or cash flow loss combined with a history of operating or
cash flow losses or a projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses associated
with an asset used for the purpose of producing revenue28
The CPA may wish to draw questions for firm personnel from this list and look for
evidence of changes in production and product demand to determine whether an asset is
impaired.

Clearly, if equipment has been moved off the shop floor into storage, and there are no
plans for future use of that equipment, an impairment loss is highly likely. The more
difficult issues arise if equipment is still in use but profitability is less certain. Profitability is
at issue if assets may be impaired because FASB Statement No. 121 states that “[i]f the sum
of expected future cash flows (undiscounted and without interest charges) is less than the
carrying amount of the asset, the entity shall recognize an impairment loss....”29 Since most
management reporting systems, however, measure profitability by product line or by
customer, it is hard to imagine how a business could survive in today’s competitive
environment without this information. Indeed, the activity-based costing initiatives begun in
the 1980s were a direct result of the need for management to understand a product’s
contribution to overall firm profitability. Although CPAs may not be accustomed to
reviewing product line profitability reports, these reports source revenues to the costs to
produce them and can answer directly whether a given production process has been
historically profitable.
Historical data are the basis of management plans and profitability forecasts. If the CPA can
obtain such forecasts directly from the personnel with line responsibility for production,
those personnel might be inclined to render a more accurate forecast since they are
unaware of management’s earnings target. One should keep in mind that line managers
may have an incentive to show as positive a picture as possible to avoid a shutdown of
production. Also, line managers may receive hints or outright requests from management to
produce an overly favorable forecast. In either case, however, if the forecasts are
accompanied by written narratives, the narratives will generally list all the downside
possibilities in order to provide political cover for the line manager should events not turn
out as planned.30 The CPA may be able to assess the reasonableness of the forecast given
the known conditions at the time and the likelihood of those downside possibilities.
Proving fraud in a forecast is difficult because a forecast is by its very nature a best guess.31
If that forecast, however, was based on facts known to be incorrect, such as a major
customer’s known unwillingness to buy the product, then the forecast was fraudulently
constructed. A forecast may also become fraudulent if it is used at a later time to justify a
28 FASB Statement 121, Accountingfor the Impairment ofLong-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed
Of paragraph 5.
29 Ibid., paragraph 6.
30 If there are no narratives, the auditor can probably obtain a list of potential downside possibilities simply
by asking the line managers.
31 For a definition of financial forecast, see AICPA Guide for Prospective Financial Statements, §200.04.
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management decision because management knows that significant facts have changed. For
example, a forecast may accurately reflect that, at the time of preparation, there was a
possibility that a certain major customer wanted to buy the product. If, however, by the
balance-sheet date, management knows that the customer is not interested and there are no
alternative buyers, it would be fraudulent to assert that the forecast is still accurate and then
use it to justify not writing down the value of assets used to produce that product.
Another area of asset writeoff that can fall victim to fraud deals with investments in the
nonpublicly traded securities of companies. Such securities are difficult to value because
transaction prices are not publicly available. If the security held is stock and there have
been substantial historical operating losses with little hope of future profitability (meaning,
the decline in value is other than temporary), that stock may be impaired according to
FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities.
Likewise, FASB Statement No. 115 states that for debt:
... if it is possible that the investor will be unable to collect all amounts due
according to the contractual terms of a debt security not impaired at acquisition,
an other-than-temporary impairment shall be considered to have occurred. If the
decline in fair value [of any security is judged to be other than temporary, the cost
basis of the individual security shall be written down to fair value as a new cost
basis and the amount of the write-down shall be included in earnings (that is,
accounted for as a realized loss).32
Without recent prices for the sale of stock and debt in a private company, the CPA might
have to look at financial information from the investee company. The investor, if it holds a
significant position in the investee, should have financial information on file (if not, this
should be a red flag that something may be amiss). Those data would likely include results
of operations that would give historical profitability. For future profit estimates, one should
look to company forecasts and assess the validity of those forecasts based upon known
relationships, if any, between the management of the investor and investee. If there exists
common representation within management or on the boards of both companies, further
inquiry may be necessary to determine the validity of any forecast. Losses over several past
yearsmay be sufficient to establish impairment, as the following case study taken from a
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) demonstrates.

Windpower Inc. Case Study

Windpower Inc., a small private company, began doing research in windmill
production and technology in 1978 with a view to later commercial development.
The following year, the same group of investors established Breezy Valley Energy
Inc. and transferred Windpower’s R&D work to Breezy Valley in 1980. Breezy
Valley reimbursed Windpower $31,308 for work done to date and from then on
Windpower lent Breezy Valley money for R&D. In fact, these loans formed the
primary source of funds for Breezy Valley.

32 FASB Statement No. 115, Accountingfor Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, paragraph 16.
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According to Windpower’s financial statements for the nine months ended March
31, 1981, loans outstanding to Breezy Valley at that date amounted to $108,434. By
the end of the following fiscal year, the aggregate loans totaled $208,146, and by
March 31, 1983, they reached $321,725. In Windpower’s financial statements for
1981 and 1982, the loans are accounted for as a receivable; during fiscal 1983, this
receivable was exchanged for Breezy Valley preferred stock.
In September 1983, Windpower filed a Form S-1 in connection with a proposed $4million initial public offering. In this filing, Windpower’s investment in Breezy
Valley was carried as an asset valued at historical cost rather than written down as
Breezy Valley’s prospects dimmed. Windpower’s investment as reported in its
various forms, represented 62 percent, 77 percent, and 80 percent of total assets at
the end of fiscal years 1981, 1982, and 1983, successively, while cumulative
operating losses increased at Breezy Valley from $118,420 in fiscal 1981 to
$265,542 in 1982 and reached $437,092 by the end of fiscal 1983. Revenues for
Breezy Valley had declined to such a degree that it was bringing in only $1 for
every $7 going out in expenses; future earnings prospects were unattractive because
Breezy Valley seemed unable to market its products.
Conclusion and Analysis. On the grounds of its failure to write down its investment

in Breezy Valley to net realizable value in accordance with GAAP, the SEC
suspended the effectiveness of Windpower’s registration statement for the $4million public offering. Since this case predated the issuance of FASB Statement No.
115, the SEC looked to FASB Statement No. 5 and found that Windpower should
have applied the provisions of FAS 5 which states in paragraph 8 that:

An estimated loss from a loss contingency . . . shall be accrued by a
charge to income if both the following conditions are met:
a) Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements
indicates that it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a
liability has been incurred at the date of the financial statements. It
is implicit in this condition that it must be probable that one or
more future events will occur confirming the fact of the loss.
b) The amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.

Windpower’s financial condition met the requirements of paragraph a) since the
investment in Breezy Valley was impaired and recovery was unlikely because of the
growing losses and limited prospects of generating sales. The requirements of
paragraph b) were also met since the amount of the loss was exactly equal to the
known aggregate amount of the loans. Clearly the impairment requirements of
FASB Statement No. 115, if it had been in effect, were also met.

On the basis of this failure to take account of the reduced value of Windpower’s
investment and the slim prospects of recovery, the SEC instituted proceedings
against Windpower’s CPA and two of its partners for improperly certifying that
Windpower’s financial statements had been prepared according to GAAP and
audited according to GAAS. The SEC accepted Offers of Settlement and
Undertakings from the CPA and its two partners.
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10.4.2 Manipulation of Acquisition Reserves
If one company acquires another using the purchase method of accounting for the
transaction under Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 16, Business
Combinations, the purchase price paid is allocated to the assets of the acquired company
using the fair value of those assets. Any excess of purchase price over the fair value of assets
acquired is booked as goodwill. Liabilities can also be transferred or accrued; those
liabilities assumed by the purchaser effectively increase the amount paid. If, as is usually the
case, the cash portion of the purchase price covers the fair value of assets acquired, then
liabilities assumed over and above the cash paid will increase goodwill.
One type of liability managers of an acquiring company may wish to set up are loss
contingencies as provided under FASB Statement No. 5,33 presumably for potential
problems inherited or created when the target company is acquired. These loss
contingencies or reserves, as they are more commonly known, typically increase the
goodwill paid for the acquired company meaning, the entry establishing the loss
contingency is a credit to a reserve liability and a debit to goodwill. That goodwill is then
amortized into income, usually over a forty-year period. Examples would include reserves
for warranties on discontinued products or reserves for bad debts that would no longer be
serviced as the acquiring company consolidates operations of the target and closes or sells
off unwanted segments. Management may also wish to set up severance reserves for
employee layoffs. If those contingencies later materialize, the expense (debit) of performing
the warranty work, writing off the debt, or paying severance is then taken to the reserve as a
credit balance on the liability section of the balance sheet.
Most important, the expense of a reserved item does not run through the income statement.
Instead, because setting up the reserve itself created or increased goodwill from the
purchase transaction, amortization of the goodwill attributable to the reserve comes into the
income statement but only a small portion, perhaps as little as one-fortieth, is expensed in a
given year. Therefore, establishing the reserve allows management to avoid taking the
entire expense into income in the current period and, by the amortization of goodwill, to
spread that expense over a much longer future time.

Clearly, management has an incentive to reserve as much as possible when making
acquisitions. Moreover, management does not need to attempt to set up all necessary
reserves by the date of the acquisition; FASB Statement No. 38, Accountingfor Preacquisition
Contingencies ofPurchased Enterprises (an Amendment ofAPB Opinion No. 16), provides for a
twelve-month period after the acquisition date to adjust the purchase price. It is here that
management actions need to be carefully reviewed. Without restrictions on the booking of
reserves after an acquisition, the management of an acquiring company could constantly
(and conveniently) create reserves to absorb current losses from an acquired company.

At some point, however, current management must take responsibility for current period
results. The twelve-month cutoff provided in FASB Statement No. 38 is the outside limit;
33 Other accounting literature discussing when and how contingencies can be incurred in connection with a
business combination includes SEC SAB 100 and Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issues Nos. 94-3,
Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit an Activity (Including Certain
Costs Incurred in a Restructuring), and 95-3, Recognition ofLiabilities in Connection with a Purchase Business
Combination.
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the period for adjusting the purchase price should end when management “is no longer
waiting for information that it has arranged to obtain and that is known to be available or
obtainable”34 at the time of the acquisition. Management crosses the line into fraud when it
creates material purchase reserves for losses that were not foreseeable at the time of
purchase, especially if management creates those reserves and adjusts the purchase price
more than twelve months after the purchase date. Likewise, management also commits
fraud when it uses reserves to absorb losses unrelated to the reasons for which the reserves
were established.

Fabulous Deals Inc. Case Study

As a divisional controller was about to go into a budget meeting, the Deal Club
corporate CFO and corporate controller handed him new numbers inflating his
revenue estimates by $200 million. He had already stayed up past midnight
designing fictitious accounts under the corporate controller’s instructions to create
numbers that met analysts’ estimates.
But this scene was not to be enacted until twenty years after Bill Battler, a wealthy
Harvard MBA, had taken over Deal Club, a small discount-shopping club, in 1976
and went public with it in 1983 at 25 times sales despite losing $2.5 million on only
$4 million in revenues the previous year. By 1997, Battler had built it into a
business reporting $2.3 billion in annual revenues. Battler had grown the business
by persuading large credit card companies to promote the club to their cardholders.
He also founded or acquired more than a dozen similar clubs in the travel and other
industries and brought them under Deal Club’s umbrella. Proud of a reported 70
percent membership renewal rate that provided what Battler called an “annuity
like” stream of predictable earnings, he saw the stock move to the $25 area with a
P/E of about 30.
Enter Carl Charise. A former tax lawyer, Charise founded Fabulous Franchises Inc.
in 1990 and went public with it in 1992 at $4 a share. The company had the
franchise rights to a number of hotel chains with a total of 500,000 rooms, real
estate brokerages, rental cars, vacation time-sharing, and other businesses. Fabulous
Franchises made money by charging a franchise fee and taking a percentage of
earnings from its operators. Earnings were growing at an annual rate in excess of 60
percent because of Charise’s good management and aggressive acquisition policy.
The stock price hit a record $79 in 1996 creating a return of 2,000 percent since
going public. In addition to an office at company headquarters in North Carolina,
he kept an office in Manhattan from which he constantly wooed Wall Street
analysts with the Fabulous Franchises story.

As each company grew bigger, growth opportunities became fewer. Battler and
Charise began telling the analysts to lower expectations since both companies
needed bigger and bigger acquisitions which were becoming harder and harder to
find. In January 1997, Battler approached Charise proposing that Deal Club take
34 FASB Statement No. 38, Accountingfor Preacquisition Contingencies ofPurchased Enterprises (an amendment of
APB Opinion No. 16), paragraph 4.b.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

31

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

over Fabulous Franchises. In the following months, discussions turned from
acquisition by Deal Club to a merger of equals.

Superficially, the two companies seemed to make likely merger partners. The
millions of well-to-do customers passing through Fabulous Franchises’ operations
were a natural market for Deal Club memberships and would create a new profit
center. The merger would utilize the synergy of Fabulous Franchises’ strong
earnings and Deal Club’s high multiple to add billions to market capitalization.
Trouble in Paradise began, however, when the two conflicting corporate cultures
started to take a better look at each other. Bill Battler proved to be an absentee
visionary and the company ran itself in a casual manner that sometimes slipped into
carelessness. Divisions were left to run things their own way. Accounting systems
were unsophisticated; financial reporting was slack; and there appears to have been
little long-term planning. These practices were defended as entrepreneurial and
had, indeed, unarguably produced a business with $2-billion-a-year in sales.
Carl Charise, on the other hand, was not only extremely charming to Wall Street,
but also a very competent CEO who ran a tight ship. When his people demanded
detailed nonpublic information including hard numbers, Deal Club executives
backed off. In fact, the Deal Club president instead of producing numbers for the
new management team produced one for himself, namely, a $25-million negotiated
payout if he were not made Chief Operating Officer of the merged company after
two years. The whole situation made Fabulous Franchises nervous but Deal Club’s
outside CPAs, gave assurances that the books were in excellent condition.
Nevertheless, in the midst of all this prickliness, Deal Club kept delivering
spectacular quarterly earnings. Fabulous Franchises executives could not confirm
anything for themselves, however, and remained apprehensive.
After the two companies closed the merger under the name Fabulous Deals Inc. in
late 1997, more unusual behavior began to surface at Deal Club. Bill Battler insisted
that the old Deal Club remain financially autonomous and that CFO Haggis
McMann and controller Patricia Candel remain in place. Deal Club’s divisional
controllers would not report to the merged company’s chief accounting officer but
to McMann and Candel, who would consolidate results before passing them on.
This arrangement was reluctantly agreed to but financial reports continued to come
in slowly and Fabulous Deals risked missing the 10-K filing deadline with the SEC.
In the face of this problem and Charise’s threats to take the matter to the board,
Battler agreed to remove McMann and Candel from the process.

More peculiar matters began to come to light when the new chief accounting officer
met with McMann, Candel, and others about the new reporting system. The former
president of Deal Club asked him how to move $165 million from merger reserves
into income “creatively” for fiscal 1998. It was also revealed that earnings had
actually been increased by $100 million using this approach in 1997. When Charise
heard this news, he was afraid he would have to restate earnings with all that
implied for the stock price which he had so assiduously worked to support through
his good relations with Wall Street. Former Deal Club executives tried to explain
the matter away and the outside CPAs assured Charise that restatement would not
be necessary.
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The biggest bombshell, however, exploded a few weeks later at a routine budget
meeting when two middle-level Deal Club executives revealed that Deal Club’s
growth story was a complete fiction and that the numbers had all been fabricated.
The story, as it came out that day and over the next few weeks, showed that under
instructions from McMann and Candel, more than 20 controllers at 17 of Deal
Club’s 22 divisions had committed fraud by creating $511 million in phony pretax
income that translated into a one-third increase in earnings for the three years
ended fiscal 1997. The fraud had grown each year until 1997 net income was 61
percent fiction. As the former Deal Club executives told the story, McMann and
Candel had said the bogus numbers were necessary to meet analysts’ forecasts.
When Charise publicly announced that Deal Club’s 1997 earnings were being
restated downward by $115 million, Fabulous Deals’ stock price plunged to $19
from $36 to reduce market capitalization by $14 billion. At 108 million shares
traded, the volume was the largest one-day turnover up to that time for any stock in
NYSE history. Three shareholder law suits had been filed by the end of the day and
about 70 more followed. By the time the stock price finally bottomed at $7.50, more
than $29 billion in market capitalization had been vaporized.
Conclusion and Analysis. The fraud seems to have been driven by the perception of

McMann, Candel, and others that meeting analysts’ expectations and maintaining
the upward momentum of the P/E and stock price were more important than
accepting the ups and downs, the good years and bad, of business and all that that
implied for the stock price. Externally perceived performance became more
important than reality. The question of the degree of Bill Battler’s involvement
remains open.

The fraud was only able to go on as long as it did because of the failure of the CPA
firm to detect the sizeable accounting irregularities. In the first three quarters of
1995, 1996, and 1997, the unaudited financial statements were doctored by
adjusting revenues upward and expenses downward at the largest Deal Club
subsidiary. These adjustments were $31 million, $87 million, and $176 million
respectively. If the CPAs had looked at these interim statements, they would have
seen a pattern of unsubstantiated changes to income and expense items. At yearend, before the CPA firm arrived to do the audit, these irregularities were reversed
and the fictitious earnings replaced by earnings converted from cookie-jar reserves.
The CPAs were so lax in their work that they failed to question this use of reserves.
They even allowed a $25-million transfer from reserves to be classified as
“immaterial.” Acquisition reserves were even used to pay for $597,000 in expenses
requested by Bill Battle for the operation of his private plane in years prior to the
acquisition. These expenses, assuming they were properly reimbursable, should
have been classified as operating costs.

This failure is even more troubling because the CPAs had had the Deal Club
account for years and McMann, Candel, and others were former employees of the
CPA firm. Bill Battle had even fought any change in CPAs after the merger. The
CPA firm paid $335 million to settle a shareholder class action suit and is embroiled
in other suits involving Fabulous Deals and Bill Battle. Fabulous Deals has agreed to
pay $2.85 billion in class action settlements.
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10.4.3 Cost Shifting Among Affiliates
If management desires to improve earnings fraudulently, it can remove expenses from the
current period income statement to make operations appear more profitable. Expenses
incurred by a firm can be shifted in the following two different ways:

1. Moved to the balance sheet to be brought onto the income statement at a future period

2. Moved to the income statement of another related entity to remove the cost altogether

Shift to the Balance Sheet
The matching principle, which states that the timing of expenses should be related to the
timing of revenues,35 restricts the first shifting method. Under this principle, if the cost was
incurred to earn revenue in the current period, as a general rule, the cost should be charged
to that revenue in the current period. There are some expenses that offer the prospect of
providing benefits to future periods and management may attempt to justify capitalizing
then amortizing them into income over future periods. This practice, however, may run
afoul of specific accounting guidance and, if management intentionally ignores this
guidance, it will create fraudulent financial statements. For example, to meet earnings
projections, management may begin capitalizing the salaries of marketing personnel on the
argument that the work they performed will benefit future-period sales.

Although there may be some conceptual merit to the argument, capitalizing sales personnel
salaries runs directly counter to an example contained in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6,
Elements ofFinancial Statements (a replacement ofFASB Concepts Statement No 3—incorporating an
amendment ofFASB Concepts Statement No. 2), paragraph 148 because it is difficult to
determine the amount and length of time of future benefits.36 Implementing the principle of
conservatism, FASB Concepts Statement No. 6 states that such expenditures are
“recognized as expenses in the period in which they are incurred because the period to
which they otherwise relate is indeterminable or not worth the effort to determine.”37
Finally, even if capitalization is justified, the manipulation of financial statements may also
occur if management switches from currently expensing costs to capitalizing them without
proper disclosure. Failure to disclose may cause readers of financial statements to believe
that profits have improved in the year of the policy change compared to previous periods
when, in reality, the improved operating results may be solely attributable to shifting
expenses to the balance sheet.
The Asset Quality Index, described in Section 10.3.2., “Quantitative Predictors,” above, is
one of the early warning signs of this type of manipulation. This index looks at the
percentage of noncurrent assets to total assets for the current year over the previous year. If
the index is greater than one, management has increased the percentage of noncurrent to
35 See FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements ofFinancial Statements (a replacement ofFASB Concepts
Statement No. 3— incorporating an amendment ofFASB Concepts Statement No. 2), paragraphs 145-149, for a
summary of the issues regarding expense recognition.
36 There is an exception that allows capitalization of sales commissions paid to agents selling insurance
policies under FASB Statement No. 60, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, paragraph 28, et seq. In
the case of insurance sales, though, actuaries are able to establish estimates of how long those policies will
remain in force and thereby generate premium income to the insurance carrier. Those estimates then provide
a reasonable basis for amortizing the commissions and other acquisition costs over future periods.
37 FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, paragraph 148.
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total assets. This type of behavior is frequently associated with the sale of stock, especially
during the period leading up to seasoned equity offerings for a company whose stock is
already publicly traded. (A seasoned equity offering consists of the sale of new, additional
shares by a public company.) A survey of academic research also found that management
frequently got away with this type of manipulation, as described in the following excerpt.

Two recent studies provide evidence that managers manage earnings at the time
of seasoned equity offerings (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998). It is well known
that shares of firms that make seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) underperform the
market in the years following the offering. These two papers show that: (1)
reported earnings of firms that make SEOs are unusually high at the time of the
SEO; (2) these high reported earnings are attributable to unusually high accruals
(including “discretionary” accruals); (3) these firms’ earnings performance is
unusually poor in the years following the SEO; (4) there is a strong association
between the extent of earnings management and subsequent stock price
performance—shares of firms with the highest accruals at the time of the SEO
tend to perform worse in the years after the SEO than shares of other firms. This
evidence is consistent with the view that investors do not “see through” earnings
management at the time of the SEO. Rather, as time passes after the SEO and the
earnings management becomes apparent through subsequent earnings
disappointments, the overpricing reverses and these stocks underperform the
market38.
Clearly, the incentive is to create a short-term illusion of higher profits to sell stock at an
inflated price.

Shift to Related Entity
Sometimes fraudsters can deceive by moving costs from one entity to another under
common control. This is useful to the fraudsters in situations in which investors or analysts
are looking intently at the performance of a certain business segment and management
wants to show rising earnings in that segment to give the illusion of significant future
growth. A scenario similar to this played out in the W.R. Grace case,39 although there
management also used reserves as the tool to shift expenses (as per the discussion in the
preceding subsection entitled “Cookie Jar Reserves”). In June 1999, the SEC brought a
managed earnings case against Grace for manipulating the reported earnings of its primary
health care subsidiary, National Medical Care, Inc. Management had established reserves
for unanticipated health care reimbursements and used those reserves in subsequent
periods to reduce expenses and show a steady growth rate in its health care subsidiary.
However, there were no liabilities to justify the reserves, which consequently were not in
conformity with GAAP. Fraudsters may also want to improve a subsidiary’s earnings to
dress it up for sale by shifting costs to the parent or to affiliates and by using reserves, as in
the Grace example.

38 Dechow and Skinner, op. cit.
39 In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., AAER No. 1140, June 30, 1999. This case also raised materiality issues in
that the manipulation of subsidiary earnings was less than a rule-of-thumb threshold of 5 percent of
consolidated Grace earnings. But since the SEC found that management placed increased importance on the
subsidiary’s earnings, the SEC determined that the manipulation was material.
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Another example of cost shifting was the Livent case.40 Livent, Inc. was a Canadian theater
company that produced a number of successful Broadway shows including Phantom of the
Opera, Showboat, and Ragtime. In January 1999, the SEC brought enforcement proceedings
against nine former employees of Livent for their involvement in a scheme to inflate
income by falsifying expenses among other things. This scheme operated from 1990
through 1998. The following were the three areas of expense manipulation.
1. Livent transferred preproduction costs for the shows to fixed assets, such as set
construction.

2. Livent removed certain expenses and related liabilities from the general ledger.
3. Livent transferred costs from one show currently running to another show that had not
yet opened.
Livent shows that this type of cost shifting is especially hard to detect. Livent, however,
succeeded in its deception for eight years. Business downturns usually bring these schemes
to the surface because, if the company overall is suffering, there is no place to hide the
additional costs.
To try to detect cost shifting before a downturn, CPAs would be well served to look for
credits appearing in expense accounts. Such credits may indicate that the entity incurring
the cost accrued the expenses on its books first as debits and then transferred the expenses
out with offsetting credits. It is not safe, however, to assume that the subsidiary incurring the
expense initially recorded it as such. There may be a special reserve or liability account on
the balance sheet set up to record the initial debits with the transfer credits appearing later.
As the expenses are being booked, significant debit balances in the liability account will
grow until the transfer is made. Such debit balances in a liability account should stand out.
Also, if the transfers take place over time, there is likely to be some correspondence spelling
out the procedures, especially if the initial debit is to an unusual account such as a liability
reserve.

10.4.4 Recognizing Fictitious Revenues
The COSO report found that more than half the financial reporting frauds in the period
1987 to 1997 were attributable to overstating revenue. Revenue recognition issues have
occupied the accounting profession for many years as well. In 1984, the FASB issued FASB
Concepts Statement No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements ofBusiness
Enterprises. That statement set out the following two basic requirements for recognizing
revenue.

a. Realized or realizable. Revenues and gains generally are not recognized until
realized or realizable. Revenues and gains are realized when products (goods
or services), merchandise or other assets are exchanged for cash or claims to
cash. Revenues and gains are realizable when related assets received or held
are readily convertible to known amounts of cash or claims to cash. Readily
convertible assets have (i) interchangeable (fungible) units and (ii) quoted
prices available in an active market that can rapidly absorb the quantity held
by the entity without significantly affecting the price.

40 In the matter of Livent, Inc., AAER No. 1095, January 13, 1999.
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b. Earned. Revenues are not recognized until earned. An entity’s revenue-earning
activities involve delivering or producing goods, rendering services, or other
activities that constitute its ongoing major or central operations, and revenues
are considered to have been earned when the entity has substantially
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the
revenues....41

The staff of the SEC identified a long list of additional accounting pronouncements that
address revenue recognition, including the following:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

FASB Statement No. 13, Accountingfor Leases
FASB Statement No. 45, Accountingfor Franchise Fee Revenue
FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition When Right ofReturn Exists
FASB Statement No. 49, Accountingfor Product Financing Arrangements
FASB Statement No. 50, Financial Reporting in the Record and Music Industry
FASB Statement No. 51, Financial Reporting by Cable Television Companies
FASB Statement No. 66, Accountingfor Sales ofReal Estate
APB Opinion 10, Omnibus Opinionr-1966
Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) Nos. 43 and 45, Long-Term Construction-Type
Contracts
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Statements of Position
(SOP) No. 81-1, Accountingfor Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type
Contracts
SOP No. 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 88-18, Sales ofFuture Revenues
EITF Issue No. 91-9, Revenue and Expense Recognition for Freight Services in Process
EITF Issue No. 95-1, Revenue Recognition on Sales with a Guaranteed Minimum Resale Value

• EITF Issue No. 95-4, Revenue Recognition on Equipment Sold and Subsequently Repurchased
Subject to an Operating Lease2
In SAB 101, the SEC set out its interpretation of the above literature and concluded the
following.

The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realizable and earned
when all of the following criteria are met:

a. Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists
b. Delivery has occurred or services have been rendered
c. The seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or determinable
d. Collectibility is reasonably assured.43

41 FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements ofBusiness Enterprises,
paragraph 83 (footnotes omitted).
42 SEC SAB 101, Topic 13, A.1.
43 Ibid. Footnotes have been omitted.
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With regard to a fixed or determinable selling price, the SEC staff amplified its position by
looking to SOP 97-2 which defines a fixedfee as a “fee required to be paid at a set amount
that is not subject to refund or adjustment.”44 Even though SOP 97-2 addresses software
revenue recognition, the staff thought that the requirement of not being subject to refund or
adjustment was applicable to all transactions. If the buyer retains a right to a refund of the
purchase price, then collectibility cannot be assured. Indeed, it would be difficult to meet the
FASB Concepts Statement No. 5 realization test if the cash or other payment tendered was
subject to refund at the buyer’s discretion. Yet refund arrangements are a common area for
revenue recognition fraud. (For an example, see the case study entitled “Datatronix, Inc.
Case Study,” that follows this section.)
If company management wishes to inflate revenues by booking fictitious sales, in all
likelihood, one or more of the SEC’s conditions will have been violated. These conditions
are described in the following sections.

Lack of an Agreement
As the reporting quarter draws to an end, companies straining to achieve a revenue target
face pressure to close sales by the last day. That pressure may lead to the fraudulent
booking of premature or nonexistent sales. In the rush to close transactions by a certain
date, sales personnel may represent to management that there is an oral agreement with a
customer when, in fact, there is none. For this reason, the SEC standard requires
“persuasive evidence,” which generally means some written documentation from either the
buyer or a third party such as a purchasing agent. If a company requires a written
agreement in order to credit a salesperson with a sale, the agreement might be held up,
perhaps under review in the buyer’s legal department, at the end of the quarter. The
salesperson may then represent (perhaps accurately) that the buyer’s purchasing decision
maker has signed off on the sale; without a signed contract, however, recognition of the sale
violates the company policy. Such a policy is put in place to assure the company conforms
to GAAP. Violating that policy causes a GAAP violation if, in footnotes to the financial
statements or elsewhere, management represents that sales are not recognized without a
written agreement.45 Such a violation might also point to an internal control issue for the
CPAs to consider.
Good sales cutoff procedures can generally detect lack of proper agreements; but if written
agreements are fabricated, detection is much more difficult. Random sampling of orders
booked as revenue near the end of a quarter should provide a list of customers to call to
verify that documents are authentic. For a document fabrication scheme to succeed over
several quarters or years, however, the fabricated agreements must be replaced by authentic
agreements and real sales or there will be significant reversals of prior period sales.
Therefore, CPAs can compare, perhaps on a random basis, contracts on file at the end of a
given reporting period with contracts on file for the same transaction at a later period of
time. If the original (fake) contract has been switched, there probably was an attempt at
44 AICPA Statement of Position 97-2, paragraph 8.
45 See SAB 101, Question 1. The hypothetical posed in the SAB actually stated the normal and customary
business practice was to obtain written agreements and did not mention the existence of a company policy to
obtain written agreements. The staff's position was that companies could not book as revenue sales lacking
written agreements when the normal and customary business practice for the industry was to obtain written
agreements.
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fabrication. Conversely, if the authentic document does not appear, the sale may never
have been completed, in which case there would be a reversal in the subsequent period.
Numerous instances of such reversals would point to revenue recognition problems.

Nondelivery
What constitutes delivery varies from industry to industry but generally occurs when title
and risk of loss pass to the buyer. Delivery of some products require shipping documents
that provide a paper trail that can be audited. Delivery of products such as software,
though, may occur over the Internet at near instantaneous speed. Nevertheless, there
should be some documentation or electronic receipt verification.

Attempts at achieving fraudulent deliveries usually involve some person or entity willing to
hold the product until such time as its sale can be arranged. As part of the fraud scheme,
the recipient executes documents or e-mails that appear to confirm delivery. This recipient
is sometimes part of the scheme or can be a customer who inadvertently accepts delivery
before consummating the sale. The latter may be easier to detect because customers
receiving products before they are wanted tend to complain to company management. The
third-party recipients who park goods temporarily may be harder to detect but usually
require some payment for their services. Payment may come in the form of above-average
discounts if the third parties resell the products over future periods, or there may be special
terms allowing for product returns. An analysis of average product selling prices may point
to one customer who stands out from the rest by receiving better deals. If returns from a
given customer are abnormally high, that fact may also indicate special arrangements,
especially if the returns occur in a later reporting period. If one customer receives such
favorable treatment, the CPA should make additional inquiries as to why. In addition,
delivery schemes involving resellers typically become more apparent if other resellers
cannot sell the product as expected because of a change in market conditions. If a reseller is
still taking substantial deliveries of product after many others are experiencing sales
declines, the CPA should attempt to understand why that reseller’s channels of distribution
are clear while others are blocked.

No Fixed Price
Sometimes prices are difficult to determine, particularly if the product is to be combined
with other products before being sold to an end user. Such sales may involve a royalty
payment that is a function of the selling price. It would be inappropriate to book anticipated
future royalties as current revenues until the amount of those royalties becomes fixed upon
ultimate sale. Minimum royalties, however, may be booked when they become due. Fraud
occurs when royalties are recognized on fictitious or anticipated ultimate sales. Such royalty
arrangements, however, typically require the royalty payor to report to the royalty recipient
the quantity of ultimate sales on a periodic (usually quarterly) basis. This permits an
accounting of the final sales that can be used to verify reported royalty income.
The more deceptive form of fraud used to circumvent the fixed price requirement is the
clandestine use of side letters or arrangements that allow for refunds or discounts at the
buyer’s option or in certain circumstances. Under tight market conditions or perhaps
because the product is new and untested, it may be necessary to use these side letters to
make a sale. The most likely candidates for this type of fraud are sales personnel with some
discretion and authority such as divisional managers and above. Implementation of such a
scheme requires their authority to alter records or invent excuses should the buyer exercise
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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his rights under the side agreement. As a general rule, side letters are the result of some
type of internal control failure when the divisional manager is able to effect economic
outcomes and alter accounting records. These side letters are quite hard to detect because
the buyer usually realizes he is receiving a special deal and does not want to publicize it. Of
course, the fraudsters in the selling company will attempt to keep such agreements secret.

These schemes must come to the surface if the buyer exercises his rights under the
agreement. A more senior member of management is usually involved to cover up the
refund with a fabricated reason or another transaction. Nevertheless, there is usually some
documentation of the refund if corporate controls are in place. The CPA who suspects the
existence of side letters can certainly look for refunds and discounts that are out of the
ordinary. Keep in mind that the customer probably demanded the right to obtain a refund
or discount in the course of negotiations for the sale. To catch the existence of side letters
before refund demands are made, a suspicious CPA may review sales files for
correspondence, notes, or other evidence of such demands from the prospective customer.
If the products involved requires personnel such as engineers to install the product, those
personnel not reporting to the fraudsters may know details of the side agreement but
innocently believe there is no issue to report to senior management. It is also likely that if
fraudsters used side letters with one customer, there might be side letters with other
customers as well.

Receivables Are Not Collectible
Financially weak firms may not pay their bills. To prevent sales to firms in poor financial
condition, some type of customer-approval process independent of the sales function needs
to be in place to assess customer health, especially if the customer is placing large orders.
This review function should be integrated with the approval process for customer refunds
and discounts to prevent the implementation of side letters, which also affect collectiblity, as
discussed above. From a CPA’s point of view, an unusual concentration of orders from
small or distressed customers, particularly near the end of a reporting period or a sales
campaign, should raise concerns.

Datatronix Inc. A Case Study
Datatronix is a multinational database software company with shares traded over
the counter. The company described itself in its press releases and advertising
literature as the fastest growing company in the database software industry. In
reality, the company was showing increased revenues and earnings by using a wide
range of fraudulent accounting practices to produce the numbers on its own
financial statements as well as those filed with the SEC. For the fiscal years 1994
through 1996 and for the first quarter of fiscal year 1997, Datatronix’ salespeople,
managers, and others fraudulently inflated quarterly and annual revenues and
earnings in violation of GAAP. The violations included the following:

1. Backdating license sale agreements
2. Entering into side agreements granting rights to refunds and other concessions to
customers
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3. Recognizing revenue on transactions with reseller customers that were not
creditworthy
4. Recognizing amounts due under software maintenance agreements as software
license revenues
5. Recognizing revenue on disputed claims against customers
Managers later explained that the frauds occurred when the performance numbers
failed to meet the internal revenue and earnings objectives that in turn had been
established to meet analysts’ forecasts. As the quarterly cutoff dates approached, the
sales department tried to close as many sales as possible to meet the quarterly
objectives. If license agreements could not be signed before the end of the quarter,
they were frequently signed later and backdated to the quarter in violation of both
GAAP for revenue recognition and written internal policy. This practice was
possible because of slack internal controls. Salespersons, the very people under
pressure to produce good revenue figures, were responsible for overseeing the
dating of signatures on agreements. In one known case, an agreement was accepted
a month after the end of the quarter.
Written and oral side agreements were also common means of juggling revenues
and earnings. The agreements had a wide variety of provisions, including the
following:

1. Allowing resellers to return and to receive a refund or credit for unsold licenses

2. Committing the Company to use its own sales force to find customers for
resellers
3. Offering to assign future end-user orders to resellers
4. Extending payment dates beyond twelve months
5. Committing the Company to purchase computer hardware or services from
customers under terms that effectively refunded all or a substantial portion of the
license fees paid by the customer
6. Diverting the Company’s own future service revenues to customers as a means
of refunding their license fees
7. Paying fictitious consulting or other fees to customers to be repaid to the
Company as license fees
These side letters allowed the sales staff to “park” software licenses with resellers
and bring them into revenue without actually having sold anything to an end user,
indeed, without having even found an end user. The most notorious reseller
involved in this scheme was known as the bank and the virtual warehouse. This
reseller was, however, not very effective at moving Datatronix’s products.
Nevertheless, it entered into purchase agreements for $9.5 million in software
licenses in fiscal 1995 but sold only $2.8 million in that year. In the first half of fiscal
1996, it entered into purchase agreements for an additional $5.9 million. During the
whole of 1996, it sold only $6.2 million of the remaining $6.7 million in licenses
purchased in 1995 and none of the $5.9 million in licenses purchased in the first two
quarters of 1996.
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Datatronix created these sales through a series of side letters inducing this reseller to
enter into quarter-end purchase agreements. The Datatronix sales staff offered the
bait of allowing the reseller to book a sale they were negotiating with an end user.
The same arrangement with the same end user was offered to two other resellers.
The result allowed Datatronix to book the same end-user sale three times through
the three resellers.
Other side letters allowed resellers to cancel purchase agreements while Datatronix
continued to recognize the original sales as revenue. One agreement allowed a
reseller to cancel $6 million in licensing agreements in the third quarter of 1996.
This figure represented 14 percent of pretax income for that quarter. Another side
letter permitted a different reseller to cancel $6.4 million or 11 percent of the pretax
income in the fourth quarter.

Additional GAAP violations occurred when service agreements were recognized as
license sales and taken fully into revenue in a single quarter instead of being taken
in ratably over the life of the contract. In the 1996 fourth quarter, three service
agreement renewals totaling $11.2 million or 25 percent of pretax income for the
period were treated as license sales and taken into revenue.

In the last quarter of 1995, Datatronix invoiced a customer for $5.4 million claiming
the customer had used more copies of Datatronix’s software than had been
permitted under its license agreement. Finance staff thought the claim would be
settled at a discount to the list price; the customer was told the $5.4 million could be
applied against future purchases. The claim was settled in the first quarter of 1996
for $3.8 million but Datatronix improperly recognized the claim as fourth-quarter
1995 revenue and increased pretax income for the period by 13 percent. The
remaining $1.8 million should have been written off in first-quarter 1996 but was
instead improperly characterized as an unbilled maintenance fee receivable that was
eventually written off over the last three quarters of fiscal 1996.
Revenue was recognized from end users with whom no contract had been signed
and from whom no formal acceptance had been received. Policies for recognizing
creditworthiness were disregarded and revenues were booked from under
capitalized and new customers. Both these actions are in clear violation of the
GAAP that clearly states that “until persuasive evidence of the agreement exists and
an assessment of the customer’s creditworthiness has been made,” no revenues can
be recognized. Such improperly recognized revenues amounted to $3.3 million in
the 1996 first quarter, $9.1 in the second, and $8.2 in the third.
At the end of the fourth quarter of fiscal 1996, Datatronix sold $9.2 million worth of
software to a computer manufacturer for resale installed on its computers.
Datatronix, however, failed to deliver the software code before the end of the fiscal
year. Early in fiscal 1997, Datatronix delivered a so-called “beta” version that did
not work on the purchaser’s hardware. Usable software was not, in fact, delivered
until more than half way through 1997. Revenue from the sale was improperly
recognized, however, in the fourth quarter of 1996 and increased pretax income for
the period by 13 percent.

In 1996, Datatronix decided to open so-called Megastores where it would team up
with hardware providers to sell hardware-software solutions. So-called partnerships
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were formed with hardware providers whereby Datatronix would buy computers
for the stores while the hardware providers would buy licensing agreements of
equal or greater value than the hardware purchases. The hardware purchasers were
also asked to buy licenses for the software installed in the demonstration computers
in the Megastores. The hardware purchases and license sales were in cash and
structured so the hardware purchase would give the providers cash flow at about the
time the license agreement payments were due. All these transactions were
premised on the expectation that Datatronix would absorb the costs of setting up
new stores and that the Datatronix sales force would be involved in selling the
solution as the hardware providers sales people were not familiar with the
Datatronix software. Because of the high cost of opening and operating the
Megastores, the costs of reselling licensing agreements were going to be high for
Datatronix. To cover these costs, Datatronix offered its sales force higher
commissions if sales were closed through the hardware providers rather than by
Datatronix. Objectives were established for end-user sales to be applied against the
hardware providers’ outstanding commitments.
Datatronix recognized revenue when the hardware providers agreed to the
purchase commitments even though Datatronix itself was paying the costs and
expenses of setting up and operating the Megastores and its own sales force was
going to do most of the reselling. This arrangement was in clear violation of the
GAAP that if “other vendor obligations remaining after delivery are significant,
revenue should not be recognized, because the earnings process is not substantially
complete.”
Datatronix committed these violations of GAAP and included this false information
in its interim and annual financial statements. Information was also omitted or
misrepresented in these statements and those filed with the SEC. As a result, the
company’s reports and filings were false and misleading.

At the end of March 1997, when the company announced a revenue shortfall, the
stock price dropped 34.5 percent to $9 29/32 from $15 1/8 and reduced the
Datatronix market capitalization to $1.5 billion from $2.3 billion. About two weeks
after this collapse, CPAs began to hear about accounting irregularities in 1995 and
1996. Management realized that if the truth came out there would have to be a
restatement and they resisted further investigation by indulging in additional
fraudulent behavior for the purpose of limiting the scope of the audit. Over the next
few months, nevertheless, more of the story began to emerge and by early
September 1997, more than $100 million in various irregularities had been
identified on the previously issued financial statements. On the basis of these
revelations, amended 10-Ks and 10-Qs were filed with the SEC.
In the face of the SEC’s intention to institute administrative proceedings against
Datatronix, the company submitted an Offer of Settlement which the SEC accepted.
Conclusion and Analysis. The root of the problem seems to have been a lack of
internal controls strong enough to permit the preparation of financial statements
within GAAP. The effect of this lack of controls was magnified by an organizational
structure that had important financial people responsible for revenue recognition
reporting directly to sales personnel rather than to senior financial management.
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Sales people under pressure to produce revenues to support analysts’ forecasts were
thus able to put pressure on their immediate financial superiors to recognize
revenues not generated in accordance with GAAP.

10.5

Financial Statement Fraud Checklist
The following checklist (table 10.4) addresses internal controls issues, taken from the
discussion in this chapter, specific to suspected financial statement fraud. The checklist is an
addition to the Risk Management checklist in chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,”
Section 1.5, “Risk Management Checklist,” and other checklists found in other sections of
“The Fraud Handbook”.
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Table 10.4 Financial Statement Fraud Checklist
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Motives
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater
likelihood ofpotentialfinancial statement fraud.

a. Is there a perception among management of the company or
individual operating units that there is extraordinary
pressure (over and above the pressures typically associated
with this industry) to achieve a higher level of reported
earnings?
b. Do management compensation agreements tie
compensation or bonuses to higher levels of reported
earnings?
c. Is there extraordinary pressure from outside shareholders or
other outsiders to improve the value of company stock?

d. With regard to shares held by management or major
shareholders, could the existence of any of the following
provide an incentive to maintain or increase reported
earnings, especially in the near term?

• Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans
that postpone ownership
• Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers
from acquiring shares until specified dates or the
occurrence of specific events
• Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares
that can be sold on U. S. securities exchanges on a given
trading day

• Income tax provisions that afford more favorable
treatment to capital gains in shares held for a sufficient
period of time to qualify as long-term capital gains (the
restriction being that the government would receive more
of the sale proceeds if the share sales were classified as
short-term capital gains)
• Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding
significant blocks of stock past some event such as an
annual shareholders meeting before they can be sold

e. Is the company in danger of losing its listing on a major
stock exchange, or is it attempting to obtain a new listing?
f.

Is there extraordinary pressure, whether explicit or implicit,
to continue to report a rising trend in earnings and/or
revenues?
(continued)
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

g. Is the company operating close to or in violation of the
limits of financial covenants, such as minimum shareholders’
equity, maximum debt-to-equity ratios, or minimum current
ratios, contained in bank credit facility agreements or other
debt instruments?

h. For firms doing business in regulated industries, is the
company operating close to or in violation of the financial
restrictions set by regulators or by statute?
2. Quantitative Characteristics
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater
likelihood ofpotential financial statement fraud.

a. When calculating the following indexes for the previous and
the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-overyear increase greater than 10 percent (meaning, an index
greater than 1.1)?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index

• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Margin Index

• Sales Growth Index
b. When calculating the following indexes for the previous and
the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-overyear increase greater than 10 percent more than increases
for similar indexes of peer (same industry) companies?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index

• Gross Margin Index

• Asset Quality Index
• Sale’s Growth Index
c. Is the change in working capital over the past year
(excluding cash changes) relative to total assets at the end of
the period more than 20 percent greater than similar
calculations for peer companies?
3. Qualitative Predictors: The Audit Committee
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a need to
take action to improve the integrity and effectiveness of the Audit
Committee.

a. Has the board of directors failed to designate an audit
committee or failed to approve a charter for an audit
committee?
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. If there is an audit committee, do any of the following
conditions exist with regard to members of that committee?

• A director being employed by the corporation or any of
its affiliates for the current year or any of the past five
years
• A director accepting any compensation from the
corporation or any of its affiliates other than
compensation for board service or benefits under a taxqualified retirement plan
• A director being a member of the immediate family of an
individual who is or has been in any of the past five years
employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as an
executive officer
• A director being a partner in or a controlling shareholder,
or to which the corporation made, or from which the
corporation received, payments that are or have been
significant to the corporation or business organization in
any of the past five years

• A director being employed as an executive of another
company while any of the corporation’s executives serves
on that company’s compensation committee
c. Are there less than three audit committee members with at
least some financial accounting experience?

d. Is it not clear or not the case that the audit committee• Should be responsible for selecting the outside auditors?
• Has a formal written statement from the outside auditors
describing all relationships between the auditors and the
company?

• Regularly discusses with the outside auditors all aspects of
the propriety or lack thereof of the company’s accounting
practices?
• Receives all reports of internal control deficiencies in a
timely manner from both internal and outside auditors?
4. Other Qualitative Predictors
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater
likelihood ofpotentialfinancial statement fraud.

a. Has the company had a history of internal control problems,
whether those problems resulted in the detection of financial
statement or any other type of fraud?
(continued)
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Does the company chief executive officer engage in micro
management or other practices that could unduly influence
accounting decision-makers with regard to financial
statement reporting?

c. Are outside auditors unaware of any interim or quarterly
financial statements or financial statements prepared for
selected outside parties such as banks or investors?
d. In establishing and reviewing internal controls, has
management failed to establish adequately the key metrics
or guidelines to determine the extent and frequency of
internal auditor review?
e. Is there a lack of evidence that management has properly
communicated the internal control guidelines and
procedures to appropriate personnel?

f.

Does it appear that management does not assess the quality
of its internal controls over time?

g. Have any audit tests detected significant risks not previously
known to management?
h. Is there a history of using a quantitative standard for
materiality, such as a percentage of earnings or assets, to fail
to correct known accounting errors or irregularities?
5. Special Areas
A yes answer to any of the questions in this section should generate
further inquiry to determine ifspecific internal controls need to be
improved.

Failure to Record Loss Contingencies

a. Given the nature of the company’s business, is it likely that
any of the following issues could be relevant?
• Collectibility of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and product
defects
• Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property

• Threat of expropriation of assets
• Pending or threatened litigation
• Actual or possible claims and assessments
• Guarantees of indebtedness of others
• Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase
related property) that have been sold
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. With regard to possible contingencies, do any of the
following exist?
• The incidence of claims prior to the date of financial
statements
• Correspondence with (and bills from) outside legal
counsel
• Internal correspondence within production and research
staffs as to the need to address a critical problem with a
product already on the market
• Internal correspondence among department heads of
production, R&D, general counsel, and senior
management about postproduction problems and product
claims
• External correspondence between the manufacturer and
its customers about a given product concerning special
price concessions or special return privileges
• The incidence of special or over budget freight charges to
accommodate returns and/or the shipment of
replacement product
• Shifting of production schedules to manufacture
replacement product
• Halting manufacture of the product in question
• Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research
projects to applications engineering relating to redesign of
existing products
• Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to
customers on a regular basis over a period of weeks or
months that indicate some arrangement to compensate
for product defects

c. If there is a suspected contingency, does correspondence
between departments or within departments indicate a
problem?
d. If a contingency is likely to exist, has management used an
inadequate or inappropriate standard for quantifying the
potential claim?

Failure to Record Asset Writeoffs
a. Has the company’s industry experienced rapid changes in
engineering or materials applications that may lead to asset
writeoffs?
(continued)
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Is the industry in which the company operates very cost
competitive?

c. Has the company experienced any of the following?
• Significant changes in customer demand
• Significant loss of business to a competitor
• A need to obtain or retain a customer relationship by
bidding below cost

d. When reviewing fixed asset schedules with production or
divisional personnel, have any of the following occurred?

• A significant decrease in the market value of an asset
• A significant change in the extent or manner in which an
asset is used or a significant physical change in an asset
• A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the
business climate that could affect the value of an asset or
an adverse action or assessment by a regulator

• An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the
amount originally expected to acquire or construct an
asset
• A current period operating or cash-flow loss combined
with a history of operating or cash-flow losses or a
projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses
associated with an asset used for the purpose of producing
revenue

e. Is there evidence of significant changes in production or
product demand?
f.

From the review of moving expenses and discussion with
production personnel, does it appear that any equipment has
been moved off the shop floor into storage?

g.

the company not maintain profitability analyses by product
line or by customer?

h. Upon reviewing profitability analyses, does it appear that
certain products have not been historically profitable?

i.

For historically unprofitable product lines, to justify not
writing down assets for impairment, has management used
any of the following?

• Overly optimistic forecasts of future profitability
• Out-of-date forecasts
• Forecasts not prepared or reviewed by personnel with
line responsibility for production
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist
j.

Yes

No

NA

Ref

If written narratives accompany the forecasts, do they
discuss downside possibilities that management has not
adequately taken into account?

k. Are there any facts now known that would invalidate
assumptions contained in the forecast?

1.

For investments in non-publicly traded securities, have any
of the following occurred?

• Does the company have financial data adequate to
determine historical profitability of the investee?
• If the investee has not been historically profitable, has
management failed to write down the investment based
upon an overly optimistic forecast?

• If the investee has not been historically profitable, has
management failed to write down the investment based
upon a forecast prepared by management with business
or family ties to the investor company?
Acquisition and Cookie Jar Reserves
a. Were reserves established without a clear purpose or
justification?
b. If reserves were established by a current period charge to
income, were earnings prior to the charge in excess of
management or outside expectations?

c. Were reserves established at or near the close of a reporting
period?
d. Were reserves established without adequate review by
senior management?
e. Upon review of charges to a given reserve, are there charges
for expenses that are not appropriate to the stated purpose of
the reserve?

f.

Was the timing of the takedown of reserves coincident with
achieving certain financial targets set by management or
outsiders?

g. Was the amount of the takedown of reserves for a given
period necessary to achieve certain financial targets set by
management or outsiders?

h. Has any of the following occurred with regard to acquisition
reserves?
(continued)
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Were reserves established after twelve months from the
date of the acquisition?

• Were reserves set up for items not related to the
acquisition?
• Does the quantity of costs allocated to the reserve in a
given period cause earnings to reach certain financial
targets set by management or outsiders?
Cost Shifting
a. Has management made a recent change in policy with
regard to capitalizing previously expensed costs?
b. Has a change in policy with regard to capitalizing previously
expensed costs not been disclosed in company financial
statements?

c. Has management proposed to capitalize a new category of
expenditure that customarily is expensed on peer-group firm
financial statements?
d. Does the timing of changes in policy with regard to
capitalizing expenses coincide with any of the following?
• Implementation of a management bonus plan or
calculation of bonuses under that plan
• Commencement of the sale of stock or the search for an
equity partner
• Implementation of a new credit facility or recent
problems in maintaining financial covenants under an
existing facility

e. But for the capitalization of certain expenses, would any of
the following occur?
• Management would not receive certain bonuses or other
benefits under a management compensation plan.
• In the opinion of securities analysts, appraisers, or
underwriters, the company’s share price would be
significantly lower.
• The company would be in violation of loan or debt
covenants.

f.
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Does the capitalization of expenses cause the firm’s Asset
Quality Index to increase significantly in excess of increases
(if any) for its industry peers?
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

g. If company management provides segment or subsidiary
financial data, especially if management or outsiders tend to
point to performance of that segment or subsidiary in their
discussions of company performance, has either of the
following occurred?
• Have expenses been incurred by the parent that relates to
the segment or subsidiary?

• Have other segments or subsidiaries incurred expenses
that should be allocated to the segment or subsidiary in
question?
h. Has senior management failed to establish proper
procedures for allocating or apportioning costs among
affiliates or, if there is a policy, is there evidence that
adherence is lax or that there have been documented lapses?

i.

Is there correspondence among heads of affiliates
concerning disputes over expense allocations or
apportionment that has not come to the attention of the
audit committee?

j.

Were reserves established at the parent company for
expenses anticipated for subsidiaries?

k. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to the parent or
another subsidiary?
1.

Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to reserves
established at the parent level or in another subsidiary?

m. Is there any correspondence between accounting personnel
at the parent and subsidiary levels that describe special
procedures for certain costs that are incurred by the
subsidiary but not charged to earnings of that subsidiary?
Recording Fictitious Revenues

a. If the company requires signed agreements from customers
before revenue is recognized, have sales personnel indicated
or stated any of the following?

• Their managers have approved as income sales contracts
that were not signed as of the period end.
• Unsigned contracts were recorded as revenue under the
premise that key buyer personnel had given verbal
approvals.
• Unsigned contracts were recorded as revenue under the
premise that key buyer personnel had signed the contract
but the contract was held up for other reasons.
(continued)
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Have there been prior internal control failures with sales
cutoff?
c. If fabricated contracts are suspected, have the sales cutoff
tests performed by internal or outside auditors failed to look
for the fabrication and substitution of contracts?

d. Have sales cutoff tests failed to examine the history of sales
returns and reversals over time?

e. With regard to the requirement for timely delivery, has any
of the following occurred?
• Are there lapses in documentation of delivery?

• Have customers complained about receiving deliveries
too early?
• Have returns from a certain customer or reseller been
abnormally high?

f.

Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are
receiving unusually generous sales terms for returns or
refunds?

g. Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are
receiving unusually low prices or above-average discounts?
h. Is the price for component products sold by the company
dependent, at least in part, upon the price of the final
product sold by another company?

i.

Have royalties been accrued to income prior to receipt of
confirmation from the payor that royalties are owed?

j.

Do department heads have the authority to both approve
sales and the recognition of related revenue in the financial
statements?

k. Is there a lack of review of sales revenue recognition at the
senior management level?

1.

Is there a history of revenue being recognized improperly?

m. Have department heads approved significant refunds or
returns that are out of the ordinary or appear to violate
company policies?

n. Have refunds or returns been historically high for a certain
department?
o. Have the reasons for refunds and returns not been
documented or, if documented, have the reasons given been
insufficient?
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Table 10.4 (continued)
Financial Statement Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

p. Has senior management failed to review or been lax in
reviewing significant sales refunds and returns?
q. If side letters are suspected, has either of the following
occurred?
• Engineers, technicians, or others involved with the
installation of the products indicated that certain
customers made additional demands before agreeing to
buy.

• There are notes or letters in sales files indicating that
customer demands had been made to allow for returns or
refunds.
r. Are sales approved before obtaining credit checks for new
customers or for existing customers that are experiencing
financial difficulties?

s. Is there an unusual concentration of orders from small or
distressed customers occurring near the end of a reporting
period or sales contest?
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Appendix:
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin:

No. 99-Materiality
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 211

[Release No. SAB 99]
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission

ACTION: Publication of Staff Accounting Bulletin
SUMMARY: This staff accounting bulletin expresses the views of the staff that exclusive
reliance on certain quantitative benchmarks to assess materiality in preparing financial
statements and performing audits of those financial statements is inappropriate;
misstatements are not immaterial simply because they fall beneath a numerical threshold.

DATE: August 12, 1999
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: W. Scott Bayless, Associate Chief
Accountant, or Robert E. Burns, Chief Counsel, Office of the Chief Accountant (202-9424400), or David R. Fredrickson, Office of General Counsel (202-942-0900), Securities and
Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549-1103; electronic
addresses: BaylessWS@sec.gov; BurnsR@sec.gov; FredricksonD@sec.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The statements in the staff accounting bulletins
are not rules or interpretations of the Commission, nor are they published as bearing the
Commission’s official approval. They represent interpretations and practices followed by
the Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant in
administering the disclosure requirements of the Federal securities laws.

Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary

Date: August 12, 1999

Part 21 l-(AMEND) Accordingly, Part 211 of Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
amended by adding Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 to the table found in Subpart B.
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STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN NO. 99

The staff hereby adds Section M to Topic 1 of the Staff Accounting Bulletin Series. Section
M, entitled “Materiality,” provides guidance in applying materiality thresholds to the
preparation of financial statements filed with the Commission and the performance of
audits of those financial statements.

STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETINS
TOPIC 1: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

M. Materiality

1. Assessing Materiality

Facts: During the course of preparing or auditing year-end financial statements, financial
management or the registrant’s independent auditor becomes aware of misstatements in a
registrant’s financial statements. When combined, the misstatements result in a 4%
overstatement of net income and a $.02 (4%) overstatement of earnings per share. Because
no item in the registrant’s consolidated financial statements is misstated by more than 5%,
management and the independent auditor conclude that the deviation from generally
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) is immaterial and that the accounting is
permissible.1
Question: Each Statement of Financial Accounting Standards adopted by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) states, “The provisions of this Statement need not be
applied to immaterial items.” In the staff's view, may a registrant or the auditor of its
financial statements assume the immateriality of items that fall below a percentage
threshold set by management or the auditor to determine whether amounts and items are
material to the financial statements?

Interpretive Response: No. The staff is aware that certain registrants, over time, have
developed quantitative thresholds as “rules of thumb” to assist in the preparation of their
financial statements, and that auditors also have used these thresholds in their evaluation of
whether items might be considered material to users of a registrant’s financial statements.
One rule of thumb in particular suggests that the misstatement or omission2 of an item that
falls under a 5% threshold is not material in the absence of particularly egregious
circumstances, such as self-dealing or misappropriation by senior management. The staff
reminds registrants and the auditors of their financial statements that exclusive reliance on
this or any percentage or numerical threshold has no basis in the accounting literature or
the law.
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may provide the basis for a
preliminary assumption that—without considering all relevant circumstances—a deviation of
less than the specified percentage with respect to a particular item on the registrant’s
financial statements is unlikely to be material. The staff has no objection to such a “rule of
thumb” as an initial step in assessing materiality. But quantifying, in percentage terms, the
magnitude of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality; it cannot
appropriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant considerations.
Materiality concerns the significance of an item to users of a registrant’s financial
statements. A matter is “material” if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
58
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person would consider it important. In its Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.
2, the FASB stated the essence of the concept of materiality as follows:

The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the
light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is
probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would
have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.3

This formulation in the accounting literature is in substance identical to the formulation
used by the courts in interpreting the federal securities laws. The Supreme Court has held
that a fact is material if there is—
a substantial likelihood that the . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of information
made available.4

Under the governing principles, an assessment of materiality requires that one views the
facts in the context of the “surrounding circumstances,” as the accounting literature puts it,
or the “total mix” of information, in the words of the Supreme Court. In the context of a
misstatement of a financial statement item, while the “total mix” includes the size in
numerical or percentage terms of the misstatement, it also includes the factual context in
which the user of financial statements would view the financial statement item. The
shorthand in the accounting and auditing literature for this analysis is that financial
management and the auditor must consider both “quantitative” and “qualitative” factors in
assessing an item’s materiality.5 Court decisions, Commission rules and enforcement
actions, and accounting and auditing literature6 have all considered “qualitative” factors in
various contexts.
The FASB has long emphasized that materiality cannot be reduced to a numerical formula.
In its Concepts Statement No. 2, the FASB noted that some had urged it to promulgate
quantitative materiality guides for use in a variety of situations. The FASB rejected such an
approach as representing only a “minority view,” stating—
The predominant view is that materiality judgments can properly be made only
by those who have all the facts. The Board’s present position is that no general
standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account all the
considerations that enter into an experienced human judgment. 7

The FASB noted that, in certain limited circumstances, the Commission and other
authoritative bodies had issued quantitative materiality guidance, citing as examples
guidelines ranging from one to ten percent with respect to a variety of disclosures.8 And it
took account of contradictory studies, one showing a lack of uniformity among auditors on
materiality judgments, and another suggesting widespread use of a “rule of thumb” of five
to ten percent of net income.9 The FASB also considered whether an evaluation of
materiality could be based solely on anticipating the market’s reaction to accounting
information.10
The FASB rejected a formulaic approach to discharging “the onerous duty of making
materiality decisions”11 in favor of an approach that takes into account all the relevant
considerations. In so doing, it made clear that—
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[Magnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the
circumstances in which the judgment has to be made, will not generally be a
sufficient basis for a materiality judgment.12
Evaluation of materiality requires a registrant and its auditor to consider all the relevant
circumstances, and the staff believes that there are numerous circumstances in which
misstatements below 5% could well be material. Qualitative factors may cause
misstatements of quantitatively small amounts to be material; as stated in the auditing
literature:
As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in
materiality judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come to the
auditor’s attention could have a material effect on the financial statements.13

Among the considerations that may well render material a quantitatively small
misstatement of a financial statement item are-

whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of precise measurement or
whether it arises from an estimate and, if so, the degree of imprecision inherent in
the estimate14
whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends
whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations
for the enterprise
whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or vice versa
whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s
business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s
operations or profitability
whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with regulatory
requirements
whether the misstatement affects the registrant’s compliance with loan covenants
or other contractual requirements
whether the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s
compensation-for example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses
or other forms of incentive compensation
whether the misstatement involves concealment of an unlawful transaction.

This is not an exhaustive list of the circumstances that may affect the materiality of a
quantitatively small misstatement.15 Among other factors, the demonstrated volatility of
the price of a registrant’s securities in response to certain types of disclosures may provide
guidance as to whether investors regard quantitatively small misstatements as material.
Consideration of potential market reaction to disclosure of a misstatement is by itself “too
blunt an instrument to be depended on” in considering whether a fact is material.16 When,
however, management or the independent auditor expects (based, for example, on a
pattern of market performance) that a known misstatement may result in a significant
positive or negative market reaction, that expected reaction should be taken into account
when considering whether a misstatement is material.17

For the reasons noted above, the staff believes that a registrant and the auditors of its
financial statements should not assume that even small intentional misstatements in
60
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financial statements, for example those pursuant to actions to “manage” earnings, are
immaterial.18 While the intent of management does not render a misstatement material, it
may provide significant evidence of materiality. The evidence may be particularly
compelling where management has intentionally misstated items in the financial statements
to “manage” reported earnings. In that instance, it presumably has done so believing that
the resulting amounts and trends would be significant to users of the registrant’s financial
statements.19 The staff believes that investors generally would regard as significant a
management practice to over- or under-state earnings up to an amount just short of a
percentage threshold in order to “manage” earnings. Investors presumably also would
regard as significant an accounting practice that, in essence, rendered all earnings figures
subject to a management-directed margin of misstatement.

The materiality of a misstatement may turn on where it appears in the financial statements.
For example, a misstatement may involve a segment of the registrant’s operations. In that
instance, in assessing materiality of a misstatement to the financial statements taken as a
whole, registrants and their auditors should consider not only the size of the misstatement
but also the significance of the segment information to the financial statements taken as a
whole.20 “A misstatement of the revenue and operating profit of a relatively small segment
that is represented by management to be important to the future profitability of the
entity”21 is more likely to be material to investors than a misstatement in a segment that
management has not identified as especially important. In assessing the materiality of
misstatements in segment information-as with materiality generally
situations may arise in practice where the auditor will conclude that a matter
relating to segment information is qualitatively material even though, in his or
her judgment, it is quantitatively immaterial to the financial statements taken as a
whole.22
Aggregating and Netting Misstatements

In determining whether multiple misstatements cause the financial statements to be
materially misstated, registrants and the auditors of their financial statements should
consider each misstatement separately and the aggregate effect of all misstatements.23 A
registrant and its auditor should evaluate misstatements in light of quantitative and
qualitative factors and “consider whether, in relation to individual line item amounts,
subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they materially misstate the financial
statements taken as a whole.”24 This requires consideration of-

the significance of an item to a particular entity (for example, inventories to a
manufacturing company), the pervasiveness of the misstatement (such as whether
it affects the presentation of numerous financial statement items), and the effect of
the misstatement on the financial statements taken as a whole . . . .25

Registrants and their auditors first should consider whether each misstatement is material,
irrespective of its effect when combined with other misstatements. The literature notes that
the analysis should consider whether the misstatement of “individual amounts” causes a
material misstatement of the financial statements taken as a whole. As with materiality
generally, this analysis requires consideration of both quantitative and qualitative factors.
If the misstatement of an individual amount causes the financial statements as a whole to be
materially misstated, that effect cannot be eliminated by other misstatements whose effect
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may be to diminish the impact of the misstatement on other financial statement items. To
take an obvious example, if a registrant’s revenues are a material financial statement item
and if they are materially overstated, the financial statements taken as a whole will be
materially misleading even if the effect on earnings is completely offset by an equivalent
overstatement of expenses.

Even though a misstatement of an individual amount may not cause the financial
statements taken as a whole to be materially misstated, it may nonetheless, when aggregated
with other misstatements, render the financial statements taken as a whole to be materially
misleading. Registrants and the auditors of their financial statements accordingly should
consider the effect of the misstatement on subtotals or totals. The auditor should aggregate
all misstatements that affect each subtotal or total and consider whether the misstatements
in the aggregate affect the subtotal or total in a way that causes the registrant’s financial
statements taken as a whole to be materially misleading.26
The staff believes that, in considering the aggregate effect of multiple misstatements on a
subtotal or total, registrants and the auditors of their financial statements should exercise
particular care when considering whether to offset (or the appropriateness of offsetting) a
misstatement of an estimated amount with a misstatement of an item capable of precise
measurement. As noted above, assessments of materiality should never be purely
mechanical; given the imprecision inherent in estimates, there is by definition a
corresponding imprecision in the aggregation of misstatements involving estimates with
those that do not involve an estimate.

Registrants and auditors also should consider the effect of misstatements from prior periods
on the current financial statements. For example, the auditing literature states,
Matters underlying adjustments proposed by the auditor but not recorded by the
entity could potentially cause future financial statements to be materially
misstated, even though the auditor has concluded that the adjustments are not
material to the current financial statements.27
This may be particularly the case where immaterial misstatements recur in several years
and the cumulative effect becomes material in the current year.
2. Immaterial Misstatements That are Intentional
Facts: A registrant’s management intentionally has made adjustments to various financial
statement items in a manner inconsistent with GAAP. In each accounting period in which
such actions were taken, none of the individual adjustments is by itself material, nor is the
aggregate effect on the financial statements taken as a whole material for the period. The
registrant’s earnings “management” has been effected at the direction or acquiescence of
management in the belief that any deviations from GAAP have been immaterial and that
accordingly the accounting is permissible.
Question: In the staff's view, may a registrant make intentional immaterial misstatements
in its financial statements?
Interpretive Response: No. In certain circumstances, intentional immaterial
misstatements are unlawful.
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Considerations of the Books and Records Provisions Under the Exchange Act

Even if misstatements are immaterial,28 registrants must comply with Sections 13(b) (2)-(7)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).29 Under these provisions,
each registrant with securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act,30 or
required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d),31 must make and keep books, records,
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of assets of the registrant and must maintain internal accounting controls that
are sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that, among other things, transactions are
recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of financial statements in conformity with
GAAP.32 In this context, determinations of what constitutes “reasonable assurance” and
“reasonable detail” are based not on a “materiality” analysis but on the level of detail and
degree of assurance that would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.22
Accordingly, failure to record accurately immaterial items, in some instances, may result in
violations of the securities laws.

The staff recognizes that there is limited authoritative guidance34 regarding the
“reasonableness” standard in Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act. A principal statement of
the Commission’s policy in this area is set forth in an address given in 1981 by then
Chairman Harold M. Williams.35 In his address, Chairman Williams noted that, like
materiality, “reasonableness” is not an “absolute standard of exactitude for corporate
records.”36 Unlike materiality, however, “reasonableness” is not solely a measure of the
significance of a financial statement item to investors. “Reasonableness,” in this context,
reflects a judgment as to whether an issuer’s failure to correct a known misstatement
implicates the purposes underlying the accounting provisions of Sections 13(b)(2)-(7) of the
Exchange Act.37
In assessing whether a misstatement results in a violation of a registrant’s obligation to keep
books and records that are accurate “in reasonable detail,” registrants and their auditors
should consider, in addition to the factors discussed above concerning an evaluation of a
misstatement’s potential materiality, the factors set forth below.

The significance of the misstatement. Though the staff does not believe that
registrants need to make finely calibrated determinations of significance with
respect to immaterial items, plainly it is “reasonable” to treat misstatements
whose effects are clearly inconsequential differently than more significant ones.
How the misstatement arose. It is unlikely that it is ever “reasonable” for
registrants to record misstatements or not to correct known misstatements—even
immaterial ones—as part of an ongoing effort directed by or known to senior
management for the purposes of “managing” earnings. On the other hand,
insignificant misstatements that arise from the operation of systems or recurring
processes in the normal course of business generally will not cause a registrant’s
books to be inaccurate “in reasonable detail.”38

The cost of correcting the misstatement. The books and records provisions of
the Exchange Act do not require registrants to make major expenditures to
correct small misstatements.39 Conversely, where there is little cost or delay
involved in correcting a misstatement, failing to do so is unlikely to be
“reasonable.”
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The clarity of authoritative accounting guidance with respect to the
misstatement. Where reasonable minds may differ about the appropriate
accounting treatment of a financial statement item, a failure to correct it may not
render the registrant’s financial statements inaccurate “in reasonable detail.”
Where, however, there is little ground for reasonable disagreement, the case for
leaving a misstatement uncorrected is correspondingly weaker.
There may be other indicators of “reasonableness” that registrants and their auditors may
ordinarily consider. Because the judgment is not mechanical, the staff will be inclined to
continue to defer to judgments that “allow a business, acting in good faith, to comply with
the Act’s accounting provisions in an innovative and cost-effective way.”40
The Auditor’s Response to Intentional Misstatements

Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act requires auditors to take certain actions upon discovery
of an “illegal act. ”41 The statute specifies that these obligations are triggered “whether or
not [the illegal acts are] perceived to have a material effect on the financial statements of the
issuer . . . .” Among other things, Section 10A(b)(l) requires the auditor to inform the
appropriate level of management of an illegal act (unless clearly inconsequential) and assure
that the registrant’s audit committee is “adequately informed” with respect to the illegal act.

As noted, an intentional misstatement of immaterial items in a registrant’s financial
statements may violate Section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act and thus be an illegal act.
When such a violation occurs, an auditor must take steps to see that the registrant’s audit
committee is “adequately informed” about the illegal act. Because Section 10A(b)(l) is
triggered regardless of whether an illegal act has a material effect on the registrant’s
financial statements, where the illegal act consists of a misstatement in the registrant’s
financial statements, the auditor will be required to report that illegal act to the audit
committee irrespective of any “netting” of the misstatements with other financial statement
items.
The requirements of Section 10A echo the auditing literature. See, for example, Statement
on Auditing Standards No. (“SAS”) 54, “Illegal Acts by Clients,” and SAS 82,
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.” Pursuant to paragraph 38 of SAS
82, if the auditor determines there is evidence that fraud may exist, the auditor must discuss
the matter with the appropriate level of management. The auditor must report directly to
the audit committee fraud involving senior management and fraud that causes a material
misstatement of the financial statements. Paragraph 4 of SAS 82 states that “misstatements
arising from fraudulent financial reporting are intentional misstatements or omissions of
amounts or disclosures in financial statements to deceive financial statement users.”42 SAS
82 further states that fraudulent financial reporting may involve falsification or alteration of
accounting records; misrepresenting or omitting events, transactions or other information in
the financial statements; and the intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating
to amounts, classifications, the manner of presentation, or disclosures in the financial
statements.43 The clear implication of SAS 82 is that immaterial misstatements may be
fraudulent financial reporting. 44
Auditors that learn of intentional misstatements may also be required to (1) re-evaluate the
degree of audit risk involved in the audit engagement, (2) determine whether to revise the
nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures accordingly, and (3) consider whether to
resign.45
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Intentional misstatements also may signal the existence of reportable conditions or material
weaknesses in the registrant’s system of internal accounting control designed to detect and
deter improper accounting and financial reporting.46 As stated by the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission,
in its 1987 report,

The tone set by top management—the corporate environment or culture within
which financial reporting occurs—is the most important factor contributing to the
integrity of the financial reporting process. Notwithstanding an impressive set of
written rules and procedures, if the tone set by management is lax, fraudulent
financial reporting is more likely to occur.47
An auditor is required to report to a registrant’s audit committee any reportable conditions
or material weaknesses in a registrant’s system of internal accounting control that the
auditor discovers in the course of the examination of the registrant’s financial statements.48
GAAP Precedence Over Industry Practice

Some have argued to the staff that registrants should be permitted to follow an industry
accounting practice even though that practice is inconsistent with authoritative accounting
literature. This situation might occur if a practice is developed when there are few
transactions and the accounting results are clearly inconsequential, and that practice never
changes despite a subsequent growth in the number or materiality of such transactions. The
staff disagrees with this argument. Authoritative literature takes precedence over industry
practice that is contrary to GAAP.49
General Comments

This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance in the accounting or auditing
literature.50 This SAB and the authoritative accounting literature cannot specifically
address all of the novel and complex business transactions and events that may occur.
Accordingly, registrants may account for, and make disclosures about, these transactions
and events based on analogies to similar situations or other factors. The staff may not,
however, always be persuaded that a registrant’s determination is the most appropriate
under the circumstances. When disagreements occur after a transaction or an event has
been reported, the consequences may be severe for registrants, auditors, and, most
importantly, the users of financial statements who have a right to expect consistent
accounting and reporting for, and disclosure of, similar transactions and events. The staff,
therefore, encourages registrants and auditors to discuss on a timely basis with the staff
proposed accounting treatments for, or disclosures about, transactions or events that are not
specifically covered by the existing accounting literature.

Footnotes
-[1]- American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), Codification of
Statements on Auditing Standards (“AU”) § 312, “Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting
an Audit,” states that the auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a)
planning and setting the scope for the audit and (b) evaluating whether the financial
statements taken as a whole are fairly presented in all material respects in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles. The purpose of this Staff Accounting Bulletin
(“SAB”) is to provide guidance to financial management and independent auditors with
respect to the evaluation of the materiality of misstatements that are identified in the audit
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

65

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

process or preparation of the financial statements (i.e., (b) above). This SAB is not intended
to provide definitive guidance for assessing “materiality” in other contexts, such as
evaluations of auditor independence, as other factors may apply. There may be other rules
that address financial presentation. See, e.g., Rule 2a-4, 17 CFR 270.2a-4, under the
Investment Company Act of 1940.

- [2]- As used in this SAB, “misstatement” or “omission” refers to a financial statement
assertion that would not be in conformity with GAAP.
- [3]- FASB, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics
of Accounting Information (“Concepts Statement No. 2”), 132 (1980). See also Concepts
Statement No. 2, Glossary of Terms-Materiality.
- [4]- TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). See also Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, determinations of
materiality require “delicate assessments of the inferences a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would
draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him . . . .” TSC
Industries, 426 U.S. at 450.

- [5]- See, e.g., Concepts Statement No. 2, 123-124; AU § 312.10 (“. . . materiality judgments
are made in light of surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative
and qualitative considerations.”); AU § 312.34 (“Qualitative considerations also influence
the auditor in reaching a conclusion as to whether misstatements are material.”). As used in
the accounting literature and in this SAB, “qualitative” materiality refers to the surrounding
circumstances that inform an investor’s evaluation of financial statement entries. Whether
events may be material to investors for non-financial reasons is a matter not addressed by
this SAB.

- [6]- See, e.g., Rule l-02(o) of Regulation S-X, 17 CFR 210.1-02(o), Rule 405 of Regulation
C, 17CFR 230.405, and Rule 12b-2, 17 CFR 240.12b-2; AU §§ 312.10-.11, 317.13, 411.04
n. 1, and 508.36; In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation, 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Westinghouse
Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996); In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co.,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. (“AAER”) 1140 (June 30, 1999); In the
Matter of Eugene Gaughan, AAER 1141 (June 30, 1999); In the Matter of Thomas Scanlon,
AAER 1142 (June 30, 1999); and In re Sensormatic Electronics Corporation, Sec. Act Rel.
No. 7518 (March 25, 1998).
- [7]- Concepts Statement No. 2, 131 (1980).
- [8]- Concepts Statement No. 2, 131 and 166.

- [9]- Concepts Statement No. 2, 167.
- [10]- Concepts Statement No. 2, 168-69.

- [11]- Concepts Statement No. 2, 170.
- [12]- Concepts Statement No. 2, 125.
- [13]- AU §312.11.

- [14]- As stated in Concepts Statement No. 2, 130:
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Another factor in materiality judgments is the degree of precision that is
attainable in estimating the judgment item. The amount of deviation that is
considered immaterial may increase as the attainable degree of precision
decreases. For example, accounts payable usually can be estimated more
accurately than can contingent liabilities arising from litigation or threats of it,
and a deviation considered to be material in the first case may be quite trivial in
the second.

This SAB is not intended to change current law or guidance in the accounting literature
regarding accounting estimates. See, e.g., Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20,
Accounting Changes 10, 11, 31-33 (July 1971).
- [15]- The staff understands that the Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force (“Task Force”)
was convened in March of 1998 and has made recommendations to the Auditing Standards
Board including suggestions regarding communications with audit committees about
unadjusted misstatements. See generally Big Five Audit Materiality Task Force, “Materiality
in a Financial Statement Audit—Considering Qualitative Factors When Evaluating Audit
Findings” (August 1998). The Task Force memorandum is available at www.aicpa.org.
- [16]- See Concepts Statement No. 2, 169.
- [17]- If management does not expect a significant market reaction, a misstatement still may
be material and should be evaluated under the criteria discussed in this SAB.
- [18]- Intentional management of earnings and intentional misstatements, as used in this
SAB, do not include insignificant errors and omissions that may occur in systems and
recurring processes in the normal course of business. See notes 38 and 50 infra.

- [19]- Assessments of materiality should occur not only at year-end, but also during the
preparation of each quarterly or interim financial statement. See, e.g., In the Matter of
Venator Group, Inc., AAER 1049 (June 29, 1998).
- [20]- See, e.g., In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., AAER 1140 (June 30, 1999).

- [21]- AUI § 326.33.

- [22]- Id.
- [23]- The auditing literature notes that the “concept of materiality recognizes that some
matters, either individually or in the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.” AU §
312.03. See also AU §312.04.

- [24]- AU § 312.34. Quantitative materiality assessments often are made by comparing
adjustments to revenues, gross profit, pretax and net income, total assets, stockholders’
equity, or individual line items in the financial statements. The particular items in the
financial statements to be considered as a basis for the materiality determination depend on
the proposed adjustment to be made and other factors, such as those identified in this SAB.
For example, an adjustment to inventory that is immaterial to pretax income or net income
may be material to the financial statements because it may affect a working capital ratio or
cause the registrant to be in default of loan covenants.
- [25]- AU § 508.36.
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-[26]- AU § 312.34

-[27]- AU § 380.09.
- [28]- FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (“Standards” or “Statements”)
generally provide that “[t]he provisions of this Statement need not be applied to immaterial
items.” This SAB is consistent with that provision of the Statements. In theory, this language
is subject to the interpretation that the registrant is free intentionally to set forth immaterial
items in financial statements in a manner that plainly would be contrary to GAAP if the
misstatement were material. The staff believes that the FASB did not intend this result.

-[29]- 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)-(7).
- [30]- 15 U.S.C. § 781.
- [31]- 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d).
- [32]- Criminal liability may be imposed if a person knowingly circumvents or knowingly
fails to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsifies books,
records or accounts. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(4) and (5). See also Rule 13b2-l under the Exchange
Act, 17 CFR 240.13b2-l, which states, “No person shall, directly or indirectly, falsify or
cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the
Securities Exchange Act.”
- [33]- 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7). The books and records provisions of section 13(b) of the
Exchange Act originally were passed as part of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”). In the conference committee report regarding the 1988 amendments to the
FCPA, the committee stated,

The conference committee adopted the prudent man qualification in order to
clarify that the current standard does not connote an unrealistic degree of
exactitude or precision. The concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates
the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs of compliance.
Cong. Rec. H2116 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
- [34]- So far as the staff is aware, there is only one judicial decision that discusses Section
13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act in any detail, SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567
F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983), and the courts generally have found that no private right of
action exists under the accounting and books and records provisions of the Exchange Act.
See e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990) andJS Service Center
Corporation v. General Electric Technical Services Company, 937 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).

- [35]- The Commission adopted the address as a formal statement of policy in Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 17500 (January 29, 1981), 46 FR 11544 (February 9, 1981), 21
SEC Docket 1466 (February 10, 1981).
- [36]- Id. at46FR 11546.

- [37]- Id.
- [38]- For example, the conference report regarding the 1988 amendments to the FCPA
stated,
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The Conferees intend to codify current Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) enforcement policy that penalties not be imposed for insignificant or
technical infractions or inadvertent conduct. The amendment adopted by the
Conferees [Section 13(b)(4)] accomplishes this by providing that criminal
penalties shall not be imposed for failing to comply with the FCPA’s books and
records or accounting provisions. This provision [Section 13(b)(5)] is meant to
ensure that criminal penalties would be imposed where acts of commission or
omission in keeping books or records or administering accounting controls have
the purpose of falsifying books, records or accounts, or of circumventing the
accounting controls set forth in the Act. This would include the deliberate
falsification of books and records and other conduct calculated to evade the
internal accounting controls requirement.
Cong. Rec. H2115 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
- [39]- As Chairman Williams noted with respect to the internal control provisions of the
FCPA, “[t]housands of dollars ordinarily should not be spent conserving hundreds.” 46 FR
11546.

- [401- Id, at 11547.
- [41]- Section 10A(f) defines, for purposes of Section 10A, an “illegal act” as “an act or
omission that violates any law, or any rule or regulation having the force of law.” This is
broader than the definition of an “illegal act” in AU § 317.02, which states, “Illegal acts by
clients do not include personal misconduct by the entity’s personnel unrelated to their
business activities.”
- [42]- AU § 316.04. See also AU § 316.03. An unintentional illegal act triggers the same
procedures and considerations by the auditor as a fraudulent misstatement if the illegal act
has a direct and material effect on the financial statements. See AU §§ 110 n. 1, 316 n. 1,
317.05 and 317.07. Although distinguishing between intentional and unintentional
misstatements is often difficult, the auditor must plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatements in
either case. See AU § 316 note 3.
- [43]- AU § 316.04. Although the auditor is not required to plan or perform the audit to
detect misstatements that are immaterial to the financial statements, SAS 82 requires the
auditor to evaluate several fraud “risk factors” that may bring such misstatements to his or
her attention. For example, an analysis of fraud risk factors under SAS 82 must include,
among other things, consideration of management’s interest in maintaining or increasing
the registrant’s stock price or earnings trend through the use of unusually aggressive
accounting practices, whether management has a practice of committing to analysts or
others that it will achieve unduly aggressive or clearly unrealistic forecasts, and the
existence of assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that
involve unusually subjective judgments or uncertainties. See AU §§ 316.17a and .17c.

- [44]- AU §§ 316.34 and 316.35, in requiring the auditor to consider whether fraudulent
misstatements are material, and in requiring differing responses depending on whether the
misstatement is material, make clear that fraud can involve immaterial misstatements.
Indeed, a misstatement can be “inconsequential” and still involve fraud.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

69

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Under SAS 82, assessing whether misstatements due to fraud are material to the financial
statements is a “cumulative process” that should occur both during and at the completion of
the audit. SAS 82 further states that this accumulation is primarily a “qualitative matter”
based on the auditor’s judgment. AU § 316.33. The staff believes that in making these
assessments, management and auditors should refer to the discussion in Part 1 of this SAB.
- [45]- AU §§ 316.34 and 316.36. Auditors should document their determinations in
accordance with AU §§ 316.37, 319.57, 339, and other appropriate sections.
- 146]- See, e.g., AU § 316.39.
- [47]- Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting at 32
(October 1987). See also Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (February 8, 1999).

- [48]- AU § 325.02. See also AU § 380.09, which, in discussing matters to be communicated
by the auditor to the audit committee, states,

The auditor should inform the audit committee about adjustments arising from
the audit that could, in his judgment, either individually or in the aggregate, have
a significant effect on the entity’s financial reporting process. For purposes of this
section, an audit adjustment, whether or not recorded by the entity, is a proposed
correction of the financial statements ....
- [49]-See AU §411.05.
- [50]- The FASB Discussion Memorandum, Criteria for Determining Materiality, states that
the financial accounting and reporting process considers that “a great deal of the time might
be spent during the accounting process considering insignificant matters .... If
presentations of financial information are to be prepared economically on a timely basis
and presented in a concise intelligible form, the concept of materiality is crucial.” This SAB
is not intended to require that misstatements arising from insignificant errors and omissions
(individually and in the aggregate) arising from the normal recurring accounting close
processes, such as a clerical error or an adjustment for a missed accounts payable invoice,
always be corrected, even if the error is identified in the audit process and known to
management. Management and the auditor would need to consider the various factors
described elsewhere in this SAB in assessing whether such misstatements are material, need
to be corrected to comply with the FCPA, or trigger procedures under Section 10A of the
Exchange Act. Because this SAB does not change current law or guidance in the accounting
or auditing literature, adherence to the principles described in this SAB should not raise the
costs associated with recordkeeping or with audits of financial statements.

http://www.sec.gov/rules/acctrps/sab99.htm
Last update: 08/13/1999
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1

Construction
1.1 Introduction
The construction sector includes entities conducting the following kinds of operations:
• Residential and commercial building construction
• Construction of roads, bridges and similar public works
• Residential and commercial renovations
• Installation of plumbing, electrical and similar infrastructure

This sector is highly cyclical, and competition for work can be fierce. The competitive
pressure affecting construction firms, their employees, and sub-contractors can result in an
increased risk of fraud.

1.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Contract bidding fraud (bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and so on):
Competitive pressures can lead to collusion among bidders on a contract, thus exposing
the company to criminal prosecution. Alternatively, managers and employees who feel
they have little stake in the company may accept kickbacks or secret commissions from
either the company’s customers or its suppliers in exchange for under-the-table financial
consideration or preferential treatment.
• Materials substitution: Subcontractors may substitute materials of lower quality than
called for in the contract specifications, in order to (1) make a profit on contracts they
have underbid on, or (2) increase their profits. The company itself may also engage in
this practice, exposing itself to criminal prosecution or civil liability.
• Tax evasion (underground economy): Especially in residential construction and
renovations, companies may solicit or accept “cash-without-a-receipt” business, in order
to avoid sales taxes as well as reduce their income taxes.
• Employee misbehavior (theft, sabotage, and the like.): Depending on the nature of the
employee-employer relationship and the construction contract, some employees may
feel little loyalty to the projects they work on and have no inclination to complete work
on time. Line employees may steal materials or intentionally create time and cost
overruns to extend their own employment. As material and labor costs soar during the
construction phase, support personnel (for example, accounting or purchasing) may
concoct inventory or accounts payable schemes to defraud their employer or customers.

1.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the construction sector are described below.
• Corporate policies, particularly in the areas of employee relations and enforcement, are
key to establishing an environment that minimizes the risk of fraud. If both management
and lower-level employees feel they have a stake in the company and they also believe
that (1) they are being fairly treated, for example with respect to compensation, and (2)
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any employee will be severely dealt with for any breach of the law or the company’s
policies, then they are less likely to engage in fraud, commercial crime or destructive
acts.
• Physical access restrictions, for example with respect to construction materials and
supplies at the company’s premises and at work sites, will deter theft or sabotage.
• Supervisory performance and independent checks will help ensure that the company’s
work is up to contract standards and minimize the potential for materials substitution or
other quality problems.
• Adequate insurance is especially important in this sector.

1.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the construction sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Construction Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management—Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
construction sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, audit [especially
confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution (related controls include good
corporate policies and supervision)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, tax evasion, and violating
occupational health and safety laws (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal, audit
functions)
• Other key risk management issues for this sector: insurance
(continued)
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Construction Sector Checklist (continued)
Construction Sector Checklist
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the construction
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids,
been adequately addressed:

• Lapping frauds, such as accounts receivable lapping (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies, especially strict
enforcement)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Construction Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X
X

False advertising

X

Insider trading
X

Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety laws

X

Violation of privacy

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Construction Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Construction Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

8

X

X

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

2 Financial Services

2.1 Introduction
The extremely high liquid asset values of the financial-services industry when coupled with
the worldwide scope of its activities make it a prime target for fraud, from both inside and
outside. Indeed, Willie Sutton, the infamous bank robber, probably summed it up best
when he was asked why he robbed banks. He responded: “Because that’s where the money
is, stupid.”

Customers of this industry’s services are located throughout the world. Today, they can
access its services through the mail, the Internet, the telephone, and finally, the traditional
means, personally. Everyone, from small savers using their local bank’s ATM to
multinational conglomerates taking part in billion dollar mergers, requires this sector’s
services and products.
As a target for the fraudster, the financial-services industry is probably the richest and most
rewarding target there is. Therefore, there is a pressing need to ensure that adequate
internal controls are in place to deter and, when applicable, detect fraud on a timely basis.
This must be properly appreciated and addressed by the financial service entities’
managements, auditing and consulting CPAs, and customers.

For our purposes, the financial-services sector includes the following lines of business:
1. Banks (of all types including trust companies), and credit unions.
2. Insurance companies and insurance brokers.

3. Securities brokers (regardless of the type of investment or regulatory agency).
4. Mutual funds and retirement trust funds (including pension funds, 401ks and the like).
Although there may be a generally accepted perception that these entities are regulated by
government agencies, the level of official oversight varies greatly. Further, that oversight is
usually aimed at the solvency of the service entity itself, rather than whether an employee
of an entity or an entity’s customer is a fraudster. Therefore, neither the entities nor their
customers can afford complacency or carelessness.
The fraudster, relying on personal knowledge of what the oversight agencies regulate and
the controls that management has put in place, hatches his or her scheme to minimize the
risk of apprehension by avoiding those very controls. Yet, the fraudster proceeds with his
or her plan notwithstanding the general deterrence of criminal and civil laws. They know
what they are doing is wrong, but they do it anyway.

Moreover, the deregulation of the financial-services industry has lead to the creation of
super entities. Banks, insurance companies, investment brokers, and mutual funds are no
longer separate entities. They are complete financial-services entities providing one or
more services, all designed to provide their customers one-stop shopping. Unfortunately,
the resulting financial behemoths could become too large to be effectively monitored by
the same regulators and internal control systems that previously oversaw smaller, less
diversified entities. This consolidation has facilitated the entry of the fraudster into the
doors and portals of the industry and has provided increased opportunities for the fraudster
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to succeed. Incursions and fraudulent activity will likely become more widespread, more
remunerative, and more difficult to track down.
Therefore, CPAs, both internal and external, and managements of the financial-services
entities must actively develop and refine their systems of fraud prevention. They have to
keep in mind Willie Sutton’s observation; they are where the money is. They also must
keep the special risks inherent to the financial-services sector in the forefront of their
thinking. There is no gain to be made through profitable transactions if those profits are
flushed down unknown drains.
Well designed and diligently implemented internal control systems should provide a
special deterrence against the peculiar and prevalent types of fraud affecting the financialservices sector. As previously noted, the fraudster chooses to target the easy mark without
fear of the law. Making it harder for him or her to operate can only serve to plug the drain.

The following material, drawn from actual case experience endemic to financial-services
entities, summarizes and illustrates the kinds of fraudulent behavior to expect. These frauds
highlight the sector’s key vulnerabilities that are summarized and addressed by specific
recommendations and controls found in the Checklist and Grids.

2.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The financial-services sector is subject to fraud by a wide range of perpetrators. Those most
frequently encountered include:

• Employees. These frauds typically involve cash or accounts receivable. They range from
outright theft or skimming of cash to the setting up of phony customer accounts. For
example, some of the largest bank frauds have involved loan managers who set up
phony borrowers and diverted the loan proceeds to their own benefit.
• Customers. Banks are vulnerable to customer-perpetrated fraud schemes, such as check
kiting, credit-card/debit-card fraud, and phony loan security. Insurance companies are
particularly vulnerable to fake or inflated loss claims by their policyholders.

• Con artists. This wily group of individuals sees this sector as having deep pockets and
targets it with a wide variety of schemes, both direct and indirect. An example of a
direct fraud scheme is one in which a bank loan manager is approached with an
elaborate, seemingly irresistible short-term loan opportunity that would yield a quick
profit. The catch is that, in addition to the proposal being totally fraudulent, the loan
manager has to put up a large amount of bank funds for a short period of time. An
example of an indirect fraud scheme is the, so-called, bank inspector fraud, in which a
bank’s elderly customer is persuaded by the con artist to help in the investigation of a
teller. The catch is that the customer must withdraw a large amount of cash to further
the con artist’s phony investigation.
• Computers. The new tool of the fraudster. Hacking into other peoples’ accounts or
setting up fake transactions to net dollars is among the rapidly increasing number of
computer frauds that are showing up. The fraudster is relying on the sector’s heavy use
of automation and its inability to look at all transactions to provide the time needed to
grab the money and run.
• Breach of trust and related fiduciary activities: Fiduciary frauds include many types of
commercial crime; for example, a stock broker or money manager could abscond with
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a client’s funds or churn a client’s discretionary account with a series of unauthorized
transactions to increase commissions; money laundering; or invasion of privacy for gain.

Banks (of all Types Including Trust Companies), and Credit Unions
Banks (of all types including trust companies)1, and to a lesser extent credit unions, occupy
a special niche in our society. They are allowed to engage in both the receipt of deposits
and the lending of money. These cash-related activities offer numerous opportunities to the
fraudster, both internal and external to the organization.
A cause of concern for entities acting in a fiduciary capacity is the potential for fraud
through abuse of the relationship between a bank’s subsidiary acting as an investment
adviser and an investment vehicle, for example, a mutual fund sponsored and managed by
a different subsidiary of the bank. Although underlying trust documents impose a fiduciary
obligation on the bank as trustee to act in the best interest of the trust beneficiary,
individual officers may favor bank-sponsored investments to bolster their personal careers
to the detriment of the trust beneficiaries. Thus, internal relationships that induce,
especially through financial remuneration, the bank to disregard its own fiduciary
obligation may, depending on all of the attendant circumstances, lead to fraud. This is
especially true when there are willful failures to disclose possible conflicts of interest, as
happened with several banks implying to their customers that the pure investment products
they were selling were insured deposits. For a further discussion of this topic, see the
section below on mutual and pension funds.
Loan security is another bank vulnerability to fraud. Whether it is the loan applicant
providing collateral that is not what it purports to be or a loan officer knowingly accepting
insufficient collateral to show improved personal business, the potential for internal or
external fraud exists. If the loan is large enough and the collateral rotten enough, a bank’s
very financial stability could be threatened.

Collateral Can’t Be In Two Places At the Same Time Case Study

A bank sought to extend a substantial loan to a company in the precious-metals
industry. The company dutifully completed all of the forms, including granting a
security interest in its inventory of gold bars (bullion) to the bank. Following
established good practices, the bank obtained the right to periodically audit and
inspect the company’s inventory records and underlying inventory. Every three
months or so, the bank would send its internal audit team to check on its gold
bullion. On Friday, the team would visit a vault in South America and record the
presence of the hypothecated bullion. On Monday, the team would visit the vault
in New York City and again record the presence of the requisite gold horde.
Although the same gold bullion could not be in two different places at the same
time, it was discovered that the same gold bullion somehow managed to be in two
different places at two different times—just like the audit team!
1 For the purposes of this analysis, bank includes commercial banks, savings banks, trust companies, credit
unions and the like. There are important distinctions; for example, the agencies providing deposit insurance
are not of importance to this discussion of fraudulent behavior.
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Common sense and the willingness to devote adequate resources to important tasks
such as the verification of collateral are essential. The bank’s internal auditors failed
to take those steps that should normally be followed by a reasonable CPA
providing assurance services. For instance, the audits followed a recognizable
pattern: South America followed by New York, never the reverse; and the audits
were always sequential, never simultaneous.

Although there were probably other audit failings, such as giving the borrower
advance notice of the audit, the bank’s internal auditors had to establish a valid
audit program to assure the continued existence of the gold. A further open door to
fraud was the bank’s failure to take possession of the collateralized gold in escrow.
With the gold in its possession, the bank would be secure in its loan and its
customer would have been able to use the bullion for its own business purposes, but
with the bank’s knowledge and approval.

Collateral Must Exist To Be Collateral Case Study

A frozen-seafood distributor obtained a loan from a bank using its frozen-seafood
inventory as collateral. The bank properly executed all the normal collateralization
documents, including the right to inspect the inventory and value its existence.
Consistent with industry custom, the value of the collateral was indirectly related to
its age; that is, the value of the seafood substantially decreased as it aged in the
freezer.
Every three or four months, the bank would courteously call the seafood company,
and obtain a mutually convenient date on which the bank’s inspectors could inspect
and value the seafood inventory. Once notified of the impending audit, the seafood
company’s employees would change the dates on the inventory in the freezers,
making the old fresh and ever more valuable to the casual inspector.

In fact, the seafood company had been experiencing financial difficulties for a long
time. Sales were slow, and working capital was short. In brief, the company could
not afford to purchase new inventory.
The bank’s inspectors were more than polite. They also did not like to spend time
in the subzero temperatures inside the company’s freezers. After entering the cold
storage area, they would quickly check the dates of the boxes—labeled sea scallops,
count a few, and then perform rough estimates of value.

There are highly tasteful meals that could be made of frozen sea scallops: They
could be sauteed in garlic and olive oil and placed on a bed of saffron rice. This
company’s product, although labeled sea scallops, was actually detritus—inedible
filler. The only proper place for this collateral was in a landfill. As security, it cost
the bank more to haul it away than it would have fetched at market.
Among the lessons to be learned from this case are: know your customer, know
your customer’s product, go beyond the label on the package, and in all cases
follow established inventory audit practices. Failure to have the recognized
reasonable controls in place can only open the door wide for the external or
internal fraudster.
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Insurance Companies and Insurance Brokers
The insurance industry, which is an integral part of both the commercial and personal
economy, is made up of three overlapping discrete functions. First, there are the insurance
companies themselves (including reinsurance companies). They accept the risk of loss of
others, whether it be for accidents, earthquakes, injury or death. Then the brokerage sector
sells the product of the insurance companies to the world. Last is the claims function that
determines the validity and value of the loss claims, and whether or not the claim is
actually covered by the contract of insurance.
There is no uniformity in the insurance industry. Some insurance companies are totally
integrated. That is, all three functions are under one roof: underwriting, sales and claims
adjusting are all handled by the insurance company’s employees. Other insurance
companies “farm out” either the sales or adjustment functions to independent entities.
Further, these independent entities might contract to work exclusively for one insurance
company or agree to service a single insurance company.

Regardless of the structure, the same fraud opportunities, whether internal or external,
exist. However, as in any other industry, the effectiveness of the insurance policy and its
initiating sales step and subsequent potential for claims relies on the good-faith relationship
between the parties involved.

Reliance on good faith, however, is no deterrence for the fraudster. Sufficient internal
controls to make it difficult for the fraudster should be in place. Procedures at the insurance
company level as basic as randomly verifying application information or validity of claims
are needed (for example, was there really a hurricane on the date claimed?). Likewise at
the brokerage level there should also be controls in place to ensure that the application
information is valid. For instance, is the gray-haired, palsied applicant for a life insurance
policy really the macho 45-year old he claims to be? Or, for a claims department, is there a
methodology in place to determine that one doctor’s name is showing up on an inordinate
number of auto-accident injury claims?
At the same time, the customer of the insurance companies and its sales and claims
functions have to be aware of the frauds they could be subjected to. The simple step of
making sure that a company-issued contract of insurance is in hand will go a long way to
protect against sales fraud. In addition, it is important to check that any repairs to damaged
property are completed according to the terms of the insurance contract.

When Good Faith Becomes Bad Business Case Study
The ABC Company, a small start-up company, presents an interesting study of
reliance on good faith. ABC began operations as a small manufacturer of
specialized electronic parts for the defense industry. Due to good fortune and hard
work, ABC grew. It had always used the services of a particular insurance broker,
relying on it for all of the company’s and its principals’ insurance needs. Because
there had been no problems with the coverage or the service, there was no reason
for ABC to question the insured-broker relationship and certainly no reason to
change brokers. For years, premiums were dutifully sent to the broker, and the
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broker routinely sent broker-generated confirmations of insurance coverage to the
insured.

Unfortunately, the familiar maxim “you don’t know whether your basement takes
in water until it rains hard” was applicable in this instance. A terrible storm
engulfed the area. Many businesses and residences were devastated. Buildings,
equipment, and inventory were destroyed, including over a million dollars’ worth
of property damage to ABC.
“Thank God for the insurance,” exclaimed the principals of ABC. Unfortunately,
God was likely their best recourse. The long-trusted, premium-accumulating
insurance broker had discovered that there are warm and sunny places on the earth
where the long arms of the U.S. justice systems do not reach. What better place to
take all of those diverted premiums? The ABC Company discovered the hard way
that trust is like water. Some is essential to prevent dehydration; however, too much
will drown you. A simple, regular review of the insurance file to confirm the
presence of company-issued documents of valid insurance would have been
sufficient to avoid the loss.

The moral of this story: don’t accept the assurance of your insurance intermediaryyour broker-confirm that he or she spent your money with the insurance carrier;
look for the carrier-issued policy for verification.

Because this failure to pay over premiums was such a common occurrence, a
limited amount of the risk was shifted to the insurance companies. If a supposed
insured can prove payment of a premium to a fraudulent broker or agent, there is
some limited degree of protection. This is designed to help the unsophisticated
consumer. ABC’s losses would have far exceeded any industry or governmentordered protection.

Up in Smoke and Into Thin Air Case Study
In this case, the insurer was the deceived party. A New York City company, which
had a valid fire insurance policy covering structure and inventory, lost most of its
inventory in a warehouse fire. Unfortunately, the records proving the existence of
the inventory were also destroyed in the fire. The insurer quickly discovered that
you don’t necessarily know what you have until it’s gone, even if it was never really
there.

The insured prepared a million-dollar-plus claim for the lost inventory,
notwithstanding the absence of records and despite the existence of some eye
opening circumstances. Here are the obvious clues that all was not right with the
claim:
• First: the claimed value of the inventory was nearly three times the value of the
preceding year’s inventory. Was the company apparently anticipating an
unprecedented rush of sales or did it have an unexpected growth spurt?
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• Second: the non-financial records, including personnel files and insurance
policies, were removed from the warehouse office two weeks before the fire. The
financial records were the only records left in the office.
• Third: the insured tripled the insurance policy coverage on the last policy
renewal date one month prior to the fire. Was this the reasonable forward
looking planning of a profitable business or, in hindsight, the planning of an
unprofitable business?
• Fourth: in support of its proof of damages, the insured offered a valuation of the
company, including its inventory, dated less than two months before the fire.
The valuation was prepared for the owner as part of an apparently contentious
divorce proceeding with his estranged wife, who alleged that the owner had
incurred huge gambling debts.
The valuation was not credible, however, because it was tainted by irremediable
bias. Investigation revealed that the valuator and owner were brothers. In actual
fact, the only financial circumstance that could be verified was the owner’s
$100,000 payment to his brother, the valuator, for his fictitious valuation from
which both spouses hoped to reap a bonanza at the insurance company’s
expense.
• Fifth: the insured confirmed the suspicions of investigators when a fullyprepared claim was submitted less than two weeks after the fire.
Clearly, foresight is superior to hindsight; in this case the insured party was far too
well prepared. And the foresight of the insurance carrier to have the controls in
place to allow the recognition of the false claim illustrates that superiority of
foresight.

Cooking the Books Case Study
The construction industry is one of the most cyclical and seasonal. These expected
irregularities can threaten or impair a construction company’s ability to secure
surety bonding, a requirement necessary to bid for and obtain work. Pursuant to a
surety company’s demand, the construction company requested its independent
auditor, a CPA firm, to issue a report on the company’s financial statements for the
preceding year. The construction company’s management and the CPA firm’s audit
engagement partner foresaw some difficulties. The year in question was not a good
year for the company.

Business can be complicated. Thus, cooperation can be the foundation of success
for many ventures. Over the course of many years, the CPA firm had grown
dependent on the revenues received from its audits of the construction company. In
fact, the construction company was its best client.
The construction company management and the audit engagement partner agreed
that: the end justified the means. Besides, liberties, although improper, could be
taken with GAAP; there was apparent flexibility. Given the circumstances, the
company’s method, with the complicity of the auditor, of obtaining the bonding did
not seem relevant. Further, the auditor rationalized that it wasn’t as though the
company couldn’t do the job.
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In furtherance of the scheme, the company and the audit partner conspired to
prepare and issue fraudulent financial statements. Inevitably, Murphy’s Law (that
which will go wrong, will in fact go wrong) struck and the company, with a dire
shortage of working capital, defaulted on the job.

After the default the surety smelled a rat. Unfortunately, for the surety company, it
took the work of independent forensic accountants with an in-depth knowledge of
the construction industry to unravel and expose the deliberate falsity of the
financial statements. The surety, in relying exclusively on the company and its CPA
firm, did not perform its own due diligence.

A simple step, such as independently verifying bank accounts would have saved the
surety big bucks. Clearly, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

Stock and Other Investment Brokers
With so much wealth invested under the custody of stock and other investment brokers,
clients of the investment-brokerage industry need to keep a vigilant watch on their
investments (and therefore their money). Notwithstanding the general observation that
most brokerage activities are perfectly legitimate, fraudulent activity does occur both within
the inner workings of the industry and externally.
Internal fraud in the securities markets usually involves complex transactions, such as
illegally parking stocks and undisclosed trading on insider information for illicit personal
gain. Externally, the foisting of fraudulent investments on unsophisticated investors, who
are only too ready to put their money in investments that are too good to be true, is all too
common.

Exceptional circumstances organized or exploited by fraudsters may wreak financial
devastation on swindled clients. Often, fraud in the brokerage industry results from an
omission to disclose material information or an intentional misstatement of a material fact.
The fraudster manipulatively preys on greed, gullibility, and an unwillingness to look
behind the fraudster’s spiel. Getting the rich to part with their money is an art to which
some fraudsters dedicate years.

IfIt Looks Too Good To Be True...Case Study
A prominent couple in a New Jersey suburb had savings to invest. The husband
had been the mayor of his medium-sized town for eight years. The wife worked for
many years as a manager for a major insurance carrier in the same town. Arguably,
the husband and wife were reasonably sophisticated. Then they threw a party.

Friends invited friends and the couple made new acquaintances, including a welldressed, well-spoken, gentleman who worked for a small but apparently successful
brokerage firm in Connecticut. The couple had not heard of this brokerage, but
they had known their mutual friend for nearly two decades. What better reference
would they need other than the word-of-mouth assurance from their trusted friend?
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The broker recommended a hot new investment: limited-partnership interests in oil
and gas properties off the coast of China. These investments were hot and
availability was selectively limited, so the broker urged the couple to act quickly or
risk being frozen out of the offering.
To be part of the buying syndicate, the couple had to put $200,000 up-front
immediately. They knew that they should wait for the prospectus but they were
afraid the delay could mean the possibility of losing the opportunity to put their
money into this sure-fire investment. So rather than wait, the couple transferred the
requested funds to the broker, and in due course they received papers verifying
their investment. For eighteen months the couple received a monthly statement
showing the value of their investment in the limited-partnership interests. It was a
good investment, or at least it seemed so on paper.

After two months passed without a statement, however, the couple called the
broker, using the telephone number on the earlier months’ statements. The
telephone company informed them that the number was no longer in service.

Further inquiry revealed the following:
• The limited partnerships never existed in economic reality.
• The brokerage had no employees other than their friend’s friend.
• Neither the brokerage nor its sole employee was registered at the state or federal
level to sell securities.
• The only asset owned or held by the brokerage was a computer with a highquality printer.
What went wrong here? Quite simply, the fraudster, posing as an investment
broker, was working on the principle that you can’t fool all of the people all of the
time, but you can fool some of the people some of the time. Especially if greed is
involved.

It is foolish for anyone to think that he or she is immune from being prey to such
tactics. It takes a wise person to recognize that anyone can be deceived, particularly
if there is pressure based on the importance of acting quickly—no need to perform
your normal due diligence, you know I’m legit—and greed—returns like this don’t
come along every day—are permitted to override reason. Wearing an expensive
suit, flashing luxury jewelry, and displaying the confidence of a person who has
profound familiarity with the capital markets are personal attributes that assure
neither any return on investment nor a commitment to act with integrity.

Among other types of fraud perpetrated by unscrupulous brokers are unauthorized trading,
churning, and market (price) manipulation. Occasionally, the compensation structure
applicable to brokers serves to promote fraudulent conduct. Brokers whose income
depends on commissions and bonuses based on the volume of trading generated by their
clients are directly rewarded for the quantity and not the quality of trades they initiate on
behalf of their clients. This suggests that clients should exercise careful scrutiny of their
broker’s conduct, especially when it comes to granting discretion to trade. Probably the
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best advice is: do not give unfettered trading discretion to a broker or investment adviser.
Although the broker could be totally honest when the relationship begins, a change in
circumstances brought about by events, such as losses at the racetrack or in the market, or
unexpected heavy medical expenses at home, could change the situation. The potential
temptation for fraud is always there.
Among the brokerage-related scams in vogue is a short-sellers’ spreading of intentionally
false and misleading information in an attempt to depress the value of a target company’s
publicly traded stock. This practice has become particularly prevalent on bulletin boards
through the Internet. Of course, the victim here is not only the company but also investors
who were duped into selling perfectly good stock for the wrong reason. Typically, in these
cases the short-selling broker-dealer accumulates a substantial uncovered short position in
the company’s stock. Essentially, the broker-dealer sells borrowed stock; that is, stock that
the broker-dealer is obligated to purchase in the future to apply against the uncovered short
position.
In the case of the good-faith short-seller, he or she is speculating that the price in the target
company’s stock will drop for any number of valid market reasons, such as failure to meet
earnings projections or the loss of a significant customer. Short selling is a valid and sound
trading tactic. However, in the case of the bad faith short-seller, he or she is deliberately
engaged in market manipulation for the purpose of depressing the target’s stock price for
personal gain. The fraudster posts rumors or tips on message boards warning of events,
such as high-level management dissension or recent inquiry by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or some other such risk-raising circumstance. Often in these cases, investors
cannot or will not engage in patient reasoning or exercising due diligence. The race goes to
the swift, and the herd-mentality takes over, causing a deluge of sell orders, depressing the
target company’s stock price to the joy and personal enrichment of the fraudster.
Although this kind of fraud is relatively easy for the short seller to perpetrate in stocks with
limited distribution, it is more difficult for widely held stocks. The new tool of the fraudster
is the Internet. It provides the opportunity to widely distribute opinions, regardless of their
validity. At the same time the Internet facilitates the fraudster’s trading activities from the
comfort of his or her home. As well, the Internet provides a certain degree of secrecy.
There is a tendency by users to accept the information posted and the trades don’t
necessarily show up immediately in the normal source sites. It behooves the investor to be
wary of and resist unfounded rumors and other misleading acts of market manipulation.

Mutual and Retirement Funds
The multi-billion-dollar value of investments in mutual and retirement funds presents a
strong appeal for the fraudster. The mutual fund managers and retirement fund trustees as
institutional investors have substantial market power and can command expert service,
including research, from the securities industry. Moreover, the money in these funds often
represents savings to be held for long-term investments for which custody has been given
to a fiduciary, that is, fund manager or retirement plan trustee. While most situations
involve reliable, competent administrators, it is always best to be aware of the pitfalls that
can and do occur. Although no one can anticipate all of the acts of the fraudster, care
should be taken to limit vulnerability and to maintain the flow of timely feedback. Few
people are so busy that they can afford to lose hundreds of thousands of dollars. There is
no substitute for vigilant monitoring of investments regardless of whether they are held in
mutual funds, retirement plans or “long,” that is, in the securities themselves.
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Too Busy, Too Trusting, Too Bad Case Study
Occasionally, the lines of communication between mutual fund administrator and
individual investors are subjected to malicious manipulation, often, as a result of the
investors’ own (misguided or erroneous) request. For instance, a well-respected
mutual fund regularly mailed its monthly statements to its investors. One investor
requested that his statements be mailed to his newly selected financial adviser,
notifying the mutual fund that he was too busy to read them. At a later date, the
adviser provided evidence of authority to act on behalf of the investor. Shortly
thereafter, the adviser, without advising the client, liquidated the entire mutual fund
investment, requesting that the proceeds be delivered to his address. The backoffice of the mutual fund complied, not suspecting the fraudulent action of the
adviser. Unfortunately, the financial adviser had no specific authority to order the
complete redemption on behalf of the investor. The documentation provided to the
mutual fund was bogus; the money disappeared into Nigeria. Worse, the investor
did not discover this swindle until several months after the fact. He was too busy.
Generally, mutual funds provide a ready means of diversifying a portfolio without
buying all the individual stocks (or bonds) held in the fund. Professionals, usually
with verifiable records of performance, manage the funds. Regulatory monitoring is
with the federal government (SEC), and some states offer additional regulation
through their blue-sky laws. This monitoring does not, however, extend to the type
or quality of the investments. Thus, the door is open for a mutual fund,
notwithstanding management by professionals who should know better, to fall
victim to fraudulent conduct. The competition to increase investment-return
performance, which it is hoped will stimulate sales of the mutual fund, can lead to
investments with a higher risk of fraud. For instance, investing in emerging nations
could successfully yield high returns, but often the lack of regulation, lax
enforcement of existing regulations, and different standards of business ethics lead
to fraud-induced investment losses. The further afield the search for an investment
takes the investment manager, the greater the risk of making an investment that is
likely to fail as a result of fraud.

Gambling by Any Other Name Is Still Gambling Case Study

Some mutual fund managers are as willing to buy rosy but unrealistic prospects and
forecasts as any other credulous investor. Returns from a manufacturing company
based in the Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Union) were
expected to increase dramatically. With privatization loosening the market and a
large influx of capital from U.S. mutual fund investors, this business could not lose.
It had made money under the rigid Soviet administration, so it stood to reason that
it could only make more money given the application of Western capitalism.
Unfortunately, the economic model practiced by the business was crony capitalism.
Only a fraction of the invested capital trickled down to the actual production, and
the debts incurred by the rapid expansion wreaked havoc, inducing a significant
restructuring in which millions of dollars were “lost.”
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Was this a fraud? Undoubtedly the application of principles of due diligence would
have disclosed both the especially high risk of the investment and the extreme
improbability of success. If the fund involved were advertised as a high-risk
overseas fund, the purchasers were put on notice as to what they were buying into.
The manager was following the investment objectives of the fund: high risk yields
high returns. Probably not fraud unless the manager had knowledge before
investing that the investment was itself a fraud.

If the fund was a large cap growth fund or some other moderate-risk fund, and the
same investment were made, the answer would probably be different. For example,
would the investment manager have invested his own funds in his moderate risk
fund knowing of the investment in the high-risk former Soviet business? A high-risk
investment might be said to be fraud or at the least negligence if the fund manager
makes the investment in an effort to see a relatively staid fund beat modest market
expectations and outperform the competition. Clearly, the manager strayed from
the published investment goals of the fund. Although the professional manager’s
mindset may not have been fraudulent, his willingness to buy into the fraudulent
scheme of the manufacturing company resulted in large losses for the fund.

There is a fine line. When does an act of investing become fraud? One obvious
situation is the case of the investment manager who makes a suspect investment
because of personal gain: as an inducement the subject company kicks back 10
percent of the investment to the manager off the books. Thus, investors have to
monitor the investments of the funds to make sure they meet the fund’s stated goals.
Likewise, the senior administrators of the umbrella group of funds to which the
individual fund belongs have to review their fund’s investment manager’s activities
to see whether the investments the manager made match the fund’s objectives, and
if not, why?
Retirement plan funds are particularly vulnerable to fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
and other dishonest conduct perpetrated by the plan trustee, plan sponsor, or other
persons responsible for investing these savings on the plan’s behalf. This is because
few persons monitor their own investments adequately. As with mutual funds, each
investor’s contribution is pooled with numerous other investors’ contributions. The
idea that somebody must be watching closely is widely—although mistakenly—held.
After all, an employer (plan sponsor) would always make its contributions, wouldn’t
it?

Never a Borrower Be . . . Case Study
The business’ profit margins were tight. Working capital was inadequate and the
cost of capital prohibitive. As well, the limit on the line of credit had been
exceeded. So, the business looked to the only source of ready cash it could find; it
“borrowed” from the pension fund. Just a little at first. A million here, a million
there; soon, it became easy, almost a habit.

To avoid scrutiny of the business’ CPAs who most certainly would have picked up
on the new source of cash, the business’ CFO and president conspired to get rid of
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the old CPA firm and hired a replacement CPA firm. Not surprisingly, the
conspirators chose a small, understaffed, somewhat inexperienced CPA firm. The
new CPA firm looked at the new engagement as a growth opportunity; it was an
engagement that represented the lion’s share of its billings. Disguising the borrowings
as seemingly legitimate and independent private placements in the pension fund’s
financial statements, the business continued the fraud. However, earnings didn’t
pick up, things remained slow. “No sense in borrowing all that good money only to
watch it disappear in the losing business, the fraudsters agreed; let’s keep it
ourselves.”

The threat of the criminal justice system and expected integrity go only so far. They
fall short sometimes, and the business also fell short for its employees. The business’
creditors, who were also shortchanged, forced it into involuntarily bankruptcy.
Unraveling the fraud proved embarrassing. The employees, that is, the true
investors in the retirement plan, had only the prison sentences of the malefactors
and worthless orders of restitution as solace. With the principal players in jail and
the money nowhere to be found, the employees have only the limited recovery that
can be expected from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation to replace their
losses.

2.3 Key Preventative Controls
Because of the large asset values at stake, there are many fraud prevention controls in the
financial-services sector that must be in place to effectively reduce the risk of fraud. At best,
informed and watchful monitoring tends to deter the fraudster, chasing him or her
elsewhere. Or if the fraudster decides to challenge the controls taxing his or her cleverness,
the controls might induce an exposing mistake. At worst, the controls can make the
fraudster even more ingenious than before.
Notwithstanding adequate controls, the world is not perfect. There are no guarantees; the
fraudster will at times succeed. But the controls are a success if their effect is to make the
fraudsters’ successes fewer and less frequent.

• Remember that fraudsters will invent or exaggerate insurance claims, divert premiums,
and otherwise take undue advantage of a given situation. Controls must be in place that
will make it difficult and so challenging for the fraudster that he or she will shop
elsewhere for an insurance broker or company. Verify details and research
relationships. Do not assume that all lies will be small ones. This is not to suggest that
insurance companies should erect insurmountable obstacles against all parties seeking
payment on claims. No company employing reasonable compliance practices coupled
with sound internal controls and plain common sense need sacrifice the goodwill of its
policyholders.
• Mutual fund and retirement plan statements should be reviewed and read with
understanding by all investors. This should be done as a matter of course shortly after
the statements are received. Unless otherwise unavoidable, do not delegate this
important activity to others, especially those who have access to the accounts. Do not

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

10.11

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

assume anyone will bear the burden without sticking his or her hand into the pot
containing the funds.
• Ask questions about particular investments. At least make the plan sponsor and plan
trustee aware that people are looking. Follow-up on potential red flags such as an
unexplained or unexpected change in the independent CPA firm.
• Employees contributing to 401(k) plans should actively monitor their accounts. Track
employer contributions on the statements periodically received from the trustee. At year
end reconcile trustee’s statements with the amounts shown on Form W-2 as having been
deducted. In addition, verify that the investments have been placed into the proper
funds. Understand what are the allowable investments, and understand what fees are
proper.
• When selecting a broker for stock and other investments, clients should confirm that the
broker is properly registered and is covered by the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC). The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the North
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), state regulatory agencies, and the Federal Trade Commission are
sources of information about the brokerage industry and individual brokers. Moreover,
clients should carefully review the documentation supporting the client-broker
relationship, including contracts and dispute procedures. In a continuing investment
relationship, the client should promptly review transaction confirmations and monthly
statements. If unauthorized trading or other misconduct is evident, immediately lodge a
complaint with the brokerage’s management. If this does not provide satisfaction,
further steps, such as contacting the SEC or state authorities, should be taken without
delay even if the unauthorized trade appeared to be a profitable investment decision for
the client.

• Because product offerings are complex, clients should not overestimate their own level
of competence. Some investments are suitable only for those who can afford large
losses. Unfortunately, in a climate of volatile markets and sexy products, for example
the class of product called derivatives, some clients let greed get the best of them,
choosing to gamble rather than invest. The fraudster takes advantage of the get-richquick dream driven by greed. The potential for making an investment based on greed
exists in everyone, and the sweet-talking fraudster is ready to exploit this human failing.
• In addition, it is essential that the following controls be put in place for all businesses
within the financial-services sector:
—A strong written code of ethics and well-defined business conduct should be
mandatory for all employees. There should be sanctions for any employee who fails to
adhere to these guidelines.
—Effective physical access controls.
—Thorough screening of employees prior to hiring. At a minimum this should include
checking all references, including education and work history. Some organizations in
this sector should go even farther, especially for more sensitive positions. This could
include more extensive background checks, psychological testing and even drug
testing.
—Mandatory annual vacations of, at a minium, two consecutive weeks. Ongoing
schemes are common in this sector. These schemes often fall apart or are easily
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detected when the perpetrator is removed from the scene for a consecutive period of
even a few weeks.

—Prohibition of management override of basic controls. There have been many
instances of branch managers in this sector who were able to circumvent or override
basic controls. This power to override enabled them to perpetrate extremely large
frauds sometimes running in the millions of dollars.
—Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies
and control over software and program development.
—Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process, test
checking and monitoring of employee performance, and thorough follow-up of any
exceptions or customer complaints.
—A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.

2.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the financial services sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.

(Text continued on page 11)
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Financial Services Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the financial
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Customer and other outsider frauds, such as false loan
applications, con schemes, and the like (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, good corporate policies, and strong internal
audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, money laundering, and violation of privacy (related
controls include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision] and strong internal audit
functions and periodic external audits

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Financial Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (sabotage, espionage, and the like)

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information,and the like)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

X

Violating occupational health and safety laws
Violation of privacy
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Financial Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Financial Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like
Mandatory annual vacations

X
X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

Prohibition of management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Internal-Audit Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X

13
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3 Government

3.1 Introduction
The government sector includes:
• Federal, state, and municipal governments.
• Government agencies and government-owned corporations.
• Organizations that receive most of their funding from government sources. For example,
depending on the jurisdiction, this could include public elementary and secondary school
systems; institutions of higher education (for example state university systems and local
community colleges); municipal and state hospitals; and local ambulance services and
volunteer fire departments.

Because of its tremendous size and the large budgets involved, this sector is especially
prone to supplier and accounts payable frauds.

3.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Theft or diversion of government-owned inventory, for example office supplies.
• Accounts payable schemes by managers or employees, involving phony suppliers,
inflated invoices, and so on.
• Overstated expense accounts.
• Acceptance of bribes (kickbacks, secret commissions) in exchange for contract approvals
or inflated price approvals.
• Frauds by suppliers (overbilling, double-billing, product substitution, and so on).
• Computer-related fraud.
• Money laundering, for example, through government-run lotteries or pari-mutual
betting facilities; bribe giving, for example through government-owned corporations or
agencies seeking foreign sales.
• Violation of privacy, because of the extensive records on individuals kept by this sector.
Tax evasion is obviously also a major problem in this sector, with the perpetrator in this
case being the taxpayer.

3.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the government sector include:

• Strong enforcement, that is, ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any
breach of either the law or the government’s policies.
• Good employee relations. This is especially important because of the large number of
employees in this sector and the very high percentage who are unionized. Poor handling
of this area can lead to a very antagonistic employer-employee relationship, which can
not only lower productivity but also increase the risk of fraud, sabotage, and other illegal
acts by some employees.
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• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of
duties. For example, the responsibility for each step in the accounts payable cycle (such
as contracts, requisition, purchase order, receiving, accounts payable, check preparation)
should ideally be segregated to minimize the otherwise high potential for fraud in this
cycle.

• Good computer security including access restrictions, disaster recovery contingencies,
and control over software and program development. This is important not only to
ensure smooth operations, but also to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of
information, or both.
• Supervisory controls including a well-defined review and approval process.
• A strong internal audit function.

3.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the government sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Government Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
government sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees, and expense report fraud
(related controls include job descriptions and segregation of
duties, audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good management policies [especially
strict enforcement])

• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good management
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good management policies and
supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the government, including
money laundering (for example, for government-run
lotteries and pari-mutual betting operations), tax evasion,
and violation of privacy (related controls include good
management policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit functions [especially
internal audit])
(continued)
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Government Sector Checklist (continued)
Government Sector Checklist

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the government
sector, and related controls, as set out on the attached grids,
been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good management policies [especially
strict enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees or others (related
controls include physical access restrictions, and good
management policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Government Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by managers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
X

Theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X
X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like.

Use of Computers in Fraud

X

Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (theft of funds, misuse of information, and the like)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

Money laundering (for example, lotteries and pari-mutual betting
operations)

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion (that is, where the taxpayer is the perpetrator)

X
X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
Violation of privacy

X

Government Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Government Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Government Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts payable
variance)

X

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

X

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)
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4 High Technology

4.1 Introduction
High technology is the constant process of technical innovation in every industry. However,
the current use of what has become a modern everyday term usually refers to the fields of
electronics, computers and other data processing equipment, telecommunications,
biotechnology, defense and aerospace, and other related fields. The Merriam Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition) defines high technology as, “the scientific technology
involving the production or use of advanced or sophisticated devices esp. in the fields of
electronics and computers.” The common thread among the various definitions is always
the latest or most recent technical advancement in a field or industry.

These technologies were made possible by the breakthroughs in mathematics, physics and
biology of the 20th century. High technology is distinguished not only for the products that
have increased the convenience and enjoyment of our lives but also for the revolutionary
business strategies that have changed the way business entities think about management,
markets and customers.
High technology is not an industry as such but is a means of digitizing information and
managing processes that cut across all industries. Technology permits the improvement of
manufacturing operations on the shop floor in addition to the flow of information in the
front office. We identify high technology as the latest advancement and permutation in an
industry that augments an existing process to the point of possible revolution.
For our purposes, we will focus on the possible frauds and controls in the high technology
sector, which includes the following fields or industries:

1. Computer hardware and software development, installation and implementation

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

E-commerce and cyberfraud
Telecommunications
Biotechnology
Defense and aerospace
Other leading-edge scientific or industrial research and development

In addition, we will consider both the creation and use of this new technology in
nonscientific or nontechnical areas. For example, many industries such as the automotive
industry are a mixture of old and new technologies. A car is still four wheels on a frame but
it also has a wide array of electronic equipment, from the automated voice that tells you
your seatbelt is undone to the sensors that automatically adjust your speed relative to your
proximity to adjacent vehicles.

What is common to high technology in all industries, however, is usually a new idea or
product that could be very valuable on the open market for that industry. These products
also carry high-risk levels, and major research and development expenditures to support
them. Unfortunately, the presence of large funds and the bottomless appetite of a gullible
public for new places to speculate with their money has attracted a new generation of
fraudsters practicing many of the same old tricks and a few new ones. As always, big
money attracts big crime. The fact that small companies have proliferated in this sector of
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the economy has attracted fraudsters who float new companies, take shareholders’ money
and disappear. The proprietary nature of much of the research has also raised the profile of
the industrial spy. Getting the jump on the competition is essential when the financial
stakes are so huge. Knowing who’s doing what and when a competitor’s new product is
coming to market can mean life or death to a young startup living on a limited amount of
venture capital.

4.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The primary key vulnerabilities to fraud in the high-technology sector include the
following:

• Theft or diversion of inventory, for example, small items, such as computer chips, that
have a high per-unit dollar value. In this area, the computer can be both the target of
the fraud and used as the instrument to commit the fraud. The main vulnerability with
new or leading-edge computer technology is the proprietary nature of the intellectual
property involved in the product. The physical targeting of a computer is not limited to
theft of its various components. The information stored on a hard drive of a targeted
computer can be sold, especially if it contains important proprietary information, such
as customer lists or prototype design information. Trafficking in counterfeit computer
components is a major problem, especially with the many so-called discount merchants
clamoring for the consumers’ dollars. For instance, in once case a company was indicted
on charges of trafficking in counterfeit CPU (Central Processing Unit) chips and
software. Legitimate computer CPU manufacturers, such as Intel Corporation, qualify
their CPUs to operate at specified speeds, mark that speed on the CPUs themselves, and
further mark the CPU with their trademarks and other identifying information. To
ensure the quality and life expectancy of the CPU, the legitimate manufacturer specifies
each CPU to operate at less than top speed, and incorporates a speed-lock mechanism
into each CPU to prevent operation at a speed greater than that specified.
• Counterfeiters, however, typically acquire genuine computer CPUs, remark them so
that they will appear to be of superior quality and speed than they actually are, and
disable the speed-lock mechanism. The counterfeiter then puts the mismarked CPUs in
the supply chain through wholesalers, and in turn sells to retailers at steep discounts.
The end consumer buys the inferior CPU, assuming it to be the genuine article with the
expected superior quality and speed, at a price commensurate with the real thing. As a
result, the purchasers are victimized because the remarked CPUs are more likely to
burn out from ordinary use sooner than the properly adjusted legitimate ones. This
results from the strain of operating at a higher speed than the true specification. So the
consumer doesn’t get what he or she thinks was paid for and the legitimate
manufacturers are victimized by lost sales of their superior quality CPUs and the loss of
faith in their genuine, quality products.
• Frauds by officers or directors, such as fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting,
manipulation of share prices, insider trading, antitrust violations, or organizational
bribes given as part of the contract bidding process.
• Sabotage and espionage, both from inside and outside the organization.
• Failure to communicate the potential security gaps to employees, businesses, and
customers of the technology they use on a daily basis. This is especially true when
interacting with the Internet.
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• Failure of a company to install adequate security measures, properly maintain and up
date them, and to make the fact that they are in place known to system users, both
internal and external.
• Allowing one person or a discrete group to have sole control of important company
information and technology. Dividing authority will go a long way to reduce the risk of
the system and the information it holds being invaded from the inside, especially by a
disgruntled employee.
• Companies should protect against piracy by setting up an anti-piracy group and
demonstrating its commitment to ensuring that its customers receive legitimate, licensed
software, and that commercial partners receive the appropriate revenues for the
distribution of their software. Further, there should be no hesitation in prosecuting a
discovered pirate.
• Be alert to con artists, who approach potential technology users with schemes requiring
the payment of advances or up front seed money, but then disappearing or never
delivering on their end of the contract. Due diligence should be performed before
money changes hands.
• Among the risks associated with the operation of purchasing systems are false input of
invoices, diversion of payments, and misappropriation of purchases.
• Because high tech involves cutting-edge intellectual property, constant attention should
be paid to possible breaches of licensing agreements and patent infringement. The more
unique the product, the more it has to be protected.
• Dishonest contractors padding bills on big dollar defense and aerospace contracts are a
constant task for government internal auditors.
• Falsified research results at academic and private laboratories.
Not surprisingly, the different fields and/or industries in the high tech sector experience
both similar and varying vulnerabilities. Some of the most prevalent are highlighted
according to the individual areas within this sector.

Computer Hardware and Software Development, Installation, and
Implementation
Most companies or industries concerned about the security of their product focus on
attacks from outside. As a result, there are security loopholes for the internal fraudster to
slip through. The controls a company establishes are the only way to address and
significantly reduce the vulnerabilities of high-tech computer products. These controls
should be designed to thwart the outside attack from a hacker, the inside attack by a
current or former employee, and the combined attack of an employee and an outsider.

While vandals can attack the machines and hackers can invade the systems, the real
problem is with a company’s own employees. The days of the giant mainframe housed in a
locked, air-conditioned room and operated by only a few people on site are long gone.
Today, the proliferation of the personal computer (PC) has permitted the creation of local
and wide area networks (LANs and WANs) that give large numbers of people access to the
system through workstations both at the home offices and at locations far removed from
there. The computer-adept fraudster is now most likely to be a company employee with a
good knowledge of the systems and their vulnerabilities.
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Disgruntled Employees Can Be a Time Bomb Case Study
U.S. Attorney Robert J. Cleary announced that a federal jury found a former chief
computer network administrator guilty of unleashing a computer programming
time bomb that deleted all design and production programs of a New Jersey-based
high-tech measurement and control instruments manufacturer. The Omega
Engineering Corp. of Bridgeport, N.J.—a manufacturing firm serving National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Navy, as well as private
companies—suffered damages from lost contracts and lost productivity that totaled
more than $10 million.

This case illustrates the ironic fact that the tools that allow and facilitate the
development of high technology are the very same tools that create the
vulnerability and susceptibility of the product. The ability and knowledge of an
insider, usually the developer, to adversely use computer software to attack a new
product should always be a major concern to any company or industry.

Starting in the early 1990s computer chips were a major commodity in the criminal market.
As a result of the high demand and limited supply—chip manufacturers could not produce
enough to keep up with the demand—the prices skyrocketed. An underworld trade in high
speed memory chips developed: there were now high-tech thieves. Around the world
thieves vandalized the desktop and laptop computers of numerous companies for the sole
purpose of stealing these now precious memory chips. The high-tech thefts increased
operating costs for businesses. The increased theft-insurance premium for covering
company assets was one result. Likewise, consumers were not shielded from this high-tech
crime wave.

The central problem of computer hardware and software development is building secure
machines and systems. Security is paramount because these machines and systems house a
company’s intellectual assets, which includes more than secret, technical product
information. The computers are the residence of a company’s internal operating processes
for managing customer lists and analyzing marketing, billing, and every other type of
information essential to profitability.

E-Commerce and Cyberfraud
The more employees, customers, and suppliers are connected to the growing number of
computers that, in turn, are connected to a company’s nationwide or global operations, the
more vulnerable a company is to unauthorized intrusions. Probably the scariest aspect of
this word-wide hook up is that the intruder does not physically have to invade an entity’s
premises to do damage. Any place on earth is a good starting point from which to attack a
business half way around the world.
Cyberfraud is a crime that is perpetrated, aided, or abetted most often by technology
specialists in information systems. The definition covers computer-related crime, theft of
proprietary information, electronic intrusion, credit-card fraud, embezzlement, extortion,
and sabotage. Businesses use firewalls and encryption, which employ the principle of
separation of responsibilities, to compartmentalize the workplace and to protect internal
22.2
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systems from unauthorized external access. However, information and communications
systems change rapidly, making security upgrades costly and sometimes difficult to
implement. Also, as IT systems get more complex, security becomes even more
complicated and layered with slower authorization procedures, which can be time
consuming and costly.

E-commerce businesses are faced with the challenge for a market-driven system of
controlling costs and increasing profits versus protecting proprietary information. There are
an increasing number of cases that illustrate how a fraudster can enrich him- or herself by
gaining access to another’s intellectual property.

E-Commerce Alias Case Study

In a suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Novell
alleged that a Mr. Bonner used several alias accounts on eBay’s auction site as a
vehicle to distribute unlicensed copies of Novell’s Net Services software. Novell
contended that Bonner conducted more than forty illegal auctions of its software
over a six-month period.
Cases like this one show that not only does the creator of the proprietary property
lose but also the intermediary, in this instance the sales channel, which is trying to
compete fairly, loses. And the honest customers, who are seeking to acquire
legitimate, licensed software, end up confused, harmed, and possibly resolved to
stay away from e-commerce.

E-Hacker Havoc Case Study
A recent article in the Canadian National Post stated that “[A] Canadian hacker
made headlines last autumn when his antics slowed Websites to a crawl. The
resulting loss for e-businesses? $1.2 million in revenues. According to an IBM
survey, 75% of companies had their sites hacked into at least once last year, and the
U.S. Federal Trade Commission reported a $10-billion loss from Internet fraud in
1999.”

Another target of a systems invader is the proprietary customer information stored on a
company’s computers. It is difficult to place a value on this information when it is in the
hands of competitors. But there is no doubt that it is worth a lot. The fraudster with the
right high-tech knowledge can steal the ideas, customers, and business of another. In the
world of e-commerce, the same technology and tools are used to compete legitimately or
fraudulently. The sad thing is that the instructions on how to use otherwise legitimate
technology is readily available to the potential fraudster on the Internet.
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E-Commerce Dirty Dealing Case Study

An Internet bookseller in Boston, MA, which also operated an Internet
communications service, was charged in federal court with intercepting electronic
communications and the unauthorized possession of password files. The
Information presented in court alleged that the purpose of the interception was, in
part, to gain a competitive commercial advantage for ALIBRIS/INTERLOC’s own
online book-selling business by compiling a database of other dealers’ purchases
and by analyzing the book-selling market. The Information alleged that ALIBRIS’s
corporate predecessor, INTERLOC, INC. was an on-line bookseller, and also
operated a business called Valinet, which provided Internet service in the
Greenfield, MA area. INTERLOC provided email service to its customer book
dealers. The Information alleged that for periods of time between January and June
1998, ALIBRIS/INTERLOC intercepted email messages sent by online bookseller
Amazon.com to ALIBRIS/INTERLOC bookseller clients who had INTERLOC
email addresses.

Gaining Unauthorized Access Can Lead toJail Case Study

An Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigation resulted in the filing of an
Information against a contractor’s former employee charging him with computer
fraud. The Information alleged that the fraudster used his NASA-owned computer
workstation to hack into the computers of private businesses. The OIG
investigation disclosed that the former employee used his NASA-provided
workstation to gain unauthorized access to a computer network domain located at
an academic institution. Once he gained access to the domain, he downloaded
stored password files. The accused pled guilty to the charge and made restitution to
the institution and other business that were victimized.

The high-tech-age ability to warehouse and manipulate data has added a new twist to
raiding a competitor’s personnel. Because of rapid changes, there is a limited pool of
potential employees with the requisite knowledge of the technology, the hardware and
expertise. Today’s high tech companies have far more to worry about than just protecting
their physical and intellectual property. As the expression goes “a company is only as good
as its employees . . . .”

One Against Four Case Study
A new competitor, Triple One Technology, started hiring employees away from
Four Four Four, Inc., an established IT business. Over a period of time, Triple One
wooed Four’s CEO and others on down to the level of research analyst. Four’s
employees were systematically targeted in small groups. Once the pattern of
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employee raiding was recognized, there was an immediate concern for the loss of
intellectual property, which became the stimulus for possible litigation.

When the CEOs of both companies were unable to come to some agreement, Four
tightened its security and controls. Employees who left Four were investigated for
possible breaches of contract. Their computers and emails were searched for
evidence of preparations to take or the actual taking of proprietary information with
them to their new jobs. One former employee was caught with proprietary
information. He had emailed the proprietary files to himself at home.
It is interesting to note that in this case, although the established business was itself
a high-tech company, the information at risk here was the customer lists, pricing
sheets, vendor discounts, and structured margins. It is most noteworthy, of course,
that all of this information was acquired by hiring away Four’s employees who had
access to the information. In one underhanded move, Triple One was able to get
both the highly trained professional personnel it needed to compete in the global
marketplace and to acquire the invaluable inside information that would give it the
competitive edge. This particular case was successfully prosecuted under the
Industrial Espionage Act.

The advent of e-commerce and the low cost of setting up phony businesses on the World
Wide Web make consumers more vulnerable to fraudsters. Names, addresses, credit card
numbers and expiration dates are freely sent often without any guarantee that the
transmission is protected by one of the available secure line softwares. The Internet enables
scam artists to victimize consumers all over the world in simple and inexpensive ways.

An offshore World Wide Web site offering the sale of fictitious goods may attract U.S.
consumers who can shop at the site without incurring international phone charges, be
contacted through email messages, and may not even know that the merchant they are
dealing with is offshore.
The original purpose of the Internet was communication, specifically around the world and
between coasts at record speeds. This type of speed can be detrimental when the wrong
type of communication is sent, especially because we have not perfected the means to
instantly verify the communicated information or its true source.

Cyber-styled Stock Market Manipulation Case Study
Emulex, which is based in Costa Mesa, California, was the target of a stock
manipulation scheme. According to the indictment, a false press release was sent to
Internet Wire on August 24, 2000, for distribution. The bogus press release, which
purportedly was issued by Emulex, claimed that (1) Emulex was under
investigation by the SEC, (2) the company’s chief executive officer was resigning,
and (3) Emulex had revised its latest earnings report to show a loss instead of the
profit previously reported.
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The false press release was distributed by Internet Wire on the morning of August
25, and a number of news organizations—including CBS Market Watch,
Bloomberg, and CNBC—reported the story. As a result of the false press release and
its subsequent reportage, the stock price of Emulex plummeted from more than
$110 a share to approximately $43 a share in less than one hour. There was also a
significant increase in the trading volume of Emulex stock, most of which was done
by individual traders—many of whom experienced significant losses because they
sold their shares at prices significantly lower than the true value of the stock.

This type of fraudulent Internet activity is easily accomplished with today’s technology.
The impact of cyberfraud is growing as the number of household computers multiplies and
the availability of user-friendly, simpler software makes access to the Internet even easier.
Tied to this are the high-tech kids, preteens and teens, who no longer spend time outdoors
in physical activity, but rather amuse themselves with new challenges: invading companies
worldwide via the Internet.

Kids Will be Kids Case Study
In April 1999, Patrick W. Gregory was responsible for the transmission of a
computer program that allowed him to gain unauthorized access to a protected
computer owned by “1688.com.” Gregory stole banking information and passwords
and posted it all on the Internet, and he compromised the site’s users’ personal
email accounts.

Typically, Gregory and his coconspirators would replace the legitimate Web pages
of their victims’ sites with text and graphics relating to their organization, globalHell.
In some instances other coconspirators, who were members of total-kaOs and
globalHell would obtain complete and unauthorized control over a victim’s system,
known as “root level access.” Thereafter, total-kaOs and globalHell members would
intentionally crash and delete data on protected computer systems causing untold
damage to the victims’ networks. The damages were sometimes financial and
sometimes intangible, including the loss of faith in the victimized organizations and
loss of brand name impact as a result of the public defacements of their web sites.

The Internet provides a con artist with the unprecedented ability to reach millions of
potential victims without leaving the comforts of home, wherever in the world that might
be. As far back as December 1994 (almost a millennium in computer development time),
the Justice Department indicted two people for fraud on the Internet. Among other things,
they had placed advertisements on the Internet that promised the potential victims
“valuable goods upon payment of money.” But the defendants never had access to the
goods, and never intended to deliver them to their victims. Both pleaded guilty to wire
fraud.
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Telecommunications
Telecommunication companies can either be the target of a direct attack or taken over and
used by hackers to access targeted companies. Fraudsters can choose to weave their
communications through service providers in a number of different countries to hide their
tracks. As a result, crimes or abuses that seem to be local in nature might require
international assistance and cooperation.

The use of technology and high-tech devices to accomplish the fraudsters’ goals is also a
key concern of many industries. These devices are used to access either customer
information or proprietary company information. These powerful high technologies can
have powerful consequences.

Phone Phreak Case Study

By using stolen unauthorized access devices, such as telephone numbers, personal
identification numbers (PINs), and credit card numbers, Patrick W. Gregory
illegally accessed numerous teleconferences using the facilities of victims AT&T,
MCI, Sprint, Latitude Communications, and various other telecommunications
Gregory routinely accessed the teleconferences, which routinely lasted more than
six hours, with the aid of unauthorized access devices. This allowed him to steal free
telephone service in order to share and coordinate attacks on protected computers
throughout the world. Gregory also used the unauthorized access devices to listen
to or to disrupt teleconferences of legitimate third parties using the
telecommunications services of these victim companies. Specifically, in June 1998,
Gregory participated in an AT&T teleconference for which he and others caused
billing in excess of $4,200 to be charged to an innocent third party legitimately
using the conference services. In October 1998, Gregory, using stolen
teleconference access information from Latitude Communications, gained access to
Dallas Community College District’s teleconference system and caused
teleconference classes at the College to be disrupted. That break-in resulted in a
telephone charge in excess of $18,500 to be made to the College.

Spam isJunk Foodfor Computers Case Study

There are also the problems of internal attacks on a company’s computer
communication systems. A federal grand jury indicted Scott D. Dennis of
Anchorage, AK, on April 18, 2000, for allegedly interfering with a governmentowned communication system. The indictment states that Dennis, who was the
system administrator and computer security officer for the U. S. District Court for
the District of Alaska, initiated at least one of five attacks on Judsys, which is a mail
list server that runs on a computer owned and operated by the U. S. District Court
for the Eastern District of New York.
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Dennis attacked the system through an email flood that impaired the availability of
the Judsys system to others. The system was overwhelmed with spam, that is,
inappropriate “junk” email. Specifically, Judsys subscribed to numerous other mail
list servers on the Internet. When the other mail list servers sent an acknowledging
email, Judsys was flooded with emails. The Judsys computer had to be shut down and
taken out of operation, reconfigured, and brought back on-line. An investigation
determined that the attacks came from computers traced to Dennis through the
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that were used.

Fraudsters use computers to position themselves in new kinds of consumer fraud that
would have never been previously possible. In one case, two hackers in Los Angeles
pleaded guilty to computer crimes committed to ensure they would win prizes given away
by local radio stations. When the stations announced that they would award prizes to a
particular caller, for example, the ninth caller, the hackers manipulated the local telephone
switching equipment to ensure that the winning call was their own. Their prizes included
two Porsche automobiles and $30,000 in cash. Both of the fraudsters received substantial
jail terms.
There are other cases in which the consumer is unknowingly used as a resource for
fraudulent telephone calls and other telecommunication scams. According to an FTC
complaint, people who visited certain pornographic Web sites were told they had to
download a special computer program. Unknown to them, the program secretly rerouted
their phone calls from their own local Internet provider to a phone number in Moldova, a
former Soviet republic, from which a charge of more than two dollars a minute could be
billed. According to the FTC, more than 800,000 minutes of calling time were billed to
unsuspecting U.S. customers.

Biotechnology
Biotechnology, a relatively new industry, is at the heart of the development of patents for
products derived from the growing knowledge of the human and other genomes. New
drugs for humans and animals as well as genetically engineered plants that resist insects, rot
and disease are coming from discoveries in this field. The competition for knowledge is
intense because of the billions to be earned from sales of these new products. As a result,
biotechnology is prone to industrial espionage and to the theft of specialized equipment
and computers.

Cloned DNA Does Equal Cloned Patents Case Study

In a recent fraud case involving biotechnology patents, the question was for
Promega to prove that it was Cetus’ intent to mislead the Patent and Trademark
Office through withholding material information in a patent application.
A polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is widely held as one of the most important
inventions in molecular biology in the last half of this century. PCR makes it
possible to take a small amount of DNA and make many copies of it. Forensic
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testing, rapid identification of infections, and faster gene manipulation (what once
took six months can be done in an afternoon) are all applications of PCR. The key
component of PCR is Taq polymerase, an enzyme that copies DNA.
In 1992 Hoffman-La Roche sued Promega for breach of license agreement
Maintaining that there were other applications of Taq polymerase and that end
users were responsible for ensuring that they were licensed to use Taq polymerase
for PCR, Promega denied the breach of contract claim and countered by
challenging the validity of the Taq patent. Promega claimed that the Cetus
inventors knew that they did not have a novel invention when they applied for the
U.S. patent for the use of Taq polymerase for PCR and knowingly withheld that
information.

The trial court decided in 1996 that it had clear and convincing evidence that Cetus
withheld material information from the Patent and Trademark Office in its patent
application. Thus, an attempt at fraud through omission failed. Remember, failure
to act can be as much a fraudulent act as actually performing a fraudulent act.

Defense and Aerospace
The end of the cold war did not reduce the need to upgrade weapons and equipment for
the military. In fact, military and defense needs moved forward with space exploration. Just
as in the movies and best-selling books, the development of weapons systems is now and
always has been the subject of criminal intent either through espionage or theft. Spies both
internal and external are constantly seeking access to secret information. Both military and
aerospace contractors often experience cost overruns that sometimes have involved
fraudulent overcharging. In general the frauds perpetrated in this area revolve around
vendor frauds (both with and without an internal confederate) such as bribery, kickbacks,
and false claims.

Conspiracy Where You Least Expect It Case Study
A joint investigation by the OIG, Defense Criminal Investigation Service (DCIS),
and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) resulted in an indictment of
a NASA contractor’s former buyer and the owner of a subcontractor company. The
indictment charged them with conspiracy, false claims, and kickbacks.

The investigation disclosed that the former buyer solicited and received kickbacks
from the subcontractor totaling $11,000. The subcontractor disguised some of the
kickbacks as “ghost” employees. The individuals conspired to inflate invoices billed
to the Government through a contract valued at $700,000.
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Robotics Contractor's Employee Fraud Case Study

A joint investigation by the OIG, FBI, and DCIS led to an indictment charging
three of a contractor’s employees with eleven counts of conspiracy to defraud the
United States and making false claims on contracts. Two of the three employees
were also charged with making false statements to a bank to obtain a line of credit.
Criminal Informations were filed against two other employees charging them with
conspiracy. At the heart of the fraud were false progress payment requests the
employees submitted on which they overstated the contract work performed

False Certification ofMicroelectronic Devices Case Study

A joint investigation of a NASA/Department of Defense (DOD) contractor by the
OIG and the DCIS resulted in an indictment against a contractor and five of its
employees for conspiracy, and making false statements and false claims. The
indictment alleged that the accused falsely certified that they had performed tests of
microelectronic devices in conformance with the Government contract
specifications. The fraudulent activity took place over a nine-year period. The
devices had application in a number of significant NASA and military programs,
including the Space Shuttle, F-14 aircraft, and submarines.
A separate indictment alleged that a Government quality assurance representative
falsely certified that he had witnessed the tests at the contractor site (the internal
cooperative fraudster).

High-Tech Crime Caught by Low-Tech Method Case Study
Fraud perpetrated through old-fashioned, low-tech methods, in this case mail fraud,
can show up in high-tech situations. For example, an investigation by the OIG, FBI,
DCIS, Department of Transportation (DOT), and AFOSI led to the indictment of a
fastener supplier and its owner. The indictment on fifteen counts of mail fraud
charged them with selling commercial grade fasteners to the Government, but
falsely certifying they met more stringent military specifications. The fasteners were
used on Space Shuttle applications, other NASA spacecraft, FAA radar systems,
and DOD radar and launch systems.

Trade Secrets Theft Case Study
An OIG investigation resulted in charges against two of a contractor’s former
employees at a NASA Center in connection with the theft of trade secrets. The
investigation confirmed that one of the former employees offered to sell what was
purported to be technical and cost proprietary data relating to a NASA
procurement competition. A defendant agreed to sell computer disks containing

22.10

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

confidential material for $25,000. He claimed that the information pertained to a
pending NASA procurement program valued at approximately $30 million.

The DOD has 2.1 million computers on 10,000 LANs around the world and
requires a high level of proprietary encryption to protect itself. Without the
encryption facility, the whole DOD system would be open to compromise because
it runs over public circuits using commercial software and hardware. The threat to
the DOD system is mainly from international terrorists, criminals, or those wishing
to spread knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. The DOD has allocated more
than $500 million to develop a secure system. One of the most important aspects of
the new system has been controls on the export of encryption technology.

Other Leading Edge Scientific or Industrial Research and Development
Academic research as well as research in private labs at major manufacturers are also the
targets of theft and industrial espionage. Academic research presents a special case because
so much of it is done with publicly funded resources. The publication in academic journals
of falsified university-based and funded research to advance the careers of the researchers is
not unheard of.
In the private sector, research results are kept under wraps as much as possible because of
the huge amounts of money to be made from the development and marketing of products
designed with the proprietary information. Because many companies may be
simultaneously, but independently, carrying on similar research, the resulting patents,
trademarks, and copyrighted materials are frequently the subject of litigation. It is a
question of who won the race, and was it won legitimately or through fraud. The latter
reflects the loser’s mentality: we could only have lost if our competition cheated.

4.3 Key Preventative Controls
Internal controls are the most frequently cited method for reducing the risk of fraud and
detecting fraud. Encouraging employees to take an active role in reducing fraud also pays
dividends. Sometimes, fraud is discovered by accident. A survey, by Ernst & Young (Fraud,
the Unmanaged Risk : An International Survey of the Effects ofFraud on Business, May 1996),
suggested that as much as 60 percent of reported frauds, . . were discovered by chance,
i.e., by outside information, anonymous external tip-off, internal whistle-blower, accident
or change of management.”
Tip-offs from internal or external sources are an important source of fraud detection. Many
businesses have installed ‘hotlines’ or ‘helplines’ to enable staff and outsiders to voice their
concerns about behavior that may indicate the presence of fraud. These lines may be
manned or unmanned (that is, linked to an answering machine). The advantage of a
manned line is that it provides a live contact from whom the whistle-blowing staff member
can seek advice on fraud risks, the internal controls, and how to proceed.

Make sure you know your employees. Verifying backgrounds, references, and past
employment history is key to a company’s reducing internal exposure to fraud. This is
especially true for high tech departments in which easy access to important, proprietary
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information is part of the normal work activities. Employees are not always who they
appear to be. Recent studies suggest that many dotcom executives have suspicious, if not
totally suspect, backgrounds.
Some environments are generally more vulnerable to fraud. Consider the following, for
example:

• Management does not perceive fraud to be a risk or management has made no effort to
assess its fraud risk exposure
• Management ignores irregularities; takes the ostrich “head-in-the-sand” approach
• Management has failed to clearly communicate to its staff the types of behavior that are
not acceptable

• For one reason or another, management has failed to keep staff morale at an acceptably
high level
• Management’s actions have induced high staff turnover
• Management failed to provide adequate staff training for the systems and procedures its
personnel operates
Fraudsters frequently use a number of techniques to conceal evidence of their crimes.
There are, however, certain signs that generally indicate the presence of fraud. For
example, consider the following telltale signs.

• Staff who take no holidays or who regularly work alone after normal hours or on
weekends

• Employees whose lifestyles appear to exceed their salaries
• Staff who won’t delegate certain tasks, keep their work to themselves, and discourage
others from learning about their jobs’ responsibilities
• Staff who resent being questioned about their work or who answer evasively when
questioned about their work
• Staff who always have plausible excuses—always a little too smooth—for errors
• Staff who insist on dealing personally with certain suppliers or particular transactions
This is not an exhaustive list but a reminder that line managers should be alert to behavior
that, in isolation or in conjunction with other possible warning signs, may suggest the
concealment of irregular activities.

Many organizations use the format of a fraud policy statement to communicate the
organization’s attitude and approach to the threat of fraud. These statements may include
some or all of the following points.
• Assigning responsibilities for the overall management of fraud; that is, establishing the
necessary controls, monitoring the operation of the controls, and handling the
discovered fraud
• The formal procedures that staff should follow when a fraud is discovered
• Providing the necessary staff training for reducing the opportunities for fraud and
increasing the possibility of detecting fraud
• Creating of awareness among the staff that response plans exist, and will be
implemented, to deal with and minimize the damage caused by any fraudulent attack
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Organizing the fraud reduction and discovery teams involves assigning responsibility to
individuals or groups so that they work together as a team to achieve the desired objectives
in the most efficient manner. Major principles in establishing the organizational structure to
combat fraud are:

• Clearly defining the responsibilities of individuals for resources, activities, objectives,
and targets. For example, establishing levels of authority as a preventive measure, such
as setting dollar limits on the payments that can be authorized by an individual without
a second signature. To be effective, periodic audits should be made to ensure that
transactions have been properly authorized
• Establishing clear reporting lines that embody the most effective chain of command to
allow adequate supervision
• Separating duties to reduce opportunities for fraud. This is also largely a preventive
measure that ensures that all the key functions and controls over a process are not
carried out by the same individual; for example, purchasing goods should be kept
separate from the receiving function; similarly the acknowledgement of the receipt of
goods should be separated from the authority to pay invoices
• And, as a general rule, avoiding placing too many functions in any one individual’s
hands, regardless of how responsible that employee may appear to be

Suggested Controls for Contract Frauds in the Aerospace and Defense
Industries
The following will help to ensure that proper contract tendering procedures will not fail
because of collusion or cozy relationships between staff and contractors.

• An approved list of suppliers should be considered. This list should be regularly
updated with any amendments appropriately authorized.
• Clear and unambiguous tendering procedures should be established. Adherence to
these procedures should be closely monitored.
• The bidders should deliver tenders directly to those responsible for selection without
passing through intervening hands not involved in the bidding process.
• Late tenders should not be accepted.
• Staff should be required to declare any personal interests or possible conflict of interests
they may have that could affect the tendering process.
The following will help to assure that payments are only made for work actually
performed.

• To prevent collusion between a contractor and an employee, invoices should only be
paid when accompanied by an independent certification that the contracted work has
been satisfactorily completed.
• The purchaser of services should maintain a register of contracts in progress.
• The only contracts that can be added to the contract register must be properly approved
and authorized according to established protocols.
• All contract changes in the original contract terms should be documented, change
orders should be sequentially numbered, with the documentation prepared in an agreed
format and authorized before payment.
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• Prior to approval of a payment, the payment should be reconciled with the budget by
someone other than the person requesting the payment be made. Further, the payment
should be within the parameters of the planned expenditures.

Suggested Controls for Computer Hardware and Other Valuable Assets
The following describes some of the controls that should be in place to reduce the threat of
fraud or other irregularities associated with a company’s procurement and proper use of
computer hardware and other valuable assets within departments.
• An up-to-date asset register should be maintained with the assets assigned to individual
budget centers.
• The assets should be adequately described and identified on the asset register.

• When possible, the assets should be marked for identification.
• Controls should be established to assure the physical security of the assets.
• Spot checks should be regularly carried out to ensure the existence of the listed assets
where they are supposed to be.
• Details of proposed sales, reason for the sales, expected prices to be received, the date of
the sales, and expected results should be reviewed and approved prior to the sales.
There should be a follow-up after the sale to review the results including confirming that
the expected price was in fact received and that the funds received were promptly
deposited in the appropriate account.

Risks Associated with Sensitive Documentation
The following describes some of the controls that should be in place to reduce the threat of
fraud or other irregularities that could arise from improper access to sensitive information
or misuse of information for private gain.

• Controls should be established to protect third party’s information held on company
computers, and steps should be taken to assure compliance with the requirements of the
Data Protection Act; further, staff should be informed of the rules.
• Official documentation should be held in a secure environment.
• Vetting of staff should be at an appropriate level, which should relate to the nature of
the post held.
• Access to computer records should be entered into a log and spot checks should be
made to confirm that there were independently verified valid reasons for any unusual
accesses.
4.4 Checklist and Grids

A fraud risk management checklist specific to the high-technology sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.

(Text continued on page 23)
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High Technology Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the high
technology sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion of computer
chips (related controls include physical access restrictions
and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts, job
descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like, (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit function)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)

• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by or against the organization, including
patent infringement, antitrust violations, and organizational
bribe giving (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision],
strong internal audit functions, and periodic outside audits)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the high technology
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
(continued)
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High Technology Sector Checklist

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, strong internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, etc. (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
High Technology Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Interned Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (for example, front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers, or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (theft or diversion of computer chips)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (for example, inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud

X

Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading and antitrust violations

X

Money laundering
Organizational bribe giving

X
X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
High Technology Sector

High

Avg

Corporate Policies:
Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud
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X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (for example, exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft.)

X

Low
or NA
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5 Manufacturing

5 . 1 Introduction
The manufacturing sector contains numerous varieties of businesses. A few of the major
segments include:

• Auto and auto parts manufacturing

• Clothing and textile industries
• Production of other consumer goods (ranging from durable goods, such as televisions,
washing machines, and furniture to everyday items such as soap and garbage bags)
• Food processing and packaging

This sector is fairly average in its overall susceptibility to fraud.

5.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Employee frauds, typically involving inventory, accounts payable, or payroll. These
frauds are sometimes carried out in collusion with outsiders.
• Supplier frauds such as overbilling or materials substitution.
• Some forms of commercial crime, such as environmental crime, or violation of
occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws, or both.

5.3 Key Preventive Controls
The manufacturing sector is fairly average across the board in terms of the importance of
specific controls.

The best defense against the potential for inventory, accounts payable, and payroll frauds is
a good segregation of duties and regular accounting reconciliations. Included in the latter
should be periodic inventory counts for comparison with the perpetual records. Consistent
unexplained shortages in raw materials, for example, may indicate the presence of fraud.

5.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the manufacturing sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
manufacturing sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, periodic external
audits [especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime and violating occupational health and
safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement],
supervision, and strong internal audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the manufacturing
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions, [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Manufacturing Sector Checklist (continued)
Manufacturing Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
etc. (related controls include good corporate policies
[especially strong enforcement, and strong internal audit
functions])

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Manufacturing Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

X

False advertising
Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X
X

Organizational bribe giving
X

Tax evasion

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
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Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Manufacturing Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Manufacturing Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable, and inventory)

X

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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6 Media and Communications

6.1 Introduction
The media and communications sector includes:
• Book publishing
• Print and broadcast media
• Music and motion picture industries
• Telephone, cable, and satellite industries

Although certain parts of this sector are in decline (for example, newspaper and fiction
book publishing), for the most part the sector has been characterized by very high growth,
especially over the last two decades. As is the case with the high technology sector, the
growth and the glamorous nature of some parts of the media and communications sector
contribute to the risk of fraud.

6.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds by officers or directors, such as fraudulent financial reporting, manipulation of
share prices, insider trading, and antitrust violations.

• Frauds by customers. Some parts of this sector—for example, telephone and cable
companies-are vulnerable to equipment theft by customers.
• Con artists, who may approach this sector with schemes requiring the payment of
advances or up front seed money, but then disappear or never deliver on their end of the
contract.
• Copyright and patent infringement, which can be a problem for some parts of this
sector-for example, unauthorized decoder boxes in the cable industry.
• Violation of privacy. The nature of the sector can sometimes make this a problem,
although violations have to be weighed against other rights, such as freedom of the
press.

6.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the media and communications sector
include:
• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong enforcement—for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any antitrust violations (by both the company and society generally), and
prosecuting copyright and patent infringers to the fullest extent of the law.
• Physical access controls, such as credit screening of customers before allowing them to
walk off with leased company equipment.
• Good computer security, to protect against fraud and avoid breaches of confidentiality,
or the misuse of information, or both.
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• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits. This should include
periodic direct confirmation of customer statement information.

6.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the media and communications sector follows
along with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in
that sector.
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Media and Communications Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the media and
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Management fraud, such as making false financial
statements, inflating income, manipulating share prices,
insider trading, and the like (controls include good
corporate policies such as strong enforcement, and internal
audit functions)
• Customer and outsider frauds, such as theft of equipment,
copyright and patent infringement, con schemes, (related
controls include good corporate policies, supervision, and
enforcement)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including violation
of privacy (related controls include good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement and supervision])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the media and
communications sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
(continued)
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Media and Communications Sector Checklist (continued)
Media and Communications Sector Checklist

• Inventory fraud such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X
X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like
Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X
X

Employee sabotage or espionage
External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading and antitrust violations

X
X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

X

Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Media and Communications Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Media and Communications Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (fair compensation, counseling, and the like)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (locks, alarms, security), and the like

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X
X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (physical access, passwords, and the like)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (antivirus, full documentation, and the like)

X

Programmer controls (supervision, antisabotage, and the like)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)
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X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (fidelity, fire, liability, theft, and the like)

X

Low
or NA
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7 Nonprofit
7.1 Introduction
The nonprofit sector, for purposes of this section, consists primarily of charitable and
benevolent organizations. It excludes operations set out under the government sector
heading in section 3.
Except for cash theft and skimming, this sector is generally less prone to fraud from either
within or outside the organization. However, there are a number of commercial crime risks.

7.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:

• Employee or volunteer frauds, typically involving the theft or skimming of cash.
• Commercial crime involving such things as breach of trust (that is, cash theft or
skimming at the organizational level), con schemes in which funds received are not used
for the advertised purposes, and tax evasion by phony charities. Since this sector collects
large volumes of information in the form of mailing lists and other data about
contributors, there is also the potential for abuse of this information, invasion of privacy,
and so on.

7.3 Key Preventive Controls
Three key fraud prevention controls in the nonprofit sector are:

1. Strong enforcement, that is ensuring that employees are severely dealt with for any
breach of the law. This is important to send a deterrent message as well as to maintain
public faith and support in the organization.
2. Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, especially with respect to segregation and
duplication of duties. For example, the opening of mail should be carefully controlled
because it may contain cash. An appropriate system might be for two people to open
mail, one of whom records cash receipts in a log for later balancing against deposit slips,
charitable receipts issued, and so on.
3. Follow-up of contributor complaints (for example, no receipt received).

7.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the nonprofit sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Nonprofit Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the nonprofit
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, false advertising, tax evasion, and violation of privacy
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal
audit functions)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the nonprofit sector,
and related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal and external
audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

40

Yes

No

NA

Ref

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Nonprofit Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (lapping, phony customers or credits, and the like)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X
X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

X

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and so on

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising (perpetration of con schemes)

X
X

Insider trading
Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion (illegitimate charities)

X
X

Violating occupational health and (OSHA) safety laws

Violation of privacy

X

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Nonprofit Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Nonprofit Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
X

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X

Mandatory annual vacations

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, contributor complaints)
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X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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8 Professional Services

8.1 Introduction
The professional services sector includes:
• Accountants

• Architects and engineers

• Doctors, dentists, and other medical professionals
• Lawyers

The distinguishing characteristics of this sector are: (1) the form of the businesspartnership, professional corporation, limited liability company or-sole practitioner; and (2)
the professional-client relationship, as well as an element of public trust.
Because the management of the business is also generally in the hands of the ownership,
there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out
of the professional’s pocket, and not merely a management embarrassment.

8.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
• Frauds involving accounts receivable, for example, accounts receivable lapping
schemes. Also, in partnership situations, some partners may commit fraud by
undertaking work directly, or billing clients directly, or both, rather than for the benefit
of the partnership as required in the partnership agreement.

• Inflated expense reports.
• Breach of trust such as theft of client funds.

8.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the professional services sector include:

• A strong code of ethics.
• Good basic controls such as (1) job descriptions, such as appropriate segregation of
duties, (2) mandatory annual vacations, (3) regular accounting reconciliations, and (4) no
management override of basic controls.
• Good computer controls especially in the area of access restrictions and disaster
recovery contingencies. This is important not only to ensure smooth operations, but also
to avoid breaches of confidentiality, or the misuse of information, or both.
• An awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many
nonaccounting professionals. Doctors and lawyers, for example, are often unaware of
the issue because they are too preoccupied with the practice of their own profession.
Adequate insurance is also important, but more from a liability standpoint than in the areas
of theft or fidelity.
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8.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the professional services sector follows along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Professional Services Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
professional services sector, and related controls, as also set
out on the attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts receivable lapping (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, mandatory annual
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of
exceptions [for example, relating to patient or client
complaints or confirmation discrepancies], and good
management policies [especially strict enforcement])

• Inflated expense report fraud (related controls include
internal audit and supervision)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust and money laundering (related controls include good
management policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit function and periodic
external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the professional
services sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good management policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good management policies and
supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Professional Services Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, personal billings)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and so on

X

Manipulation of financial statements by the owning professionals

X

Manipulation of valuation of ownership interest by the owning
professionals

X
X

Employee sabotage or espionage

External Frauds:
Client or patient theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X
X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)
False advertising

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy
Professional Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics
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Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

_____________ ............
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Professional Services Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Professional Services Sector

High

Avg

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Senior professionals acting as a good role models

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X
X

Patient or client account statements, or confirmations, or both

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Professionals’ awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Senior professional’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X

47

Appendix A—Fraud Sector-By-Sector

9 RealEstate

9.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the real estate sector includes principals or agents conducting
the following kinds of operations:

• Buying and selling of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)
• Leasing or rental of commercial and residential real estate (land and buildings)

9.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Three key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector include:
1. Employee frauds involving cash, accounts receivable, or the acceptance of secret
commissions.
2. Con schemes involving inflated real estate values, for example flipping a property
several times in nonarm’s-length transactions-each time increasing the price-in order to
ultimately induce an arm’s-length third-party to pay a fraudulently inflated price. A
variation of this is when the fraudulently inflated price is used to obtain an inflated
mortgage or loan on the property.
3. False advertising or representation concerning the property being sold, leased, or rented.

9.3 Key Preventive Controls
This sector is quite average in terms of the importance of specific controls.

Some of the best defenses against fraud in this sector include:
• Strong enforcement, (for example, ensuring that managers and officers are severely dealt
with for any violations of law or the company’s policies).
• Adequate segregation of duties (for example, between cash handling and record
keeping).
• Good supervisory and audit-investigative controls (for example independent checks to
ensure that purported real estate values make sense).

9.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the real estate sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Real Estate Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists
a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the real estate
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

• Outsider frauds, such as con schemes (related controls
include good corporate policies and supervision)
• False advertising and representation, (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit
functions and periodic external audits
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the real estate
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and
strong internal audit functions)
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Real Estate Sector Checklist (continued)
Real Estate Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including breach of
trust, environmental crime, money laundering, tax evasion,
and violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
(related controls include good corporate policies [especially
strict enforcement and supervision], and strong internal
audit functions
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Real Estate Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)
Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising or representation

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy
Corporate Policies:

X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Real Estate Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Real Estate Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval
Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X
X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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10 Recreation

10.1 Introduction
The recreation sector includes operations such as:
• Amusement parks

• Movie theaters
• Professional sports clubs
• Golf, tennis, and similar sport or recreation clubs

10.2 Key Vulnerabilities
With one major exception, this sector actually has a relatively low vulnerability to fraud.
Unfortunately, the exception involves a very important asset: cash. However, controls over
cash tend to be well developed in most of these businesses, so that in practice the main risk
is outright theft of cash rather than fraud.

Because of the seasonal and part-time nature of much of the employment in this sector, the
opportunity for payroll-related fraud may also be slightly higher.

10.3 Key Preventive Controls
The key fraud prevention control in this sector is good cash control. This includes good
physical controls (for example, cash register-ticket dispensing systems with accompanying
counters, all of which provide an audit trail), segregation of duties for cash handling and
record-keeping, and accounting reconciliations.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of
fraud or theft, and (2) a good internal audit function.

10.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the recreation sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Recreation Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the recreation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft and cash
skimming (related controls include admission counters,
physical controls and surveillance, supervision, and good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Payroll fraud [for example, ghost employees], (related
controls include strong internal audit and supervision)

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the recreation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
internal audit [especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, violating occupational health and safety
(OSHA) laws, and violation of privacy (related controls
include good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement and supervision], and strong internal audit
function and periodic external audits
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Recreation Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X
X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving
X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X
(continued)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Recreation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Recreation Sector

High

Avg

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)

X

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X
X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls
Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)
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X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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11

Natural Resources

11.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section the natural resource sector primarily includes entities
conducting mining, and oil and gas operations.

11.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Some of the key vulnerabilities to fraud in this sector are:
• Inventory, accounts payable, payroll, and expense report frauds. Because of the largeproject nature of the resource sector, companies can be particularly vulnerable to these
types of frauds.
• Frauds-by senior managers, officers, or directors-such as bid rigging, kickbacks, or
secret commissions; fraudulent financial reporting, stock touting and manipulation of
share prices; insider trading and antitrust violations; or organizational bribe giving as
part of the contract bidding process. Just as in the high technology sector, many stockrelated frauds involve mining companies.
• Supplier frauds involving inflated prices, product substitution, or substandard materials.
• Commercial crime in the areas of environmental crime and the violation of occupational
health and safety (OSHA) laws.

11.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the more important controls in the resource sector include:

• A strong code of ethics with strict sanctions for any breach.
• Strong physical controls, particularly with respect to the company’s precious inventory.
• Supervisor awareness of fraud and the possibility of fraud.
• A strong internal audit function, and periodic external audits.

11.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the natural resources sector follows, along
with related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that
sector.
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?

2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls
a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the natural
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies particularly at the hiring stage)
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)

• Environmental crime, and violating occupational health
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strict enforcement and
supervision], and strong internal audit functions)
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Natural Resources Sector Checklist (continued)
Natural Resources Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the natural
resources sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and accounts receivable lapping frauds (related
controls include job descriptions, division of duties, annual
vacations, regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of
exceptions, [for example, relating to customer complaints
or confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
division of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Natural Resources Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X
X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

X

False advertising
Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy
Corporate Policies:

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics

X

Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

X

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Natural Resources Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Natural Resources Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (especially inventory)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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12 Retail

12.1 Introduction
The retail sector is one of the largest and its diversity precludes a comprehensive list of its
elements. Any operation that caters to the consumer, from department stores to specialty
retail stores (clothing, hardware, and so on), fits this category.
Outright theft rather than fraud is the key threat to the retail sector. Just as the insurance
sector is very conscious of the cost of fraud to its industry, the retail sector is very conscious
of the cost of theft. Both industries regularly research and publish estimates of the extent of
fraud and theft in their industries, which is substantial.

12.2 Key Vulnerabilities
As noted, the key vulnerability in this sector stems not so much from fraud as it does from
theft by the industry’s employees and its customers, perhaps in equal measure although
shoplifting by customers receives by far the greatest amount of publicity.
Major fraud risks can involve cash, accounts receivable, and inventory, because all of these
are important to the industry. Outright theft of cash and especially inventory-by both
customers and employees—receives the largest amount of attention, and it is undeniably the
biggest in terms of losses. However, the fraud risks in other areas should not be ignored.

The heavily computerized nature of the industry, even among smaller retailers, means that
the opportunity to use computers in fraud is also increased.
On the commercial crime side, false advertising is a major problem in the industry, even
among some large retailers who have been charged and convicted of it. Tax evasion can
also be a problem, but mainly among smaller retailers who make cash-only deals to avoid
sales and excise taxes.

12.3 Key Preventive Controls
Among retailers of any significant size—for Mom and Pop stores, see section 13, Small
Business-virtually all the basic and computer controls are critical. Obviously, good physical
security—especially control over cash and inventory—are the most important. These controls
range from good point of sale and cash register systems that provide a proper audit trail, to
security surveillance systems that dissuade thieves.
Other important controls are: (1) a termination-prosecution policy for the commission of
fraud or theft, (2) supervisory follow-up on all customer complaints, and (3) a good internal
audit function.

12.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the retail sector follows, along with related
grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Retail Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the retail
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good corporate policies especially strict
enforcement)
• Inventory fraud, such as customer or employee theft or
diversion (related controls include physical access
restrictions and surveillance, periodic and surprise counts,
job descriptions and segregation of duties, supervision, and
good corporate policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, supervision, and a strong
internal audit function)

• False advertising and tax evasion (related controls include
good corporate policies, strict enforcement, and internal
audit functions)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the retail sector, and
related controls, as also set out on the attached grids, been
adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
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Retail Sector Checklist (continued)
Retail Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, and the like (related controls include good
corporate policies [especially strong enforcement], and
strong internal audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring
stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Retail Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions (to buyers)

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

Use of Computers in Fraud

X
X

Commercial Crime:
Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X
X

Organizational bribe giving

Tax evasion

X

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—retail sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Retail Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No management override of controls

X

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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13

Small Business

13.1 Introduction
The small business sector cuts across a large number of the other sectors. While there is no
arbitrary dividing line, it is typically thought of as an owner-operated business with
relatively few employees.
As with the professional services sector, the management of the small business is also the
ownership. In that sense, there is more at stake here in terms of fraud losses. Once again,
every dollar lost to fraud is a dollar out of the small-business person’s own pocket, and not
merely a management embarrassment.

13.2 Key Vulnerabilities
By far the most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is employee fraud involving
cash (for example, skimming) or accounts receivable (for example, lapping schemes).
Inventory-related frauds can also be a problem.

13.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the small business sector include:
• Enforcement (for example dismissal and prosecution for the commission of fraud by an
employee).
• Fair treatment of employees. In closely-held businesses, it is important that employees
not become alienated from the owner-manager, because that will only help establish a
motive for fraud.
• Good physical controls over cash and inventory.
• Regular accounting reconciliations.
• Good supervisory control is perhaps the most important preventive control. This
includes an awareness of the possibility of fraud, something that is absent among many
small-business owners who become preoccupied with other areas of the business.

• Adequate insurance.

13.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the small business sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Small Business Sector Checklist
1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the small
business sector, and related controls, as also set out on the
attached grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming, or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies], and good policies especially strict
enforcement)

• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good policies
[especially strict enforcement])
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the small business
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable fraud, such as phony suppliers, inflated
invoices, and the like (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, and especially
supervision)

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors or
others (related controls include physical access restrictions,
and good policies [particularly at the hiring stage])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
good computer integrity controls, and supervision)
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Small Business Sector Checklist (continued)
Small Business Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA
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• Commercial crime by the business, including breach of
trust, environmental crime, false advertising, money
laundering, tax evasion, and violating occupational health
and safety (OSHA) laws (related controls include good
policies [especially strict enforcement and supervision])
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Small Business Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming, or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by principals

X

Manipulation of business valuations by principals

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X
X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

X

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X
X

Insider trading
Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X

X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Mission statement and code of ethics
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X
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Small Business Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Small Business Sector

Fair performance appraisal and review system

High

Avg

Low
or NA

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Principals acting as a good role model

X

Basic Controls:
Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

No principal’s override of controls

X

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:
Principal’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Principal’s follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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14 Transportation

14.1 Introduction
For purposes of this section, the transportation sector includes:
• Trucking industry

• Railway and airline companies (both passenger and freight)

• Other passenger transportation systems (buses, subways, ferries, etc.)

14.2 Key Vulnerabilities
The most important vulnerability to fraud in this sector is in the billing and accounts
receivable area. Accounts receivable lapping schemes, for example, are a major risk
especially among smaller carriers. Cash frauds may also exist where payment by customers
is in cash.
Because of the competitiveness of the industry and the fact that much of it is contract-based,
there is also a higher risk of frauds involving bid rigging, kickbacks, and secret
commissions.

14.3 Key Preventive Controls
Some of the key fraud prevention controls in the transportation sector include:
• Strong enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution of employees for fraud.

• Job descriptions with good segregation of duties.
• Reconciliations, especially bank and accounts receivable.
• Customer statements with supervisory follow-up on any related customer complaints or
exceptions.
• A good internal audit function and periodic external audits.

14.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the transportation sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Transportation Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management—Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the
transportation sector, and related controls, as also set out on
the attached grids, been adequately addressed:

• Front-end and lapping frauds such as cash theft, cash
skimming or accounts receivable lapping (related controls
include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
mandatory annual vacations, regular accounting
reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions [for example,
relating to customer complaints or confirmation
discrepancies] and good corporate policies especially strict
enforcement)
• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])

b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Accounts payable and payroll fraud, such as phony
suppliers or ghost employees (related controls include job
descriptions and segregation of duties, internal audit
[especially confirmations], and supervision)
• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement and strong internal
audit functions])

• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])
• Outsider frauds, such as inflated supplier invoices or
product substitution, con schemes, and the like (related
controls include good corporate policies and supervision)
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Transportation Sector Checklist (continued)
Transportation Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA
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• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety
laws (related controls include good corporate policies, strict
enforcement, supervision, and strong internal audit
functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Transportation Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:

Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:
Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like

X

Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

X

Use of Computers in Fraud
Commercial Crime:

X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)

Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Transportation Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Transportation Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)
Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

X
X

Mandatory annual vacations
Accounting reconcihations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X
X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:

Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls (for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

Forensic accountants and investigators

X

Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

X
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15

Wholesale
15.1 Introduction
The wholesale sector basically consists of distributors and importers of just about any form
of merchandise. Typically, the sector is the bridge between the manufacturing and retail
sectors.

15.2 Key Vulnerabilities
Employee schemes involving any one or more of the following-accounts receivable,
inventory, or accounts payable-are probably the most common threats, as well as frauds by
suppliers, such as overbilling and product substitution.

15.3 Key Preventive Controls
Key controls include:

• Enforcement, including dismissal and prosecution for fraud.
• Strong physical access controls over assets, especially inventory.
• Job descriptions that are clear and adhered to, including appropriate segregation of
duties.
• Mandatory annual vacations. Ongoing schemes are common in this sector. These
schemes often fall apart and are easily detected when the perpetrator is removed from
the scene for even a few weeks.
• Regular (that is, monthly) accounting reconciliations, including bank, accounts
receivable and accounts payable.
• Good computer security, especially access restrictions.
• Supervisory follow-up on exceptions and customer complaints.
• A strong internal audit function and periodic external audits.

15.4 Checklist and Grids
A fraud risk management checklist specific to the wholesale sector follows, along with
related grids that highlight fraud vulnerability and key preventive controls in that sector.
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Wholesale Sector Checklist

1. Generic Checklists

a. This checklist is designed to be used as an addendum or
supplement to the generic Risk Management-Ethical
Environment Checklist in chapter 2 of this Handbook, as well
as the other checklists cross-referenced therein. Has the Risk
Management-Ethical Environment Checklist been
completed?
2. Key Vulnerabilities and Controls

a. Have the following high vulnerability areas for the wholesale
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:
• Front-end and lapping frauds, especially accounts
receivable lapping (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, mandatory annual vacations,
regular accounting reconciliations, follow-up of exceptions
[for example, relating to customer complaints or
confirmation discrepancies], and good corporate policies
[especially strict enforcement])

• Inventory fraud, such as theft or diversion (related controls
include physical access restrictions and surveillance,
periodic and surprise counts, job descriptions and
segregation of duties, supervision, and good corporate
policies [especially strict enforcement])
• Accounts payable frauds, especially phony suppliers and
inflated invoices (related controls include job descriptions
and segregation of duties, internal audit [especially
confirmations], and supervision)
b. Have the following vulnerability areas for the transportation
sector, and related controls, as also set out on the attached
grids, been adequately addressed:

• Management fraud, such as false financial statements,
inflating income, manipulating share prices, insider trading,
and the like (related controls include good corporate
policies [especially strong enforcement], and strong internal
audit functions and periodic external audits)
• Sabotage and espionage by employees, competitors, and
the like (related controls include access restrictions, and
good corporate policies [particularly at the hiring stage])

• Computer crime (related controls include job descriptions,
segregation of duties, annual vacations, good computer
integrity controls, supervision, and a strong internal audit
function)
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NA
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Wholesale Sector Checklist (continued)
Wholesale Sector Checklist

Yes

No

NA

Ref

• Secret commissions, kickbacks, and the like (related
controls include job descriptions and segregation of duties,
supervision, and good corporate policies [especially strict
enforcement])
• Commercial crime by the organization, including
environmental crime, false advertising, money laundering,
tax evasion, and violating occupational health and safety
(OSHA) laws (related controls include good corporate
policies, strict enforcement, supervision, and strong internal
audit functions)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Wholesale Sector

High

Avg

Low
or NA

Internal Frauds:
Cash theft, skimming or lapping (front-end frauds)

X

Accounts receivable (for example, lapping, phony customers or
credits)

X

Inventory fraud (for example, theft, diversion)

X

Accounts payable frauds (for example, phony suppliers)

X

Payroll frauds (for example, ghost employees)

X

Inflated expense reports by managers and others

X

Bid-rigging, kickbacks, secret commissions, and the like

X

Manipulation of financial statements by officers

X

Manipulation of share prices by directors and officers

X

Employee sabotage or espionage

X

External Frauds:

Customer theft, false instruments or claims, and the like
Supplier fraud (inflated invoices, product substitution)

X
X

Frauds by competitors (for example, sabotage, espionage)

X

Con schemes or extortion by outsiders

X
X

Copyright piracy, patent infringement, and the like

X

Use of Computers in Fraud

Commercial Crime:
X

Breach of trust (for example, theft of funds, misuse of information)
Environmental crime (for example, dumping)

X

False advertising

X

Insider trading

X

Money laundering

X

Organizational bribe giving

X

Tax evasion

X

Violating occupational health and safety (OSHA) laws

X
X

Violation of privacy

Corporate Policies:
X

Corporate mission statement and code of ethics
Enforcement (for example, dismissal and prosecution for fraud)

Employee relations (for example, fair compensation, counseling)
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Fraud Vulnerability Grid—Wholesale Sector (continued)
Fraud Vulnerability Grid
Wholesale Sector

High

Avg

Fair performance appraisal and review system

X

Employee screening and testing before hiring

X

Management acting as a good role model

X

Low
or NA

Basic Controls:

Physical access restrictions (for example, locks, alarms, security)

X

Job descriptions, segregation-duplication of duties, and the like

X

Mandatory annual vacations

X

Accounting reconciliations (bank, accounts receivable, accounts
payable variance)

X

Customer account statements, or confirmations, or both

X

X

No management override of controls

Computer Controls:
Access restrictions (for example, physical access, passwords)

X

Regular off-site backups of programs and data files

X

Software controls for example, antivirus, full documentation)

X

Programmer controls (for example, supervision, antisabotage)

X

Supervisory, Audit-Investigative and Insurance:

Supervisor’s awareness of fraud or possibility of fraud

X

Supervisory review and approval

X

Supervisory performance, or independent checks, or both

X

Supervisor follow-up (exceptions, customer complaints)

X

Auditors (internal, external)

X

X

Forensic accountants and investigators
Adequate insurance (for example, fidelity, fire, liability, theft)

........

X
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Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit
*
(Supersedes Statement on Auditing Standards No. 53, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316; and amends AU sec. 110, “Responsibilities and
Functions of the Independent Auditor” and AU sec. 230, “Due Care in the
Performance of Work” of Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47,
AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)

Introduction
1. AU Section 110 of Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1,
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended by this
Statement [appendix A] (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
110, “Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor”),
states that “The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial state
ments are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or
fraud.”*1 This Statement provides guidance to auditors in fulfilling that
responsibility, as it relates to fraud, in an audit of financial statements
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Specifically, this Statement—
• Describes fraud and its characteristics (see paragraphs 3 through 10).
• Requires the auditor to specifically assess the risk of material mis
statement due to fraud and provides categories of fraud risk factors
to be considered in the auditors assessment (see paragraphs 11
through 25).

◦All references to AU section 110 of SAS No. 1, AU section 230 of SAS No. 1, or to SAS
No. 47 “as amended by this Statement” reflect the amendments that appear in appen
dixes A, B, and C, respectively, in this Statement.
1 The auditors consideration of illegal acts and responsibility for detecting misstate
ments resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal acts that are
defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on the determination
of financial statement amounts, the auditors responsibility to detect misstatements
resulting from such illegal acts is the same as that for errors (see SAS No. 47, Audit
Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended by this Statement [appen
dix C] [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312]) or fraud.
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•

Provides guidance on how the auditor responds to the results of the
assessment (see paragraphs 26 through 32).
Provides guidance on the evaluation of audit test results as they
relate to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud (see para
graphs 33 through 36).
Describes related documentation requirements (see paragraph 37).
Provides guidance regarding the auditors communication about
fraud to management, the audit committee, and others (see para
graphs 38 through 40).

•

•
•

2. While this Statement focuses on the auditors consideration of
fraud in an audit of financial statements, management is responsible for
the prevention and detection of fraud.2 That responsibility is described
in paragraph 3 of SAS No. 1, AU section 110, “Responsibilities and
Functions of the Independent Auditor,” as amended, which states,
“Management is responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and
for estabfishing and maintaining internal control that will, among other
things, record, process, summarize, and report transactions consistent
with management's assertions embodied in the financial statements.”

Description and Characteristics of Fraud
3. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditors interest
specifically relates to fraudulent acts that cause a material misstatement
of financial statements. The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from
error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement
in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.3 Two types of mis
statements are relevant to the auditors consideration of fraud in a
2 In its October 1987 report, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, also known as the Treadway Commission, noted that “The responsibility for
reliable financial reporting resides first and foremost at the corporate level. Top man
agement—starting with the chief executive officer—sets the tone and establishes the
financial reporting environment. Therefore, reducing the risk of fraudulent financial
reporting must start with the reporting company.”
3 Intent is often difficult to determine, particularly in matters involving accounting
estimates and the application of accounting principles. For example, unreasonable
accounting estimates may be unintentional or may be the result of an intentional
attempt to misstate the financial statements. Although the auditor has no responsibil
ity to determine intent, the auditors responsibility to plan and perform the audit to
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of mate
rial misstatement is relevant in either case.
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financial statement audit—misstatements arising from fraudulent finan
cial reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of
assets.4 These two types of misstatements are described in the following
paragraphs.

4. Misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting are
intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in
financial statements to deceive financial statement users. Fraudulent
financial reporting may involve acts such as the following:
• Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or
supporting documents from which financial statements are prepared
• Misrepresentation in, or intentional omission from, the financial
statements of events, transactions, or other significant information
• Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to
amounts, classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure
5. Misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets (sometimes
referred to as defalcation) involve the theft of an entity’s assets where
the effect of the theft causes the financial statements not to be pre
sented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.5
Misappropriation can be accomplished in various ways, including
embezzling receipts, stealing assets, or causing an entity to pay for goods
or services not received. Misappropriation of assets may be accompa
nied by false or misleading records or documents and may involve one
or more individuals among management, employees, or third parties.

6. Fraud frequently involves the following: (a) a pressure or an incen
tive to commit fraud and (b) a perceived opportunity to do so. Although
specific pressures and opportunities for fraudulent financial reporting
may differ from those for misappropriation of assets, these two condi
tions usually are present for both types of fraud. For example,
fraudulent financial reporting may be committed because management
is under pressure to achieve an unrealistic earnings target.

4 Unauthorized transactions also are relevant to the auditor when they could cause a
misstatement in financial statements. When such transactions are intentional and
result in material misstatement of the financial statements, they would fall into one of
the two types of fraud discussed in this Statement. Also see the guidance in SAS
No. 54.
5 Reference to generally accepted accounting principles includes, where applicable, a
comprehensive basis of accounting other than generally accepted accounting princi
ples as defined in SAS No. 62, Special Reports (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 623), paragraph 4.
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Misappropriation of assets may be committed because the individuals
involved are living beyond their means. A perceived opportunity may
exist in either situation because an individual believes he or she could
circumvent internal control.
7. Fraud may be concealed through falsified documentation, includ
ing forgery. For example, management that engages in fraudulent
financial reporting might attempt to conceal misstatements by creating
fictitious invoices, while employees or management who misappropriate
cash might try to conceal their thefts by forging signatures or creating
invalid electronic approvals on disbursement authorizations. An audit
conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards
rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication.

8. Fraud also may be concealed through collusion among manage
ment, employees, or third parties. For example, through collusion, false
evidence that control activities have been performed effectively may be
presented to the auditor. As another example, the auditor may receive a
false confirmation from a third party who is in collusion with manage
ment. Collusion may cause the auditor to believe that evidence is
persuasive when it is, in fact, false.
9. Although fraud usually is concealed, the presence of risk factors or
other conditions may alert the auditor to a possibility that fraud may
exist. For example, a document may be missing, a general ledger may be
out of balance, or an analytical relationship may not make sense.
However, these conditions may be the result of circumstances other
than fraud. Documents may have been legitimately lost; the general
ledger may be out of balance because of an unintentional accounting
error; and unexpected analytical relationships may be the result of
unrecognized changes in underlying economic factors. Even reports of
alleged fraud may not always be reliable, because an employee or out
sider may be mistaken or may be motivated to make a false allegation.

10. An auditor cannot obtain absolute assurance that material mis
statements in the financial statements will be detected. Because of (a)
the concealment aspects of fraudulent activity, including the fact that
fraud often involves collusion or falsified documentation, and (b) the
need to apply professional judgment in the identification and evaluation
of fraud risk factors and other conditions, even a properly planned and
performed audit may not detect a material misstatement resulting from
fraud. Accordingly, because of the above characteristics of fraud and the
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nature of audit evidence as discussed in AU section 230 of SAS No. 1,
as amended by this Statement [appendix B] (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the
Performance of Work”), the auditor is able to obtain only reasonable
assurance that material misstatements in the financial statements,
including misstatements resulting from fraud, are detected.

Assessment of the Risk of Material Misstatement
Due to Fraud
11. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 311), provides guidance as to the level of
knowledge of the entity’s business that will enable the auditor to plan
and perform an audit of financial statements in accordance with gener
ally accepted auditing standards. SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and
Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended by this Statement
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312), provides that deter
mination of the scope of the auditing procedures is directly related to
the consideration of audit risk and indicates that the risk of material mis
statement of the financial statements due to fraud is part of audit risk.
12. The auditor should specifically assess the risk of material mis
statement of the financial statements due to fraud and should consider
that assessment in designing the audit procedures to be performed. In
making this assessment, the auditor should consider fraud risk factors
that relate to both (a) misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting and (b) misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets
in each of the related categories presented in paragraphs 16 and 18.6
While such risk factors do not necessarily indicate the existence of fraud,

6 The auditor should assess the risk of material misstatement due to fraud regardless of
whether the auditor otherwise plans to assess inherent or control risk at the maximum
(see paragraphs 29 and 30 of SAS No. 47, as amended by this Statement). An auditor
may meet this requirement using different categories of risk factors as long as the
assessment embodies the substance of each of the risk categories described in para
graphs 16 and 18. Also, since these risk categories encompass both inherent and
control risk attributes, the specific assessment of the risk of material misstatement due
to fraud may be performed in conjunction with the assessment of audit risk required
by SAS No. 47, paragraphs 13 through 33, as amended by this Statement, and SAS
(continued)
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they often have been observed in circumstances where frauds have
occurred.

13. As part of the risk assessment, the auditor also should inquire of
management (a) to obtain managements understanding regarding the
risk of fraud in the entity and (b) to determine whether they have knowl
edge of fraud that has been perpetrated on or within the entity.
Information from these inquiries could identify fraud risk factors that
may affect the auditors assessment and related response. Some exam
ples of matters that might be discussed as part of the inquiry are (a)
whether there are particular subsidiary locations, business segments,
types of transactions, account balances, or financial statement categories
where fraud risk factors exist or may be more likely to exist and (b) how
management may be addressing such risks.
14. Although the fraud risk factors described in paragraphs 17 and 19
below cover a broad range of situations typically faced by auditors, they
are only examples. Moreover, not all of these examples are relevant in
all circumstances, and some may be of greater or lesser significance in
entities of different size, with different ownership characteristics, in dif
ferent industries, or because of other differing characteristics or
circumstances. Accordingly, the auditor should use professional judg
ment when assessing the significance and relevance of fraud risk factors
and determining the appropriate audit response.
15. For example, in a small entity domination of management by a sin
gle individual generally does not, in and of itself, indicate a failure by
management to display and communicate an appropriate attitude regard
ing internal control and the financial reporting process. As another
example, there may be little motivation for fraudulent financial reporting
by management of a privately held business when the financial statements
audited are used only in connection with seasonal bank borrowings, debt
covenants are not especially burdensome, and the entity has a long history
of financial success consistent with the industry in which it operates.
Conversely, management of a small entity with unusually rapid growth or
profitability may be motivated to avoid an interruption in its growth
trends, especially compared with others in its industry.
No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), paragraphs 27
through 38. Furthermore, the assessment of audit risk may identify the presence of
additional fraud risk factors that the auditor should consider.
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Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent
Financial Reporting

16. Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from fraudulent
financial reporting may be grouped in the following three categories:
a. Managements characteristics and influence over the control envi
ronment. These pertain to managements abilities, pressures, style,
and attitude relating to internal control and the financial reporting
process.
b. Industry conditions. These involve the economic and regulatory
environment in which the entity operates.
c. Operating characteristics and financial stability. These pertain to
the nature and complexity of the entity and its transactions, the
entity’s financial condition, and its profitability.
17. The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstate
ments arising from fraudulent financial reporting for each of the three
categories described above:
a. Risk factors relating to managements characteristics and influence
over the control environment. Examples include —
• A motivation for management to engage in fraudulent financial
reporting. Specific indicators might include —
— A significant portion of management's compensation repre
sented by bonuses, stock options, or other incentives, the
value of which is contingent upon the entity achieving unduly
aggressive targets for operating results, financial position, or
cash flow.
— An excessive interest by management in maintaining or
increasing the entity’s stock price or earnings trend through
the use of unusually aggressive accounting practices.
— A practice by management of committing to analysts, credi
tors, and other third parties to achieve what appear to be
unduly aggressive or clearly unrealistic forecasts.
— An interest by management in pursuing inappropriate means
to minimize reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons.
• A failure by management to display and communicate an appro
priate attitude regarding internal control and the financial
reporting process. Specific indicators might include —
— An ineffective means of communicating and supporting the
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entity’s values or ethics, or communication of inappropriate
values or ethics.
— Domination of management by a single person or small
group without compensating controls such as effective over
sight by the board of directors or audit committee.
— Inadequate monitoring of significant controls.
— Management failing to correct known reportable conditions
on a timely basis.
— Management setting unduly aggressive financial targets and
expectations for operating personnel.
— Management displaying a significant disregard for regulatory
authorities.
— Management continuing to employ an ineffective account
ing, information technology, or internal auditing staff.
• Nonfinancial managements excessive participation in, or preoc
cupation with, the selection of accounting principles or the
determination of significant estimates.
• High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board mem
bers.
• Strained relationship between management and the current or
predecessor auditor. Specific indicators might include —
— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor
on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters.
— Unreasonable demands on the auditor including unreason
able time constraints regarding the completion of the audit
or the issuance of the auditors reports.
— Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappro
priately limit his or her access to people or information or his
or her ability to communicate effectively with the board of
directors or the audit committee.
— Domineering management behavior in dealing with the
auditor, especially involving attempts to influence the scope
of the auditor's work.
• Known history of securities law violations or claims against the
entity or its senior management alleging fraud or violations of
securities laws.
b. Risk factors relating to industry conditions. Examples include —
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• New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements that could
impair the financial stability or profitability of the entity.
• High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied
by declining margins.
• Declining industry with increasing business failures and signifi
cant declines in customer demand.
• Rapid changes in the industry, such as high vulnerability to
rapidly changing technology or rapid product obsolescence.
c. Risk factors relating to operating characteristics andfinancial stabil
ity. Examples include —
• Inability to generate cash flows from operations while reporting
earnings and earnings growth.
• Significant pressure to obtain additional capital necessary to stay
competitive considering the financial position of the entity—
including need for funds to finance major research and develop
ment or capital expenditures.
• Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant
estimates that involve unusually subjective judgments or uncer
tainties, or that are subject to potential significant change in the
near term in a manner that may have a financially disruptive effect
on the entity — such as ultimate collectibility of receivables, tim
ing of revenue recognition, realizability of financial instruments
based on the highly subjective valuation of collateral or difficultto-assess repayment sources, or significant deferral of costs.
• Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course
of business or with related entities not audited or audited by
another firm.
• Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially
those close to year end, that pose difficult “substance over form”
questions.
• Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in
tax-haven jurisdictions for which there appears to be no clear
business justification.
• Overly complex organizational structure involving numerous or
unusual legal entities, managerial lines of authority, or contrac
tual arrangements without apparent business purpose.
• Difficulty in determining the organization or individual(s) that
control(s) the entity.
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• Unusually rapid growth or profitability, especially compared with
that of other companies in the same industry.
• Especially high vulnerability to changes in interest rates.
• Unusually high dependence on debt or marginal ability to meet
debt repayment requirements; debt covenants that are difficult
to maintain.
• Unrealistically aggressive sales or profitability incentive pro
grams.
• Threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile
takeover.
• Adverse consequences on significant pending transactions, such
as a business combination or contract award, if poor financial
results are reported.
• Poor or deteriorating financial position when management has
personally guaranteed significant debts of the entity.

Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From
Misappropriation of Assets
18. Risk factors that relate to misstatements arising from misappro
priation of assets may be grouped in the two categories below. The
extent of the auditor's consideration of the risk factors in category b is
influenced by the degree to which risk factors in category a are present.
a. Susceptibility of assets to misappropriation. These pertain to the
nature of an entity’s assets and the degree to which they are subject
to theft.
b. Controls. These involve the lack of controls designed to prevent or
detect misappropriations of assets.

19. The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstate
ments arising from misappropriation of assets for each of the two
categories described above:
a. Risk factors relating to susceptibility of assets to misappropriation
• Large amounts of cash on hand or processed
• Inventory characteristics, such as small size, high value, or high
demand
• Easily convertible assets, such as bearer bonds, diamonds, or
computer chips
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Fixed asset characteristics, such as small size, marketability, or
lack of ownership identification
b. Risk factors relating to controls
• Lack of appropriate management oversight (for example, inade
quate supervision or monitoring of remote locations)
• Lack ofjob applicant screening procedures relating to employees
with access to assets susceptible to misappropriation
• Inadequate recordkeeping with respect to assets susceptible to
misappropriation
• Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or independent checks
• Lack of appropriate system of authorization and approval of
transactions (for example, in purchasing)
• Poor physical safeguards over cash, investments, inventory, or
fixed assets
• Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for transactions
(for example, credits for merchandise returns)
• Lack of mandatory vacations for employees performing key
control functions
•

20. The auditor is not required to plan the audit to discover informa
tion that is indicative of financial stress of employees or adverse
relationships between the entity and its employees. Nevertheless, the
auditor may become aware of such information. Some examples of such
information include (a) anticipated future employee layoffs that are
known to the workforce, (b) employees with access to assets susceptible
to misappropriation who are known to be dissatisfied, (c) known unusual
changes in behavior or lifestyle of employees with access to assets sus
ceptible to misappropriation, and (d) known personal financial pressures
affecting employees with access to assets susceptible to misappropria
tion. If the auditor becomes aware of the existence of such information,
he or she should consider it in assessing the risk of material misstate
ment arising from misappropriation of assets.
Consideration of Risk Factors in Assessing the Risk of Material
Misstatement Due to Fraud

21. Fraud risk factors cannot easily be ranked in order of importance
or combined into effective predictive models. The significance of risk
factors varies widely. Some of these factors will be present in entities
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where the specific conditions do not present a risk of material misstate
ment. Accordingly, the auditor should exercise professional judgment
when considering risk factors individually or in combination and
whether there are specific controls that mitigate the risk. For example,
an entity may not screen newly hired employees having access to assets
susceptible to theft. This factor, by itself, might not significantly affect
the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud.
However, if it were coupled with a lack of appropriate management
oversight and a lack of physical safeguards over such assets as readily
marketable inventory or fixed assets, the combined effect of these
related factors might be significant to that assessment.

22. The size, complexity, and ownership characteristics of the entity
have a significant influence on the consideration of relevant risk factors.
For example, in the case of a large entity, the auditor ordinarily would
consider factors that generally constrain improper conduct by senior
management, such as the effectiveness of the board of directors, the
audit committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility,
and the internal audit function. The auditor also would consider what
steps had been taken to enforce a formal code of conduct and the effec
tiveness of the budgeting or reporting system. Furthermore, risk factors
evaluated at a country-specific or business segment operating level may
provide different insights than the evaluation at an entity-wide level.7 In
the case of a small entity, some or all of these considerations might be
inapplicable or less important. For example, a smaller entity might not
have a written code of conduct but, instead, develop a culture that
emphasizes the importance of integrity and ethical behavior through
oral communication and by management example.
23. SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of
Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319), requires the auditor to obtain a suffi
cient understanding of the entity’s internal control over financial
reporting to plan the audit. It also notes that such knowledge should be
used to identify types of potential misstatements, consider factors that
affect the risk of material misstatement, and design substantive tests.
The understanding often will affect the auditor's consideration of the
significance of fraud risk factors. In addition, when considering the
7 SAS No. 47, paragraph 18, as amended by this Statement, provides guidance on the
auditors consideration of the extent to which auditing procedures should be per
formed at selected locations or components.
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significance of fraud risk factors, the auditor may wish to assess whether
there are specific controls that mitigate the risk or whether specific con
trol deficiencies may exacerbate the risk.8

24. If the entity has established a program that includes steps to pre
vent, deter, and detect fraud, the auditor may consider its effectiveness.
The auditor also should inquire of those persons overseeing such pro
grams as to whether the program has identified any fraud risk factors.
25. The assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
is a cumulative process that includes a consideration of risk factors indi
vidually and in combination. In addition, fraud risk factors may be
identified while performing procedures relating to acceptance or con
tinuance of clients and engagements,9 during engagement planning or
while obtaining an understanding of an entity’s internal control, or while
conducting fieldwork.10 Also, other conditions may be identified during
fieldwork that change or support a judgment regarding the assess
ment— such as the following:
• Discrepancies in the accounting records, including —
— Transactions not recorded in a complete or timely manner or
improperly recorded as to amount, accounting period, classifi
cation, or entity policy.
— Unsupported or unauthorized balances or transactions.
— Last-minute adjustments by the entity that significantly affect
financial results.
• Conflicting or missing evidential matter, including —
— Missing documents.
— Unavailability of other than photocopied documents when
documents in original form are expected to exist.
— Significant unexplained items on reconciliations.
8 SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, paragraph 47, states that assessing control risk
at below the maximum level involves identifying specific controls that are likely to
prevent or detect material misstatements in those assertions, and performing tests of
controls to evaluate their effectiveness.
9 See Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 2, System of Quality Control for a
CPA Firm’s Accounting and Auditing Practice (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 2,
QC sec. 20), paragraphs 14 through 16.
10 The auditor also ordinarily obtains written representations from management con
cerning irregularities involving management and employees that could have a material
effect on the financial statements (see SAS No. 19, Client Representations [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333]).
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— Inconsistent, vague, or implausible responses from management
or employees arising from inquiries or analytical procedures.
— Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s records and confir
mation replies.
— Missing inventory or physical assets of significant magnitude.
Problematic or unusual relationships between the auditor and client,
including —
— Denied access to records, facilities, certain employees, cus
tomers, vendors, or others from whom audit evidence might
be sought.11
— Undue time pressures imposed by management to resolve com
plex or contentious issues.
— Unusual delays by the entity in providing requested information.
— Tips or complaints to the auditor about fraud.

The Auditors Response to the Results
of the Assessment
26. A risk of material misstatement due to fraud is always present to
some degree. The auditors response to the foregoing assessment is
influenced by the nature and significance of the risk factors identified as
being present. In some cases, even though fraud risk factors have been
identified as being present, the auditors judgment may be that audit
procedures otherwise planned are sufficient to respond to the risk fac
tors. In other circumstances, the auditor may conclude that the
conditions indicate a need to modify procedures.12 In these circum
stances, the auditor should consider whether the assessment of the risk
of material misstatement due to fraud calls for an overall response, one
11 Denial of access to information may constitute a limitation on the scope of the audit
that may require the auditor to consider qualifying or disclaiming an opinion on the
financial statements (see SAS No. 58, as amended, Reports on Audited Financial
Statements [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508], paragraphs 22
through 32).
12 SAS No. 47, as amended by this Statement, requires the auditor to limit audit risk to
a low level that is, in the auditor’s professional judgment, appropriate for expressing an
opinion on the financial statements.
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that is specific to a particular account balance, class of transactions or
assertion, or both. The auditor also may conclude that it is not practica
ble to modify the procedures that are planned for the audit of the
financial statements sufficiently to address the risk. In that case with
drawal from the engagement with communication to the appropriate
parties may be an appropriate course of action (see paragraph 36).

Overall Considerations

27. Judgments about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud
may affect the audit in the following ways:
• Professional skepticism. Due professional care requires the auditor
to exercise professional skepticism — that is, an attitude that
includes a questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evi
dence (see SAS No. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in
the Performance of Work,” paragraphs 7 through 9, as amended by
this Statement). Some examples demonstrating the application of
professional skepticism in response to the auditor's assessment of the
risk of material misstatement due to fraud include (a) increased sen
sitivity in the selection of the nature and extent of documentation to
be examined in support of material transactions, and (b) increased
recognition of the need to corroborate management explanations or
representations concerning material matters — such as further
analytical procedures, examination of documentation, or discussion
with others within or outside the entity.
• Assignment of personnel. The knowledge, skill, and ability of per
sonnel assigned significant engagement responsibilities should be
commensurate with the auditors assessment of the level of risk of
the engagement (see SAS No. 1 [AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 210, “Training and Proficiency of the Independent
Auditor,” paragraph 3]). In addition, the extent of supervision should
recognize the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and the
qualifications of persons performing the work (see SAS No. 22, para
graph 11).
• Accounting principles and policies. The auditor may decide to con
sider further management's selection and application of significant
accounting policies, particularly those related to revenue recogni
tion, asset valuation, or capitalizing versus expensing. In this respect,
the auditor may have a greater concern about whether the account-
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ing principles selected and policies adopted are being applied in an
inappropriate manner to create a material misstatement of the finan
cial statements.
Controls. When a risk of material misstatement due to fraud relates
to risk factors that have control implications, the auditor's ability to
assess control risk below the maximum may be reduced. However,
this does not eliminate the need for the auditor to obtain an under
standing of the components of the entity’s internal control sufficient
to plan the audit (see SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78). In
fact, such an understanding may be of particular importance in fur
ther understanding and considering any controls (or lack thereof)
the entity has in place to address the identified fraud risk factors.
However, this consideration also would need to include an added
sensitivity to managements ability to override such controls.

28. The nature, timing, and extent of procedures may need to be
modified in the following ways:
• The nature of audit procedures performed may need to be changed
to obtain evidence that is more reliable or to obtain additional cor
roborative information. For example, more evidential matter maybe
needed from independent sources outside the entity. Also, physical
observation or inspection of certain assets may become more impor
tant. (See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, as amended [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326], paragraphs 19 through
22.)
• The timing of substantive tests may need to be altered to be closer
to or at year end. For example, if there are unusual incentives for
management to engage in fraudulent financial reporting, the auditor
might conclude that substantive testing should be performed near or
at year end because it would not otherwise be possible to control the
incremental audit risk associated with that risk factor. (See SAS No.
45, Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards—1983 [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 313, “Substantive Tests Prior
to the Balance-Sheet Date”], paragraph 6.)
• The extent of the procedures applied should reflect the assessment
of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. For example,
increased sample sizes or more extensive analytical procedures may
be appropriate. (See SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling [AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350], paragraph 23, and SAS
No. 56, Analytical Procedures [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.
1, AU sec. 329].)
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Considerations at the Account Balance, Class of
Transactions, and Assertion Level

29. Specific responses to the auditor's assessment of the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud will vary depending upon the types or
combinations of fraud risk factors or conditions identified and the
account balances, classes of transactions, and assertions they may affect.
If these factors or conditions indicate a particular risk applicable to spe
cific account balances or types of transactions, audit procedures
addressing these specific areas should be considered that will, in the
auditor's judgment, limit audit risk to an appropriate level in light of the
risk factors or conditions identified. The following are specific examples
of responses:
• Visit locations or perform certain tests on a surprise or unannounced
basis — for example, observing inventory at locations where auditor
attendance has not been previously announced or counting cash at a
particular date on a surprise basis.
• Request that inventories be counted at a date closer to year end.
• Alter the audit approach in the current year — for example, con
tacting major customers and suppliers orally in addition to written
confirmation, sending confirmation requests to a specific party
within an organization, or seeking more and different information.
• Perform a detailed review of the entity’s quarter-end or year-end
adjusting entries and investigate any that appear unusual as to
nature or amount.
• For significant and unusual transactions, particularly those occurring
at or near year end, investigate (a) the possibility of related parties
and (b) the sources of financial resources supporting the trans
actions.13
• Perform substantive analytical procedures at a detailed level. For
example, compare sales and cost of sales by location and line of
business to auditor-developed expectations.14
• Conduct interviews of personnel involved in areas in which a con13 SAS No. 45, Omnibus Statement on Auditing Standards—1983 (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 334, “Related Parties”), provides guidance with respect to
the identification of related-party relationships and transactions, including transac
tions that may be outside the ordinary course of business (see paragraph 6 of SAS No.
45).
14 SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec.
329) provides guidance on performing analytical procedures used as substantive tests.
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cern about the risk of material misstatement due to fraud is present,
to obtain their insights about the risk and whether or how controls
address the risk.
When other independent auditors are auditing the financial state
ments of one or more subsidiaries, divisions, or branches, consider
discussing with them the extent of work necessary to be performed
to ensure that the risk of material misstatement due to fraud result
ing from transactions and activities among these components is
adequately addressed.
If the work of a specialist becomes particularly significant with
respect to its potential impact on the financial statements, perform
additional procedures with respect to some or all of the specialist's
assumptions, methods, or findings to determine that the findings are
not unreasonable or engage another specialist for that purpose. (See
SAS No. 73, Using the Work of a Specialist [AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 336], paragraph 12.)

Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent
Financial Reporting
30. Some examples of responses to the auditors assessment of the
risk of material misstatements arising from fraudulent financial report
ing are —
• Revenue recognition. If there is a risk of material misstatement
due to fraud that may involve or result in improper revenue recog
nition, it may be appropriate to confirm with customers certain
relevant contract terms and the absence of side agreements — inas
much as the appropriate accounting is often influenced by such
terms or agreements.15 For example, acceptance criteria, delivery
15 SAS No. 67, The Confirmation Process (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 330), provides guidance about the confirmation process in audits performed in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Among other considerations,
that guidance discusses the types of respondents from whom confirmations may be
requested, and what the auditor should consider if information about the respondent’s
competence, knowledge, motivation, ability, or willingness to respond, or about the
respondents objectivity and freedom from bias with respect to the audited entity
comes to his or her attention (AU sec. 330.27). It also provides that the auditor main
tain control over the confirmation requests and responses in order to minimize the
possibility that the results will be biased because of interception and alteration of
the confirmation requests or responses (AU sec. 330.28). Further, when confirmation
responses are other than in written communications mailed to the auditor, additional
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and payment terms and the absence of future or continuing vendor
obligations, the right to return the product, guaranteed resale
amounts, and cancellation or refund provisions often are relevant in
such circumstances.
• Inventory quantities. If a risk of material misstatement due to
fraud exists in inventory quantities, reviewing the entity’s inventory
records may help to identify locations, areas, or items for specific
attention during or after the physical inventory count. Such a review
may lead to a decision to observe inventory counts at certain loca
tions on an unannounced basis (see paragraph 29). In addition,
where the auditor has a concern about the risk of material misstate
ment due to fraud in the inventory area, it may be particularly
important that the entity counts are conducted at all locations sub
ject to count on the same date. Furthermore, it also may be
appropriate for the auditor to apply additional procedures during
the observation of the count — for example, examining more rigor
ously the contents of boxed items, the manner in which the goods
are stacked (for example, hollow squares) or labeled, and the quality
(that is, purity, grade, or concentration) of liquid substances such as
perfumes or specialty chemicals. Finally, additional testing of count
sheets, tags or other records, or the retention of copies may be war
ranted to minimize the risk of subsequent alteration or
inappropriate compilation.

Specific Responses — Misstatements Arising From
Misappropriations of Assets
31. The auditor may have identified a risk of material misstatement
due to fraud relating to misappropriation of assets. For example, the
auditor may conclude that such a risk of asset misappropriation at a par
ticular operating location is significant. This may be the case when a
specific type of asset is particularly susceptible to such a risk of misap
propriation — for example, a large amount of easily accessible cash, or
inventory items such as jewelry, that can be easily moved and sold.
Control risk may be evaluated differently in each of these situations.
Thus, differing circumstances necessarily would dictate different
responses.
evidence, such as verifying the source and contents of a facsimile response in a
telephone call to the purported sender, may be required to support their validity (AU
sec. 330.29).
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32. Usually the audit response to a risk of material misstatement due
to fraud relating to misappropriation of assets will be directed toward
certain account balances and classes of transactions. Although some of
the audit responses noted in paragraphs 29 and 30 may apply in such cir
cumstances, the scope of the work should be linked to the specific
information about the misappropriation risk that has been identified.
For example, where a particular asset is highly susceptible to misappro
priation that is potentially material to the financial statements, obtaining
an understanding of the control activities related to the prevention and
detection of such misappropriation and testing the operating effective
ness of such controls may be warranted. In certain circumstances,
physical inspection of such assets (for example, counting cash or securi
ties) at or near year end may be appropriate. In addition, the use of
substantive analytical procedures, including the development by the
auditor of an expected dollar amount, at a high level of precision, to be
compared with a recorded amount, may be effective in certain circum
stances.

Evaluation of Audit Test Results
33. As indicated in paragraph 25, the assessment of the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud is a cumulative process and one that
should be ongoing throughout the audit. At the completion of the audit,
the auditor should consider whether the accumulated results of audit
procedures and other observations (for example, conditions noted in
paragraph 25) affect the assessment of the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud he or she made when planning the audit. This accumula
tion is primarily a qualitative matter based on the auditors judgment.
Such an accumulation may provide further insight into the risk of mate
rial misstatement due to fraud and whether there is a need for
additional or different audit procedures to be performed.
34. When audit test results identify misstatements in the financial
statements, the auditor should consider whether such misstatements
may be indicative of fraud.16 If the auditor has determined that mis
statements are or may be the result of fraud, but the effect of the
misstatements is not material to the financial statements, the auditor
nevertheless should evaluate the implications, especially those dealing
16 See note 3.
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with the organizational position of the person(s) involved. For example,
fraud involving misappropriations of cash from a small petty cash fund
normally would be of little significance to the auditor in assessing the
risk of material misstatement due to fraud because both the manner of
operating the fund and its size would tend to establish a limit on the
amount of potential loss and the custodianship of such funds is normally
entrusted to a relatively low-level employee.17 Conversely, when the
matter involves higher level management, even though the amount
itself is not material to the financial statements, it may be indicative of a
more pervasive problem. In such circumstances, the auditor should
reevaluate the assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to
fraud and its resulting impact on (a) the nature, timing, and extent of the
tests of balances or transactions, (b) the assessment of the effectiveness
of controls if control risk was assessed below the maximum, and (c) the
assignment of personnel that may be appropriate in the circumstances.
35. If the auditor has determined that the misstatement is, or may be,
the result of fraud, and either has determined that the effect could be
material to the financial statements or has been unable to evaluate
whether the effect ismaterial, the auditor should —
a. Consider the implications for other aspects of the audit (see previ
ous paragraph).
b. Discuss the matter and the approach to further investigation with an
appropriate level of management that is at least one level above
those involved and with senior management.
c. Attempt to obtain additional evidential matter to determine whether
material fraud has occurred or is likely to have occurred, and, if so,
its effect on the financial statements and the auditors report
thereon.18
d. If appropriate, suggest that the client consult with legal counsel.

36. The auditors consideration of the risk of material misstatement
due to fraud and the results of audit tests may indicate such a significant
risk of fraud that the auditor should consider withdrawing from the
engagement and communicating the reasons for withdrawal to the audit
committee or others with equivalent authority and responsibility (here-

17 However, see paragraph 38 for a discussion of the auditor's communication responsi
bilities.
18 See SAS No. 58 for guidance on auditors’ reports issued in connection with audits of
financial statements.
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after referred to as the audit committee).19,20 Whether the auditor con
cludes that withdrawal from the engagement is appropriate may depend
on the diligence and cooperation of senior management or the board of
directors in investigating the circumstances and taking appropriate
action. Because of the variety of circumstances that may arise, it is not
possible to describe definitively when withdrawal is appropriate. The
auditor may wish to consult with his or her legal counsel when consid
ering withdrawal from an engagement.

Documentation of the Auditor's Risk Assessment
and Response
37. In planning the audit, the auditor should document in the work
ing papers evidence of the performance of the assessment of the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud (see paragraphs 12 through 14).
Where risk factors are identified as being present, the documentation
should include (a) those risk factors identified and (b) the auditors
response (see paragraphs 26 through 32) to those risk factors, individu
ally or in combination. In addition, if during the performance of the
audit fraud risk factors or other conditions are identified that cause the
auditor to believe that an additional response is required (paragraph 33),
such risk factors or other conditions, and any further response that the
auditor concluded was appropriate, also should be documented.

19 Examples of “others with equivalent authority and responsibility" may include the
board of directors, the board of trustees, or the owner in owner-managed entities, as
appropriate.
20 If the auditor, subsequent to the date of the report on the audited financial statements,
becomes aware that facts existed at that date which might have affected the report had
the auditor then been aware of such facts, the auditor should refer to section 561 of
SAS No. 1 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 561, “Subsequent
Discovery of Facts Existing at the Date of the Auditors Report”), for guidance.
Furthermore, paragraph 10 of SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor and
Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 315), provides
guidance regarding communication to the predecessor auditor.
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Communications About Fraud to Management,
the Audit Committee,21 and Others21
22
38. Whenever the auditor has determined that there is evidence that
fraud may exist, that matter should be brought to the attention of an
appropriate level of management. This is generally appropriate even if
the matter might be considered inconsequential, such as a minor defal
cation by an employee at a low level in the entity’s organization. Fraud
involving senior management and fraud (whether caused by senior man
agement or other employees) that causes a material misstatement of the
financial statements should be reported directly to the audit committee.
In addition, the auditor should reach an understanding with the audit
committee regarding the expected nature and extent of communications
about misappropriations perpetrated by lower-level employees.

39. When the auditor, as a result of the assessment of the risk of
material misstatement due to fraud, has identified risk factors that have
continuing control implications (whether or not transactions or adjust
ments that could be the result of fraud have been detected), the auditor
should consider whether these risk factors represent reportable condi
tions relating to the entity’s internal control that should be
communicated to senior management and the audit committee.23 (See
SAS No. 60, Communication of Internal Control Related Matters Noted
in an Audit [AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 325].) The
auditor also may wish to communicate other risk factors identified when
actions can be reasonably taken by the entity to address the risk.
40. The disclosure of possible fraud to parties other than the client’s
senior management and its audit committee ordinarily is not part of the
auditor’s responsibility and ordinarily would be precluded by the audi
tor’s ethical or legal obligations of confidentiality unless the matter is
reflected in the auditor’s report. The auditor should recognize, however,

21 See note 19.
22 The requirements to communicate noted in paragraphs 38 through 40 extend to any
intentional misstatement of financial statements (see paragraph 3). However, the com
munication may utilize terms other than fraud — for example, irregularity, intentional
misstatement, misappropriation, defalcation — if there is possible confusion with a
legal definition of fraud or other reason to prefer alternative terms.
23 Alternatively, the auditor may decide to communicate solely with the audit committee.
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that in the following circumstances a duty to disclose outside the entity
may exist:
a. To comply with certain legal and regulatory requirements24
b. To a successor auditor when the successor makes inquiries in
accordance with SAS No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor
and Successor Auditors (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU
sec. 315)25
c. In response to a subpoena
d. To a funding agency or other specified agency in accordance with
requirements for the audits of entities that receive governmental
financial assistance
Because,potential conflicts with the auditors ethical and legal obliga
tions for confidentiality may be complex, the auditor may wish to consult
with legal counsel before discussing matters covered by paragraphs 38
through 40 with parties outside the client.

Effective Date
41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for
periods ending on or after December 15,1997. Early application of the
provisions of this Statement is permissible.

24 These requirements include reports in connection with the termination of the engage
ment, such as when the entity reports an auditor change under the appropriate
securities law on Form 8-K and the fraud or related risk factors constitute a
“reportable event” or is the source of a “disagreement,” as these terms are defined in
Item 304 of Regulation S-K. These requirements also include reports that may be
required, under certain circumstances, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (codified in section 10A(b)l of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934) relating to an illegal act that has a material effect on the financial statements.
25 In accordance with SAS No. 7, communication between predecessor and successor
auditors requires the specific permission of the client.
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Appendix A
Amendment to "Responsibilities and Functions
of the Independent Auditor"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. I, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110.)

1. This amendment adds a new paragraph 2 (and renumbers the existing
paragraphs 2 through 9) to include a statement of the auditor's responsibility, in
an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards,
for the detection of material misstatement in the financial statements due to
fraud. The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) believes that the revised descrip
tion of that presently existing responsibility is more understandable because its
structure parallels the description of the auditor’s responsibility contained in
the auditors standard report. The ASB also believes that inclusion of this state
ment in the general standards should heighten the auditor’s awareness of the
extent of the current responsibility in an audit for the detection of material mis
statement due to fraud. New language is shown in boldface italics. The
amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for periods ending on
or after December 15, 1997. Early application of the provisions of this
Statement is permissible.
2. The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud.1 Because of the
nature of audit evidence and the characteristics offraud, the auditor is able
to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstate
ments are detected.2 The auditor has no responsibility to plan and perform
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements, whether caused
by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial statements are
detected.

1 See SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, as amended
by SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec, 312), and SAS No.
82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The auditor’s consideration of illegal acts and
responsibility for detecting misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in
SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,AU sec.
317). For those illegal acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct
and material effect on the determination offinancial statement amounts, the audi
tor's responsibility to detect misstatements resulting from such illegal acts is the
same as that for error or fraud.
2 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the
Performance of Work,” paragraphs 10 through 13).
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Appendix B
Amendment to "Due Care in the Performance of Work"
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230.)

1. This amendment includes an expanded discussion of due professional
care and reasonable assurance reflected in the change of the section title from
“Due Care in the Performance of Work” to “Due Professional Care in the
Performance of Work.” The objective of these revisions is to heighten the audi
tor’s awareness of the need for professional skepticism throughout the conduct
of the audit as well as to articulate clearly the concept of reasonable assurance.
New language is shown in boldface italics; deleted language is shown by strike
through. The amendment is effective for audits of financial statements for
periods ending on or after December 15, 1997. Early application of the provi
sions of this Statement is permissible.
1.

The third general standard is:
Due professional care is to be exercised in the planning and performance of the
audit and the preparation of the report.1

2.
This standard requires the independent auditor to plan and perform his or her
work with due professional care. Due professional care imposes a responsibility
upon each person professional within an independent auditors organization to
observe the standards of field work and reporting. Exorcise of duo care requires crit
ical review at every level of supervision of the work done and the judgment exercised
bythose assisting in the audit.
3.
A paragraph appearing in Cooley on Torts, a legal treatise, often cited-by^ttorneys in discussing due care merits quotation here describes the obligationfor due

care as follows:
Every man who offers his services to another and is employed assumes the duty
to exercise in the employment such skill as he possesses with reasonable care and
diligence. In all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers
his services, he is understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the
degree of skill commonly possessed by others in the same employment, and if his
pretentions are unfounded, he commits a species of fraud upon every man who
employs him in reliance on his public profession. But no man, whether skilled or
unskilled, undertakes that the task he assumes shall be performed successfully,
and without fault or error; he undertakes for good faith and integrity, but not for
infallibility, and he is liable to his employer for negligence, bad faith, or dishon
esty, but not for losses consequent upon pure errors of judgment.2

4.
The matter of due professional care concerns what the independent auditor
does and how well he or she does it. The quotation from Cooley on Torts

1 This amendment revises the third general standard of the ten generally accepted
auditing standards.
2 D. Haggard, Cooley on Torts, 472 (4th ed., 1932).
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provides a source from which an auditor’s responsibility for conducting an
audit with due professional care can be derived. The remainder of the
Statement discusses the auditor’s responsibility in the context of an audit.
5. An auditor should possess “the degree of skill commonly possessed” by
other auditors and should exercise it with “reasonable care and diligence”
(that is, with due professional care).

6. Auditors should be assigned to tasks and supervised commensurate with
their level of knowledge, skill, and ability so that they can evaluate the audit
evidence they are examining. The auditor with final responsibility for the
engagement should know, at a minimum, the relevant professional account
ing and auditing standards and should be knowledgeable about the client.3
The auditor with final responsibility is responsible for the assignment of
tasks to, and supervision of, assistants.4

Professional Skepticism
7. Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skep
ticism. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning
mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence. The auditor uses the knowl
edge, skill, and ability called for by the profession of public accounting to
diligently perform, in good faith and with integrity, the gathering and objec
tive evaluation of evidence.
8. Gathering and objectively evaluating audit evidence requires the auditor
to consider the competency and sufficiency of the evidence. Since evidence is
gathered and evaluated throughout the audit, professional skepticism should
be exercised throughout the audit process.
9. The auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes
unquestioned honesty. In exercising professional skepticism, the auditor
should not be satisfied with less than persuasive evidence because of a belief
that management is honest.

Reasonable Assurance
10. The exercise of due professional care allows the auditor to obtain rea
sonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material
misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud. Absolute assurance is not
attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of
fraud. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards may not detect a material misstatement.

11. The independent auditor’s objective is to obtain sufficient competent evi
dential matter to provide him or her with a reasonable basis for forming an
opinion. The nature of most evidence derives, in part, from the concept of
selective testing of the data being audited, which involves judgment regard
ing both the areas to be tested and the nature, timing, and extent of the tests
to be performed. In addition, judgment is required in interpreting the results
3 See SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,
AU sec. 311), paragraph 7.
4 See SAS No. 22, paragraph 11.
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of audit testing and evaluating audit evidence. Even with good faith and
integrity, mistakes and errors in judgment can be made. Furthermore,
accounting presentations contain accounting estimates, the measurement of
which is inherently uncertain and depends on the outcome offuture events.
The auditor exercises professionaljudgment in evaluating the reasonableness
of accounting estimates based on information that could reasonably be
expected to be available prior to the completion offield work.5 As a result of
these factors, in the great majority of cases, the auditor has to rely on evi
dence that is persuasive rather than convincing.6

12. Because of the characteristics offraud, particularly those involving con
cealment and falsified documentation (including forgery), a properly
planned and performed audit may not detect a material misstatement. For
example, an audit conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards rarely involves authentication of documentation, nor are auditors
trained as or expected to be experts in such authentication. Also, auditing
procedures may be ineffective for detecting an intentional misstatement that
is concealed through collusion among client personnel and third parties or
among management or employees of the client.
13. Since the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is based on the
concept of obtaining reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and
his or her report does not constitute a guarantee. Therefore, the subsequent
discovery that a material misstatement, whether from error or fraud, exists
in the financial statements does not, in and of itself, evidence (a) failure to
obtain reasonable assurance, (b) inadequate planning, performance, orjudg
ment, (c) the absence ofdue professional care, or (d) a failure to comply with
generally accepted auditing standards.

5 See SAS No. 57, Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 342), paragraph 22.
• See SAS No. 31, Evidential Matter, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 326).
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Appendix C
Amendment to Audit Risk and Materiality
in Conducting an Audit
(Amends Statement on Auditing Standards No. 47, AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 312.)

1. This amendment revises SAS No. 47, Audit Risk and Materiality in Con
ducting an Audit, to provide a foundation within the audit risk model for the
consideration of fraud and to incorporate guidance on errors that was formerly
included in SAS No. 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report
Errors and Irregularities (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316),
which is superseded by this SAS. The revisions also (a) elaborate on factors an
auditor should consider for an entity with multiple locations or components and
(b) include changes to conform to the definition and description of internal
control contained in SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in a
Financial Statement Audit: An Amendment to SAS No. 55 (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 319). New language is shown in boldface italics;
deleted language is shown by strike-through. The amendment is effective for
audits of financial statements for periods ending on or after December 15,
1997. Early application of the provisions of this Statement is permissible.
1 . This Statement provides guidance on the auditors consideration of audit risk and
materiality when planning and performing an audit of financial statements in accor
dance with generally accepted auditing standards. Audit risk and materiality affect
the application of generally accepted auditing standards, especially the standards of
field work and reporting, and are reflected in the auditor's standard report. Audit risk
and materiality, among other matters, need to be considered together in determin
ing the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures and in evaluating the
results of those procedures.

2 . The existence of audit risk is recognized by the statement in the auditor' standard
report that the auditor-obtained “reasonable assurance” about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement.1 in the description of the responsi

bilities and junctions of the independent auditor that states, “Because of the
nature of audit evidence and the characteristics offraud, the auditor is able
to obtain reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that material misstate
ments are detected.”1 Audit risk2 is the risk that the auditor may unknowingly fail
1For purposesof this section,-misstatements includes both errors and irregularities as
defined in SAS No. 53, The Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and
Irregularities, paragraphs 2 3.

1 See SAS No. 1, Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures, as amended
by SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 110, “Respons
ibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor”) and SAS No. 1 (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 230, “Due Professional Care in the Per
formance of Work”), for a further discussion of reasonable assurance.
2 In addition to audit risk, the auditor is also exposed to loss or injury to his or her profes
sional practice from litigation, adverse publicity, or other events arising in connection with

(continued)
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to appropriately modify his or her opinion on financial statements that are materi
ally misstated.*3

3. The concept of materiality recognizes that some matters, either individually or in
the aggregate, are important for fair presentation of financial statements in confor
mity with generally accepted accounting principles,4 while other matters are not
important. The phrase in the auditor’s standard report “present fairly, in all mate
rial respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles” indicates
the auditors belief that the financial statements taken as a whole are not materially
misstated.
4. Financial statements are materially misstated when they contain misstatements
whose effect, individually or in the aggregate, is important enough to cause them not
to be presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles. Misstatements result from misapplications of generally
accepted accounting principles, departures from fact, or omissions of necessary
information. Misstatements can result from errors or fraud.5

5. In planning the audit, the auditor is concerned with matters that could be
material to thefinancial statements. The auditor has no responsibility to plan
and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance that misstatements,
whether caused by errors or fraud, that are not material to the financial
statements are detected.

financial statements that he has audited and reported on. This exposure is present even
though the auditor has performed -his-the audit in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards and has reported appropriately on those financial statements. Even if an
auditor assesses this exposure as low, he the auditor should not perform less extensive pro
cedures than would otherwise be appropriate under generally accepted auditing standards.
3 This definition of audit risk does not include the risk that the auditor might erroneously
conclude that the financial statements are materially misstated. In such a situation, he the
auditor would ordinarily reconsider or extend his auditing procedures and request that
the client perform specific tasks to reevaluate the appropriateness of the financial state
ments. These steps would ordinarily lead the auditor to the correct conclusion. This
definition also excludes the risk of an inappropriate reporting decision unrelated to the
detection and evaluation of misstatements in the financial statements, such as an inappro
priate decision regarding the form of the auditor's report because of an uncertainty or a
limitation on the scope of the audit.
4 The concepts of audit risk and materiality also are also applicable to financial statements
presented in conformity with a comprehensive basis of accounting other than gener
ally accepted accounting principles; references in this Statement to financial statements
presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles also include those
presentations.

5 The auditor’s consideration of illegal acts and responsibility for detecting
misstatements resulting from illegal acts is defined in SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts
By Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317). For those illegal
acts that are defined in that Statement as having a direct and material effect on
the determination offinancial statement amounts, the auditor's responsibility to
detect misstatements resulting from such illegal acts is the same as that for errors
or fraud.
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6. The term errors refers to unintentional misstatements or omissions of
amounts or disclosures in financial statements. Errors may involve—
• Mistakes in gathering or processing datafrom which financial statements
are prepared.
• Unreasonable accounting estimates arising from oversight or misinter
pretation offacts.
• Mistakes in the application of accounting principles relating to amount,
classification, manner of presentation, or disclosure.6

7. Although fraud is a broad legal concept, the auditor’s interest specifically
relates to fraudulent acts that cause a misstatement offinancial statements.
Two types of misstatements are relevant to the auditor’s consideration in a
financial statement audit — misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting and misstatements arising from misappropriation of assets. These
two types of misstatements are further described in SAS No. 82,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316). The primary factor that distinguishes fraud
from error is whether the underlying action that results in the misstatement
in financial statements is intentional or unintentional.
8. When considering the auditor’s responsibility to obtain reasonable assur
ance that the financial statements are free from material misstatement, there
is no important distinction between errors and fraud. There is a distinction,
however, in the auditor’s response to detected misstatements. Generally, an
isolated, immaterial error in processing accounting data or applying
accounting principles is not significant to the audit. In contrast, when fraud
is detected, the auditor should consider the implications for the integrity of
management or employees and the possible effect on other aspects of the
audit.
5. 9. When reaching a conclusion concluding as to whether the effect of misstate
ments, individually or in the aggregate, is material, an auditor ordinarily should
consider their nature and amount in relation to the nature and amount of items in
the financial statements under audit. For example, an amount that is material to the
financial statements of one entity may not be material to the financial statements of
another entity of a different size or nature. Also, what is material to the financial
statements of a particular entity might change from one period to another.
6. 10. The auditor’s consideration of materiality is a matter of professional judgment
and is influenced by his or her perception of the needs of a reasonable person who
will rely on the financial statements. The perceived needs of a reasonable person are
recognized in the discussion of materiality in Financial Accounting Standards Board
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information, which defines materiality as “the magnitude of an omission
or misstatement of accounting information that, in the light of surrounding circum
stances, makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the
information would have been changed or influenced by the omission or misstate
ment.” That discussion recognizes that materiality judgments are made in light of

6 Errors do not include the effect of accounting processes employed for convenience,
such as maintaining accounting records on the cash basis or the tax basis and peri
odically adjusting those records to prepare financial statements in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles.
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surrounding circumstances and necessarily involve both quantitative and qualitative
considerations.

7. 11. As a result of the interaction of quantitative and qualitative considerations in
materiality judgments, misstatements of relatively small amounts that come to the
auditors attention could have a material effect on the financial statements. For exam
ple, an illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if there
is a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material contingent liability or a
material loss of revenue. 6 6 7

Planning the Audit
8. 12. The auditor should consider audit risk and materiality both in (a) planning the
audit and designing auditing procedures and (b) evaluating whether the financial
statements taken as a whole are presented fairly, in all material respects, in confor
mity with generally accepted accounting principles. The auditor should consider
audit risk and materiality in the first circumstance to obtain sufficient competent evi
dential matter on which to properly evaluate the financial statements in the second
circumstance.
Considerations at the Financial Statements Level6

9. 13. The auditor should plan the audit so that audit risk will be limited to a low
level that is, in his or her professional judgment, appropriate for issuing expressing
an opinion on the financial statements. Audit risk may be assessed in quantitative or
nonquantitative terms.

10. 14. SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision (AICPA, Professional Standards,
vol. 1, AU sec. 311), requires the auditor, in planning the audit, to take into consid
eration, among other matters, his or her preliminary judgment about materiality
levels for audit purposes.78 That judgment may or may not be quantified.
11. 15. According to SAS No. 22, the nature, timing, and extent of planning and thus
of the considerations of audit risk and materiality vary with the size and complexity
of the entity, the auditors experience with the entity, and his or her knowledge of
the entity’s business. Certain entity-related factors also affect the nature, timing, and
extent of auditing procedures with respect to specific account balances and classes of
transactions and related assertions. (See paragraphs 17 24 through 26 33.)

16. An assessment of the risk of material misstatement (whether caused by
error or fraud) should be made during planning. The auditor’s understand
ing of internal control may heighten or mitigate the auditor’s concern about
the risk of material misstatement.9 In considering audit risk, the auditor
67 The auditor's responsibility for illegal acts is discussed-in- See SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by

Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol.

1, AU sec. 317).

• See SAS No. 53,- The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregu
larities, paragraphs 10 12, for afurther discussion of the consideration of-audit risk at the
financial statement-level.
7 8 This Statement amends SAS No. 22, Planning and Supervision, paragraph 3e, by substi
tuting the words "Preliminary judgment about materiality levels” in place of the words
“Preliminary estimates of materiality levels.”

9 See SAS No. 55, as amended by SAS No. 78, Consideration of Internal Control in
a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1,AU sec. 319).
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should specifically assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial
statements due to fraud.10 The auditor should consider the effect of these
assessments on the overall audit strategy and the expected conduct and scope
of the audit.

17. Whenever the auditor has concluded that there is significant risk of
material misstatement of the financial statements, the auditor should con
sider this conclusion in determining the nature, timing, or extent of
procedures; assigning staff; or requiring appropriate levels of supervision.
The knowledge, skill, and ability of personnel assigned significant engage
ment responsibilities should be commensurate with the auditor's assessment
of the level of risk for the engagement. Ordinarily, higher risk requires more
experienced personnel or more extensive supervision by the auditor with
final responsibilityfor the engagement during both the planning and the con
duct of the engagement. Higher risk may cause the auditor to expand the
extent of procedures applied, apply procedures closer to or as of year end,
particularly in critical audit areas, or modify the nature of procedures to
obtain more persuasive evidence.
18. In an audit of an entity with operations in multiple locations or compo
nents, the auditor should consider the extent to which auditing procedures
should be performed at selected locations or components. The factors an
auditor should consider regarding the selection of a particular location or
component include (a) the nature and amount of assets and transactions exe
cuted at the location or component, (b) the degree of centralization of
records or information processing, (c) the effectiveness of the control envi
ronment, particularly with respect to management’s direct control over the
exercise of authority delegated to others and its ability to effectively super
vise activities at the location or component, (d) the frequency, timing, and
scope of monitoring activities by the entity or others at the location or com
ponent, and (e) judgments about materiality of the location or component.

19. In planning the audit, the auditor should use his or her judgment as to the
appropriately low level of audit risk and his or her preliminary judgment about
materiality levels in a manner that can be expected to provide him, within the inher
ent limitations of the auditing process, with sufficient evidential matter to obtain
reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement. Materiality levels include an overall level for each statement; however,
because the statements are interrelated, and for reasons of efficiency, the auditor
ordinarily considers materiality for planning purposes in terms of the smallest aggre
gate level of misstatements that could be considered material to any one of the
financial statements. For example, if he the auditor believes that misstatements
aggregating approximately $100,000 would have a material effect on income but that
such misstatements would have to aggregate approximately $200,000 to materially
affect financial position, it would not be appropriate for him or her to design audit
ing procedures that would be expected to detect misstatements only if they
aggregate approximately $200,000.
13. 20. The auditor plans the audit to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting mis
statements that he or she believes could be large enough, individually or in the
aggregate, to be quantitatively material to the financial statements. Although the
auditor should be alert for misstatements that could be qualitatively material, it ordi10 See SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.
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narily is not practical to design procedures to detect them. SAS No. 31, Evidential
Matter, as amended (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 326), states
that “an auditor typically works within economic limits; the auditors opinion, to be
economically useful, must be formed within a reasonable length of time and at
reasonable cost.”

44? 21. In some situations, the auditor considers materiality for planning purposes
before the financial statements to be audited are prepared. In other situations, his
planning takes place after the financial statements under audit have been prepared,
but he the auditor may be aware that they require significant modification. In both
types of situations, the auditors preliminary judgment about materiality might be
based on the entity’s annualized interim financial statements or financial statements
of one or more prior annual periods, as long as he gives recognition is given to the
effects of major changes in the entity’s circumstances (for example, a significant
merger) and relevant changes in the economy as a whole or the industry in which the
entity operates.

15. 22. Assuming, theoretically, that the auditor’s judgment about materiality at the
planning stage was based on the same information available to him at the evaluation
stage, materiality for planning and evaluation purposes would be the same. However;
it ordinarily is not feasible for the auditor, when planning an audit, to anticipate all
of the circumstances that may ultimately influence his judgments about materiality
in evaluating the audit findings at the completion of the audit. Thus, his the audi
tor’s preliminary judgment about materiality ordinarily will differ from his the
judgment about materiality used in evaluating the audit findings. If significantly
lower materiality levels become appropriate in evaluating his audit findings, the audi
tor should reevaluate the sufficiency of the auditing procedures he or she has
performed.

16. 23. In planning auditing procedures, the auditor should also consider the
nature, cause (if known), and amount of misstatements that he or she is aware of
from the audit of the prior period’s financial statements.
Considerations at the Individual Account-Balance or

Class-of-Transactions Level

17. 24. The auditor recognizes that there is an inverse relationship between audit
risk and materiality considerations. For example, the risk that a particular account
balance or class of transactions and related assertions could be misstated by an
extremely large amount might be very low, but the risk that it could be misstated by
an extremely small amount might be very high. Holding other planning considera
tions equal, either a decrease in the level of audit risk that the auditor judges to be
appropriate in an account balance or a class of transactions or a decrease in the
amount of misstatements in the balance or class that he the auditor believes could
be material would require the auditor to do one or more of the following: (a) select
a more effective auditing procedure, (b) perform auditing procedures closer to year
end the balance sheet date, or (c) increase the extent of a particular auditing proce
dure.

18. 25. In determining the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures to be
applied to a specific account balance or class of transactions, the auditor should
design procedures to obtain reasonable assurance of detecting misstatements that he
or she believes, based on his the preliminary judgment about materiality, could be
material, when aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes, to the
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financial statements taken as a whole. Auditors use various methods to design pro
cedures to detect such misstatements. In some cases, auditors explicitly estimate, for
planning purposes, the maximum amount of misstatements in the balance or class
that, when combined with misstatements in other balances or classes, could exist
without causing the financial statements to be materially misstated. In other cases,
auditors relate their preliminary judgment about materiality to a specific account bal
ance or class of transactions without explicitly estimating such misstatements.
19.26. The auditor needs to consider audit risk at the individual account-balance or
class-of-transactions level because such consideration directly assists him in deter
mining the scope of auditing procedures for the balance or class and related
assertions. The auditor should seek to restrict audit risk at the individual balance or
class level in such a way that will enable him or her, at the completion of his the
examination, to express an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole at an
appropriately low level of audit risk. Auditors use various approaches to accomplish
that objective.

20. 27. At the account-balance or class-of-transactions level, audit risk consists of
(a) the risk (consisting of inherent risk and control risk) that the balance or class and
related assertions contain misstatements (whether caused by error orfraud) that
could be material to the financial statements when aggregated with misstatements in
other balances or classes and (b) the risk (detection risk) that the auditor will not
detect such misstatements. The discussion that follows describes audit risk in terms
of three component risks. 11 The way the auditor considers these component risks
and combines them involves professional judgment and depends on his the audit
approach.
a. Inherent risk is the susceptibility of an assertion to a material misstatement,
assuming that there are no related internal controls structure policies or proce
dures. The risk of such misstatement is greater for some assertions and related
balances or classes than for others. For example, complex calculations are more
likely to be misstated than simple calculations. Cash is more susceptible to theft
than an inventory of coal. Accounts consisting of amounts derived from account
ing estimates pose greater risks than do accounts consisting of relatively routine,
factual data. External factors also influence inherent risk. For example, techno
logical developments might make a particular product obsolete, thereby causing
inventory to be more susceptible to overstatement. In addition to those factors
that are peculiar to a specific assertion for an account balance or a class of trans
actions, factors that relate to several or all of the balances or classes may
influence the inherent risk related to an assertion for a specific balance or class.
These latter factors include, for example, a lack of sufficient working capital to
continue operations or a declining industry characterized by a large number of
business fadlures. (See SAS No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and
Report Errors and Irregularities, paragraph 10.)
b. Control risk is the risk that a material misstatement that could occur in an asser
tion will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis by the entity’s internal

11The formula in the appendix (paragraph 48) to SAS No. 39, Audit Sampling (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 350), describes audit risk in terms of four compo
nent risks. Detection risk is presented in terms of two components: the risk that analytical
procedures and other relevant substantive tests would fail to detect misstatements equal
to tolerable misstatement, and the allowable risk of incorrect acceptance for the sub
stantive test of details.
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control structure policies or procedures. That risk is a function of the effective
ness of the design and operation of internal control structure policies or
procedures in achieving the entity’s broad internal control structure objectives
relevant to an audit preparation of the entity’s financial statements. Some con
trol risk will always exist because of the inherent limitations of any internal
control structure.
c. Detection risk is the risk that the auditor will not detect a material misstatement
that exists in an assertion. Detection risk is a function of the effectiveness of an
auditing procedure and of its application by the auditor. It arises partly from
uncertainties that exist when the auditor does not examine 100 percent of an
account balance or a class of transactions and partly because of other uncertain
ties that exist even if he or she were to examine 100 percent of the balance or
class. Such other uncertainties arise because an auditor might select an inappro
priate auditing procedure, misapply an appropriate procedure, or misinterpret
the audit results. These other uncertainties can be reduced to a negligible level
through adequate planning and supervision and conduct of a firm’s audit prac
tice in accordance with appropriate quality control standards.
21. 28. Inherent risk and control risk differ from detection risk in that they exist
independently of the audit of financial statements, whereas detection risk relates to
the auditor’s procedures and can be changed at his or her discretion. Detection risk
should bear an inverse relationship to inherent and control risk. The less the inher
ent and control risk the auditor believes exists, the greater the detection risk he that
can be accepted. Conversely, the greater the inherent and control risk the auditor
believes exists, the less the detection risk he that can be accepted. These compo
nents of audit risk may be assessed in quantitative terms such as percentages or in
nonquantitative terms that range, for example, from a minimum to a maximum.

22. 29. When the auditor assesses inherent risk for an assertion related to an
account balance or a class of transactions, he or she evaluates numerous factors that
involve professional judgment. In doing so, he the auditor considers not only fac
tors peculiar to the related assertion, but also, other factors pervasive to the financial
statements taken as a whole that may also influence inherent risk related to the asser
tion. If an auditor concludes that the effort required to assess inherent risk for an
assertion would exceed the potential reduction in the extent of his auditing proce
dures derived from such an assessment, he the auditor should assess inherent risk
as being at the maximum when designing auditing procedures.

23. 30. The auditor also uses professional judgment in assessing control risk for an
assertion related to the account balance or class of transactions. The auditor’s assess
ment of control risk is based on the sufficiency of evidential matter obtained to
support the effectiveness of internal control structure policies or procedures in pre
venting or detecting misstatements in financial statement assertions. If the auditor
believes controls structure policies or procedures are unlikely to pertain to an asser
tion or are unlikely to be effective, or if he believes that evaluating their effectiveness
would be inefficient, he or she would assess control risk for that assertion at the max
imum.

24. 31. The auditor might make separate or combined assessments of inherent risk
and control risk. If he the auditor considers inherent risk or control risk, separately
or in combination, to be less than the maximum, he or she should have an appro
priate basis for his these assessments. This basis may be obtained, for example,
through the use of questionnaires, checklists, instructions, or similar generalized
materials and, in the case of control risk, his the understanding of the internal con-
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trol structure and his the performance of suitable tests of controls. However, pro
fessional judgment is required in interpreting, adapting, or expanding such
generalized material as appropriate in the circumstances.

32. The detection risk that the auditor can accept in the design of auditing pro
cedures is based on the level to which he or she seeks to restrict audit risk related to
the account balance or class of transactions and on his the assessment of inherent
and control risks. As the auditor’s assessment of inherent risk and control risk
decreases, the detection risk that he can be accepted increases. It is not appropriate,
however, for an auditor to rely completely on his assessments of inherent risk and
control risk to the exclusion of performing substantive tests of account balances and
classes of transactions where misstatements could exist that might be material when
aggregated with misstatements in other balances or classes.

26. 33. An audit of financial statements is a cumulative process; as the auditor per
forms planned auditing procedures, the evidence he obtains obtained may cause
him or her to modify the nature, timing, and extent of other planned procedures. As
a result of performing auditing procedures or from other sources during the
audit, Iinformation may come to the auditors attention as-result of performing
auditing procedures or from other sources during the audit that differs significantly
from the information on which his the audit plan was based. For example, the extent
of misstatements he detects detected may alter his the judgment about the levels of
inherent and control risks, and other information he obtains obtained about the
financial statements may alter his the preliminary judgment about materiality. In
such cases, he the auditor may need to reevaluate the auditing procedures he or
she plans to apply, based on his the revised consideration of audit risk and material
ity for all or certain of the account balances or classes of transactions and related
assertions.

Evaluating Audit Findings
27. 34. In evaluating whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all
material respects, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, the
auditor should aggregate misstatements that the entity has not corrected in a way
that enables him or her to consider whether, in relation to individual amounts,
subtotals, or totals in the financial statements, they materially misstate the financial
statements taken as a whole. Qualitative considerations also influence an the auditor
in reaching a conclusion as to whether misstatements are material.

28. 35. The aggregation of misstatements should include the auditors best estimate
of the total misstatements in the account balances or classes of transactions that he

or she has examined (hereafter referred to as likely misstatement
**
l2), not just the
amount of misstatements he specifically identifiesd (hereafter referred to as known
misstatement).10 13 When the auditor tests an account balance or a class of transSee SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report—Errors and
Irregularities, 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, para
graphs 22-25, 33—35, for a further discussion of the auditors consideration of

differences between the accounting records and the underlying facts and circumstances.
paragraphs provides specific guidance on the auditor's considera
tion of an audit adjustment that is, or may be, an irregularity the result offraud.

This section Those

10 13 If the auditor were to examine all of the items in a balance or class, the likely misstate
ment applicable to recorded transactions in the balance or class would be the amount of
known misstatements specifically identified.
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actions and related assertions by an analytical procedure, he or she ordinarily would
not specifically identify misstatements but would only obtain an indication of
whether misstatement might exist in the balance or class and possibly its approximate
magnitude. If the analytical procedure indicates that a misstatement might exist,
but not its approximate amount, the auditor ordinarily would have to employ other
procedures to enable him or her to estimate the likely misstatement in the balance
or class. When an auditor uses audit sampling to test an assertion for an account
balance or a class of transactions, he or she projects the amount of known misstate
ments he identified in his the sample to the items in the balance or class from which
his the sample was selected. That projected misstatement, along with the results of
other substantive tests, contributes to the auditors assessment of likely misstatement
in the balance or class.

29. 36. The risk of material misstatement of the financial statements is generally
greater when account balances and classes of transactions include accounting esti
mates rather than essentially factual data because of the inherent subjectivity in
estimating future events. Estimates, such as those for inventory obsolescence, uncol
lectible receivables, and warranty obligations, are subject not only to the
unpredictability of future events but also to misstatements that may arise from using
inadequate or inappropriate data or misapplying appropriate data. Since no one
accounting estimate can be considered accurate with certainty, the auditor recog
nizes that a difference between an estimated amount best supported by the audit
evidence and the estimated amount included in the financial statements may be rea
sonable, and such difference would not be considered to be a likely misstatement.
However, if the auditor believes the estimated amount included in the financial
statements is unreasonable, he or she should treat the difference between that esti
mate and the closest reasonable estimate as a likely misstatement and aggregate it
with other likely misstatements. The auditor should also consider whether the dif
ference between estimates best supported by the audit evidence and the estimates
included in the financial statements, which are individually reasonable, indicates a
possible bias on the part of the entity’s management. For example, if each account
ing estimate included in the financial statements was individually reasonable, but the
effect of the difference between each estimate and the estimate best supported by
the audit evidence was to increase income, the auditor should reconsider the esti
mates taken as a whole.

30. 37. In prior periods, likely misstatements may not have been corrected by the
entity because they did not cause the financial statements for those periods to be
materially misstated. Those misstatements might also affect the current period’s
financial statements.11 14 If the auditor believes that there is an unacceptably high risk
that the current period’s financial statements may be materially misstated when those
prior-period likely misstatements that affect the current period’s financial statements
are considered along with likely misstatements arising in the current period, he the
auditor should include in aggregate likely misstatement the effect on the current
period’s financial statements of those prior-period likely misstatements.
31. 38. If the auditor concludes, based on his the accumulation of sufficient evi
dential matter, that the aggregation of likely misstatements causes the financial

11 14The measurement of the effect, if any, on the current periods financial statements of
misstatements uncorrected in prior periods involves accounting considerations and is
therefore not addressed in this Statement.
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statements to be materially misstated, he the auditor should request management
to eliminate the material misstatement. If the material misstatement is not elimi
nated, he the auditor should issue a qualified or an adverse opinion on the financial
statements. Material misstatements may be eliminated by, for example, application
of appropriate accounting principles, other adjustments in amounts, or the addi
tion of appropriate disclosure of inadequately disclosed matters. Even though the
aggregate effect of likely misstatements on the financial statements may be immate
rial, the auditor should recognize that an accumulation of immaterial misstatements
in the balance sheet could contribute to material misstatements of future finan
cial statements.
88? 39. If the auditor concludes that the aggregation of likely misstatements does
not cause the financial statements to be materially misstated, he or she should rec
ognize that they could still be materially misstated duo to because of further
misstatement remaining undetected. As aggregate likely misstatement increases, the
risk that the financial statements may be materially misstated also increases. The
Aauditors generally reduces this risk of material misstatement in planning the audit
by restricting the extent of detection risk they are he or she is willing to accept for
an assertion related to an account balance or a class of transactions. The Aauditors
also can also reduce this risk of material misstatement by modifying the nature, tim
ing, and extent of planned auditing procedures on a continuous basis in performing
the audit. (See paragraph 26 33.) Nevertheless, if the auditor believes that such risk
is unacceptably high, he or she should perform additional auditing procedures or
satisfy himself or herself that the entity has adjusted the financial statements to
reduce the risk of material misstatement to an acceptable level.

40. In aggregating known and likely misstatements that the entity has not
corrected, pursuant to paragraphs 34 and 35, the auditor may designate an
amount below which misstatements need not be accumulated. This amount
should be set so that any such misstatements, either individually or when
aggregated with other such misstatements, would not be material to the
financial statements, after the possibility offurther undetected misstatements
is considered.

Effective Date
33. 41. This Statement is effective for audits of financial statements for periods
beginning after June 30,1984. The amendments are effective for audits offinan
cial statements for periods ending on or after December 15,1997.
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This Statement entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
was adopted by the assenting votes of the fifteen members of the board, of
whom three, Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice, assented with qualification.

Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice qualify their assent for paragraphs 17 and
19, which list risk factors. They believe that it can be inferred from the
Statement that the selection of appropriate risk factors is mandated by
the Standard. Also, in paragraph 17, several of the risk factors are supported
by specific indicators. These indicators, when taken with the risk factors, create
a list of examples far too numerous for the body of a Statement.

They are concerned that, despite the fact that paragraph 14 of the Statement
states that “the auditor should use professional judgment when assessing
the . . . relevance of fraud risk factors,” in practice, auditors may mistakenly
believe that they need to consider all of the fraud risk factors in the Statement
on every audit.
In practice, the auditor should apply judgment, based on “entities of different
size, with different ownership characteristics, in different industries, or because
of other differing characteristics or circumstances,” as stated in paragraph 14 of
the Statement. Further, as business practices and processes change, including
the effects of technology, auditors will need to consider risk factors appropriate
to changed circumstances.

Messrs. McElroy, Rockman, and Vice believe that the profession and the pub
lic would be better served by publishing fewer risk factors within the Statement
and by providing example risk factors in nonauthoritative documents that can
be better tailored to the circumstances, and that can change over time as new
knowledge becomes available.

Auditing Standards Board (1996)
Edmund R. Noonan, Chair
John L. Archambault
Luther E. Birdzell
John A. Fogarty, Jr.
James S. Gerson
Stephen D. Holton
Norwood J. Jackson, Jr.
John J. Kilkeary
Deborah D. Lambert
Stephen M. McEachern
Charles J. McElroy
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Glenn J. Vice
W. Ronald Walton
Dan M. Guy
Vice President, Professional
Standards and Services

Thomas Ray
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Fraud Task Force

David L. Landsittel, Chair
W. Steve Albrecht
Robert E. Fleming
James S. Gerson
Norwood J. Jackson, Jr.
John J. Kilkeary

Joseph P. Liotta
Glenn J. Vice
Jane M. Mancino
Technical Manager,
Audit and Attest Standards

Our thanks to Richard I. Miller, AICPA general counsel and
secretary, for his contributions to the development of this SAS.
Note: Statements on Auditing Standards are issued by the Auditing Standards Board,
the senior technical body of the Institute designated to issue pronouncements on audit
ing matters. Rule 202 of the Institutes Code of Professional Conduct requires
compliance with these standards.

47

Glossary

Glossary

Glossary

Abuse of trust: See Trust, abuse of.

Account manipulation, direct: The alteration of computer programs to obtain direct but
unauthorized access to account files for the purpose of manipulation.
See also: Computer crime.
Account, nominee: A bank or trust account set up under an alias, an assumed name, a

company name, a corporate name, or a blind trust.
Account, posting improper credits to: Concealing a fraud involving the sales and

collection cycle. In this scheme, an employee posts credit memos or other noncash items,
for example, a sales return or writeoff, to the customer account from which the funds were
diverted.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Accounts receivable, misappropriation of: The diversion of payments received

from customers. An employee may open a personal bank account with a name similar to
that of the customer (for example, Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer
payments can then be taken by the employee and deposited into the employee’s bank
account.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Acquisition and payment cycle: The sequence of accounting procedures that

address the procurement of and payment for all goods and services except payroll and
capital acquisitions.

See also: Capital acquisition and repayment cycle; Payroll and personnel cycle; Procurement fraud.
Advance-fee fraud: A scheme in which assurances of some future benefit (for

example, a loan) are given to the proposed victim in return for a payment described as an
advance service fee or other advance good-faith deposit (often falsely described as a
“returnable” deposit).

Typical victims of advance-fee schemes are business people who cannot obtain banking
services or credit from customary sources. They pay “deposits” or “fees” to others on the
promise that the perpetrator will arrange loans or credit for them.
See also: Commercial crime; Finance fraud.
Advertising, false and misleading: Use of untrue or deceptive promotional

techniques resulting in consumer fraud.
Victims are consumers who rely on the false or misleading advertising or promotion.
Noteworthy practices include the following:
1. Advertising as a “sale” item an item that is actually at the regular or higher price

2. Misrepresenting the size, weight, volume, or utility of an item
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3. Making false claims about an attribute that a good or service does not in fact possess
4. Misstating the true costs of a good or service through the use of confusing payment
provisions or otherwise
See also: Bait and switch; Consumer fraud.
Allegation: In litigation, a formal assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a party to

an action, made in a pleading, setting out what that party expects to prove. In a nonlitigious
situation, a concern backed by evidence that a party has committed fraud.
Anti-trust offense: An offence consisting of one or more of the following:

1. Combinations in restraint of trade, price fixing, predatory pricing or other schemes for
the purpose of unlawfully driving competitors out of business.

2. Agreements among competitors to share business according to some agreed formula,
for example, bid-rigging conspiracies and discriminatory pricing agreements.
3. Domination of a business area by one or a few enterprises.
Victims of anti-trust offenses are businesses and purchasers of goods or services who pay
prices higher than they would if the offenses were not committed.
See also: Price fixing; Procurement fraud; Trade, restraint of
Appraisal, false: False and inflated appraisal used to support a loan for an amount

larger than would be granted if the true value of the property were known.
See also: External fraud; landfraud; real estate fraud.
Arson for profit: Intentional burning of a house or property whether one’s own or

another’s to collect the payment from the insurance company on a claim for the loss.
See also: Commercial crime; Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Auto-repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving maintenance services to

automobiles.

Auto repair fraud falls into several categories, including the following:
1. Overcharging for labor or parts or use of shoddy or substandard parts

2. Failure to perform promised services or repairs
3. Charging for services not performed or parts not used
4. Performing services or repairs that are unnecessary or unwanted
See also: Consumer fraud; Repair fraud.
Backdooring: Sale of shares by “friends” of a promoter in a stock market manipulation

scheme as the price rises but contrary to their agreement to sell only on his or her
instructions.

See also: Distribution network, setting up; Stock market manipulation; Warehousing.
Bagman: The person who carries cash as a bribe to the recipient.

2
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Bait and switch: A form of consumer fraud involving misleading advertising. A bargain

(the bait) is advertised as an inducement to lure customers to the store where they are
presented with a similar but higher priced item (the switch). Thus, the advertisement does
not constitute a bona fide offer for sale of the merchandise in question. This scheme may
be used because the advertised item is not available or is in short supply. The sales staff
may try to prevent the customer from purchasing the advertised item by directing him or
her to higher priced merchandise by criticizing the advertised goods.
See also: Advertising, false and misleading; Consumerfraud.
Banking fraud: Violations by insiders or customers of banks, trust companies or credit

unions. Insider violations generally involve embezzlement or self-dealing whereby insiders
lend money to themselves or to businesses in which they have an interest, take bribes to
make loans or refrain from collecting loans, provide special favours to outsiders or
defalcations from customer accounts. Violations by outsiders would include submitting
false financial statements to induce a bank to make a loan, the use of fraudulent collateral,
check kiting, and similar offenses.
Victims of banking fraud are bank depositors and shareholders, creditors, the federal
government as the insurer of deposits, and surety companies that bond bank employees
and officers.

See also: Check kiting; Collateral fraud; Commercial bribery; Trust, abuse of
Bankruptcy fraud: Fraud against parties to a bankruptcy. Victims are usually creditors

and suppliers of the failed or failing business, although managers of fraudulently operating
businesses can also victimize silent partners and shareholders. The following are the two
major kinds of bankruptcy fraud.

1. Fraudulently planned bankruptcy. The assets, credit, and viability of a business are
purposely and systematically used to obtain cash, which is then hidden.
2. Fraudulent concealment or diversion of assets in anticipation offilingfor bankruptcy. This
prevents the assets from being sold for the benefit of creditors.

Planned thefts and fencing activities may be associated with either kind of bankruptcy
fraud as a means of diverting assets for the purpose of converting them to cash.
See also: Finance fraud.
Bid rigging: A conspiracy among contractors to set the price or terms of a contract for
the purpose of raising the cost to the purchaser.

See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud.
Biometrics: A method to ensure that only authorized people have access to computer

systems, restricted areas, and/or equipment. It can include the checking of fingerprints, iris
recognition, and hand geometry.

See also: Computer-access control.
Blowing off: The sale of unusually large amounts of stock during a stock market

manipulation (also referred to as blowing a position).
See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Boiler room: A place of business used to promote fraudulent sales of securities,

charitable donations, lotteries, and so on, through telephone solicitation. Salespeople
working from call lists ask victims to buy a particular product or service. They call both
locally and long distance, use glibly scripted presentations and work on high commissions.
Legitimate enterprises, especially charitable institutions, often mistakenly use the services of
these operators and, as a result, rarely see much of the money collected in their names.

See also: Charity and religious fraud; Securities fraud.
Borrower misapplication of funds: Loan fraud in which a borrower, with little or no

personal risk in the collateral, misapplies borrowed funds.
See also: Loan or lending fraud.
Bundling and unbundling claims: See Claims, bundling and unbundling.
Business-opportunity fraud: One of the most common but varied forms of fraud, in

which the victim is offered the opportunity to make a living or to supplement his or her
income by going into business, full- or part-time, or by purchasing a franchise or
equipment to manufacture some item, sell merchandise, or perform some service.

Victims are generally individuals with a small pool of savings, who are enticed by the
prospect of independence and/or income.
This kind of scheme ranges from being a total sham to an “opportunity” whose promised
return is highly illusory. Work-at-home merchandising schemes, such as selling knitting
machines or raising mink, or the sale of distributorships in cosmetics, special rug cleaning
processes, and so on, are common examples of the kinds of opportunities offered in this
form of fraud. The opportunity presented by the fraudster often includes the promise of
“guaranteed” markets for the goods or services to be produced. This kind of fraud can turn
into a pyramid scheme if victims are induced to enlist other prospective victims.

See also: Franchise fraud; Pyramid scheme; Self-improvement scheme.
Capital acquisition and repayment cycle: The sequence of accounting
procedures whereby capital items are purchased and paid for. This process is sometimes
referred to as the financing cycle.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud.
Casualty-insurance fraud: Claims for staged accidents and false claims for real

accidents submitted under a casualty-insurance policy covering personal injuries and
property damage that may be sustained as the result of an accident.
See also: Claim, accident with false; Insurance fraud; Personal-injury insurance fraud.
Chain-referral scheme: Fraud in which the victim is induced to part with money or
property on the representation that he or she will make money by persuading others to buy
in.

First-tier victims usually believe that those they involve in the scheme (second-tier victims)
will make money. Since second-tier victims can only make money by involving third-tier
victims and so on, the scheme must eventually collapse. Generally, only the fraudster
makes money; few first or second-tier victims (especially if they are honest) have a
sufficient number of participating friends and acquaintances to come out whole.
4
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One common form of chain-referral scheme is the chain-letter. A more sophisticated
version is the pyramid scheme. Here, the victim is sold a franchise to sell both merchandise
and other franchises. Profits are promised to come from both merchandise sold and
commissions or “overrides” on merchandise sold by any second or later-tier victims who
buy a franchise. The profits appear, therefore, to be in selling franchises rather than in
selling merchandise. These schemes ultimately collapse under their own weight.

See also: Merchandisingfraud; Pyramid scheme.
Charity and religious fraud: Fraud arising out of the fund-raising activities of

charitable and/or religious groups.

Almost anyone can be the victim of this type of fraud often without knowing it. Even if the
victim may later suspect the fraud, however, his or her individual loss may be so small that
there is little desire to pursue the matter. The following two kinds of fraud are common.
1. Fake charity. Money is solicited for a nonexistent charitable organization or cause or for
a charitable front set up to defraud donors.

2. Misrepresentation ofassociation with a charity or religious group. Individuals solicited for
donations to a legitimate charity or religious organization are not aware that most of the
money collected is used to cover the cost of professional fund raisers and/or
administrative overhead expenses, rather than the charity. (This is a gray area in law
since professional fund raisers perform a legitimate service for which they may properly
and legally be compensated).
In some instances, charitable organizations themselves are the victims of con artists who
use them as a front to keep the largest part of the money collected. In other instances, the
solicitation falls into a gray area where otherwise legitimate charities cover up the fact that
most of the money collected goes to salaries and fund raising.
See also: Boiler room; Sham, corporate.
Check forgery: The copying of a check or some of its components (most often the

signature) onto a fraudulent check to induce a financial institution to believe it is a bona
fide check.
See also: Check fraud.
Check fraud: A general term for the attempted or actual negotiation of a bad check at a
financial institution. Kinds of fraud in this category include: a false deposit made by a new
customer, forged, altered or stolen check and check kiting.

See also: Check kiting; New-account fraud.
Check kiting: A kind of fraud against banks that depends for success on the length of

time the banking system takes to clear checks. The most common form of check kiting
involves at least two bad checks used intentionally to temporarily obtain credit. In the
simplest case, the fraudster must open two bank accounts, each of which contains little or
no money. The accounts are often established at different banks in different cities in order
to create and take advantage of a longer clearing period. A check is then written on one
account for deposit in the other. This process may be repeated within the next day or so to
build up the amount the fraudster needs to carry out the scheme. Money is then withdrawn
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from one of the accounts before the first checks are cleared. The process can continue with
multiple accounts in different cities and a constant stream of deposits and withdrawals.

Banks are victims of check kites. When first discovered, check kites often appear to have
cost the bank far more than they actually have after all transactions have been analyzed,
since hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks may have been circulated to steal only a
few thousand dollars. In some instances, however, massive amounts have been stolen. In
many cases, businesses employ check kites when they cannot get loans from banks to tide
themselves over a temporary business crisis and intend to (and often do) put the money
back into the accounts before the check kite is discovered. In these instances, the bank has
been fraudulently induced to unwittingly grant what amounts to an interest-free loan. This
form of fraud is becoming increasingly difficult to perpetrate because of the speed of
electronic clearing.

See also: Bankingfraud; Check fraud.
Churning: The buying and selling of stock for a client by a broker solely to generate

commissions rather than to meet the client’s investment objectives.
Claim, accident with false: An individual involved in a real accident later
exaggerates the seriousness of his or her personal injuries in order to collect an excessive
insurance claim.

See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Claim, false or fraudulent: Fraudulently written claim for payment for goods or

services not provided as claimed. False claims may involve activities such as the following:
1. Presentation of a bogus claim or claimant; for example, ghost payrolling

2. Misrepresentation of the qualifications of an otherwise ineligible claim or claimant, for
example, welfare fraud
3. Misrepresentation of the extent of payment or benefits to which a claimant is entitled,
for example, overtime-pay fraud

4. Claims for reimbursement for goods and services allegedly provided to nonexistent
recipients, for example, health care fraud, by service providers

The false claim will carry all the trappings of a legitimate claim and is most successfully
undertaken by individuals with a thorough knowledge of the system being defrauded. The
false claim will sometimes involve the cooperation of executives or officials of the entity to
which the claims are submitted.

See also: Commercial bribery; Ghost employee; Government-benefit program, fraud against;
insurance fraud; Health-care fraud; Welfare fraud.
Claims, bundling and unbundling: The practice of physicians or clinics billing a
patient’s health insurance provider (government or private carrier) separately for medical
services performed at the same time.

See also: Health-insurance fraud.
Cleaning up the market: Buying up as many shares of a company as possible when

they become available. (Also referred to as taking out the market.)

6
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Collateral fraud: The holding, taking, or offering of defective collateral pursuant to a
financial transaction. In many instances collateral fraud will be related to bank loan
transactions. Beyond this, however, this kind of fraud may be encountered in connection
with any transaction in which defective security is provided, such as security for private
loans, non-existent accounts receivable sold or pledged to factors, and the like. In some
cases, collateral used as security may not belong to the person offering it. The collateral
could be stolen (for example, securities), borrowed, or already subject to an undisclosed
lien or other encumbrance. Alternatively, there may be some gross misrepresentation as to
the collateral’s value.

Collateral frauds are typically violations of federal fraud and banking laws. There may be
elements in banking or corporate violations involving self-dealing, such as when a bank
officer makes a loan knowing the collateral is bad. Collateral frauds may also be involved
in organized crime activities, for example, obtaining proceeds of stolen securities not by an
attempted sale, which would precipitate discovery when title was transferred, but by their
use as collateral for loans.

See also: Banking fraud.
Collusion or collusive fraud: A private agreement in which several parties plan to

commit fraud against another party or organization. The group of fraudsters could be as
few as two people and could include parties who are internal or external to an
organization, or both. For example, collusion occurs if an internal fraudster helps an
external fraudster commit a crime in return for a secret commission, kickback, or bribe.
See also: External fraud; Internal fraud.
Commercial bribery: A form of insider fraud or abuse of trust in which an employee

or officer of a business, charitable organization, or government entity is given a bribe or
some other valuable consideration to induce the employee or official to make a purchase,
grant a contract, or provide some special privilege (such as a zoning variance or license).

See also: Trust, abuse of; Procurement fraud.
Commercial crime: A white-collar crime committed by an individual or group of
individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and, indirectly, themselves.

See also: Economic crime; Externalfraud; Procurement fraud; White-collar crime.
Compartmentalization: A restriction that limits computer users’ access to the specific
files and programs for which they have a job-related requirement.

See also: Computer access control.
Computer-access control: A series of controls used to help ensure that only

authorized persons are permitted to access computer systems. Controls include passwords,
compartmentalization, the use of biometrics, one-time passwords, automatic log-off, timeday controls, dialback systems, requests for random personal information, and Internet
authentication.

See also: Biometrics; Compartmentalization; Computer crime; Dialback systems; Internet
authentication; Information, random personal; Controls, time-day.
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Computer crime: A crime in which a computer is used either to commit a crime or as
the target of crime. Crimes committed using a computer may include embezzlement,
larceny, fraud, forgery, and counterfeiting. Crimes that target computers may include
sabotage, vandalism, electronic burglary, wire tapping, and gaining illegal access. The most
common forms of computer crime involve the manipulation of inputs and outputs.

See also: Computer-access control.
Computer fraud: Fraud arising out of the increasing use of the computer to maintain
business and government records, such as those relating to inventories, accounts payable
and receivable, and customer and payroll records. Most computer frauds are really
traditional kinds of fraud that are committed by using a computer to alter electronic
records rather than manually altering paper records. True computer frauds do exist, such as
those involving unauthorized changes to a computer’s programming, but these are
relatively less common and are most often committed by technical computer people.

See also: Computer crime.
Computer intrusion: Unauthorized access to another organization’s computers.

See also: Computer-access control; Computer crime.
Consumer fraud: A deception in the marketplace involving sellers’ misrepresentations

to buyers. Victims are consumers of all kinds, individual and institutional, public and
private. Common forms of consumer fraud include the following:
1. Sale of useless goods or services, represented as beneficial, for example, “miracle face
creams”

2. Misrepresentation of product performance, benefits, or safety
3. False and misleading advertising

4. Failure to service items after sale, including reneging on warranties

5. Repair fraud
6. Hidden charges with respect to financing, necessary follow-up services, and so on
7. Weights and measures violations
See also: Advertising, false and misleading; Auto-repair fraud; Bait and switch; Chain-referral
scheme; Merchandising fraud; Repair fraud; Weights and measures fraud.
Controls, time-day: Controls that restrict access to computer systems to those times

when employees are supposed to be on duty. An extension of this concept uses automated
time-clock systems to deny access; the system reports a violation if access is attempted
when an employee is shown as not being authorized to be present.
See also: Computer-access control.
Copyright piracy: The use of another’s copyright or other business rights for profit
without the legal right to manufacture or copy the product.

See also: Commercial crime.
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Corruption, public or official: An abuse of trust violation involving commercial

bribery, collusion with bid-rigging, avoidance of the competitive process in connection
with the purchase of goods and services by government entities, self-dealing in connection
with government purchases, or grants of franchise to use public property and real estate.
Most public corruption has its parallel in the private sector. Thus conflict of interest is the
public equivalent of insider trading.
See also: Commercial bribery; Procurement fraud; Government-benefit program, fraud against;
Trust, abuse of
Coupon-redemption fraud: Cheating manufacturers or merchandisers who promote

sales of their products by offering coupons that return part of the purchase price when the
products are purchased.

Many manufacturers, primarily in the food business, place coupons in newspaper and
magazine ads offering, for example, “15 CENTS OFF” if the product is purchased. The
grocery store is supposed to redeem the coupon, and will customarily receive a service
charge of about 5 cents for handling the transaction. Frauds are committed against the
manufacturers by amassing large numbers of coupons and submitting them to
manufacturers without any bona fide purchases of the products.

This kind of fraud involves two basic steps, as follows.
1. Collect coupons.

2. Process the coupons for redemption.
Coupons can be collected by going through large numbers of old newspapers and
magazines; sometimes this is done by trash collection or waste disposal companies as a side
venture. Processing for collection requires the collaboration of retail merchants and is most
efficiently done with the cooperation of officials of food retail chains.

See also: Commercial crime.
Credit-card fraud: Fraudulent application for, extension, and use of credit cards.
Victims are the issuers of the credit cards. Common credit card abuses include the
following:

1. Use of stolen credit cards

2. False statements in the application for a credit card, including application under a false
name
3. Making a purchase using a legitimate credit card with no intention of paying

4. Manufacture and use of fake credit cards
5. Electronic swiping of a card to capture card data later used to make unauthorized
purchases

See also: Bankingfraud.
Credit-card receipt, altered: A fraudulent increase in the amount recorded on a

credit-card receipt.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Credit, false application for: False information on a credit application including

overstated assets, nonexistent assets, understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue, and
understated expenses.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lendingfraud.
Credit rating fraud: Fraudulent application for, extension, and use of credit. Victims

are generally the providers of credit. Common credit-related schemes include the
following:

1. Sale of good credit ratings to high-risk applicants

2. False statements in credit applications
3. Creation of false credit accounts for the purpose of theft
The modus operandi of these schemes varies widely. Recently, employees of credit rating
organizations have altered credit ratings for payment, sometimes using computer
techniques. The creation of false financial statements is another common method. On a
smaller scale is a fraud that operates like shoplifting—opening a charge account with false
information in order to purchase and immediately take away goods.

See also: Loan or lending fraud.
Customs duty fraud: The false understatement by an importer of the value of goods to

be imported to reduce the amount of customs duty paid to the government of the country
into which the goods are imported.

See also: Commercial crime; Tax and revenue violation.
Debt-consolidation or adjustment swindle: The purported bundling of a debtor’s

assets and income to repay all creditors over a period of time in order to keep creditors
from pressing for the immediate payment of all sums due.

There are legitimate private agencies that provide these services and they have similar
workout procedures available after filing for bankruptcy.
The usual modus operandi is to use heavy television and newspaper advertising to lure
debtors into signing up. Sometimes the perpetrators will talk creditors into waiting for their
money; in other instances, they falsely tell the debtors they have been able to call the
creditors off. They then take the debtors’ assets and a portion of their weekly or monthly
earnings, paying themselves first and (usually only after they have their entire “fee”) dole
out the remainder to creditors. Frequently, creditors receive little or nothing and the
debtors are left minus their fees and still in debt.

See also: Finance fraud.
Dialback systems: A computer security system that accepts a user identification (ID)

and password then hangs up and dials a predetermined number. The system is only
accessible by dialing in from a set location.

See also: Computer-access control.
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Differential association: A theory established by Edwin H. Sutherland that explains

why crime is committed. There are ten principles to his theory which, in summary, asserts
that a person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation
of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
Diploma mill: An outlet that grants diplomas to all people who apply for them in

exchange for a hefty fee. Because the diploma mill is not accredited, the diplomas are
worthless.
See also: Externalfraud; Self-improvement scheme.
Directory-advertising fraud: Fraud arising from the selling of printed mass

advertising services. The following are the two basic kinds.

1. Impersonation schemes involve con artists who send bills to business enterprises
resembling those customarily received; for example, purported bills from the phone
company for yellow page advertising, with directions to make checks payable to entities
whose names are similar to legitimate payees of the bills.

2. Another kind of scheme involves promising that advertising will appear in a
publication distributed to potential customers even though distribution will actually be
limited to the advertisers themselves, if the directory is printed at all.
See also: Externalfraud.
Distribution network, setting up: A term used in stock market manipulation. The

network is set up with the promoter as its head and several distributors located in cities
with facilities for trading the stock in question. Each distributor has access to a brokerage
house’s sales force which in turn has access to the floor traders who will actually be
executing the trades. Via this network, the promoter has control over trading in the subject
stock.
Double-indemnity fraud: The report by a beneficiary of a life insurance policy of a

natural death as having been accidental in order to obtain more than the face value of the
policy.

See also: Insurance fraud; Life-insurance fraud.
Double-pledging collateral: Fraudulently pledging the same collateral to different

lenders before the related liens are recorded and registered.
See also: Externalfraud; Landfraud; Real estate fraud.
Down payments and retainers, absconding with: A fraud in which the fraudster

absconds with money obtained from the victim in advance by the false promise to provide
goods or services.
Economic crime: A crime that is similar to white-collar crime but broader in its scope

in that it includes violent crimes committed by people without any particular occupational
status.
See also: White-collar crime.
Economic espionage: An act in which business secrets are stolen for the benefit of

another organization.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Economic extortion: A crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained

through intimidation or persistent demands.

See also: Commercial crime.
Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud: The conversion to one’s own use or benefit of

the money or property of another, over which one has custody with which one has been
entrusted or over which one exerts a fiduciary’s control. Victims include institutions,
businesses in general, pension funds, and beneficiaries of estates managed by fiduciaries.
See also: Banking fraud; Insider trading; Loan or lendingfraud; Trust, abuse of
Employment-agency fraud: Fraudulent solicitations of money or fees in order to find

employment for, to guarantee the employment of, or to improve the employability of
another. Victims are generally individuals seeking jobs or hoping to improve their skills in
order to obtain better paying jobs. Variations of employment-related fraud include the
following.

1. Phony job agencies. An agency solicits advance fees in order to find employment for the
victim, when in fact, the service is neither provided nor is it intended to be.

2. Job trainingfraud. Money is received from victims to train them for specific
employment. The training is not supplied; “guaranteed” job opportunities on
completion of training do not materialize; the training is misrepresented as being
“certified” or “recognized” by employers when it is not.
Energy-crisis fraud: Fraud arising out of the sale of goods or services related to energy

or fuel use, saving, and production.

Victims are generally consumers interested in saving on energy costs. Energy schemes
include the following.

1. Merchandise schemes. Sale of worthless or bogus items that do not deliver the specific
benefits promised or the degree of benefit promised; for example, carburetor gadgets to
save gasoline or phony solar heating systems. Often, these kinds of fraud occur because
of the novelty of the items involved combined with the naivete of the victims.

2. Weights and measures violations. Short weighing or measuring fuels to customers; for
example, the manipulation of gas pump measuring devices or the misrepresentation of
fuel types by changing octane ratings on fuel pumps.
3. Distributors' discriminatory allocation offuel. Distribution to subdistributors and retailers,
in consideration of commercial bribes to distributors’ executives or special payments to
companies with the power to make distribution, in the form of under-the-table
payments or required purchases of other items, in violation of antitrust or other laws.

See also: Antitrust offense; Commercial bribery; Merchandising fraud; Weights and measures fraud.
Environmental abuse: Business behavior that can harm the environment. The legal

system considers these acts to be crimes. The two major practices are pollution and the
misuse of natural resources. Businesses commit these crimes to avoid the costs associated
with compliance.
See also: Commercial crime; Pollution and environmental protection violation.
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Ethics: Principles or standards of human conduct.

Evidence: Oral, written, or physical material presented as proof in a trial or other

hearing for the purpose of convincing the trier of fact (that is, judge, jury, mediator,
arbitrator, and so on) of the truth of the facts and allegations.
Expense report, false: Expense report containing any combination of overstated,
fictitious, or duplicated items prepared and submitted for reimbursement to an employee.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Claim, false or fraudulent.
Expert witness: A person possessing specialized knowledge acquired through

experience, education, or training. Expert witnesses can provide opinions in court, whereas
lay witnesses can only provide evidence regarding their physical experiences—what they
saw, smelled, heard, tasted, or touched.
External fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by arm’s-length parties.

See also: Commercial crime; Internalfraud.
Fictitious company, payment of invoices to: The embezzler establishes a fake

entity (often with a post-office box for an address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate
company) and gets the fake entity entered into company records as a legitimate vendor.
The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake vendor, has them processed in the
accounts payable system, and pockets the payments made to satisfy the fake invoices.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud; Sham, corporate.
File-maintenance instructions, failure to enter: Failure to input information

into the computer system because of an intention to deceive. For example, deliberately not
updating computer files when an employee has left the firm and not removing that
employee from the payroll records. This kind of “omission” might be for the purpose of
creating a ghost employee.
See also: Payroll and personnel cycle.
File-maintenance transactions, phony: Performing file maintenance transactions

such as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. These
transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example, the use of
ghost employees to embezzle funds.

See also: Computer crime; Payroll and personnel cycle; Sales and collection cycle.
Finance fraud: One of several kinds of fraud, including the following:

1. False mortgage security. The mortgage loan is larger than the underlying value of the
property secured by the mortgage.

2. Advance fee fraud. The victim pays an up-front finder’s fee in exchange for a promise to
receive an advance on a loan.
3. Debt consolidation scheme. A fraudulent debt consolidation agency makes money by
organizing the debtors’ affairs and collecting and retaining most, if not all, the money
handled on the debtor’s behalf.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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4. Bankruptcy fraud. This includes fraudulent conveyances, concealed assets, asset
stripping, or fraudulently planned bankruptcy.
The victims of financial fraud are generally financial institutions.

See also: Advance-fee fraud; Bankruptcy fraud; Commercial crime; Mortgage security, false.
Financial-statement auditing: A methodology used by auditors to evaluate the

accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of recorded business transactions through sampling,
confirmation, and analytical techniques.
Financial statement, false: False information created by upper-level managers with

intent to manipulate data to enhance reported profitability and thereby earn higher
bonuses, impress supervisors or executives, impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to
comply with the goals set by senior management. The methods of creating a false financial
statement include overstating revenue, overstating assets, understating expenses,
understating liabilities, and misrepresenting information in the notes to the financial
statements.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud; Statement, false.
Forensic: Material that is used in, or suitable to courts of law.

See also: Forensic accounting; Forensic standard.
Forensic accounting: An accounting subdiscipline that investigates alleged financial

wrongdoing or damage for the purpose of providing evidence to meet the evidentiary
standards of the courts. The forensic accountant also supplies expert testimony for
arbitration hearings, mediation, and other business dispute resolution processes.

See also: Forensic; Forensic standard.
Forensic standard: The evidentiary test of the courts. Evidence must meet the

standards of court admissibility and be able to withstand cross examination.
See also: Forensic; Forensic accounting.
Franchise fraud: Fraud in the sale or service of a franchise.

Franchise fraud generally occurs in one or more of the following ways.

1. The franchisor has no intention of honoring any of its obligations; that is, the
“franchise” is a complete ruse to acquire the victim-franchisee’s initial investment
money.
2. The franchisor fails to provide promised goods or services essential to the success of the
franchise.

3. The franchisor makes success for the franchisee either difficult or impossible by
allowing too many franchises in a given market area.
4. The franchisor has misrepresented the market or demand for goods or services central
to the franchise, or has misrepresented the level of skill needed to realize franchise
profitability.

14
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Item 1 is outright fraud, while items 2 to 4 represent variations that range from fraud to
shady dealing and the failure to fulfill contractual obligations.
See also: Business-opportunity fraud; Chain-referral scheme.
Fraud: Criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. The deception

must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.

See also: Commercial crime; Externalfraud; Internalfraud.
Fraud auditing: A methodology used by fraud auditors to find transactions that differ

from the normal series of transactions and suggest irregularities that could be fraudulent.
See also: Financial-statement auditing.
Fraudulent disbursement: The theft (embezzlement) of a company’s cash by an

employee, for example, by using company checks either to withdraw cash directly or to
pay personal expenses.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Front-end fraud: The improper direction given to a company’s customers to take their

business elsewhere thereby depriving the company of profits it would otherwise have
earned.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Funeral fraud: A class of guilt-inducement fraud that relies on the emotional stress of

victims who have lost or are about to lose loved ones through death. Victims are the
relatives or friends of the deceased or terminally ill.
Funeral-related fraud often takes the form of consumer and merchandising fraud and
generally involves one or more of the following practices.
1. Relying on the guilt or anxiety of bereaved relatives. Victims are persuaded to contract for
unnecessary or unduly elaborate funeral services or merchandise.

2. Billingfor funeral expenses to include charges for services not performed. The fraudster relies on
the victim’s grief to cloud his or her memory as to whether or not a particular service
was performed and/or to preempt the victim’s challenge of the bill for payment.
3. Misrepresentation. Victims are told that certain goods or services are required by law
when they are not.
4. Fraudulent contracts. The victim is sold and pays for the future provision of goods or
services the fraudster has neither the intention nor the capacity to provide; for example,
the sale of nonexistent cemetery plots.
See also: Consumer fraud; Guilt-inducement fraud; Merchandisingfraud.
Generic risk factors: Risk factors within the control of the entity protecting itself but

outside the control of potential perpetrators.
Ghost employee: A payroll fraud in which the embezzler enters the name of a fictitious
employee into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll check. Fictitious
employees are commonly referred to as “ghosts.”

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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In one variation of this scheme, the names of individuals whose employment has
terminated are kept on the payroll for several pay periods after they leave their jobs. The
embezzler then receives the paychecks for the former employees. In another variation of
the ghost payroll, the fraudster develops an overtime-pay scheme in which false claims are
made for overtime work performed by bona fide employees.
Victims are generally public and private entities responsible for honoring payroll claims.
Often, the ghost payroll is a device used to defraud government programs designed to
provide employment for the unemployed or disadvantaged. This is closely related to
welfare and unemployment insurance fraud. This device is used in cost-plus contracts to
cheat government entities or by managers of sub-units in private enterprises to steal from
their parent organizations.

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Government-benefit program, fraud against; Payroll and
personnel cycle.
Government-benefit program, fraud against: Unlawful application for and
receipt of money, property, or benefit from a public program designed to confer money,
property, or benefit under specific guidelines.

Victims are federal, state, county, and municipal governments; their taxpayers; and
qualified, intended beneficiaries of the programs. Typical kinds of fraud suffered by
government programs include the following:

1. The misrepresentation of applicants’ qualifications concerning program eligibility; for
example, welfare received by ineligible people

2. False billing or vouchering for services not rendered or for nonexistent beneficiaries;
for example, physician’s claims under provincial health programs for patients not
treated or for specific treatments not provided
3. Inflated billing, vouchering, or claiming that charges public programs more than the
allowable costs; for example, housing fraud in which the cost of construction is inflated
so that the builder or owner receives more than the total cost of land and buildings and
avoids making the investment required by law and administrative guidelines
4. Embezzlement by employees or officials misusing their custodial or fiduciary positions
to convert public funds, property, or benefits to their own use; for example, licensed
dispensers of food stamps converting them to their own use
5. Use of properly obtained funds in which money, property, or benefit are used for
purposes other than those for which they were intended; for example, the use of
student loans for purposes other than education
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Health-care fraud;
Statement, false; Welfare fraud.
Guilt-inducement fraud: Fraud perpetrated by inducing guilt or anxiety in the victim

concerning a child, parent, spouse, or friend. Victims are persuaded to part with money or
property in the belief that they are atoning for any “shortcomings” or fulfilling
“obligations” toward another.
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Guilt inducement is used in many kinds of fraud. A few examples are the following.

1. Encyclopedia salespeople induce victims to sign purchase contracts by suggesting that
their children will fail at school unless the books are bought.
2. Children of deceased parents are persuaded to purchase elaborate and unnecessary
funeral arrangements for fear of not giving a “decent” burial. Victims are urged to
believe that their failure to make these purchases implies a lack of affection or respect
for the deceased.
3. Unnecessary and imprudent expenditure for life insurance is induced by the suggestion
that failure to do so implies a lack of care for spouse and children.
4. Self-improvement merchandise and facilities are marketed to victims on the basis of
guilt inducements such as, “You owe it to your spouse to be as [lovely, manly, successful, or
whatever] as you can be” or “You can only be a failure if you fail to take advantage of
opportunities to improve your [looks, job, speaking ability, or whatever]."

See also: Funeral fraud; Self improvement scheme.
Health-care fraud: This term covers numerous types of fraud in the health care

industry, for example, marketing drugs without adequate testing or for which the test results
have been falsified.

See also: Commercial crime; Health-insurance fraud; Medicalfraud.
Health-insurance fraud: There are several forms of health insurance fraud, for

example, mobile labs, bundling or unbundling claims, or collusion between an insured and
a provider to claim health insurance for his or her own benefit.
See also: Claims, bundling and unbundling; health-care fraud; insurance fraud.
Home-repair or home-improvement fraud: Fraud arising from the provision of

goods and services in connection with the repair, maintenance, or renovation of housing
units.

Victims are generally homeowners but may also include public agencies or programs that
subsidize or underwrite home purchase and ownership. Home repair or improvement
fraud includes the following practices:
1. Intentionally shoddy or incompetent workmanship
2. Sale of overpriced or unfit materials or services
3. Failure to provide services or goods paid for by the customer
4. Submission of false claims for materials or work not provided

5. Misrepresentation of the need for particular materials or services to be performed
6. Misrepresentations or concealment of the costs of credit or of the nature of liens
securing the payment obligations

The victim may be told that the home is in violation of building codes or in a condition
substandard to the rest of the neighborhood thus lowering the value of the home or
compromising the safety of the victim’s family.
See also: Consumer fraud; Merchandisingfraud; Repair fraud.
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Homicide for profit: A homicide in which a victim is murdered for financial gain by

the murderer or the person hiring the murderer.
See also: Homicide fraud; Insurance fraud; Life-insurance fraud.
Homicide fraud: A fraud in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the
policy holder to collect benefits.

Income tax fraud: The evasion of a tax by any means including filing false or

fraudulent returns.
See also: External fraud.
Inflated costs: Expenses that have been artificially inflated and invoiced when a

contractor is paid on a cost-plus basis.
See also: Commercialfraud; Procurement fraud.
Information, random personal: Information, known only to an authorized

individual, that is used as a means of identifying unauthorized log-in attempts to a
computer system. The computer randomly transmits a question using this information and
denies access to the user unless it receives the right answer. If several dozen questions are
on file, it can be a very useful technique for stopping unauthorized computer use.
Input tampering: A computer scheme that can be accomplished by altering, forging,

or fabricating computer input documents. In an entity, especially a small business with
inadequate logical access control, input tampering is quite easy to accomplish.

See also: Computer crime.
Insider trading: Benefiting oneself or others in whom one has an interest by trading on

privileged information or position. Typical situations include those in which a corporate
officer or director trades in the stock of his or her company on the basis of inside
information as to prospective profits or losses; bank officers lending money to themselves
or businesses in which they have an interest; corporate executives or purchasing officials
setting up suppliers of goods and services to contract with their companies.
See also: Bankingfraud; Commercial bribery; Securities fraud; Trust, abuse of.
Instructions, unauthorized: Commands placed by a computer programmer into a

computer program to perform unauthorized functions, for example, making payments to a
vendor not on an approved list.
See also: Computer crime.
Insurance fraud: Fraud perpetrated by or against insurance companies. Victims may

be the clients or stockholders of insurance companies or the insurer itself.

Insurance fraud breaks down into the following categories and subclasses.
1. Fraud perpetrated by insurers against clients or stockholders includes the following:
a. Failure to provide coverage promised and paid for when claim is made

b. Failure to compensate or reimburse fully on claims

c.

18

Manipulation of risk classes and high-risk policy holder categories

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Glossary

d. Embezzlement or abuse of trust in management of premium funds and other assets
of insurance companies
e.

Twisting, that is, illegal sales practices in which the insurer persuades customers to
cancel current policies and purchase new replacement ones

2. Fraud perpetrated by policy holders against insurance providers includes the following:

a. Filing of bogus claims for compensation or reimbursement, or of multiple
claims for the same loss from different insurers, and so on
b. Inflating reimbursable costs on claim statements
c.

Paying bribes or kickbacks to local agents to retain coverage or to obtain
coverage in an improper risk category

d. Failing to disclose information or making false statements in an application for
insurance
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Claim, accident with false; Claim, false or fraudulent; Double
indemnity fraud; Homicide fraud; Life-insurance fraud; Mortgage-insurance fraud; Personal-injury
insurance fraud; Trust, abuse of
Intellectual-property theft: The theft of intellectual assets such as business plans or

trade secrets.
Internal fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by its employees, officers, or

directors.

See also: Externalfraud.
Internet authentication: A computerized security measure used to identify a specific
Internet user and to send information across the Internet safely.

See also: Computer-access control.
Inventory balances, understating beginning: Fraudulent financial reporting to

conceal inventory shortages or theft. A common method for understating beginning
inventory is to overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence. For example,
understating may be perpetrated if there has been a change in management and current
management wishes to report improved profitability.

See also: Financial statement, false; Inventory and warehousing cycle.
Inventory and warehousing cycle: The accounting process that deals with the
purchase and warehousing of merchandise for manufacture or resale or both.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Investment fraud: The use of imprudent, illusory, or bogus projects or businesses to

attract investors through the prospect of high rates of return.
Investment fraud generally victimizes those with a pool of liquid or convertible assets,
ranging from retirees or near-retirement age people, widows and widowers, to high-income
professionals and businessmen. Hallmarks of this kind of fraud may include the following.
1. The investment promises a higher-than-average rate of return.
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2. The investment project is still in development, that is, the project or business is not a
mature entity.
3. The buyer purchases the investment from a stranger.
4. The investment has a generalized definition of its nature and scope and lacks detailed
plans for measuring any progress.
5. The object or site of the investment is geographically remote or distant from investors.
6. The seller fails to fully disclose facts that are material to the investor prior to his
commitment of money.

7. The seller is not registered with the appropriate regulatory agencies, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission or a state's securities commission.
8. The seller promises special advantages such as tax benefits.
See also: Land fraud; Ponzi scheme; Pyramid scheme; Securities fraud.
Invoice, false: An invoice submitted by a contractor for goods not delivered or for

service not performed.
See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud.
Invoice, false sales: An altered company copy of the sales invoice showing a lower

sales amount than the original invoice sent to the client. The difference between the real
sale amount and the adjusted lower amount is then misappropriated when payment is
received.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Invoice, false supplier: A supplier’s invoice is prepared and submitted for payment to

the company even though no goods have been delivered, no services rendered, or the
invoice shows inflated quantity, inflated value, or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud.
Jitney: The buy/sell broker disclosed on the exchange printout is acting on behalf of

another broker.
Kickback: A form of off-book fraud in which the funds used for illegal payments or

transfers are not drawn from the payer’s regular company bank account and the payments
do not appear on the payer’s books and records. In collusion with suppliers, a purchasing
agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities, including allowing the supplier
to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment, excess purchasing of property or
services, or bid-rigging.

See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud; Off-book fraud; Secret commission.
Land fraud: The sale of land, based on extensive misrepresentations as to value, quality,

facilities, and/or state of development.

Victims are usually individuals buying land for retirement and/or investment. Land fraud
usually consists of the direct sale of land or the sale of an interest in land—
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1. To which the seller has no present title or claim of right; that is, the seller cannot
properly transfer title or interest to the buyer as represented at the time of the sale.
2. About which there has been a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact.

3. At inflated or unjustified prices based on misrepresentations made to the purchaser.

4. On the promise of future performance or development, which the seller neither intends
to provide nor can reasonably expect to occur. Misrepresentations usually claim the
presence of utilities, water, roads, recreational facilities, credit terms, and so on.
See also: Investment fraud.
Landlord-tenant fraud: Unlawful leasing or renting of property. Common fraud

practices by landlords include the following:
1.

Keeping two sets of books, in support of tax fraud

2. Schemes to avoid the return of security deposits
3. Rental of property to which one has no title claim or right

4. . Deliberate and persistent violations of safety and health regulations; failure to provide
heat, services, and so on.
Lapping: A customer’s payment is embezzled and then recorded as paid sometime after

the receipt of a subsequent payment from another customer. To keep customer A from
complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A's account. Customer
C’s payment is applied to customer B’s account, and so on.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Legitimate front: A form of money laundering in which a legitimate front business

operating with large cash receipts is opened so that illegally earned money can be mingled
with the bank deposits of the legitimate income of the business to disguise the source of the
illegal money.

See also: Money laundering.
Life-insurance fraud: Any form of fraud making a life insurance company the victim.

See also: Double-indemnity fraud; Homicide fraud.
Loan fraud, single-family housing: Misapplication of funds by a borrower who
purchases single-family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality is
purchasing rental properties for resale.

See also: Loan or lendingfraud.
Loan or lending fraud: The use of false information or the omission of material

information for the purpose of granting or extending a loan.
When perpetrated by borrowers, loan fraud may take on any of the following forms:

1.

Obtaining a loan through false statements

2. Using the loan for a purpose other than that for which the loan was granted
3. Larceny by false pretenses by which a loan is obtained with no intention of repayment
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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When perpetrated by the lending officer, loan fraud may take on any of the following
forms:
1.

Lending to oneself through ghost accounts

2. Lending to friends or entities in which one has an interest
3. Commercial bribery, meaning, approving loans to those who would not otherwise
qualify as borrowers in exchange for kickbacks or other considerations
4. Advance fee schemes by which would-be borrowers remit money to secure a loan that
is not forthcoming or for which no payment was necessary
A separate and important dimension of loan fraud involves the misuse or misrepresentation
of items of collateral and collateral accounts.
See also: Banking fraud; Collateral fraud; Statement, false; Trust, abuse of
Loan, nominee: A loan made in the name of a straw borrower or agent while the

identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to the lender.
Loan to non-existent borrower fraud: Use of a false identity to obtain a loan. This

scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower or with the assistance of an insider
such as a loan officer.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lending fraud.
Long the stock: Buying stock. Your long position represents the number of shares

owned (also referred to as going long).
Market manipulation: The intentional inflation of a stock price accomplished by

stock purchases, usually in a small-cap market, with a sudden sale to third parties who are
left with stock that is worth substantially less than they paid for it.
Medicaid-Medicare fraud: Fraudulent practices involving the receipt or provision of
health-care services under government-financed Medicare or Medicaid programs. This
kind of fraud is usually perpetrated by health-care providers (both professional and facility
operators) against the government financing the programs or the intended beneficiaries of
the programs, or both. Specific Medicaid-Medicare fraud practices include the following.

1. Ping-ponging. Referring patients to other doctors in a clinic to claim reimbursement for
the “consultation” rather than for bona fide patient treatment or observation.

2. Upgrading. Billing for services not provided.
3. Steering. Sending patients to a particular pharmacy, medical lab, and so on, for required
prescriptions or services and receiving improper payments in return.
4. Shorting. Delivering less medication (for example, pills) than prescribed while charging
for full amount.
5. Procurement abuses. Establishing supply-purchase arrangements with firms that pay
kickbacks to health care facilities or providers with firms that are owned by those
controlling the facility itself.
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6. False claims. Submitting claims for payment by the government for patients who do not
exist, or who were never seen or treated.

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Government-benefit program, fraud against; Kickback;
Procurement fraud.
Medical fraud: Provision and sale of bogus, highly questionable or dangerous medical

services, cures, or medications.

Victims are often terminally or incurably ill patients seeking miracles. Also victimized are
the poorly informed, who are vulnerable to false claims for beauty treatments and
cosmetics.

Medical fraud generally includes one or more of the following.
1. Quackery. False representation of oneself as a legally trained and licensed health care
professional

2. Fake cures. Sale of bogus or highly questionable “cures” for specific illnesses or diseases
3. Misrepresentation. In addition to misrepresenting the therapeutic value of medication, the
intentional omission of the known side effects of medication
4. Misrepresentation of treatment. False statement about the therapeutic value of a particular
treatment and the degree of its “acceptance” in bona fide medical practice; omission of
material information concerning known side effects of a treatment that would affect the
patient’s choice of treatment program
See also: Health-care fraud.
Merchandising fraud: An umbrella term for a broad variety of consumer fraud
involving false inducements to purchase merchandise, which either is not as represented or
will never be delivered.

These kinds of fraud usually involve one or more of the following:

1. Representation that the item is sold at a lower than usual price, even though it is
actually sold at the usual retail price or higher
2. Misrepresentation of the quality or utility of the merchandise

3. Misrepresentation of the ultimate price or credit terms

4. Misleading information on warranties, the return policy or the validity of “money back
guarantees”
5. Solicitation of money with no intention to deliver the merchandise promised

6. “Bait and switch” fraud
Victims customarily buy from door-to-door salespeople or are entrapped when they
respond to newspaper, magazine, telephone, radio, or television advertisements.

See also: Consumer fraud.
Mixing of funds: Commingling client funds with the funds of the brokerage firm,
which then enables the broker to post the winning trades to the brokerage firm or the
losing trades to their clients.

See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Mobile lab: A scheme in which a group of people posing as medical professionals set up

a lab in a storefront located in a blue-collar, low-income area to offer free physicals to
people who have medical insurance. The insured is subjected to extensive, expensive tests
that are billed to his or her insurance company. The mobile labs are gone when the insured
returns for the test results.

See also: Health-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Modeling-school fraud: Fraudulent schools tell students they must have a portfolio of
portraits to send to potential customers in order to get modeling assignments. The victim is
then charged greatly inflated prices by a photographer who is often a participant in the
scam.

See also: External fraud; Self-improvement scheme.
Money laundering: The process of turning “dirty” money, that is, illegally obtained

money, into “clean” money to conceal its existence, source or use, or to obstruct
investigative efforts, to preserve assets from forfeiture or to evade taxes.

See also: Legitimate front; Offshore banks and tax havens; Reporting guidelines, breach of;
Smurfing.
Money-transfer fraud: Funds are stolen by an outsider or bank employee with access

to the correct identification numbers needed to transfer funds by wire.

See also: External fraud.
Mortgage-insurance fraud: A scheme in which a healthy individual, who has a

mortgage insurance policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the
purchaser of the property defaults because of death or disability, falsely claims that he or
she is disabled in order to have the insurance company pay the mortgage.

See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Mortgage security, false: Security offered for mortgage financing purposes that is

nonexistent or has a value far lower than represented.

See also: Commercial crime; Finance fraud.
New-account fraud: The use of false identification to open new accounts and steal

money before the bank collects the funds from fresh deposits.

See also: Check fraud.
Nominee account: See Account, nominee.

Nursing-home fraud: Various kinds of fraud perpetrated by individuals providing

institutional nursing and convalescent care to patients, particularly the aged.

Victims are the patients of the facilities, their families, and/or governmental entities that
subsidize the cost of care.
Forms of nursing home fraud abuses include the following:

1. Unlawful conversion or attachment of patients’ assets

2. False claims to patient, family, or government entity regarding services delivered
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3. False statements in license applications or renewals
4. Maintenance of fraudulent records as to general or overhead costs of operation of
facilities as a basis for false claims to governmental entities

5. Receipt of kickbacks from facility suppliers
6. Employment of inadequate or unqualified staff in violation of licensing guidelines

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Embezzlement andfiduciary fraud; Government-benefit
program, fraud against; Health-care fraud; Procurement fraud.
Off-book fraud: Fraud that occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit

trail is likely to exist.
See also: On-book fraud.
Offshore banks and tax havens: Banks or financial institutions located in tax havens
that conduct local and international business transactions in which money and other
securities can be held or transferred from one jurisdiction to another in secrecy under the
protection of banking privileges. The owners of the assets direct the transactions—
personally or through an intermediary, such as a trust to minimize taxes, evade taxes, or
avoid creditors.

See also: Money laundering.
On-book fraud: Fraud occurring in a business in which an audit trail (sometimes

obscure) exists that could aid in its detection.

See also: Off-book fraud.
Overhead charge, false: Fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of bogus

labor charges or overbilling of materials to increase profits in a cost-plus contract to allow
the contractor to keep the difference between actual and inflated costs.

See also: Property-improvement fraud.
Patent fraud: A variation of the advance fee fraud. The fraudster solicits “patentable”

ideas or gadgets through newspaper advertisements, and so on, for “evaluation by experts.”
The “evaluation” usually involves a fee, or at least “further processing” of the submission
may involve a fee. The fraudster usually has neither the intention nor the capacity to
evaluate or process a patentable item.
See also: Advance-fee fraud; Self-improvement scheme; Vanity-publishing scheme.
Payroll and personnel cycle: The accounting process that handles the hiring, firing,

and payment of employees along with timekeeping, expense accounts, and travel
reimbursement and insurance matters.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Pension-fund fraud: Theft and fraudulent conversion of pension fund assets either by

trustees, employers, or employees.
Fraud perpetuated by trustees in violation of their fiduciary duty in the management of
pension funds through the following:
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1. Poor investments tied to self-dealing or commercial bribery

2. Embezzlement
This fraud victimizes both the individuals who have contributed to the fund and those
intending to benefit from it. Victims are employees whose potential benefits are reduced
either by fraud or bankruptcy, as well as the employer whose contributions to the pension
plan could be inflated or lost.

See also: Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Claim, false or fraudulent; Commercial bribery; Trust,
abuse of
Personal checks, substituting for cash: An employee takes money from the cash

register and substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always in balance,
but the employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank
account. Consequently, the employee receives free use of the cash.
Personal-injury insurance fraud: Report of a real but overstated physical injury or

a false injury to an insurance company to recover unentitled benefits such as for a tort
claim or reimbursement of fake medical expenses.
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Personal property pawned: The perpetrator inflates the value of his or her personal

belongings, insures them, and then pawns them for a lesser amount of cash. He or she then
reports them stolen and files a claim. If the insurance payment is received, he or she then
recovers the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance payment and pockets
the difference.

See also: Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Pigeon drop or pocketbook drop: One of a large variety of street con games. The

victim is persuaded to withdraw a large sum of cash from a bank account to show good
faith or financial responsibility regarding the sharing of a “discovered” cache of money
with two other persons (who are con artists). In the course of the con, both the “discovered”
money and the victim’s “good faith” money disappear as do the con artists.
Victims may be anyone, since perpetrators of this fraud have a remarkable ability through
words to disarm their victims. Keys to the pigeon drop con are the following:
1.

The con artists do not appear to be associated or know each other in any way.

2. A pocketbook, envelop, and so on, containing a sizable amount of money and no
owner identification is “found” by one of the perpetrators who suggests the money is
illicitly generated, for example, a gambler’s proceeds.

3. The fraudsters agree to share the money with the victim who shows “good faith” to
those involved by putting up money. Alternately, all may agree to put money into a
pool to be held by a coconspirator, meaning, the one who did not find the money.
4. A switch is made while the victim is distracted, and his or her money is stolen by one of
the perpetrators.
Pollution and environmental protection violation: One of many abuses that

violates specific environmental- and pollution-control statutes and orders. White-collar
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crime abuses in this area consist primarily of the making or submitting of false statements
concerning the degree of compliance with regulations for pollution control in order to
cover up violations or lack of compliance with environmental standards. Falsification of test
or sample data designed to measure compliance with standards represents another form of
this violation.

See also: Commercial crime; Environmental abuse; Statement, false.
Ponzi scheme: This is a general class of fraud (a variation of the pyramid scheme) in

which the fraudster uses money invested by later victims to pay a high rate of return to the
first group of investors instead of making promised investments. These schemes must
inevitably collapse because it is mathematically impossible to continue them indefinitely.
The length of time they can continue will depend upon the promised rate of return to
investors, the amount of money the fraudster takes out for him- or herself and the costs of
inducing victims to part with their money (for example, sales commissions). Many of these
frauds have cheated their victims of millions of dollars; some frauds have operated over a
period of years.

Ponzi elements exist in many varieties of investment fraud under different guises and in
different variations; for example, long-term investments and short-term business financing.
See also: Investment fraud.
Possession of property obtained by crime: An offense that refers either to the

actual possession of property obtained by a crime or to the possession of proceeds from the
disposal of property obtained by a crime.

See also: Fraud.
Price fixing: Illegal combinations by sellers to administer the price of a good or service,

thus depriving customers of a competitive marketplace, restraining competition, and
maintaining an artificial price structure.
Victims are customers who are deprived of freely determined prices for the goods and
services they purchase. Secondary victims may be competitors of the firms participating in
the price-fixing agreement.
See also: Anti-trust offense; Trade, restraint of
Procurement fraud: Unlawful manipulation of the public or private contracting
process to obtain an advantage.

Victims are competitors, the public or private entity soliciting bids it believes to be
competitive as well as customers or constituents of those entities who do not realize the
benefits that would be derived from a truly competitive procurement process.
Three main forms of competitive procurement fraud are the following.

1. Bid rigging. A form of illegal anticompetitive activity in which bidders in a competitive
procurement collusively set their bids in such a way as to deprive the bid solicitor of a
competitive process. The effect is an administered bidding process in which the winner
and the terms and prices of the goods and services involved are set by the conspirators
rather than by the competitive process. Parties to the conspiracy are thus able to divide
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among themselves a set of procurement contracts and to fix prices for goods and
services at the same time.
2. Bidfixing. A form of illegal manipulation of the procurement process whereby one
bidding party is provided with inside information by the bid solicitor or an agent,
which enables the said bidder to gain an unfair advantage over other bidders.
3. Bribery and kickbacks. The awarding of procurement contracts on the basis of the
payment of bribes and kickbacks to procurement officials rather than on the basis of
competitive procurement guidelines.

See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Commercial bribery; Kickback; Corruption, public or official.
Product substitution: The substitution, without the knowledge of the purchaser, of a

less expensive product or service. The purchaser is charged for the more expensive product
or service and the fraudster pockets the difference.
See also: Commercial crime; Externalfraud; Procurement fraud; Property-improvement fraud.
Property-improvement fraud: The fraudster goes door-to-door promising repairs to

property at bargain rates, collecting up-front money and then absconding with the
proceeds. The victims are usually senior citizens.

See also: Externalfraud.
Property-insurance fraud: An insured reports a false theft, inflates the value of his or

her personal belongings and pawns them or purposely destroys them to collect a benefit
from the insurer.
See also: Arson for profit; Insurance fraud; Personal property pawned; Repossessed household goods.
Public or official corruption: See Corruption, public or official.
Purchases, unnecessary: Inventory ordered specifically for personal use, theft, or

scrap proceeds. The embezzlements are then charged to inventory.

See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Inventory and warehousing cycle; Procurement fraud.
Pyramid scheme: The commercial version of the chain letter scheme used by

fraudsters to sell phony investments (Ponzi scheme), distributorships, franchises, and
business opportunity plans.

See also: Chain-referral scheme; Franchise fraud; Investment fraud.
Real estate fraud: A form of loan fraud involving the purchase of under- or over

valued real estate.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lendingfraud; Mortgage security, false.
Referral sales fraud: See Chain-referral scheme; Merchandisingfraud.

Repair fraud: Consumer fraud involving repair or maintenance service performed on

consumer goods.
These white-collar crime schemes generally involve the following:

1. Overcharging for services performed
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2. Charging for services and parts not used
3. Performing services or repairs not wanted or needed
4. Failing to perform services or repairs promised

See also: Consumer fraud.
Reporting guidelines, breach of: A breach in defiance of a government

requirement that banks assist in the prevention of money laundering by reporting details of
large cash deposits. For example, a bank employee who conspires with a money launderer
to make deposits without reporting the required details is breaching the reporting
guidelines.

See also: Money laundering
Repossessed household goods: Household items are repossessed and the insured

submits a false claim to the insurer reporting the property was stolen.
See also: Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Repurchasing: A stock market manipulation in which the promoter buys back control

of the company when the stock price reaches rock bottom.

See also: Stock market manipulation.
Risk factors, generic: Risk factors within the control of the entity protecting itself but

outside the control of potential perpetrators.
Revenue recognition in the improper period: Preparation of false financial

statements through the improper accruals of revenue on future, anticipated sales.
Techniques include altering dates on shipping documents or holding the books open until
after shipments have occurred. This technique is often used to inflate reported profits.

See also: Financial statement, false; Revenue recognition on transactions that do not meet revenue
recognition criteria.
Revenue recognition on transactions that do not meet revenue
recognition criteria: Preparation of false financial statements by improperly

recognizing revenue on transactions for which the earning process is incomplete—for
example, when the right of return exists, or on bill-and-hold transactions. The items
involved are often concealed through the use of written side agreements or oral agreements
that are not included with the company’s books of account.
See also: Financial statement, false; Revenue recognition in the improper period.
Running a box: One or more persons control the movement of a stock to manipulate

its price. They are called “the box.”
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sales and collection cycle: The billing of goods or services to customers, the setting
up of accounts receivable for customers who purchase goods or services on credit and the
collection of funds relating to those receivables.
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Scrap, theft of: This kind of theft can be significant, especially if the thief has the

authority to designate saleable inventory as scrap. In most companies, inventory scrap is
easy to steal because it is not recorded or well controlled.
See also: Procurement fraud.
Secret commission: The most common form of procurement fraud. A secret payment

is given, usually by a supplier to a purchasing agent, to buy the purchasing agent’s
influence on his or her employer’s decision making.

See also: Commercial crime; Kickback; Procurement fraud.
Securities fraud: Fraudulent activities involving the sale, transfer, or purchase of

securities or money interests in the business activities of others.
Victims are generally investors who are not aware of the full facts regarding transactions
into which they enter. Abuses cover a broad range and can include, for example, the
following situations.

1. Businesses or promoters seek to raise capital unlawfully or without proper registration
and monitoring.
2. Securities of no value are sold or are misrepresented as being worth far more than their
actual value.
3. Purchasers are not advised of all facts regarding securities and/or of the failure to file
appropriate disclosures with federal and provincial regulatory agencies.
4. Insiders use special knowledge to trade in securities to the disadvantage of the general
public.

5. Broker-dealers and investment advisers act for their own benefit rather than for the
benefit of their clients.
6. False information is provided to security holders and the investing public in financial
statements published or filed with securities regulatory agencies or in the media as a
result of payments to financial writers or publications.

7. Manipulation of the price of securities by purchases and sales on the stock exchanges or
over-the-counter markets.
Securities violations potentially exist wherever investors rely on others to manage and
conduct the business in which an investment is made. It is not necessary that there be any
formal certificates such as stocks and bonds. Any form of investment agreement is
potentially a “security.”

See also: Advance-fee fraud; Boiler room; Insider trading; Investment fraud; Statement, false.
Self-improvement scheme: This kind of fraud appeals to the victim’s desire to

improve him- or herself personally or financially by the acquisition of social, employment,
or physical skills or attributes.

Schemes in this category tend to run on a continuum from improving purely personal or
social skills and attributes to those tied to an individual’s employment opportunities. On
the personal end of the scale are the dance studio or charm school schemes; on the
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employment end of the scale are fraudulent job training schemes and advance fee
employment agencies.
Somewhere in the middle are modeling agencies which purport to both improve the
“person” and his or her employment prospects. Also included are courses on improving
one’s image or ability to communicate with others. Some business opportunity schemes,
which hold out the prospect of financial improvement plus “being a respected community
businessperson,” also fall into this category by appealing to the victim’s desire to improve
his or her finances and lifestyle.

See also: Business-opportunity fraud; Employment-agency fraud; Vanity-publishing scheme.
“Sewer” service: A term used to describe the kinds of activity noted below.

Many merchandising, home repair, and other kinds of fraud rely on the use of litigation for
ultimate collection of the proceeds of the fraud. Likewise, many enterprises that are not
strictly speaking fraudulent, for example, those that sell much overpriced merchandise on
credit, also depend on litigation or the threat of litigation to squeeze money from victims.

In both these situations, devices are often adopted to fraudulently deprive victims of the
opportunity to defend against litigation-usually by not informing them that litigation has
been initiated against them (that is, dropping the summons or subpoena “down the sewer”).
This is accomplished, usually, by false affidavits, filed in court, that a summons and
complaint were served on the victim.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sham, corporate: The use of a corporate entity to provide a veil of respectability and

substance for fraudulent activity.

See also: Commercial crime.
Sham transaction: A fraudulent transaction giving the impression of a legitimate

transaction at a higher price. These transactions are particularly difficult to detect because
they involve collusion with a co-conspirator outside the entity.

See also: Sham, corporate.
Shell company: An inactive company whose shares have been repurchased.

Short weighting or loading: Deliberate shorting of the volume or quantity of a cargo

or other purchase. The short load is accompanied by a false invoice demanding payment
for the full amount. This kind of fraud is easiest to perpetrate where the goods involved are
of a nature or bulk that it is difficult for the receiver to detect shortages.

The reverse of the short weighting or loading fraud is often used as a modus operandi for
theft of cargo. In this situation, a transport vehicle is intentionally overloaded; the overage
is not recorded and the overloaded amount forms the basis of kickbacks to the scheme
operators from the recipient of the shipment, who is often the fence for the stolen goods.
Manipulation of the size or volume of loads must always be accompanied by false
documentation.

This violation involves either a false claim to a customer or a plain and simple theft from
the shipper. Because insiders are frequently involved, it will often involve commercial
bribery, kickbacks, and so on.
See also: Weights and measures fraud.
Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
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Short selling: A technique whereby the trader is gambling that the price of a stock will

fall. Thus, he or she anticipates a profit on the transaction by selling a number of shares
first, for later delivery at a specified price. The trader then buys those shares at a later date,
when, if his or her gamble were correct, the share price has fallen and he or she delivers
them. Thus, the trader makes a profit during a period of declining prices of the stock.
Siphoning funds: Illegal withdrawal of money in small amounts from a large number

of accounts. For example, pennies and portions of pennies (resulting from rounding off)
can be shaved from thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a
single account that is accessed by the embezzler.
Skimming: A scheme in which cash is skimmed before it enters the accounting system.
For example, an employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt or prepares a receipt
for less than the amount received.

See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Smurfing: The use of couriers (also known as smurfs} to deposit and withdraw cash or

cash equivalents at financial institutions in amounts less than the reporting limit to avoid
reporting requirements.
See also: Money laundering.
Statement, false: The concealment or misrepresentation of a fact material to the

decision-making process of an entity. The false statement is often the means by which a
fraudulent scheme to obtain money or benefit is effected for either of the following, among
other, reasons.
1. The false statement constitutes the underlying documentation for a false claim.

2. The false statement impedes discovery of the fraudulent scheme, that is, covers up the
fraud. These statements often provide the opportunity for conditioning the victim to
unquestioningly accept and approve a false claim.
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Ghost employee; Government-benefit program, fraud against.
Stock market manipulation: A crime perpetrated by a stock promoter who

artificially influences the market price of shares in a company for personal gain at the
expense of the investing public.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud.
Street certificate: A stock certificate that has been issued in the name of a brokerage
firm and then endorsed by it. It is now like a bearer certificate and can change hands
several times in many trades without being returned to a trust company for transfer.
Taking out the market: See Cleaning up the market.
Talent-agency scheme: See: Self-improvement scheme; Vanity-publishing scheme.

Tax and revenue violation: Fraud perpetrated with the intent to deprive a taxing

authority of revenue to which it is entitled or of information it needs to make a judgment
regarding revenues to which it is entitled or to avoid admission of involvement in illicit,
though profitable, business activities.
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Tax fraud may be perpetrated through the filing of a false return, as in personal income tax
fraud; through the bribery of a public official, as may occur in property tax assessment
fraud; or in the failure to file appropriately, as with an organized crime-figure who may not
be concerned with avoiding tax liability but rather with revealing the sources of his or her
taxable income. Many white-collar crimes obligate the offender to commit tax fraud
because of illicitly obtained money he or she does not wish to report, for example, assets
due to bribe, larceny, kickback, or embezzlement proceeds. Common crimes, especially of
a business nature, also result in tax violations, for example, bookmaking and fencing stolen
goods, which could be income and sales tax abuses.
Tax avoidance through false statements may be a component of otherwise legitimate
business enterprises, especially in the areas of business and occupation taxes, inventory
taxes, and sales taxes. Individuals and businesses will also seek to avoid or evade excise
taxes, for example, on cigarettes or in the case of tanker trucks by the substitution of lowtaxed home heating oil for higher-taxed diesel fuel.

See also: Income tax fraud.
Trade, restraint of: Actions, combinations, or schemes that interfere with unfettered

marketplace transactions. Examples are price fixing, bribery and kickbacks for commercial
advantage, interference with competitive bidding processes, dictation of price structure to
customers or dealers, and exclusive buying arrangements.
See also: Commercial bribery; Price fixing; Procurement fraud.
Transactions, entering false: Entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts

payable system or recording false credit memos to reduce legitimate accounts receivable.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Sales and collection cycle.
Trust, abuse of: Misuse of one’s position and/or privileged information gained by

virtue of that position to acquire money, property, or some privilege to which one is not
entitled. Abuse of trust also often involves a violation of fiduciary duty.
Abuse of trust can occur in many areas but arises most frequently in the following four
white-collar crime areas.

1. Banking. Self-dealing in connection with loans or credit to oneself, one’s friends, or
business associates.
2. Securities. Insider information used for personal benefit at the expense of clients,
stockholders, and others.

3. Commercial bribery. Manipulation of procurement and competitive bidding processes.

4. Embezzlement. Misuse of property or funds in the custody of a trustee.
See also: Banking fraud; Commercial bribery; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Insider trading;
Procurement fraud; Securities fraud.
Trust fund, misappropriation of: The diversion of client funds held in trust and use

of the money for purposes other than those intended by the client.

See also: External fraud.
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Vanity-publishing scheme: Any scheme that involves eliciting fees from individuals

on the promise of promoting their creative “talents” (real or imaginary) or assisting them in
the development of said “talent.”

The success of these kinds of fraud relies on the victim’s vanity about his or her hitherto
unrecognized talent. These schemes work best in areas such as literary publishing or song
writing, where taste is more important than performance standards.

The fraudster will imply a promise of national advertising, book reviews, distribution, and
special marketing services but not so concretely that he or she will be held to any
obligation. The victims usually invest heavily and lose both their money and their hopes.
They are left with a few copies of a printed and scored song arrangement or a number of
copies of books that established book review publications have not troubled to look at
because of their publishing source.
See also: Self-improvement scheme.
Warehousing: Part of a stock market manipulation that places shares into the hands of

people who are friendly to the promoter—warehousing or parking—to allow the promoter
to maintain control of the shares and continue to restrict and regulate their availability.
Wash-trading: A flurry of trading activity falsely created by the promoter’s group to

give the appearance of great interest in the stock to increase demand for the stock among
the public to whom the promoter plans to eventually sell his holdings when the price
reaches a certain level.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Weights and measures fraud: Cheating customers by failure to deliver prescribed

weights or volumes of desired goods. The victim is defrauded by relying on the false
documents provided by the fraudster testifying to the delivered quantities.
Examples of white-collar crimes include the following:
1. Gas pump meter manipulation to show more gas pumped than received by the
customer

2. Odometer rollbacks in auto sales
These kinds of fraud are most successful if the victim cannot easily verify the accuracy of
the measuring devices or if the victim has no reason to question the seller’s claim or
statement, for example, when the products sold are bottled or packaged.
See also: Short weighting or loading.
Welfare fraud: Abuses of government income and family subsidy programs.

Government welfare programs are often exploited by applicants who apply for benefits to
which they are not entitled or continue to claim eligibility even though they no longer meet
the eligibility criteria.
Receipt of money from claimants by officials processing welfare claims represents another
dimension of this fraud. These monies may be solicited as kickbacks in exchange for the
filing of inflated claims; as bribes to certify claimants who are ineligible or to avoid
reporting claimants’ ineligibility or as extortion for processing claims to which a recipient is
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fully eligible. In some cases, nonexistent recipients (ghosts) may be created to fraudulently
siphon money out of the programs.
See also: Government-benefit program, fraud against.
White-collar crime: Nonviolent crime for financial gain committed through deception

by entrepreneurs, professionals, or semiprofessionals using their special occupational skills
and opportunities. This category also includes similar crimes committed by anyone having
special technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of
the person’s occupation.

See also: Commercial crime; Economic crime.
Work-at-home schemes: See Business-opportunity fraud; Franchise fraud.

Written-off account, diversion of payments from: Diversion of payments

received from a customer whose account has been written off. Because most companies do
not monitor defunct accounts, this activity is rarely detected. For example, an employee
will work with a customer to collect an overdue receivable. Before the customer pays, the
employee writes off the account, removes it from the books, and pockets the funds
received.

See also: Internal fraud; Sales and collection cycle.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

35

Bibliography

Bibliography

Bibliography

Set out below is a selected list of books and Web sites for further reading on the subject of
fraud, commercial crime, and related topics.

BOOKS
Albanese, Jay S. White-Collar Crime in America. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995.

Beasley, Mark S., Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson. Fraudulent Financial Reporting
1987-1997: An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. New York: Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 1999.
Beaven, Guy W. Hello Suckers!: Inside the Brutal World ofStock Market Scams and How to
Prevent Falling Victim. Washington Grove, MD: Gordon-Richardson Press, 1995.

Bequai, August. White Collar Crime: A Twentieth Century Crisis. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath,
1978.
Bertrand, Marsha. Fraud!: How to Protect Yourselffrom Schemes, Scams, and Swindles. New
York: American Management, 1999.

Binstein, Michael, and Charles Bowden. Trust Me: Charles Keating and the Missing Billions.
New York: Random House, 1993.

Bintliff, Russell L. Complete Manual of White Collar Crime Detection and Prevention. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993.
Black, Henry C. Black's Law Dictionary: Fifth Edition. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1979.

Bologna, Jack, and Paul Shaw. Avoiding Cyber Fraud in Small Businesses. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 2000.

. Corporate Crime Investigation. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1997.
Bologna, Jack. Handbook on Corporate Fraud: Prevention, Detection, and Investigation. Boston:
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1993.
Brickey, Kathleen F. Corporate and White Collar Crime: Selected Cases and Statutes. New York:
Aspen Law & Business, 1997.

Bucy, Pamela H. White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials. St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1998.
Calavita, Kitty, Henry N. Pontell, and Robert H. Tillman. Big Money Crime: Fraud and
Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis. Berkley: University of California Press, 1997.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/ 01

1

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Camerer, L. Costly Crimes, Commercial Crime and Corruption in South Africa. Johannesburg:
Institute for Security Studies, 1997.
Cole, Richard B. Management ofInternal Business Investigations: A Survival Guide. Springfield,
IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1996.

Coleman, James William. The Criminal Elite: Understanding White-Collar Crime. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1998.

Comer, Michael J. Corporate Fraud, Second Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998.
, Patrick M. Ardis, and David H. Price. Bad Lies in Business: The Commonsense Guide to
Detecting Deceit in Negotiations, Interviews, and Investigations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992.
Croft, Roger. Swindle!: A Decade of Canadian Stock Frauds. Toronto: Gage Pub., 1975.
Dailey, Edward J. Health Care Fraud: A New White Collar Crime: Strategies for Compliance,
Audit, Litigation, and Prosecution. Boston: MCLE, 1997.

Durkin, Ronald L., and Everett P. Harry III. Fraud Investigations in Litigation and Dispute
Resolution Services: A Nonauthoritative Guide. New York: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, Inc., 1997.

Dykeman, Francis C. Forensic Accounting: The Accountant as Expert Witness. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1982.
Edelhertz, Herbert, James O. Golden, and Stephen W. Cooley. The Investigation of WhiteCollar Crime: A Manualfor Law Enforcement Agencies. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. ofJustice,
1977.

Elliott, Robert K., and John J. Willingham. Management Fraud: Detection and Deterrence. New
York: Petrocelli Books, 1980.

Frank, Peter B., and Michael J. Wagner. Providing Litigation Services. New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1993.
Garman, Thomas E. Ripoffs and Frauds, How to Avoid and How to Get Away. Houston: Dame
Publications, 1996.
Geis, Gilbert, Robert F. Meier, and Lawrence M. Salinger. White-Collar Crime: Classic and
Contemporary Views. New York: Free Press: Distributed by Simon & Schuster, 1995.

Ghosh, Anup K. E-Commerce Security: Weak Links, Best Defenses. New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1998.
Grau, J. J., and B. Jacobson. Criminal and Civil Investigation Handbook. New York: McGrawHill, 1993.

Green, Gary. Occupational Crime. Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall, 1997.
Haynes, Stephen L. Computers and Litigation Support. New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1981.

Hogue, Elizabeth E., Sanford V. Teplitzky, and Howard L. Sollins. Preventing Fraud and
Abuse: A Guide For Medicare and Medicaid Providers. Owings Mills, MD: National Health Pub.,
1988.

2

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Bibliography

Hoyt, Douglas et al. Computer Security Handbook, Second Edition. New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1995.
Janal, Daniel S. Risky Business : Protect Your Business from Being Stalked, Conned, or Blackmailed
on the Web. New York: Wiley, 1998.

Judson, Karen. Computer Crime: Phreaks, Spies and Salami Slicers. Berkley Heights, NJ:
Enslow Publishers, 1999.

Katz, Leo. Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Kirk, Paul L., and John I. Thornton, Eds. Crime Investigation, Second Edition. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1985.

Krauss, Leonard L, and Aileen MacGahan. Computer Fraud and Countermeasures. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979.

Langdale, Rachel. Case Studies in Corporate Crime. Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics
and Research, 1990.
Leonard, Orland. Corporate and White Collar Crime: An Anthology. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson
Publishing, 1995.

Levi, Michael. Fraud: Organization, Motivation, and Control. Aidershot, England; Brookfield,
VT: Ashgate, 1999.
Magnuson, Roger J. The White Collar Crime Explosion: How to Protect Yourselfand Your
Company from Prosecution. Minneapolis, MN: Dorsey & Whitney, 1992.
Manning, George A. Financial Investigation and Forensic Accounting. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press,
1999.

Mazer, Robert E., and S. Craig Holden. Medicare Anti-Fraud and Abuse: A Guide For Hospitals,
Labs &MDs. Washington, DC: Washington G-2 Reports, 1992.

McMahon, David. Cyber Threat. Toronto: Warwick Publishing, 2000.
Moscarino, George J., and Charles M. Kennedy. Corporate Investigations: A Practical Primer.
Washington, DC: Washington Legal Foundation, 1996.

National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. Cooking the Books: What Every Accountant
Should Know About Fraud. New York: NASBA, 1993.

Neilson, R. Todd, et al. Providing Bankruptcy and Reorganization Services: A Nonauthoritative
Guide. New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1998.
Nelken, David. White-Collar Crime. Aidershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth
Publishing, 1994.
Nossen, Richard A. The Detection, Investigation, and Prosecution ofFinancial Crimes. Richmond,
VA: Thoth Books, 1993.

Parker, Donn B. Fighting Computer Crime: A New Framework for Protecting Information. New
York: Wiley Computer Publishing, 1998.

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

3

The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud

Pipkin, Donald L. Information Security: Protecting the Global Enterprise. Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall PTR, 2000.

Podgor, Ellen S., and Jerold H. Israel. White Collar Crime in A Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing, 1997.
Poveda, Tony G. Rethinking White-Collar Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

Rae, Weston. Combating Commercial Crime. North Ryde, NSW: Law Book, 1987.
Ramachandran, K.S. (Kattalai Sivasubramanya). Scanning the Scam: How and Why of the
Securities Scandal. New Delhi: Neo Publishing, 1993.
Ramos, Michael J., and Anita M. Lyons. Considering Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit:
Practical Guidance for Applying SAS No. 82. New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1997.

Schneier, Bruce. Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 2000.
Siegel, Larry J. Criminology: Theories, Patterns and Typologies, Third Edition. St. Paul, MN: West
Publishing Company, 1992.

Soble, Ronald L., and Robert E. Dallos. The Impossible Dream: The Equity Funding Story, the
Fraud of the Century. New York: New American Library, 1975.
Stephenson, Peter. Investigating Computer-Related Crime: Handbook for Corporate Investigators.
Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999.
Tomes, Jonathan P. Fraud, Waste, Abuse and Safe Harbors: A Guide for the Healthcare
Professional. Chicago: Probus Publishing, 1993.

. Healthcare Fraud, Waste, Abuse, and Safe Harbors: The Complete Legal Guide. Chicago:
Probus Publishing, 1993.
United States Congress. Federal Efforts to Combat Fraud, Abuse, and Misconduct in the Nation’s
S &L’s and Banks. Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O., 1990.
Wagner, Charles R. The CPA and Computer Fraud. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1979.

Wadlow, Thomas A. The Process ofNetwork Security: Designing and Managing a Safe Network.
Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Longman, 2000.
Walter, Ingo. The Secret Money Market: Inside the Dark World of Tax Evasion, Financial Fraud,
Insider Trading, Money Laundering, and Capital Flight. New York: Harper & Row, Ballinger
Division, 1990.

Wellman, Francis L. The Art of Cross-Examination. New York: Dorset Press, 1997.

Wells, Joseph T. Occupational Fraud and Abuse. Austin, TX: Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, 1997.

Wells, Joseph T., et al. Fraud Examiners Manual, Third Edition. Austin, TX: Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners, 1998.
Williams, Howard E. Investigating White-Collar Crime: Embezzlement and Financial Fraud.
Springfield, IL: C.C. Thomas, 1997.

4

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

Bibliography

WEB SITES
Advance Fee Frauds: Nigerian Scams, http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/

The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, http://www.cfenet.com

Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees,
1999. http://www.nyse.com/ and http://www.nasdaqnews.com/.
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
http://www.coso.org/main.htm
CSCAP Working Group on Transnational Crime. http://www.cscap.org/crime.htm

Fighting Fraud and Corruption. http://www.ex.acuk/~RDavies/arian/scandals/fight.html
Fraud Bureau, http://www.fraudbureau.com

Fraud Defense Network. http://www.frauddefense.com
Fraud Internet Information. http://dir.yahoo.com/Computers_and_Internet/Internet/
Business_and_Economics/Fraud/

Fraud on the Internet Resource List. http://www.emich.edu/public/coe/nice/fraudrl.html

Fraudnet. http://www.auditnet.org/fraudnet.htm
Fraud News. http://www.fraudnews.com
The Institute of Internal Auditors. “Struggling to incorporate the COSO recommendations
into your audit process? Here’s one audit shop’s winning strategy.” Dennis Applegate and
Ted Wills. December 1999. http://www.coso.org/Articles/audit_shop.htm .

International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators, http://www.iafci.org/start.html
National Check Fraud Center. http://www.ckfraud.org
National Fraud Information Center. http://www.fraud.org

Securities and Exchange Commission. Internet Fraud: How to Avoid Internet Investment
Scams. http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cyberfr.htm
Securities and Exchange Commission. “The Numbers Game”, a speech presented to the
New York University Center for Law and Business by Arthur Levitt, Sept. 28, 1998.
http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt.

White-Collar Crime: Loss Prevention Through Internal Control. Prepared for Chubb
Group of Insurance Companies by Ernst & Young.
http://www.chubb.com/library/wcrime.html

Fraud Supp. 1—3/01

5

Report on Fraud

1
Fraud

REPORT
ON

Volume 2 . Issue 4 .January 2000

Top Travel Spot
for Fraudsters
Giving Fraud
the Finger

2

3

Software that
Uncovers Scams

4

Credit Card Fraud
Goes International

8

Ponzi Scheme
Hits Japan 10

Kroll Lindquist Avey
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING, LITIGATION CONSULTING, BUSINESS VALUATION

The Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

REPORT

on Fraud

Leaving [for]

Las Vegas

PUBLISHERS
In Canada

Peter Hoult, CA
Todd Shoalts, CA, CFE

Looking for a fraudster on the lam?

In the United States

Take a gamble on Las Vegas. The odds are

Linda P. Cohen
William Jennings, CPA, CFE

good you’ll find him there.

EDITOR

Paul McLaughlin

IT SEEMS ONLY FITTING that the city founded by mobster Bugsy
Siegel in the 1940s has become the destination of choice for felons
fleeing the law. Las Vegas is America’s fastest growing metropolitan area,
with a population of 1.3 million. It also welcomes about a half million
people a week, making it a seemingly ideal place to become lost in the
crowd.
“Sooner or later they all end up in Vegas,” Alfredo Cervantes, a
sergeant with the Las Vegas Criminal Apprehension Team, told the Los
Angeles Times. “Criminals, like everybody else, know they can get
anything and everything here, from girls to gambling. If they do get
caught, at least they had one last hurrah in Sin City.”
And many of them do get caught, at a higher rate than anywhere else
in the U.S. “During the first 10 months of fiscal year 1999, the Las Vegas
task force arrested 840 felons, the largest number by any of the 56
fugitive U.S. apprehension teams,” reported the Times. “In the same
period, the Los Angeles team netted 382 arrests, New York’s 301 and
San Francisco’s 251.”
Among the apprehended fraudsters was a disgraced New Jersey
prosecutor who skipped bail after being arrested on corruption and tax
fraud charges. During his time in Las Vegas he may have taken in a strip
show performed by a New York drug dealer. She was arrested onstage
when task force officers noticed her tell-tale snake tattoos.
One of the more unusual arrests occurred last September, soon after a
restaurant cashier finished a Reader’s Digest article about Grant Warren
Beaucage, who was wanted in Canada for the murder of his wife. The
cashier put down the magazine and looked up at the man about to pay
for his meal. She recognized him as Beaucage, from the picture in the
article, and alerted hotel security. He was apprehended a short time
later.
Considering that fraudsters often have a large stash of money with
them, it seems likely that Vegas’ bright lights would be a particularly
compelling lure for them. And it might turn out to be a smart place to
hide. “Sorting through 700 warrants each month, [the Criminal
Apprehension Team] forsake embezzlers and scam artists for the more
violent elusive offenders,” reported the Times. But even if fraudsters do
gain freedom in Las Vegas, we can take some solace in assuming that
most of them will lose their ill-gotten gains in the casinos.
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Giving
Fraud the
Finger

Think only criminals have their fingerprints taken? Then you don't
know about biometrics security. You likely soon will.

PIN NUMBERS and other types
of security codes, passwords and
cards for banking and other
financial transactions will likely
become obsolete in the next few
years. “As we know, these systems
offer a limited level of security
from fraud,” says Dr. Edward
Cheng, VP of Public Relations
with SecuGen Corporation, a
global biometrics company located
in Silicon Valley, CA. “But a
fingerprint is unique to each
person. Even identical twins have
different fingerprints. So a
fingerprint cannot be stolen or
copied.”
Biometrics is the automated
method of using an individual’s
distinct biological features for
security purposes. This technique
can verify an individual’s identity
using physical measurements such
as fingerprints, palm size, facial
features, iris scans and voice
recognition.
SecuGen has recently begun a
pilot project with ING Direct,
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Canada using a fingerprint
biometrics security system for
ING’s Internet banking products.
ING Direct is a member of the
ING Group, one of the world’s
largest financial institutions, with
assets exceeding US$430 billion.
Under the project, about 500 of
ING’s customers will use a special
mouse developed by SecuGen,
known as EyeD Mouse II, that has
built-in fingerprint recognition
technology.
The users must first register their
thumbprint with ING (a one-time
enrollment done over the Internet).
When they log on to conduct a
banking transaction, for example,
their thumbprint is scanned by
their mouse (there is a small glass
section on the left side of the
mouse, known as a platen, where
the thumb of the right hand
typically rests) to confirm their
identity. The verification takes less
than a second.
“We’re already using this type
of system with other companies,

for things such as security access to
offices,” says Dr. Cheng. “But this
project, I believe is the first ever
with a financial institution.” He
says the system is highly accurate,
which was not necessarily the case
with earlier versions of this
technology. “A person’s unique
features are extracted and turned
into a 60-digit code number,” he
says. “The image is basically
distortion-free. ”
Less worrisome than the quality
of the technology is the question
about consumer response to having
their fingerprints stored in the
computers of a large corporation.
“The fear of ‘Big Brother’ is
certainly a concern with some
people,” says Dr. Cheng. “But
we’ve found that once they
understand how secure their
fingerprints are from misuse, they
are very happy to cooperate with a
system that protects them from
fraud.” ■
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Getting

Fraud detection goes high-tech as
many industries turn to software

programs to uncover scams.

4

THE 3-D COMPUTER graphic
swirled around and revealed a tall
tower with many strings attached.
It was a graphic representation of a
high-rise building on Toronto’s
Yonge Street and the strings
represented 167 people from that
address who had filed insurance
claims with a prominent Canadian
insurance company.
The next graphic showed that
130 people from a two-story
building outside Ottawa had all
made claims with the same insurer.
With a look of horror, an
executive from the insurance firm
scribbled down the addresses as he
suddenly realized both buildings
were office towers — not residential
locations, as the claims indicated.
It was a telltale sign the claims
were suspect.

In the very recent past those
fraudulent claims might not have
been uncovered. They would
likely have contributed to the $1.3
billion insurance losses a year,
which makes insurance fraud one
of Canada’s biggest white-collar
crime problems. But they were
detected, during an impressive
demonstration of a new software
program called “Fraud
Investigator” from InfoGlide Corp.
Fraud Investigator was run on
the insurance company’s computer
database. In a matter of minutes,
the software found serious
problems that the insurance
company’s existing fraud detection
methods had not discovered.
“We searched claims and
residential addresses and then had
the program visualize the
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addresses with the most claimants,”
says Lee Thistle of TSI Solutions
Inc., the Canadian distributor of
Fraud Investigator.
Most insurance computer
systems in Canada have little or no
ability to search their own
databases to find suspect claims.
But the patented “similarity search
engine” at the heart of Fraud
Investigator can detect any
possible interrelated data in
insurance claims.
Fraud-detecting software is a
recently new tool on the
marketplace. It’s of value to most
sectors that face large-scale fraud,
but particularly the insurance
industry, banks, telephone
companies and government health
insurance plans.

One Size Doesn’t Fit All
Report on Fraud set out to discover
what software was on the market
and how companies and
professionals can best judge what
will work for them. We quickly
discovered there is no “one size fits
all” solution.
Insurance industry chatter is
focused on Fraud Investigator
because it was the clear winner of
an informal fraud detection
software test run by the U.S.
National Insurance Crime Bureau
(NICB). (See sidebar on page 7.)
Fraud Investigator’s similarity
search engine can cross-search
multiple databases even if
they have different formats
and “dirty data” containing
numerous errors. It can
find names, addresses and
as many as 30 other identifiers,
even if criminals have carefully
changed the data to avoid
detection. As well, it can
incorporate other public records to
expand its own detection
effectiveness.
Scott Bothwell of the NICB says
it plans to use the Internet so that
insurance companies using Fraud
Investigator can access NICB’s
questionable claims database to
check to see if a person, or
someone similar to that person,
has filed multiple claims with
different companies. This would
allow them to conduct a search in
real time and approve or reject a
claim very quickly.
Another characteristic that
makes Fraud Investigator popular
is its ease of use. Field investigators

need only a day’s training and do
not require the assistance of
computer programmers.
InfoGlide is initially marketing
the software to the property and
casualty segment of the insurance
industry, but will soon target auto
and healthcare insurers. It says the
similarity search technology is also
being used by a U.S. intelligence
agency to help track terrorists.
Fraud Investigator may also
prove effective in combating some
forms of Internet fraud. InfoGlide
just signed a contract with the
leading Internet auction site, eBay
Inc., to help it attack identity fraud.
The problem of customers who
take money from purchasers and
then never deliver the goods has
plagued eBay. It will use InfoGlide
software to keep known fraudsters
off its network even if they change
their names and other identifiers.
In a test on eBay’s computer
system, the InfoGlide software
found one person posing as 345
others, the company says.

Tracking Telephone Fraud
A very different type of software is
being used to combat fraud in the
telephone industry. Most phone
companies use a form of neural
network technology that tracks
customer calling-patterns and flags
any unusual deviations.
An explosion of wireless and
Internet services has made the
telecom industry more prone to
fraud than ever. An estimated
$6-$8 billion a year is siphoned
from telephone revenue in the U.S.
Typical frauds include:
...continued
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• cloning cell phones — duplicating

transmitter codes of individual
phones and then using the code to
run up huge long distance charges
that are billed to the unsuspecting
cell phone owner. It’s a favorite
trick of Canadian telemarketing
fraudsters who target Americans
• dial-through fraud — hacking into
corporate PBX systems and then
making long distance calls
• calling card theft — stealing calling
card numbers and selling them on
the black market
• clip-on fraud — tapping into an
exposed telephone line outside an
office building and then selling
access to unlimited numbers of
people. It’s prominent in poor
ethnic communities where many
people lack the means to make
telephone calls home.
MCI Worldcom’s “Sheriff”
program and “Supersleuth” from
Nortel Networks are leading
solutions in the telecom industry.
Nortel developed its anti-fraud
software over the past decade in its
UK labs and commercialized it two
years ago. It’s based on neural
network artificial intelligence
technology that is modeled on
human thought patterns, says Walt
Shedd, Nortel’s vice president of
business development for North
America.
Supersleuth has been a hot seller
with German, Dutch and Central
American cell phone firms. As well,
four local exchange carriers in the
U.S. are using it, as are two
Canadian companies.
The rise of flexible, unified voice,
data and Internet networks has
increased the vulnerability to fraud.

6

There are about 50 different forms
of fraud, including subscription
fraud, identity fraud, technical
cloning fraud in analog wireless
networks and clip-on fraud in
landline networks.
“We see different types of fraud
emerge almost on a daily basis and
a lot of times it may be just a
variation of an old scheme,” Shedd
says. “It takes awhile for people to
see it.”

With Supersleuth, he adds, “we’re
looking at 70 different events or
characteristics in any given record
and mapping that to known fraud
types. We’re also looking at what is
expected behavior within this
service being provided and we’re
tracking deviations from that
behavior. We’ve found that 100 per
cent of the time if a new fraud is
perpetrated it may not show up and
be recognizable as something we’ve
seen in the past. But it certainly will
show up as something that is not
expected.”
Supersleuth can work with any
type of computer network. It
reaches into a database and collects
records, analyzes them and
produces results so an analyst can
see if it’s a high priority alarm.
An independent study of 40
global wireless operators, each with

its own anti-fraud program, showed
they averaged one fraud analyst per
133,000 subscribers. Those using
Supersleuth averaged one analyst
for every 666,000 subscribers,
making the phone company’s “hair
and blood” costs substantially lower,
Shedd says.
As well, the hardware costs
associated with installing
Supersleuth were one-quarter to
one-half the cost of competitive
systems. Pricing for the software is
based on the size of a company’s
subscriber base, typically being less
for smaller companies and more for
larger.
Benefit to Banks
Banks are a prime target of
fraudsters. Stolen credit and debit
cards (see “Card Tricks” page 8) are
a multi-billion dollar a year problem
for banks and the outsourcing
industry that banks use to process
credit and debit card transactions.
As with telephone companies,
banks use neural networking
software to scan transaction patterns
and recognize any deviations from
established customer practices. For
instance, if a credit card is used
normally in a certain geographic
area, say Quebec, and then
suddenly is used in Mexico, the
software will flag the transaction. A
bank analyst may then decide to
require an identification check of the
cardholder before the bank will
approve further charges.
International Neural Machines
Inc. (INM) of Waterloo, ON has
developed anti-fraud software for
Canadian and Mexican banks. The
data mining software searches the
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bank’s databases and analyzes
transactions, comparing them to
the past history of customers and
merchants to recognize potentially
fraudulent activity. Its software has
the advantage
of learning
from the data it
searches to
pick up new
tactics that
criminals may
develop, says
Oleg Feldgajer,
president of
INM. The
company
recently
received a contract from the World
Bank to install its hybrid software
in the Central Bank of Estonia
specifically to combat money
laundering in the country’s small
banking sector.
INM is also in discussions with
Canada’s new anti-money
laundering agency, FINTRAC, to
provide it with software to help
monitor cross-border financial
transactions including inter-bank
wire transfers to detect money
laundering. In time, the scrutiny
will be run via the Internet, making
laundering analysis much faster
and more effective. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
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Tests
How do you decide which software is best for

your needs? Put them to the test.

OBVIOUSLY you can hire a
consultant to advise you of
your needs, but at the end of
the day there is only one
reliable method for selecting
anti-fraud software: have
competing software vendors
run a demonstration on your
company’s own computer
database.
That was the approach taken
last year by Scott Bothwell at
the National Insurance Crime
Bureau to evaluate anti-fraud
software technologies. He
salted the NICB’s database
with information from a
sophisticated Russian fraud ring
that it had stopped in 1998. He
gave the database to two
companies to see what they
could find.
In just three days InfoGlide
found the fraud ring while the
other software product found
nothing. The similarity search

engine was able to search
several dozen fields besides
names, addresses and vehicle
identification numbers to find
the clever criminal who had
changed data to avoid
detection. Fraud Investigator
found the Russian crime gang
material in the database “but it
also found things we weren’t
aware of in our own data,”
Bothwell says.
NICB is a non-profit
investigative agency supported
by more than 1,000 U.S.
property and casualty
insurance companies. Bothwell
advises any company to do
what NICB did — have various
vendors do pilot studies using
their own company data and
then judge the results. “Some
software packages are very
expensive so you want to make
sure what you buy will work,”
he says. ■
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Losses from credit card, debit card and ATM

fraud exceed more than a billion dollars
annually in the U.S. alone. But the problem is no

longer a national one, as an expert tells us. It’s
now become an international crime.

JOE MAJKA (pronounced Mykah) is a Regional Director for Visa
U.S.A.’s Risk Management Fraud
Control Department. He has over
24 years experience in corporate
security and criminal investigations,
specializing in the area of financial
crime, and is certified by the
American Society of Industrial
Security as a Certified Protection
Professional. During his career,
Majka has been Director of Security
for Eurekabank and Corporate
Security Manager for Homefed
Bank, in San Diego. He holds a
Bachelor’s degree from California
State University, Hayward and a
lifetime teaching credential from the
University of California at Berkeley.

ROF: From Visa’s perspective, how
serious a problem is fraud?

JM: It’s very serious. Overall, fraud
increased last year, from the
previous year, by approximately

8

14 per cent. However, I should also
say that for Visa, in terms of fraud
to sales volume, fraud only
represents 6 cents for every one
hundred dollars in sales volume, or
.06 per cent.

ROF: Many of the crimes related to the
fraud losses have some kind of
international connection.
JM: That’s exactly right. From a
banking and law enforcement
perspective, if you are still thinking
locally you are behind already,
because the crooks are thinking
globally. And, to no surprise, the
Internet is bringing them to you. In
the past, a merchant was used to
doing business locally or maybe
state wide. Most customers would
walk into the business to conduct
their transactions. The Internet
takes that all away. Today, you can
be doing business with somebody
in the UK or Russia or Latin

America. They don’t have to walk
into your store any more. And the
criminals are using that to their
advantage.
ROF: Can you give an example?
JM: A Wisconsin merchant
received an order from Belarus,
part of the former Soviet Union, for
50,000 pentium chips. The guy in
Belarus gave a credit card number
that he’d obtained from a fraud
program available on the Internet
called CreditMaster. The merchant
called his bank and got
authorization and shipped the stuff
out. Now you and I might be a little
suspect about sending a first order
of 50,000 chips to someone in
Belarus that you’ve never done
business with before. But the
merchant wasn’t. After it was too
late, it was discovered that the card
number, which was from Canada,
had been stolen.
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ROF: How did that happen?
JM: CreditMaster, which anyone
who surfs the Net can find, was
developed in 1992 by a group of
hackers who decided to have fun
with the financial industry. It’s in
version 4.0 now. This program
allows you to generate credit card
and debit card account numbers.
The way it works best is to take
one good account number, which
can be obtained off a receipt. They
know that the first four to six
numbers identify whether it’s a
Visa, Mastercard, American
Express or Discovery number.
They put the number into a
program and ask it to give them
999 account numbers, half above
and half below the good number.
The program then generates a
number, usually 13-16 digits, that
meet a very simple algorithm used
in the banking industry to create a
credit card number. It’s that simple.

remember a few years ago, crooks
were stealing credit card numbers
by copying them off a restaurant
receipt, for example. To combat
that, the industry put this little
three-digit number on a card’s
magnetic stripe, which didn’t show
up on the receipt. If it wasn’t on an
authorization, the transaction was
refused. But the crooks now have a
device that we call a wedge. It can
be as small as a pack of cigarettes
or a pager. If they take your card,
typically at a restaurant, and swipe
it through the device, it stores
everything on the card: your name,
number and the three-digit code.
They then download that onto their
computer and transfer it onto a
counterfeit card. You still have your
card in your wallet. It hasn’t been
stolen or lost but the crooks can use
it. Often somewhere far away.
ROF: Where have stolen U.S. card
numbers turned up?

JM: No they don’t. But if a bank
issues their numbers sequentially,
which many of them do, chances
are they’re going to come up with a
lot of good numbers. Then what
they do is test the number out. For
example, they call AOL and if they
can open up an account with that
number, then it’s good. Or, they
transfer the number to a piece of
plastic and go to a gas station
where you can pay at the pump
with a credit card. And, as one of
my colleagues likes to say, if it
passes gas then they know they can
go ahead and commit fraud.

JM: The crooks often email the
numbers outside the country. We
have found numbers skimmed from
a restaurant in Virginia on some
suspects arrested in Taiwan. They
were linked to individuals selling
skimming devices in Japan,
Malaysia, Korea and the U.S.
Interestingly, they used the Royal
Bank logo on all their plastic.
Another example was a little
Chinese restaurant in Wilson,
Oregon. Within three to five days
after skimming customers’
numbers, those numbers showed
up in Beijing, China. Months later
we saw the same numbers in
Chicago and Latin America.

ROF: How else are numbers stolen

ROF: As a recent case in Canada

these days?

revealed, skimming also takes place at
ATM machines.

ROF: But they don’t know if the
numbers are legitimate.

JM: The most current method is
something called skimming. If you
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Russian nationals arrested in
Sweden had equipment on them
that they would lay over the PIN
pad of an ATM machine. When
you entered your PIN number it
would capture it. They also put a
device on the face of the machine
that would capture everything on
your card.
ROF: Are mostly amateurs or
organized criminals involved in this?

JM: Both, but increasingly we see
international organized crime. And
they’re using the profits from this
type of fraud to fund other
activities, such as drugs and guns.
About two years ago in southern
California, a highway patrolman
was shot and killed when he made
a routine traffic stop. In the trunk
of the car were counterfeit
travellers’ cheques. The person who
shot and killed him was a member
of an Asian organized crime group.
That’s how serious this business is.
I met with the Secret Service
recently and they were telling us
everything lately involving these
kinds of frauds seems to come back
to Hong Kong, Vancouver and San
Francisco. There’s always that
connection there.

ROF: Can you stop this kind of
fraud?

JM: We can and we’re working on
ways right now. But whatever we
come up with, the crooks will likely
find a way to crack it. What we
hope to do is stay ahead of them
for as long as we can, and to keep
the losses down to as minimum a

JM: That’s right. Last year some

9

REPORT

"Fraud

for Fraud
by Jock Ferguson

IPs becoming an all too familiar

story: a high flying financial wizard
crashes down to earth amid

THE
LATEST
FALLEN hero is
Martin A. Armstrong,
the head of the Princeton
Economic Institute (located
in Princeton, NJ., but not
connected to Princeton University),
who was charged last fall by the
U.S. Attorney of the Southern
District of New York with “a
massive scheme through which
billions of dollars of promissory
notes were fraudulently sold to
Japanese corporate investors.” The
same day the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) filed
a civil action and obtained an
injunction to freeze his assets, stop
him carrying on business and
appoint a receiver to take over his
companies. Armstrong is currently
out on $5-million bail.
Prior to the charges, the
Princeton Economic Institute billed
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itself as “perhaps
the largest global
advisory firm in the world
to major multinationals,
governments and institutions.”

Made His Stamp at Age 13
A child prodigy, Armstrong, now
49, began his career as a 13-yearold stamp dealer. The author of
several influential books on stamp
collecting, he was drummed out of
the philatelic community in 1972
after being accused of having sold
rare stamps that he didn’t own.
Undaunted, Armstrong
reinvented himself over the next
two decades as a financial guru,
establishing an impressivesounding legend. He claimed that
his $60-million artificial
intelligence forecasting system
correctly predicted crashes in the
U.S. stock and bond markets in
1987 and 1994 respectively. He

also boasted how he had correctly
forecasted the steep downturn in
the Japanese economy in 1989,
and more recent fluctuations in the
value of the yen against the U.S.
dollar. His web site showed a
picture of him with former UK
prime minister Margaret Thatcher
in 1996.
His stellar reputation as an
economic forecasting guru
attracted well-heeled institutional
investors, particularly from Japan.
In the last half of the 1990s they
gave his Tokyo office more than $3
billion to manage.

Ponzi Scheme
The breaks were applied to
Armstrong’s wild ride when he was
charged with criminally
masterminding an international
Ponzi scheme that defrauded his
Japanese corporate investors of
close to US$1 billion.
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allegations of wrongdoing.

Documents filed in criminal and
civil proceedings show a vast
chasm between appearance and
reality, a gulf that is embarrassing
for professional advisors and
executives deceived in the scam, as
there is little evidence of thorough
due diligence by investors. The
case illustrates vividly the inherent
dangers of entrusting money with
people who promise greater
returns than those being offered by
most of the market.
Investors thought Armstrong
had unique economic forecasting
expertise that other money
managers lacked, giving them an
advantage that would produce
higher returns. His crystal ball
skills, he claimed, had produced an
average annual return of 28 per
cent for six consecutive years, a
performance that would double
investors’ money in just three
years. At the time, Japanese banks
were paying zero interest.
Armstrong promised a minimum
of four per cent annual return with
an upside potential for much more.
A key to the facade were regular
reporting letters sent to investors
that falsely claimed they were
earning large returns. In fact, for
almost two years Armstrong’s
trading activity produced dramatic
losses of at least $500 million.
The greatest losses were in the
18 months prior to his arrest. As
the yen grew stronger and
stronger, Armstrong became more
desperate. Still convinced of his
own forecasting rhetoric, he bet
the U.S. dollar heavily against the
yen. It was a dreadful mistake.
Most investors bought into his
deals in U.S. dollars and were to
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be paid back in yen. This
significantly compounded
Armstrong’s problem. Deals that
had a stated interest rate of four
per cent were in fact owed over
twenty per cent with the rise in the
value of the yen against the dollar.
It’s fascinating to go back and
look at Armstrong’s published
views on the Japanese yen during

“Someday I want to be
rich. Some people get so

rich they lose all respect for
humanity. That’s how rich
I want to be. ”
- Rita Rudner

those 18 months in 1998 and 1999.
He appeared to have used his
writings to try and stem the yen’s
downward flow. In July 1999, for
example, Armstrong engaged in
some self-serving warning that if
the yen closed below 110.65 yen to
the dollar, then it could “result in
an economic catastrophe. Such a
decline in the dollar will wipe out
any sign of economic recovery and
plunge Japan into yet another
massive round of deflation. This
would most likely impact the
entire Asian region and at the
same time perhaps push China
over the edge.” But in the end, it
was Armstrong who fell.

When the FBI raided
Armstrong’s Princeton office they
found records showing obligations
to repay between $700 million and
$ 1 billion at a time when there was
only $46 million left in the kitty.
They also found that many early
investors had been repaid with
funds raised from recent investors,
the classic hallmark of a criminal
Ponzi scheme. Investigators found
at least 113 separate investment
accounts under Armstrong’s
umbrella and one company, Alps
Electric Company, could lose as
much as $185 million this year,
Bloomberg News reported. It’s not
yet been determined how much
Armstrong pocketed in
management and performance fees
or where that money is located.

Says He’s a Scapegoat
Armstrong strongly denies the
criminal allegations. His lawyer
was quoted as saying that
Armstrong is being made a
scapegoat for “honest non-criminal
trading losses.”
No matter how the criminal and
civil proceedings resolve, it is
obvious that many investors —
including upward of 80 Japanese
companies — put their blind faith
in Armstrong’s self-proclaimed
genius. Just as there are too many
stories lately of financial gurus who
may be anything but, there are
even more examples of supposedly
sophisticated investors who failed
to look beneath the surface to
determine whether a deal that
seemed too good to be true was in
fact just that. ■
Jock Ferguson is a Toronto writer.
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A Really Sick Fraud
Bobby Heaton fleeced five
investors of $6,100 late last year
from a scam he ran out of his
hospital bed. Heaton, who used a
fake name, pretended to have had
a heart attack to get into St.
Joseph’s Hospital in Houston.
Then he convinced a pastor’s wife,
who counseled the ill, to get her
friends to invest in a scheme that
promised them a 600 per cent
return on their money. Heaton not
only fled with their money, but left
without paying his $41,000 medical
bill.

Soccer Fraud Balls-Up
Twenty-two football players with
Newcastle United were double
crossed by a scalper last December
after they tried to sell their
complimentary FA Cup Final
tickets, with a face value of £36,
for £450 each. When reserve
goalkeeper Peter Keen, who was
the plan’s mastermind, returned
from handing over the tickets to
the scalper, he discovered the
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payment envelope contained only
Monopoly money. According to
The Mirror, some of the players,
many of whom earn thousands of
pounds a week, wanted the money
to pay for vacations with their
girlfriends.

Send Him to Sing Sing
Ever thought of filling out more
than one of those offers from
music companies that send you up
to a dozen CDs for the price of
one? David Russo, 33, of New
Jersey sure did. Over a four-year
period, Russo opened 1,630 fake
accounts with BMG Music
Services and Columbia House. He
used the 22,260 CDs, worth about
$350,000, to stock his flea-market
booths. Russo, who paid about
$50,000 for the CDs that he had
sent to post-office boxes under
false names, was charged with mail
fraud.

Get Your Money
Smelling Pacific Ocean
Fresh
How can Nauru, an eight-squaremile coral island in the Pacific
Ocean near Australia, have one of

the highest per capita incomes in
the world? By doing laundry for
the Russian Mafia. According to
The Sunday Times ofLondon, the
Russian mob washed about US$70
billion worth of dirty money
through the island’s 200 banks last
year. Nauru’s inhabitants were
already wealthy from the island’s
fossilized, phosphate-rich bird
droppings. They are now even
better off, thanks to a different
kind of deposit: proceeds from
drug trafficking, prostitution and
people smuggling. ■
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Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention. You will continue to receive your bi-monthly Report on
Fraud newsletter. Your 2001 Supplement includes the following important features.
New Chapter

Financial statements, sensitive areas for practitioners, are tied so closely to a CPA's activities that any
hint of fraudulent practices cannot be overlooked. Whether the motivation for fiddling with financial
statements is an effort to hide a business's worth in a messy divorce or an attempt to induce a lender to
extend further credit, the CPA's role is pivotal. We have added a completely new Handbook chapter,
"Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud," by Charles Lundelius, Jr., CPA, ABV, BS, MBA, of
Kroll Lindquist Avey, Washington, D.C. The Handbook's new chapter has been carefully constructed to
bring together all the key issues and considerations to assist you in meeting your clients' requirements or
carrying out your staff responsibilities.

The new chapter includes the following:
• The pervasive nature of financial statement fraud, exploring the most common financial
statement frauds and who is most likely to attempt the fraud
• The kinds of financial statement fraud, describing earnings manipulation and management,
balance sheet manipulation, and problems of closely held entities
• The predictors of financial statement fraud, explaining both quantitative and qualitative
predictors and how to apply them

• The special areas of financial statement fraud, delving into matters such as loss
contingencies, asset write-offs, the role of acquisition reserves, and fictitious revenues
• The financial statement fraud checklist, which is a ready-to-use tool that assists you in
covering the bases in your fight to reduce the risk of financial statement fraud

New Diskette
Your supplement includes a new Microsoft® Word diskette containing the Financial Statement Fraud
Checklist in addition to all the other checklists and fraud vulnerability grids from your old diskette. You
can download and adapt the new checklist to meet specific client or organizational needs.

056550

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • (201) 938-3000 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3329 • www.aicpa.org
ISO 9001 Certified

The C
PA. Never Underestimate The Value.®

New Sector-by-Sector Introductions
Your supplement includes expanded introductions to two of the business sectors found in Appendix A:

• The new Financial Services Sector introduction exposes the potential attack points for the
fraudster in this multi-faceted industry, which is where the money is: banking, insurance,
securities, and mutual funds. Because this sector cannot be divorced from money in all its
iterations, fraudsters make it their prime point of attack. This new information will help you to
install the fraud-reducing controls for both the financial services industry and its customers.
• The new High-Technology Sector introduction zeroes in on the fraudsters’ targets: businesses
that develop high-technology products or use high-technology to produce their products.
Fraudsters can attack these businesses using new techniques—computer invasion—or old scams
modified for new technologies. To help you strike a blow against the fraudsters, your new
information highlights the controls you can use to combat the internal or external high-tech
fraudster.

New Developments

Your supplement contains multiple replacement pages containing information on new developments in
fraud awareness and highlighting the controls that should be considered in the constant fight against the
fraudster.

Glossary and Bibliography
The new Glossary and Bibliography have more references for your information.

Report on Fraud
You will also continue to receive the Report on Fraud as part of your subscription to The CPA's
Handbook ofFraud and Commercial Crime Prevention. This bi-monthly newsletter keeps you cunent
on the newest, worldwide fraud developments.
Contact Us

If you have any questions regarding your subscription or any other AICPA product, please call the
AICPA Member Satisfaction Team at (888) 777-7077, where any agent will be pleased to assist you. Or
you may email your questions to memsat@aicpa.org.
As always, thank you for giving us the opportunity to provide timely and practical professional
information.
Sincerely,

Linda Prentice Cohen
Publisher
Professional Publications & Technology Products
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